Don Mullen –Single-Family Rentals at Pretium (Capital Allocators, EP.324)

29 Jun 2023 · 1 h 9 min

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Capital Allocators Podcast Episode Notes

Episode Title

Don Mullen – Single-Family Rentals at Pretium (EP.324)

Host

Ted Seides

Guest

Don Mullen, Founder & CEO of Pretium Partners

Podcast Description The Capital Allocators podcast features in-depth interviews with industry leaders in the institutional investment space. The discussion focuses on the processes and strategies top investors utilize for capital allocation.

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Episode Overview This episode features a conversation with Don Mullen, the CEO and founder of Pretium Partners. Pretium is a $51 billion investment firm established in 2012, specializing in single-family rentals and corporate credit markets. Mullen shares insights from his extensive career on Wall Street, the emergence of the single-family rental market, and the operational strategies employed at Pretium.

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Key Topics Discussed

  1. Background and Wall Street Experience
  2. Mullen began his career in 1979 on Wall Street.
  3. Held positions at firms including First Boston, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs.
  4. Focused on capital markets, high-yield sales, and leveraged finance.
  1. Identifying the Opportunity in Single-Family Rentals
  2. Recognized a significant opportunity in single-family rentals post-housing crisis.
  3. Advocated for investing in homes selling below replacement costs due to foreclosures.
  4. Emphasized the importance of technology in scaling the business and servicing properties.
  1. Single-Family Rental Market Insights
  2. Discussed the systemic sell-off of houses during the financial crisis and its implications for the rental market.
  3. Noted the imbalance of supply and demand in housing, predicting ongoing demand for rentals.
  4. Highlighted the shift in buyer demographics, with millennials increasingly choosing rentals.
  1. Operational Strategies at Pretium
  2. Implemented technology-driven solutions for acquiring and managing properties.
  3. Focused on creating efficiencies in property servicing, leading to higher margins.
  4. Built a proprietary search engine to facilitate the acquisition of homes.
  1. Challenges and Critiques of Single-Family Rentals
  2. Addressed common critiques regarding single-family rental firms affecting homeownership opportunities.
  3. Argued that these firms provide access to better living conditions for renters.
  4. Discussed the impact of rising interest rates on the housing market and rental dynamics.
  1. Future Aspirations for Pretium
  2. Aiming for Pretium to become a $200-$250 billion alternative asset manager.
  3. Exploring adjacencies in multifamily housing and active adult communities.
  4. Emphasis on differentiating products and creating value for investors.

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Key Takeaways

  • Market Dynamics: The single-family rental market presents an opportunity driven by demographic shifts and economic conditions.
  • Technology Integration: Utilizing technology is crucial for scaling operations and improving efficiencies in property management.
  • Investor Perspective: Understanding client needs and fostering a collaborative culture can create significant competitive advantages.
  • Long-term Vision: Strategic growth through adjacent markets is essential for sustained success and value creation.

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Closing Reflections

  • Don Mullen highlights the importance of understanding market trends and creating a supportive structure for investors and residents alike. His journey illustrates how leveraging technology and operational efficiency can transform an industry while addressing critical housing needs.

For complete show notes and more information, visit the [Capital Allocators website](https://www.capitalallocators.com/podcast/single-family-rentals-at-pretium/).

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Transcript

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0:04Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators .com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

0:44Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast. My guest on today's sponsored insight is Don Mullen, the founder and CEO of Predium Partners, a $51 billion specialized investment firm he started in 2012 to focus on the U .S. housing, residential, and corporate credit markets. In a little over a decade, Predium has rapidly grown to become one of the largest owners of single -family rentals in the country. Prior to founding Pretium, Don spent 30 years on Wall Street, including long stints at First Boston, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs, and shorter ones at Salman Brothers and Drexel Burnham -Lembert.

1:27Our conversation covers Don's history on Wall Street, identification of the opportunity in single -family rentals, and path to founding Pretium to capitalize. We discuss the single -family rental market, sourcing and servicing properties, scaling through technology, critiques of single -family rental investments, growing into adjacencies, and aspirations for Pretium in the decade to come. Before we get going, we're hosting our fourth cohort of Capital Allocators University in New York City on September 14th. Capital Allocators University, or CAU, is a chance to connect and learn with peers. We'll bring together a few dozen allocators, each with around 5 to 15 years of experience, to share frameworks on interviewing money managers, investment decision -making, leadership and management, and investing.

2:19And we'll engage with four fantastic chief investment officers, Jenny Heller from Brandywine, Kim Liu from Columbia, Anna Marshall from the Hewlett Foundation, and Brian O 'Neill, recently retired from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. You'll get a chance to meet some great people and learn a lot in an information -filled day. Hop on our website at capitalallocators .com slash university to apply. Please enjoy my conversation with Don Mullen. Don, great to see you. Nice to see you. Thanks for coming by. Why don't you take me back to how someone got to Wall Street back when you did? It was a great time to get to Wall Street.

3:03It was actually 1979. I was in college. I was looking for the opportunity to start a career that was different than working on Route 17 in New Jersey at the uniform store. That's where I previously worked, selling police uniforms and security guard uniforms. And I spoke to family members. We had one family member who had good success being in finance. He married into our Norwegian immigrant family. He connected me with some folks at an old company back then called DLJ and some folks at a company called First Boston. One fellow was very kind to give me a summer job in fixed income research, which at that time, I thought that meant analyzing the social security system because my grandmother had a fixed income.

3:58That's about all I knew about it, despite having a major in economics. Well, it didn't make any sense to me what fixed income research was. And I got the job most likely because the fellow who hired me saw my resume. And he had grew up in Queens and Jackson Heights and went to Manhattan College and eventually got an engineering degree and a business degree from Columbia. But because his dad was an elevator repairman in Queens, he said, holy, if I could get to tell my dad that I hired a Yale kid whose father was an elevator repairman, he goes, my dad would be proud of me hiring you. So I'm going to give you a job because my dad would be proud of you.

4:39So take me on a tour of your Wall Street experience. So I get that summer job in 1979, which was a great time to start on Wall Street. Similar to what Warren Buffett says, you know, we can't ignore the benefits we get from being born in an era. He points that out about himself, how poorly he would have fared in the medieval times or something like that. I completely acknowledge that. Entering Wall Street in 1979, at the beginning of peak interest rates, as they start to come down, you see an explosion of demand for experienced people as the industry grows. I'm a huge beneficiary of that. So 1979, 1980, I'm a summer person on Wall Street.

5:2481, I'm a summer person, but then I take off in September because I don't have enough money to be the European travel that so many people do when they graduate. So I did my European travel from September through January, which was a little less fun, but still I got to do it. Obviously paid for it myself, was able to get myself back into Wall Street. So First Boston as a credit analyst. Eventually I work in high yield sales. Very lucky time. 85, 86 is the beginning of that industry being created. I get to be a capital markets guy there because I get bored as a salesperson. and the team at First Boston is incredibly supportive.

6:04And I become very curious about all the adjacencies of sales. So I end up doing capital markets. Then I go to Drexel, where that was sort of the intellectual capital of knowledge about not just leverage finance, but really company valuation in some ways. The world really hadn't focused on cashflow enough then. And there's always a balance between growth and cashflow. And they were the experts in cash flow valuation. Obviously, the firm disappears and I go then to Salomon Brothers, meet some great people, but a little frustrated with the direct team that I'm working for because they're less familiar with what leveraged finance is really about.

6:43They're more classic investment bankers and classic salespeople, but good folks. And Bear Stearns comes over the transom, which is one of the scrappiest places in its entire history, fearless in its willingness to hire people who want to work hard versus people who were sort of born to it. And they give me the greatest job opportunity arguably that has ever been given. At 32 years old now, I'm given the opportunity to run a department. And in the 10 years that I was there, I went from running their high yield trading desk to all of credit emerging markets, investment grade trading, a big chunk of investment banking, leverage finance, the industry groups within it.

7:25I don't run M &A, Alan Schwartz chooses to run that. And I run all the capital markets departments, including equities and the like, and help start the asset management division and the PE division and basically have responsibility for international generally. So it was a fantastic opportunity that only would take place at a place like Bear Stearns during that cycle, being the kind of person who likes to take on things that you think aren't succeeding enough so you feel like you have the opportunity to grow as a person and the fun of solving the riddle of why doesn't this thing optimize? How do you make it optimize?

8:02And a lot of people in the business that I've seen, they kind of divide into two categories. People who do like being entrepreneur, or like as I just described, as well as some people who are more like focused on being in the thing that's already successful, and that's their way of managing their personal career risks. I thought the better career path for me was being in the thing that wasn't successful, that was harder to do, that someone else hadn't solved that problem. And by solving that problem improves your probability of adding value to the firm and your success. As Bear Stearns gets bigger, they want me to run investment banking full time, which was not my idea of the career path that I wanted.

8:48And so as a result, I let it be known to a handful of people that I was willing to leave. I was interviewed first by Goldman Sachs because they had a big challenge with their credit trading businesses. And they'd already hired some of the people who worked for me away. So they had inside knowledge of me. That person they'd hired away from me was David Solomon. And so David Solomon was recruiting me. I then spent, must have been 56 people or something crazy. A person who's pretty well known from Goldman Sachs reaches out to me and says, listen, after 56 interviews, it would come to the conclusion you just don't fit here.

9:25You're culturally a bad fit. We think you're talented, but not going to happen. A year later, David called back again and said, we want to talk to you again. I said, I'm not doing it. I spent months jerking around on this thing. He said, you're going to meet one person, one interview only. I said, okay. I had breakfast with Lloyd Blankfein, who is particularly insightful about talent. I think that's one of his great skills. In this circumstance, it wasn't about me. It was about his willingness to look at someone and make a decision, which I thought he was self -aware of his talent selection skills.

10:03And we sat down for two hours. And at the end of two hours, he told me my next 10 years of career at Goldman Sachs and convinced me, which is no small task. If you remember, I said at Bear Stearns, I ran almost everything, both mortgages and government bonds, that I was going to go to Goldman Sachs and only run the high yield trading desk. I said, Lloyd, I last did that more than a decade ago. He goes, no, no, this is going to work out great. And he described the career arc that had me at the end of the process being either a division head or being on the management committee. I left to go to Goldman Sachs and that's sort of my sell side career.

10:43There aren't that many people that canvassed so many different banks over their career on the sell side. What did you find different about all the cultures of the different places and how that impacted what you were doing? Culture is a lot of things. The leadership of the organization, by driving a type of culture, creates scalability around their vision of what an investment bank or a firm should be. So it becomes a very important thing because if everybody thinks in the terms of, is this the right thing for our place to do, then you get this repeatable thought process. That can be corrupted individually by department heads sometimes, But generally speaking, that's what all of them try to do, whether it's Goldman Sachs or Bear Stearns, arguably considered to be the two polar opposites of Wall Street.

11:35That being said, I found most of them to be more similar than different. When you're in the same ecosystem, the kid with blonde hair looks really different than the kid with brown hair. But they're still probably the same kids who are five years old, but somehow you find differences. were biased to look at our differences rather than our similarities. The other thing I'd say, you know, Bear Stearns was really characterized. And I use these two because of their perceived differences. Goldman Sachs for many, many years was not perceived as a trading firm. It was only pretty much after the financial crisis, purely woke up and realized what a trading firm it was.

12:11And Bear Stearns wasn't a trading firm, despite the image of it. It was a sales firm. So each of these nuances were meaningful. Going back to Credit Suisse versus Boston, it was really investment banker driven firm that traded to support investment banking, but it wasn't viewed as the powerhouse source of P &L back in the 80s. In most places, that wasn't. Drexel, the trading desk, effectively ran everything everywhere all the time because the trading desk and the capital markets function were integrated, one of their problems. And then at Salomon Brothers, it was almost trading to the extreme, not in a way that was oppositional to clients, but their scale of risk -taking relative to the size of the market at the time.

13:04When I ran Goldman Sachs' leveraged finance trading desk businesses, we weren't as big in some things as Salomon Brothers had been 15 years earlier. The scale of risk -taking was extraordinary. And so in the end, they share more in common than they have differences. But their differences could be meaningful. And I'd say that the most important attribute in each one, unlike big manufacturing businesses, the CEO's personality and the way he deals with the people in the organization is one of the most important attributes for culture, risk -taking, client treatment, and overall success of any business I've ever seen.

13:50You mentioned the importance of scale in these businesses. And I'm wondering if we could maybe pick something like credit derivatives where you were there early on and it was a one -off transaction type of business that later achieved scale across the industry. How do you think about how you take an opportunity that might be discrete and turn it into something that has scale? Credit derivatives is sort of the ultimate 21st century example, right? Here, you're well said that we started out in a business that had a series of bespoke contracts that were each negotiated one -off. Clearly, there was tremendous demand.

14:30That was the first thing. When you think about scaling, the effort of scaling has to have the expectation that the ability to create efficiency will be rewarded with volume. It was clear to us how valuable credit creditors could be in scale. And so to be very successful in creating volume in that space was the output of us looking at it and realizing there could be more liquidity than there was with securities. That was the $64 ,000 question you'd answer. And so once you realize that you can have more liquidity than securities, because securities by their nature were predominantly held in places like insurance companies or locked up vehicles, as a result, a small percent of the universe could trade.

15:18But when you traded these derivative contract notionals, you could have much more volume than actually existed. It made sense to drive scalability, which meant drive conformity and zero in only on the difference between what people want. What people wanted is they didn't really care that much whether the coupon was quarterly, monthly, or every six months. They didn't really care who was processing them. What they were focused on was getting the names they wanted with the liquidity they wanted that was somewhat representative of the risk in the trade. And so when you could create a vehicle like that, you satisfy the need of the marketplace to be in a position where it could more dynamically trade its risk.

16:04And so if you find an ability where there's large demand, create an efficient product to solve that demand and scalability to some degree is the output. As you're navigating your career on the sell side, you mentioned your gravitation to businesses where other people hadn't succeeded. I'm curious how you thought about trends and how you would identify opportunities. I didn't always look for places where everyone failed. There would be things that Goldman Sachs was not doing well, but other people were doing well. I had a model to study. At Bear Stearns, we had a lot of things we didn't do as well as we would have liked.

16:43Leverage finance was a good example. I had the opportunity to have almost complete control of that ecosystem. And I could learn from my experiences at Drexel. I could study Merrill Lynch at the time, was very successful. And then figure out what could we do without the resources that a Merrill Lynch had to accomplish our goal. We were number 12 in the league tables. We got to two or three, I think, after a period of time. And so when you look at opportunities to create success where either your organization doesn't or other people don't, you're right. I first focus on trends and have an insight into, similar to what I said on credit derivatives, that if you see demand, if you create the right product, the capturing the value in those longer term trends is the most effective way to be successful in that space.

17:31Now, some of that is you benefit from pattern recognition if you're 40 years on Wall Street. We've seen a lot of these things over and over, and that doesn't mean you're going to be right. I had a higher expectation for credit defaults after COVID hit, didn't properly gauge the amount of stimulus versus its impact on credit. But usually what would happen is, and single family homes is the great case study for me personally, is that it became very clear that the sell -off in houses from 2009, let's call it through 2012 -13, was going to have a lot of analogies to credit sell -off in 1991. In 1991, we had decided that high -yield bonds, or junk bonds, as they were then more commonly referred to, were radioactive.

18:18They were a disease that needed to be expelled from the U .S. economy, and we forced insurance companies out of their positions by raising cap charges. They were in S &Ls that otherwise had problems and they were forced to sell off. And as a result, that created a systemic sell -off event, even if the companies on the other side hadn't changed in their credit wallet. So you had this imbalance between buyers and sellers that created an extraordinary entry point for someone building a credit investing business. And that's one of the things that I became aware of in trends, which is that Building machines that can farm or capitalize on dislocations and trends are some of the ways some of our most successful alts managers built their business.

19:07And then once they built the culture, the infrastructure, the brand name, the ability to communicate with the broader group of allocators, they successfully were able to cause a perpetuating business that grew in size. You spotted single -family homes. How did you think about building that within Goldman compared to what you ended up doing at Pretium? I think I was concerned. Remember, we had just gone through a whole lot of Senate investigations at Goldman Sachs where I had the uncomfortable pleasure, if that's the right way to say it, of having my emails read on TV by a senator to our CEO. I would not call that one of the better moments of my life.

19:51Certainly when your mom calls and said, I just heard your name on TV spoken by XYZ Senator. Is that really your email? You're like, yeah, this isn't turning out the way I expected. I became aware because we had a loan servicer that we were selling homes at a discount to replacement costs because that was the obligation of the loan servicer. It was dealing with defaults. It had an obligation to the securitization to liquidate defaulted homes. And the process was so systemic, the homes were selling below replacement costs. One of the great rules of real estate is if anything sells below replacement costs, particularly within a community where there's demographic growth, you're supposed to buy it.

20:36And so I first identified the opportunity, talked to some of the colleagues around Goldman Sachs. There wasn't a whole lot of interest because the challenge we were going through, understandably. But I got compliance's approval to start a process by myself. My daughters were all in college. So as a result, I had plenty of free time. And so I went to all of the high -intensity locations like Tampa, Las Vegas, Riverside County, California, Phoenix, Scottsdale. Started walking communities with high default intensity, making observations about those. and then eventually invested $25 million on my money and bought houses, put a small asset management layer on top of it for people to manage local property managers.

21:25And while our margins in the phase one of that were not what I had hoped for, I hope we look a lot more like multifamily margins. I could see the opportunity for improvement because the inefficiencies in the servicing, the assets were so extraordinarily high. And I came back to the executive office of Goldman Sachs and said, I think this is going to be a very big business because almost all the houses in the United States that are rented are more fragmented than car services in the country. which if you think of what Uber effectively did is they put a logistics layer on top of the black car industry and made it more accessible for other people to get into that space.

22:08And so therefore drove down the marginal cost and made marginal access easier. So this could be Uber -esque. It'll never get the premium that Uber gets, but it's Uber -esque in its ability to be scaled up if you focus on the right attributes. So what happened was the firm actually wanted to try to do it. I was the one pushing back at that point, telling the executive office and saying, Lloyd, you were just down in Congress seven months ago. It didn't take more than a pico second for them to say, you're right, we can't do this. They didn't necessarily want me to leave, but they were very happy about the way we worked together to make sure it was a good process.

22:52So they were very supportive of helping me get the business off the ground. How do you describe and map out the single family rental market and opportunity set? The way we started it was we recognized that a couple of things. We were in the midst of 10 million foreclosures. Every one of those people is going to be a renter in some way, shape or form. So we had a massive increase in supply. We had a huge volume of houses that were stuck in sort of the American foreclosure system. And usually when they came out of that, they were really degraded in quality, so needed a lot of work. So they weren't really eligible for homeowners because there was so much work.

23:35Most homeowners don't walk around with both a down payment and $30 ,000 to rehabilitate the asset. So we had this massive inefficiency in the system that could be turned around. We originally mapped it out that we would buy distressed houses like I described. But the process was so full of fat tails, meaning, you know, so many houses that your estimate of 30 ,000 of repairs was 70 when you really got possession of it. And we also realized that the industry of servicing the houses was so nascent because the small local players weren't really ever going to be able to use the technology platforms we needed, the efficiency of delivery to people to drive margins that we ended up having to map the industry out by only buying owner -occupied houses.

24:24So houses that homeowners are choosing to sell and therefore were buying high -quality assets, not distressed assets. And by driving homogeneity in the earliest phases, similar to credit default swaps, driving it down to the simplest concept of a house. So a 2 ,000 -square -foot, three -bedroom, two -bath, two -car garage, front and back yard, predominantly in a homeowners association built in the 21st century that needs this modest repairs. We focused on clustering. You could drive efficiency of delivery of servicing. So we mapped it out. That was the tactical mapping, call it that. The strategic mapping was to focus on high demographic growth communities that were probably underbuilt.

25:10that was predominantly in the Southeast and Southwest, where you still had a positive demographic movement of Americans into those communities, and that you could buy that type of house I described in scale because there was so much development done in the last 20 years. So when you look at older communities like the greater New York area, even the greater LA area, you have so many generations of house type built over the last 70 years that you couldn't get any uniformity of house type. And so as a result, it really made it much harsher surface. So that's how we mapped it out there. The next layer up is to think of the big, big, big picture in simple terms.

25:50Are there enough houses for the people? Do we have too many or too little? And whether you look at Stanford, Harvard, Fannie Mae, almost any economic analyst will tell you we're short somewhere between three and seven million houses. Well, that's common knowledge today, but that wasn't in 2016. So we started the opportunity set as very opportunistic, focused on the fact that there was this strategic, systemic sell -off of houses at below replacement costs. As we continued to work our efficiency on the operating side, our knowledge on the investment side, continue to improve about both location and the strategic overall picture of housing in the United States.

26:37And it became very clear that the country was having a severe problem that was going to get worse, not better, over the course of the coming years as millennials stopped deferring household formations and moved into the housing market. We like to say when everybody realized not every person wants to live in Brooklyn, no matter how cool it is, because they have to move to the suburbs somewhere and raise their kids with a school that they can afford and a commute time they can tolerate. We didn't know when it was going to happen, and we certainly did not expect COVID. But what we expected is that at some point, there would be a realization that we don't have enough houses, and then the asset would become an institutionally recognized asset for allocations, and that performance would improve at that time.

27:26How did you put all the pieces together from that initial concept of the demographics lining up with the trends and the opportunity set that got created out of the financial crisis into a business? It happens over time. It doesn't happen on day one. I wish I could hit E all of the above on the first day that I had the idea, but it didn't happen that way. It happened over time. When I think about that in a way that's more like a case study is when you see such a severe dislocation. There's multiple opportunities embedded in those dislocations. The first part of the dislocation is buying the asset anywhere near its bottom.

28:09It could still be going down and it could still be going up. It doesn't have to be near the bottom, particularly for a big idea like that. So that's not the important thing. But getting in, getting focused, realizing the opportunity for the investor, that's all critical. The next phase of it, for us at least, is making sure that we're investing the time and understanding the long -term trend around that. So in high yield in the 90s, it was a process of constant recovery that created asset management firms that grazed capital for the purpose of soaking up all these cheap securities that will eventually evolve into a more robust private equity business and credit business over time.

28:49For us in this space, it was recognizing that our entry point was about the physical asset, but it wasn't about the demand. And as we moved along and operated the assets more efficiently, our funnel could get larger and larger at its top because we saw more amounts of demand of many different types. And so as a result, what we concluded is that this was a early on, again, five or six years into it, that it wasn't a trade, which is why in 2019, other people had been selling out, taking the companies public, putting them into REITs. And we had a line of people around the block telling me to go public.

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29:31And again, our best years of performance, obviously, were during COVID. We didn't expect that, but we expected the best years of performance to be when people acknowledged the fact there's a housing shortage. And when people were going public, the market had not yet been attuned to the big idea wasn't buying cheap assets. It's owning assets that are in heavy demand. And so our engine, I think we had two points where we had insight that many shared. So that was when we built the business. Many people thought, hey, these are cheap assets, let's buy them. Colony, capital, American homes for rent.

30:07John Gray is arguably the best real estate investor of my lifetime, right? And I say arguably because somebody may disagree with me, but you'd have a hard time finding someone who would disagree with that statement, I think, generally. One of the best real estate investors maybe of all time. So lots of people have that idea. But by 17, 18, 19, we were kind of lonely saying, this is not a trade. This is an industry that's here to stay, that'll be here for a long time because Americans have always rented houses. There's always going to be someone who wants to live in a good community that can't afford to purchase that house.

30:42And there's a cohort of Americans who are increasingly choosing to rent over own because they have other priorities in their life. That's why we stayed with both private as an investment manager and as our assets. And we think that opportunity is only increasing, not decreasing at this moment. because if you looked at what happened, we have 70 % of Americans have mortgages less than 4%. They're not selling their house anytime soon. I think when you go to five, the number is 95%. If the Fed raises rates, as some people are suggesting, one or two more times, mortgages will be seven. At this point, we're crushing more supply than we are actually crushing demand.

31:27So the Fed's in a really awkward spot. But the reality of it is we saw that the mismatch of housing, the ability to scale, the need for rental stock delivered in a better way. And I say a better way because we do service faster than entrepreneurs do, understandably, because they don't have full -time staff. And we have hundreds of people doing service. And so we believe that we've both created a solution for a need as well as made the product better. Where do the opportunities come from? I guess you could bucket into two or three things, Right. So there's the how do you acquire all those houses?

32:04Then how do you service all those houses? Or at least two of the biggest categories. So when we acquire houses, our first fifty nine thousand houses, we bought one at a time. That's usually one of the things that makes people's eyes a little bit like glaze over. Like, how the hell did you do that? How did you do it? So we built the technology that analyzes houses for sale in all the markets we operate in. And so we're able to acquire houses one at a time by sort of driving a proprietary search engine that didn't take, you know, four astrophysicists locked in a black room for months. The ability of off -the -shelf technology to create a lot of the things I'm going to describe is one of the reasons this industry exists.

32:52The technology wasn't ready and cheap enough to build it off the shelf using things like Salesforce and basic modifications of search to have done this in 2000. It really was the technology and the entry point occurred at the same time. What goes into that model that you're looking at when you're looking to buy? We tend to look for 30 -minute commute times, low crime rates, all data you can buy. Good school scores, not great schools, not because we're picking for people, but the Americans like good schools, but very few of them really want to spend the extra money for great schools. We want a front and backyard, so it's a classic American home you dream about if you grew up like I did.

33:39And I think our house was less than 1 ,000 square feet with three boys and one bathroom, so that was not what we're buying. We're instead looking for a three -bedroom, two -bath house from the backyard, an eat -in kitchen, two -car garage, where the predominance of the members in the community are owners. So for many folks, that's the lifetime dream to live in an asset like that. And for renters, it's really a huge advantage because historically, most folks lived in renter -based communities where all the houses were renters. And those were usually lower quality assets with lower quality schools.

34:17That's changed a lot with both our programming as well as others. And so in looking for those houses, it's one of the ways that folks are able to break out of generational poverty by living in ownership communities. But we look for assets like that because we're looking for those aspirational tenants who want to take care of the asset, want to stay there for a long time because they like to live in that community. When you're doing your diligence, when you first went out and bought the $25 million, you mentioned going to these communities, presumably looking at the homes. When you're buying $59 ,000, I'm curious what you miss in that process when you're bringing it to scale.

34:57When we started in the beginning, as I said earlier, we bought houses like a lot of people at the foreclosure sales. And the tail risk was very high. Then we start to look at portfolios that were for sale of houses from Fannie Mae and Bank of America. lots of tail risk in Bethlehem. So the things that we focused on there, just to give examples of risk factors, we used to joke a lot, but a lot of the houses that were in foreclosure like that, they used to call them grow houses because the squatters would break in and the power was still turned on and they would grow weed illegally in these houses.

35:34And that was more common in Southern California and Arizona than it was in other parts of the country where we saw. And so we just didn't want to go through all that drama. So that's why we eliminated the risk of that through unoccupied housing. Even within that, it was an iterative process to improve our inspection skills. So one of the great things in the U .S. system today is the 30 -day inspection period all Americans have. And so we were able to reduce our tail risk further by inspecting roofs and foundations. One of the big events that took place, there was a Chinese sheetrock problem in Florida.

36:17So we quickly put that into our inspection report because that was, you had to rebuild the house because those houses, the timber was fine, but the sheetrock was horrible and damaging and unhealthy. And so we tried an iterative approach to reduce fat tails. What kind of team did you have in place to do these inspections? We believe the acquisition of assets, which I talked about, is critical in all the things we do. Also, servicing the assets in a way that drives return is important. A lot of people think servicing is beta. We think it's a source of alpha. And then financing the assets wisely is equally important.

36:54Building the enterprise for us was, again, an iterative process because there wasn't anybody around doing this. And when we started it, pretty much no one in multifamily thought it was a business. So we had a huge struggle both getting everyone down the value chain. So we had to create our own group of handymen and otherwise inspectors from other fields and train them with our tools that we created. We eventually moved from the old school clipboard with checkboxes and numerical scores that were fed in quickly to custom programmed iPads that fed the data into Salesforce. And so, call it 18 months into this, we used the Salesforce platform to manage workflow for all these inspectors, as well as create documents that they could use in their iPads remotely that would feed the information to the acquisition coordinator and then power the closing process so it was both streamlined and not require emails.

38:03So when the house is agreed upon to be purchased, it alerts and schedules the inspector to go. It alerts the closing department. It alerts the finance department. And they're given timeframes to execute their tasks. So that was a big win for us. And today, how many homes are you able to buy in an average day? Well, it varies a lot. So I think one of the important things to be aware of now is that for both investors and the market generally, where value is changes tremendously. So for many, many years, homeowners would sell assets at very attractive cap rates to institutional investors because homes overall were depressed in price because we came out of that period where they traded amazing discounts.

38:55So I used to say it's really not that important to buy the house at the courthouse steps and get that extra 10 or 15 percent discount because all homes are cheap relative to demographics. All homes. Now we're in a position because of locked -in mortgage rates that all owned homes are rich compared to homes sold by an open door, offer pad, entities that right now the cost of financing is so high they're periodically forced to sell houses at attractive prices to investors. And home builders are in a position where at any given point in time, so in February when mortgages came down, they would sell to retail.

39:36When mortgage rates go up, they'll sell more to us. And so we think one of the critical parts of success right now is being able to source assets from all three and potentially even four, meaning build them yourself, venues. And so today, the bulk of our houses are bought in portfolios. A year ago or 18 months ago, they were bought from owner occupants. And now in portfolios, as an example, we'll probably buy 15 to 20 ,000 houses this year, but almost entirely in portfolio form. Once you own these homes, you mentioned there's an alpha component in servicing. What have you been able to build that's different and better from the servicing capabilities outside of Prudium?

40:21Well, there's a couple of tiers to look at. There's the original small mom and pop home servicers in the communities. When I own houses and those folks service my house, you had NOI margins of like 30%. When we put an asset management layer and create a federation of them and force tech on them, we were able to get to 45%. Once we built our internal structure where we did 100 % of the operations, we were able to drive margins to 65 % and even higher in some portfolios. So what's the difference that we do first versus that tiering? The first thing is what we did was actually save time. So it's not pricing, it's time.

41:07By owning the workflow, we crushed that down to a fraction of what it used to be. The house cash flows more and the house is available for renter sooner. Reducing the cost of turnover by both the quality of maintenance while residents are in the asset and by doing it yourself with your own workers ends up saving money and creates time savings too. So I'd say the peer group of the largest folks, we have similar efficiencies, particularly I'm talking about invitation homes, for example, American Homes for Rent. The next tier down just doesn't have the scale for owning your own workforce, owning the strategic purchasing, being able to rent houses because of your advertising budget in a more efficient way.

41:58So what we've done is capture the mindshare of the prospective residents, deliver the assets more quickly, and deliver them more cost effectively. Each stage of it is tweaking things now at this point. there's a massive easy answer. I'm curious how you think about the exit strategy in this market that you're in. Sure. I think there's a multitude of exit strategies for any portfolio, but let me frame it broadly first and then work my way down. Framing it broadly is I think this will always be an asset class that people invest in like multifamily. It's never going away, right? It's just going to have good years and not good years and houses or apartment buildings that are out of favor.

42:48So the demographics of Detroit don't justify a lot of the old buildings, but new buildings still might attract people. It's like new office does, right? I mean, office has the greatest dispersion today ever in office history. And single family homes will eventually become like a regular real estate asset class. So we will be able to sell portfolios. We saw that pre -interest rate increase. We would sell portfolios to REITs that either use our management or somebody else's management. So I think exiting portfolios will be like every other asset class, where you can sell them in pools to other institutions who like that asset class at that time.

43:29And whether they want a value -added strategy or a new build strategy or just a stable cash flow, that will take place. When you're talking to people about the strategy, what are the common critiques you run into? I think some people are still recovering from the this isn't scalable concept. So there's still like a cohort of people, despite that it's been done and it's like that it's still in front of them, still aren't aware that it can be done. and arguably that you can generate margins very similar to multifamily as an industry. We can provide more value to those folks because people have a predisposition to stay in an asset that's built around a school system longer.

44:14So as I think as an industry, two forces will be at work. We will continue to try to improve the experience of the consumer in the house by driving more efficiency and offering more services. So two or three of the things that all of the industry is focused on, including us, is efficiency of power delivery, another regulatory nightmare. Because if you put solar panels on 100 ,000 houses, guess what? I'm a utility. I don't want to be a utility. I just want to drive efficiency and delivery. So we have to sort that out. The other thing is there's a lot of ways that we touch the consumer and the structure of the market's inefficient.

44:55Like why are we making people pay monthly? instead of when they get their paycheck every two weeks. I think we're going to see things like that. So as a result, I think we'll find that this business will end up being more important to consumers, drive higher returns, and more efficiency for the consumer. The other parts of critiques are that we're taking housing stock away from prospective owners. When people focus on that, they don't focus on as well, at least equally, should be the fact that we're putting people in communities that historically they wouldn't have had the opportunity to live in.

45:29So if you're a 620 FICO score with $60 ,000 worth of debt, making you $150 ,000 or $160 ,000 a year, you weren't living in this community. And so people are raising their children in better school districts and better houses with more aspirational community members because they live in an ownership community. So I think it's a little unfair, both to the industry and our residents, not just us, our residents, that people are trying to eliminate the opportunity for them to live in those communities. The other thing that I think that is underweight is because of our capital, not just ours, but the industry, we're putting billions every year into building new houses that during a cycle like this wouldn't take place.

46:17Homeowners would back away. the imbalance would continue to a greater extreme. So when sales drop down in January because mortgages are too high, we're like, okay, we'll take a billion dollars of houses. So the home builders have come to look at us as the safety net, the lender of less resorts, so to speak. So I think the critique is unfair, that I think we will increasingly serve a great balancing function, both for residents and construction in a way that makes the market less prone to volatility and gives people more aspirational assets to live in. In such a large -scale consumer -facing business, I'm curious how you manage the inevitable PR, whether it's one of those critiques or something goes wrong in a house.

47:04You have to err on the side of helping the resident any way reasonably possible. And so our desire to use our scale when helpful for folks is one of the advantages we bring as an entity. For us, the incremental thousands of dollars to do that is the right thing to do. But mom and pop who have three houses that they're renting can't perform that intervention. Not because they're not well intended, but most of them, that's their business and they're running very tight, similar to what happened during COVID. So during COVID, mom and pop entrepreneurs who were renting assets suffered the most because folks could go into rental moratoriums.

47:49In effect, they couldn't evict people, understandably, but they had to pay their mortgages on those assets. Because we have the scale that we did and so many good residents making payments, we were able to go out and hire 25 people just to specialize in helping the people who couldn't make payments. and help them apply for federal support. So I think the arguments against scale are actually misguided. Scale makes a big difference in helping support both the residents and connectivity to the community, which is a big part of our program for the next two years. As you build this business over time, you touched earlier on adjacencies in opportunities.

48:32How have you thought about taking Predium from the scale you have in single -family rentals to other businesses? Well, I think that the most obvious things that we're going to be focused on is, as we continue to drive the efficiency of asset servicing, we should bring that to multifamily in the same communities that our single -family homes are in. So we're actively seeking out platforms to purchase in those communities or create one. In addition to that, we're focused on our home builder colleagues. Some of the smaller ones, say home builder 15 through 50, they're the ones who are most challenged by what's happened with the regional banking system.

49:15While we don't necessarily think about that impact on the home building industry, it is quite significant for all the smaller and mid -sized home builders. And so we have platforms that have been lending to construction. We're increasing our staff and increasing our capital to be in a position to take on these regional home builders as a part of our ecosystem. And we can be a great support to them because we can both buy the houses, help them buy the land and finance them. And so as a result, we expect to be good partners. So that's another adjacent thing. One of the fastest growing categories is active adult, as most people know.

49:56but basically they are quite similar communities just with older folks in it. By the way, 55 and older isn't that old anymore. Kind of a strange concept, but age has changed tremendously. It's a huge factor in the housing shortage. If you go and look, yes, the millennial generation is the greatest generation in scale since the baby boomers, but the baby boomers don't think they're old yet. And so as a result, they're still living in homes, single family homes, much longer than any generation. If you went back to 1992 and you looked at the data, you turned 60 years old and you moved out of a single family home.

50:37And it was like a rock dropping out of the sky how fast the curve goes down. And you looked at that same curve in 2019 pre -COVID, which is going to make this even more extreme. People don't move out of their house till they're 74. So you took 14 years of inventory that used to come off the market, cut down on the number of homes you're building. So below trend for almost a decade and increase the number of prospective buyers or renters. That's why this is socially extreme. But active adult is where a lot of these folks will end up moving. Actually, I think that it almost be redefined as active adult is over 65, not 55 in many cases.

51:19My parents are 85 and 86, and they live in an active adult community. But with all that being said, we think that's a great opportunity set too, because it's an area that benefits from scale. There's a large amount of ownership. There's not a lot of opportunity for rentership in that community. So if you think about the things that are adjacencies that we think we can use our toolkit for and improve the environment for the residents, active adult housing choice ventures, building communities, and using our financing arm to help build more homes at this point. How do you think about your buyer build decision on one of these adjacent businesses that you want to go into?

51:58When I think about growing businesses for Predium, you have to start top down again. You have to make sure that you're looking at a business that solves a problem for an investor. Can you differentiate the product? Is it a needed product? Is it something that creates an attractive enough return for the risk you're taking? Then you look at it and you say, can I create that in a reasonable way by acquiring a platform or a team? Speed usually does make a difference in these things. Pretty quickly, if it's a relatively new category or a relatively new adjacency, there's either competitors in the space already that have mindshare.

52:39And so you need to be in a position that you can bring some differentiation. I think that acquiring people right at this moment is far more attractive than it is doing it organically. 24 months ago, it was all about organics. Now it's about acquisitions. At this moment, valuations for a lot of alt asset managers have gone down. But a year ago, they were very high and pretty attractive. So there was a lineup of guys all thinking about going public. And all of us who manage these things are humans. So we have a normal array of emotions. What happens is to all of us with an emotional set that's not like Spock on Star Trek is the fact that we're all disappointed that we work so hard that our peak success was a year ago.

53:31And now we have to go back at it again, back into the salt mine, and rebuild a new thing, a new adjacency, get it larger, higher, so that we can have that efficiency for our client. The landscape is scattered with guys with $10 to $30 billion. I'm in the older vintage of these guys, but there's a whole lot of them between 50 and 65. and they've all thought they had reached their goal of being able to take it public or realize value and now they can. I think you're going to see what Angelo Gordon did with TPG is the beginning of a massive wave of this. There's a lot of mergers that are going to take place.

54:14And so when the market wants to do that, when people aren't holding out for the last dollar, but rather saying, I want to make sure that I'm merging with a person I can work with because I have to work again, but I want to make it easier by being bigger. It's better to be acquiring platforms if the culture fits. Going back to one of your first questions, the culture has to fit. The people have to like working together. So I have to make sure that it's a strategic advantage for the clients that you did this, that it doesn't look like over here is a private equity firm and we bought a long, short equity fund.

54:49Yeah, that has nothing to do with each other. So they're is a strategic initiative beyond the leadership getting along. When you can get all those things, I think you're going to see a lot more of this because a lot of people out there trying to figure out what they do next. As you're looking at these types of deals, what are the aspects of the culture that you've built at Predium that you look for to make sure there's a match? One of the things I'd observed that a lot of the folks out there are great investors who actually don't want to run the business of investing. So in some ways, that's the first good fit for us.

55:22It's not like that's what I want to do, but we've done a pretty decent job of it. When I look at the culture within those people, it's being in a position that they're really on a mission to create value for the investors, I think is critically important. I think it's also important that while a lot of people like to be absolute return people, most of the investors that I've come in contact really find that abhorrent. Just like, Like, how do I allocate that into my broader portfolio that the mandate is do whatever the hell you want? So I also like people who are aware of what their clients' needs are, not just focused on driving returns, but that their enterprise fits into the box that the clients want.

56:08So in a way that we add value, that's an ease of access for the clients. culturally, they have to be collaborative, but they also have to want to use the infrastructure to inform their investments. One of the most valuable things that we have is a ton of information about how the economy is performing in a lot of different ways. And so smart people will make use of that tool. I think that what we want is critical thinking. It's a big factor that to look for in someone? Do they like to try to solve complicated problems in a way that creates value for the investment? And I think that's a differentiator for us.

56:50So we don't want someone who is very beta oriented, but looks for complexity and thinks they can add value through complexity by applying the right resources and not looking for hobbyists. You know, so when we talk about non -performing loans, we often say there's professionals and tourists. We want to be professionals only with the deep knowledge, with a specialization that adds the most value because of our knowledge. And the client can choose if they want to be in that asset class or not. Our job isn't to roam the world and buy the cheapest stock off to Shanghai. That's not what we're going to do.

57:27If you put on your Lloyd Blankfein hat and you're talking to someone you're thinking of bringing in, what's the roadmap for what Predium looks like 10 years from now? So our aspirations are to be a $200 billion or $250 billion alt manager, hopefully faster than 10 years. What we want to do in doing that is to create more new categories. I think some of the categories that will morph private credit is going to change a lot over time. We're going to have a default cycle in private credit, which will have an impact on distressed investing. They'll have a new round of expertise required. We focus a lot on intellectual property as a category, whether it's patent portfolios, whether it's financing people successfully defending their patents.

58:13We continue to look at how would we add real estate debt in the right way. I think, as I said earlier, real estate's never had this much dispersion. So as one of my clients said to me the other day, we're like a lot of people, we're only in three categories of new dollars in real estates. We're in sheds, beds, and meds. Sheds being like industrial and logistics, beds being residentials, and meds being medical office. But what that just says to you how to favor like offices, which we all know, but it's going to be a massive restructuring of that space. I suspect it'll spill into others. And so the debt part of that market is going to be great.

58:50Great. So historically, people have mostly done performing real estate debt. I think you're going to see a massive growth in that. So what we want to do is be in a position that over the course of the next five to 10 years, we've added areas that had growth opportunities that add value to clients and in doing so, create an enterprise that will long exist past my time on this earth. Don, I want to ask you a couple of closing questions and we'll let you go. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? Is there a better word than dilettante? Because it has such negative connotations.

59:27But let me tell you what I mean by that, because it sounds very like aspirational and royalty. And what I really mean by that is a person who's interested in a lot of things and an expert in none. I collect some wines, but not so great. I have an art collection. I'm not that great. I play golf badly. I ride a bike. I used to be good. I'm not as good, but I love riding my bike. That's my favorite thing to find time to do because I find the relaxation after mile 25 to mile 50 to be some of the best moments outside of work and children. So that may be my thing, but building this business has been pretty encompassing during that.

1:00:06But yeah, I have a lot of interest and I'm really not very good at any of them. What'd you dream about doing when you were a kid? I dreamed of being a detective because unlike other kids in the neighborhood who had a lemonade stand, I opened a private detective stand to look for cats and lost toys and things like that. I think the book was, was it Encyclopedia Brown was a little book about that as a kid. So I used to avidly read them. So certainly at one point, I thought I would be a private detective. And later I read a lot of Lou Archer -type novels as a kid. So I loved that whole era. After that, when I grew up, better set of aspirations, let's say.

1:00:50You know, I liked the guy who had the office down the block who was the insurance salesman because he didn't have to wear a uniform. My dad wore a green uniform. And he didn't go at any of my sporting events. Not because he didn't love them, because he was embarrassed to be there in his uniform. And so I wanted to live a life that didn't have one bathroom for five people, that probably didn't require me to wear a uniform. I was excited to wear a suit, to be quite frankly, I never had one. And got me out of a lovely little town called River Edge, New Jersey, and I just wanted to get out of there.

1:01:25What's your biggest investment pet peeve? Two things. One is, despite people's best efforts, there's still a lot of consensus following. And that's only been amplified over the years by technology -driven investors and traders who focus on trend trading. And so the system really does still not reward people to be outside the system. And that was great for me. It took a long time. This was like we were out in the desert wandering around for seven, eight years before people figured out that it really was a business. The infrastructure of it is a little bit reminiscent of the Apple -IBM computer debate of the 90s where it's like you were never incented to buy an Apple product if you were a corporate purchasing person because you got no penalty for buying IBM and you had a lot of risk if you bought Apple.

1:02:19And there's a lot of that in the investing world where you don't really get a penalty for buying Blackstone in most places. And God bless them. They do a good job. So no one should take that as a critique of them, but a critique of the mindset of many, not all people in this space. I think that people write things off too fast because they often don't have the time or the willingness to explore an idea. And that creates opportunity, though. But it makes the opportunity harder to execute on. What investment mistake did you make that you'll never make again? Timing is a great example here. So personally, I was short in the last tech boom in the early 21st century.

1:03:08And I got squeezed out of my shorts and lost a huge percent of my net worth. That 60 days later, I would have tripled my net worth. so timing which is a classic complaint everyone has and that's the case even in sfr where everybody thought we were late because four or five people were in but the reality is we were early which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life first that fellow whose father was an elevator repairman has to go at the top of the list because I probably wouldn't have got a job and been invited back because when I left at the end of the summer, there was no plan to hire me back beside being a summer intern.

1:03:52My real first full -time job wasn't a junior credit analyst. My real first full -time job, I was a secretarial assistant that Mike got me on the payrolls. His name is Mike Hyland. He is a terrific guy. He got me on the payroll at First Boston as the assistant to the secretary named Louise. And I actually whited out things on spreadsheets and typed them in because we didn't have Excel back then. And then would take him to the photocopier. And that was my first full -time job on Wall Street. Then there's a bunch of other people, not the least of which is my father, I'd say. And the reason why I'd bring him up is not because he was a mentor on Wall Street, but that what I said my advantage was a willingness to work hard and, as colleagues have said, boil the ocean to find an idea.

1:04:44So I'm famous for getting on a plane with three or four canvas bags of research and finishing the trip to California or the Middle East with down to one canvas bag and then rereading it all on the way back and making notes and figuring out what to do. And that, I think, is the product of my father, who worked extraordinarily hard. His challenges in life put the chip on my shoulder. We had to borrow money from uncles and cousins and stuff like that to buy a house. And so feeling like the poor relatives was one of the important motivators. After that, I've learned from just a ton of great people like Lloyd, I mentioned, Gary Cohn, Tom Harris, Mike Milken, John Goodfriend, Ace Greenberg, Jimmy Cain.

1:05:34Even though a lot of people like to take Jimmy's name in vain, I thought I learned a lot from him. So I had the benefit of almost being a zealig for those who know those old movies of Wall Street because I worked at all these fantastic places with all these brilliant people. And they all taught me something. What was the best advice you ever received? So there was a fellow who worked at Bear Stearns named Richie Metrick, a brilliant man. And they had given me a new business unit to manage. And I went through it and started analyzing the people and laying people off and hiring people. And Richie said to me, why are you firing all these people?

1:06:14He goes, well, I kind of figured out if I could do their job better than they could, I probably should replace them. And he goes, no, stupid. That's why you're in charge.

1:06:27So it gave me a whole different perspective on human resources. So while it might sound like a story about me, it's about me being stupid. And so I had to change my views. That was one of the best pieces of advice I've ever had from someone. All right, Don, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? I think I'm very blessed. So everything that's happened, I wouldn't redo. No matter how bad it was or how good it was, I wouldn't go back and change anything. Everyone around me has just been a great experience. Great friends, great family, very happy with everyone.

1:07:07If I had the opportunity to learn something sooner. When I was in my 30s and running a lot of stuff, I had a great sense of anxiety. Because my responsibility vastly exceeded my experience. And during that period of time, I would say that I could have been more magnanimous to the people around me. And as I grew older, I became keenly aware of the fact that you don't meet anyone once. You will meet them almost as many times as the earth goes around the sun. And so as a result, I wish I was a more magnanimous younger person. Nonetheless, being is driving people hard and working hard. And I've found that to be an interesting and amusing thing as I'm in this seat today and traveling the world.

1:07:55I find people who used to work for me from Abu Dhabi to Korea. And I guess I wasn't as bad as I perceived myself to be because so many of them have been nice and helpful and collaborative. But more than a few have said to me, I stood outside your office and was absolutely scared shitless to go in. And that person is the global head of real estate allocation at a very large sovereign wealth fund. Don, thanks so much for sharing your experience, insights, and this incredible story of single family rentals. Thank you so much for the time. I appreciate it. Thanks for listening to this Sponsored Insight.

1:08:36Sponsored episodes are paid opportunities for another 12 managers a year to appear on the podcast. If you're interested in telling your story in front of the largest audience of investors in the industry, please email us at team at capital allocators dot com to apply for one of the slots.

From the publisher

This Sponsored Insight features Don Mullen. Don is the Founder & CEO of Pretium Partners, a $51 billion specialized investment firm he started in 2012 to focus on the U.S. housing, residential, and corporate credit markets. In a little over a decade, Pretium has rapidly grown to become one of the largest owners of single-family rentals in the country. Prior to founding Pretium, Don spent thirty years on Wall Street, including long stints at First Boston, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs and shorter ones at Salomon Brothers and Drexel Burnham Lambert.

Our conversation covers Don’s history on Wall Street, identification of the opportunity in single family rentals, and path to founding of Pretium to capitalize. We discuss the single-family rental market, sourcing and servicing properties, scaling through technology, critiques of single-family rental investments, growing into adjacencies, and aspirations for Pretium in the decade to come.


For full show notes, visit the episode webpage here.

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