Isaac Corre – Event-Driven Investing at Governors Lane (EP.344)

16 Oct 2023 · 46 min

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Podcast Summary: Capital Allocators – Event-Driven Investing at Governors Lane (EP.344)

Episode Overview Host: Ted Seides Guest: Isaac Corre, Founder, CEO, and Portfolio Manager of Governors Lane Release Date: Not specified Focus: The evolution and current landscape of event-driven investing, along with Isaac Corre's journey from law to finance.

Key Concepts and Themes

  • Background of Isaac Corre:
  • Transitioned from a legal background to finance, finding a passion for investing.
  • Started his career at Scoggin in 1999 before moving to Eaton Park.
  • Event-Driven Investing:
  • Historical context of event-driven investing strategies, particularly in merger arbitrage and event-driven equities.
  • Comparison of past and present investing environments, highlighting challenges and opportunities.
  • Major Themes of Investing at Governors Lane:
  • Event-Driven Equities
  • Merger-Related Investing
  • Event-Driven Credit

Detailed Discussions

  1. Isaac's Journey into Investing
  2. Transition from law to finance sparked by a desire to address pricing inefficiencies in legal risk related to securities.
  3. Initial encounter with distressed debt and merger arbitrage led to a successful career in hedge funds.
  1. Current Environment of Event-Driven Investing
  2. Shift from an easier investment environment (late 90s) to a more complex landscape today, influenced by:
  3. The rise of passive investing.
  4. Increased regulatory scrutiny affecting merger arbitrage.
  5. Greater need for fundamental analysis alongside event dynamics.
  1. Merger Arbitrage Today
  2. Contrast with previous years where opportunities were plentiful.
  3. Current challenges include:
  4. Regulatory environment under the Biden administration which has become more adversarial.
  5. Narrowing spreads leading to tougher competition and less lucrative opportunities.
  1. Event-Driven Equities
  2. Changes in market dynamics affecting spinoff and activist strategies.
  3. Importance of thorough analysis and sector specialization due to evolving corporate landscapes.
  1. Credit and Distressed Investing
  2. Historically cautious approach towards distressed credits due to low rates and tight spreads.
  3. Increasing opportunities seen in high yield markets and bank debt as spreads widen.
  1. Portfolio Construction Process
  2. Focus on a concentrated best ideas portfolio.
  3. Daily meetings to assess and adjust positions based on current market conditions and new opportunities.
  1. Competitive Landscape
  2. Transition from large firms dominating merger arbitrage to increased sophistication in the distressed credit space.
  3. Recognition of pod shops’ impact on competitive dynamics.

Key Takeaways

  • The evolution of event-driven investing reflects broader market changes, including regulatory and economic shifts.
  • Active management and deep analysis of fundamental dynamics are crucial for success in today’s investing landscape.
  • Isaac Corre emphasizes maintaining a cohesive team culture and responsible growth for Governors Lane.

Closing Thoughts Isaac Corre seeks to continue refining his strategies and maintain a disciplined growth approach at Governors Lane while adapting to the complexities of modern investing. The importance of team dynamics and a thorough understanding of market changes underscore the conversation throughout the podcast.

For further insights and updates, listeners are encouraged to join the community at Capital Allocators and explore additional resources available on their website.

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30 -something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager, majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink, provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

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2:31Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators .com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast. My guest on today's show is Isaac Coray, the founder, CEO, and portfolio manager of Governors Lane, a hedge fund he launched in 2015 that manages $1 .6 billion focused on event -driven strategies. Isaac describes himself as the least likely person to end up on Wall Street, coming to the business from an academic family and a legal background before finding a passion for the business. Our conversation covers where event -driven investing was 20 years ago and where opportunities and challenges lie today across the disciplines of merger arbitrage, event -driven equities, and event -driven credit.

3:58Isaac brings the kind of thoughtful and methodical insights to event -driven investing that are required to succeed in the discipline. Before we get going, you won't want to miss this week's release of the fourth episode of season three of Private Equity Deals on Wednesday. It's the story of Avance's purchase of Univista, a South Florida insurance agency founded by Cuban immigrants who grew it independently, sold it to a kindred spirit at Avance, and professionalized the business from there. As the weather turns cold and your pocketbook reels from your deferred 2022 tax payment, you might find yourself wanting to fly south and relocate to tax -friendly Florida.

4:42If you do and are looking for insurance, you'll know where to go after hearing this incredible story. Thanks so much for tuning in to Private Equity Deals, a separate podcast from the team at Capital Allocators on your favorite podcast player. Please enjoy my conversation with Isaac Coray. Isaac, great to see you. Good to see you, Ted. Why don't you take me back to how you got into investing? It's a pretty atypical story. I wasn't someone who grew up with the stock market around Wall Street or anything like that. I was actually practicing law and I had developed an academic interest, I would say, in finance theory.

5:21I had read a lot of textbooks, but I started getting called by potential clients who were interested in me helping them understand some legal risk that was affecting a security that they were looking at. And what I found was, this is in the late 90s, so things have changed a little bit. The market was really, really bad at pricing legal risk. And I have to say, I didn't love being a practicing lawyer. It's not like suits. It's not like LA law. But I did find this really interesting, this work really engaging. So I said, maybe I could do this for a living. And people steered me towards distressed debt investing and merger arbitrage.

5:51And in early 99, I got a job at a fund called Scoggin, and I started my career there. And it was like a switch just flipped. It just changed my life. I really loved it. It was so interesting. It was just water skiing through the entire economy. It was just a lot of fun. How would you describe the event -driven investing environment when you started? Back then, it was a good deal easier. A lot of it was, this might sound a little crass, but picking off long onlys. There were a lot of alpha donors out there, and something would get announced, whether it was a merger or a spinoff, or a company would get into trouble with some asbestos liabilities, and you just had a lot of reflexing selling.

6:26So a lot of what we did was make a quick look at what was going on and then be liquidity providers to people who were panicking. And then you could, over the course of time, figure out what was really going to happen. But the first announcement of something really created this enormous opportunity to get involved. Now, I think partially because of the rise of passive and quant, partially because the Darwinian process has weeded out a lot of the alpha donors, it's not as simple as that anymore. You have to be much more focused on both the event dynamics, but also the fundamentals of the business.

6:55It's not like all you have to do is get the event right anymore. Now it's gotten a lot more complicated. And that initial start in Skoggin, you joined what was at the time one of the big multi -strategy launches at Eric Mindich at Eaton Park. I would love to hear about that experience. When I was at Skoggin, I had gotten to know a lot of the folks on the Goldman Sachs ARB desk pretty well. And when Eric left Goldman to start Eaton Park, a number of those folks recommended me to Eric. And I met Eric in early 2004. and I just really thought that one, he was just a really, really smart guy, really nice guy, but also he had a vision that I thought was consistent with what I thought was going to happen in the industry.

7:32The industry started out as a cottage industry. A few folks in a room, typically guys with a couple of Bloombergs and they traded. And the scale of the industry was getting much, much larger. And it seemed to me that the industry had to institutionalize in a certain way. And Eric, who was, I thought, the perfect person for being one of the architects of that strategy. He came from obviously a very storied institution, but he was a risk taker. We just hit it off really well. We saw the markets pretty similarly and he offered me the job. I knew it was a big break and I took it. The launch was a very heady moment, maybe too heady.

8:06But people were lining up at the door to talk to Eric. The rest of the team was kind of a sideshow, but we were talking some of the best institutions while we were trying to build our team. I think that one of the great things about it was that there was so much buzz around the launch, we just had such heft in the labor market. So it was really great to be able to run out and knowing that we're going to have a pretty big launch and hire really high quality people, we launched with two Rhodes Scholars. And at the time, I remember commenting that there's something wrong with the US economy if Rhodes Scholars are coming to work at a hedge fund, but I'm really happy to be able to hire them.

8:40What was that model and that vision that Eric had for how to run this next generation of multistrends? So I think Eric really felt that the thing to do was to have a large organization across geographies where basically you always had someone looking at pretty much every asset class that traded in the public markets as well as a private business. And the idea was that if you could get the culture right, if you could cross -pollinate between the geographies and strategies, you'd be able to generate better results and then create to best ideas portfolio. And how did your career at Eaton Park evolve?

9:17So I started out running the US event -driven business, which was basically going to be merger arbitrage and special situation equities. At the time, we didn't have a dedicated credit effort, despite what I just mentioned to you, because the house view was that credit was so unattractive as an asset class. And we were, from almost day one, shorting pretty much every index. We eventually got involved in the subprime short. So my beat was primarily US merger arbitrage, both announced but hostiles and up for sales, as well as other event -driven equities. But I had pretty wide latitude in terms of what I could invest in on that.

9:51Pretty quickly, Eric wanted me more involved in some of the international things, whether it was sectors that I had some specialty in the United States or arbitrage situations. And I suddenly discovered that I was responsible for Australia as well, which didn't do great for sleep, but it was actually at the time a really exciting area to be investing because of all the consolidation activity in the mining industry. And I pretty much stayed with that set of responsibilities until the beginning of 2009, when Eric asked me to take over the distressed credit part of the portfolio. Our house was pretty negative on credit.

10:23We started building a dedicated credit effort in 2008. We made some personnel changes there at the end of 2008 because anyone who got any credit in 2008 lost money. And then in 2009, Eric asked me to take that over. And it was just a great opportunity. One of my colleagues here at Governor's Lane was working with me at Eden Park, Bruce Haggerty, two of them actually, and Fenel Gadadra, both of whom had come from restructuring backgrounds. I had done a fair amount of bankruptcy litigation. So it was a pretty natural fit for us. And we were involved in a lot of the large bankruptcies, Lehman, CIT, some of the auto stuff, a bunch of the financials.

10:54At what point in time did you decide you felt ready that you wanted to do your own thing? I think around 2012, I began to realize that we weren't able to access a lot of opportunities because of the size of Eaton Park. We had launched at $3 .something billion. At that point, we were running $15 billion, and we were trying to size positions based on the firm's capital. So if you're looking for $100, $200 million positions, you're really missing out on some really interesting opportunities. And I used to complain that we can't bend down to pick up $5 million. And sometimes when you bend down to pick up $5 million, you find 10.

11:28There's a lot of really good alpha opportunities there. So I felt that the strategies that I was running would do better in a smaller format where we could access some of the, now I think we'd call those micro cap, but the mid cap type opportunities. And so I felt that I really liked the strategy and I really liked the business model. I also thought the business model, frankly, would be easier to execute in a smaller firm. It's one thing to do that with a hundred people. It's another thing to do it with 20. So I began to think about the prospects of doing it. If you had said to me at any time in my career beforehand, I would have said, me running a hedge fund, that's preposterous.

12:00I was a nerdy kid who liked history and law, but I found this passion and I really wanted to do it in a format that I could do it. I also felt like I had achieved enough financial stability that I was in a position where I really wanted to manage my own money. So it seemed like a great opportunity. So I spoke to Eric in mid -2013 and I agreed to stay till the end of the year. And then I taught for a year at Harvard Law School, and then I launched Governor's Lane. So when you set out to launch Governor's Lane, there are a few things that you mentioned that seem like they're important in terms of how the culture should work and strategies you wanted to pursue.

12:37What did you set out to do? What I really wanted to do was recreate the micro team that I had at Eaton Park in a standalone vehicle, engaging in the same strategies, and to do it in an environment that would be maybe a little bit less corporate, but still quite institutional. The three strategies, and we call them themes, the three themes we invest in are event -driven equities, merger -related investing, and event -driven credit. How do you think about the team and the culture that you wanted to have? I wanted really good athletes who potentially could invest across all strategies. There's a lot of similarities between them.

13:18I would say the one that is a little bit different is the merger arbitrage part of the strategy, because the work cadence there is very different than the other two strategies. A typical equities investor, a typical creditor investor can look at his or her calendar on a Sunday night and have a pretty good idea of what they're doing for the rest of the week. Who's reporting that week? What are the conferences and things like that? A merger arbitrage investor is praying on Sunday that he's going to find out there's a lot of stuff to do on Monday. From a operational perspective, I always thought it's really important to have a dedicated merger arbitrage person.

13:49But what I really wanted were people that could understand event -driven dynamics across asset classes, people who can understand the role of balance sheet, who can understand the role of the fundamentals, that fundamentals really matter. And I think we've learned a lot more about that in the last few years. One of the things I've always looked for is people who have restructuring experience, because I think restructuring experience is really where you get the combination of equity underwriting and understanding the role of legal processes and group dynamics in terms of resolving complex situations.

14:20I'd love to pull apart each of those themes. So maybe we start with Merger Arb. What is the landscape for Merger Arb today? It's certainly a lot different than when you started. It's a very, very different environment. When I started in 1999, we were at the really fun part of the first internet bubble. And that triggered a massive, massive consolidation in the TMT world, but it wasn't just the TMT world. Rate policy had gotten a little bit more accommodating. People were pretty bullish about the future, and there was just a tremendous amount of consolidation. And we were doing that in the period of, I would say, close to peak Chicago school antitrust policy.

14:58At least in the United States, you had very, very accommodative regulatory policy. And you had a booming bull market where if you said to a long -only investor that you can get a 15 % or 20 % return on a merger ARB spread, I could get much more than that in Cisco. So it was a really, really attractive environment. It was almost too easy. I would come in every Monday morning and they'd offer me a new menu of specials. And you'd say, I'll take this one, this one, and this one. And I got a lot of risk on. And what was nice was pretty much every industry was consolidating in 1999. But it was a much easier environment.

15:28I think what had happened was in 1998, there were a lot of catastrophic merger breaks. A lot of folks had left the strategy. So the imbalance between the capital demand for the arbitrageur services and the actual amount of arbitrage capital was out of whack. So 1999 was maybe the most golden year I've ever seen in arbitrage. And then that all came to a screeching halt when the internet bubble collapsed. But for me, it was actually a great thing because it forced me to recognize the fact that you can't be a one -trick pony from a career perspective in this industry, and you really have to diversify your options.

16:01And if I had just stuck with merger arbitrage, I would have had a lot of fallow years. What's the strategy look like today? 2023 is a very, very weird year for arbitrage because we are in a pretty bifurcated market. The rate shock of 2022 has really reduced the number of transactions, and that has been compounded by a regulatory shock that has come largely in the United States, at least, from the Biden administration. The Biden administration has taken a much, much more aggressive tack towards merger control, particularly with respect to so -called vertical mergers, not competitors, but people who are in similar industries.

16:35And my perhaps overly optimistic read at the time was that they'll do that, they'll lose a couple of cases, and they'll go back to doing what they used to do before. But they've actually been much, much more persistent. And I think that leaving aside the wisdom of that strategy, the legality of the strategy, it's been very effective in chilling large cap mergers. So what we see right now is that there have been a few mergers that were announced in 2022 that have gone through very, very tortured regulatory processes, but have actually, generally speaking, the administration has not been successful in those challenges.

17:06So those situations have had very, very attractive spreads and return profiles, but with real shock risk and much more volatility than you typically want in a merger arbitrage strategy. So that's one side of the equation. The other side is the transactions that are perceived to be safe are trading at very, very tight spreads. So I don't know whether merger Arbs didn't get the memo that rates were up. But at one point, I think they were trading 290 over the riskless rate. Now, with bank debt at 500 or 600 over, it's just hard to understand why that's going on. So I would say that we've been very focused on the more regulatory complex mergers, but you just can't be as big in those.

17:45But the rest of the strategy I think right now is not that interesting. I'm actually pretty optimistic now that the administration seems to be pivoting away from some of these more extreme positions. They basically folded on Activision. They folded on Horizon, I'm pretty optimistic that once the corporates get the message that it's safer to go into the water, they'll do so. Last year, a responsible antitrust advisor would tell a corporate board, I think I can get this deal done, but it's going to be a year and a half, and there's a high chance of litigation. Very few boards are going to sign up for that.

18:14Whereas now, I think it's pretty clear that the administration is beginning to back down from that approach, although we don't know this, particularly at the FTC, we have a very, very passionate opponent of these transactions. How does the underwriting process, the diligence, differ in that complex regulatory environment to get to your probability assessment of these opportunities? It's a lot harder. It starts with we do our own analysis of market shares. If it's a vertical merger, we try to come up with every theory of harm. We hire lawyers, but a lot of it is the old leather shoe, going to the trial, watching trials on Zoom now when you can do that, talking to people in the ecosystem and getting a sense of just what the regulators are saying, whether it's at public speeches and things like that.

19:01But I will say every time the FTC announces a closed meeting, we choke up because we're just worried, what is it that they're going to do now? But it's not that different than the process we've always used in regulatory complex situations. It's just that there are so many more of them. and the things that can cause complications are just different. How do you take that set of opportunities and turn them into your portfolio underneath that theme? We look at each merger on its own, but we also recognize that there's more correlation between them. Take, for example, there were two mergers. You had Horizon Therapeutics and then you had Seattle Genetics.

19:37Totally different deals, but almost the exact same set of issues in terms of is the FTC going to decide that there's some issue that they're going to try to tie drugs to each other and take price on that. So we have to see those as similar risks. This was true in 2009 when Pfizer was buying Wyeth and Merck was buying Shearing Plow. Both were trading at really, really attractive spreads. But you had to say, look, they're both pharma deals. If there's going to be an issue, there could be an issue with both. So there's only so much that you can do of both of them. The answer was you should have done as much as you could.

20:10Now you really have to spend a lot more time on assessing what the implied probability is, what's the real downside in the situation. And that's not necessarily where are we happy to own it. It's more of a capital markets question. Where is it going to price if the deal breaks? And that kind of capital markets analysis is something that we've been doing for a very, very long time. So let's turn to event -driven equities. What's your particular way of approaching that theme? It's changed a lot over the years. It used to be that there was a list. There were spinoffs, there were post -reorg equities, and they were generally pretty reliable sources of long alpha.

20:47They were, for some of the reasons I was talking about earlier, you have this dynamic, particularly with a spinoff, where a large cap company spins off a small cap company, the long only manager is not in the business of owning that, and they reflexively sell it. That opportunity set is no longer as reliable source of alpha. It's actually still a very, very reliable source of dispersion, but there are good shorts along with the good longs. That's true of activism as well. Activism used to be much, much more simple because you had an active market for corporate control. Companies could borrow a ton of money and lever up their balance sheet.

21:20The activist thesis was a little bit easier to understand as those targets became fewer and far between. And also we began to see the debt markets become less forgiving. You see a lot more of the operational activism, which is much, much more complex to underwrite. We really began to see this in 2017 and 2018, and we were somewhat puzzled by it. There are a couple of things I would observe. One is the market structure has changed. So there are fewer alpha donors than there used to be, and the price setters are just better and better at this. So you've got to up your game. The second thing, and I think this is an important one in terms of changes in the underlying economy, a lot of these event -driven equity strategies often were essentially paths into a corporate restructuring, a turnaround of a business.

22:03And one of the things that's happened over the years is that turnarounds have become more difficult because technology and the disruption from technology and the velocity of the change in that is so great that if you fall behind, it's very, very hard to catch up. So if you have a thermostat business sitting within Honeywell for years and years, and it's just not as interesting as avionics, it's Honeywell's equivalent of equities in Dallas. That business is not getting the attention that it needs. While Amazon and Google are all about the Internet of Things and they're coming up with these really cool products.

22:36So you spin that out. It's not just that they need capital and attention. They have to retool themselves as a tech company. And that's a real challenge. So we look now at a lot of these spins, and it's not just that they were underinvested in the redheaded stepchild or whatever term you want to use. These are businesses that have fallen seriously behind and maybe terminally behind. So appreciating that change in the underlying economic environment, I think, is an important part. The second thing is to understand that even if you have all the event dynamics that you like, you have a high -quality activist, you have a management that has incentives to sandbag numbers, whatever the old tricks of the trade in terms of venture -driven investing, you You also have to recognize, in fact, even if the event dynamics are good, there's going to be a fundamental controversy.

23:19There's a reason why the market is pricing things the way they are. So you have to lean into the fundamental side just as deeply as you have to on the event driven side. And we've dialed up our sector specialization. We've dialed up our training on modeling and all those things. But we've really leaned into alternative data, too, because alternative data is a really, really powerful tool. And obviously, in the large cap world, it is table stakes. And there's loads of stuff that's published. What we find on the Adventraven side is that if you start doing bespoke work around situations that aren't going to be obviously off -the -shelf providers, we can generate real opportunities, whether it's creating our own custom index from web scrapes of travel nurse day rates so that we could figure out what some hospital margins are going to be market by market or things like that.

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24:04It really is a very, very powerful tool. And we find that when we apply it in situations like that, it's not the same competitive environment as we've seen in the long, short world. As you triage the world of these event -driven equity situations, where do you hone in on your sweet spot so that you know where to apply, say, alternative data in that example? So we certainly look at a lot of the things that drive the old opportunity set, which is activist situations, spinoffs, companies that have gotten themselves into some problem, some legal or regulatory disruption that has changed things. We're always looking for things where corporates are trying to do something to make their business better or are facing something that's made it a lot worse.

24:46And then the nice thing is you get to pull on threads from that. And sometimes that's where things get really interesting. We were involved in a semiconductor company where there was a subject of an activist campaign. And that really gave us a lot of other opportunities to look at other things. How about the credit and distressed world? How have you evolved in how you look for opportunities there? We have always been very focused on the stressed and distressed credit world. I would say that we were not big players in that market over the course of most of our lifespan at Governor's Lane, partially because we thought rates were just too low and spreads were too tight.

25:22We were involved periodically in some of these situations. And one of the things I think about this stress market that was pretty sobering for us was this creditor -on -credit violence that you're seeing now. It used to be that if you were in the same class of creditors, generally you thought that you were going to coordinate together to maximize the outcome for the credit group. That changed. I don't know whether it was because of a dearth of opportunities in distress or whether it's because the sponsors became more willing to play off one creditor against each other. In some situations, such as PCG, it was just such a big opportunity and it became quite a food fight.

25:54I'm optimistic that that will get somewhat less violence if we see a real distress cycle, but the positive distress opportunities has kept us away. I think there's some amount of adverse selection in distress until the last year or two, just because there's so much liquidity. There are very few good businesses with bad balance sheets going into bankruptcy. Now, I'll say this. There are some folks who have done a spectacular job in distress, and I have enormous respect for what they've been able to do. We tend to be more neutral in terms of cyclicality unless it slaps us across the face. We run pretty low beta.

26:27But what we've seen in the last year, I would say, is credit spreads really widened out a lot as rates went up. Part of that was fear of the economy. Part of that was that a lot of folks who are stretching along the risk curve because rates were so low now feel more comfortable in cash. So we've now seen much more opportunity and we've gotten much more involved in both high yield and bank debt. I should say, by the way, that we have from time to time been opportunistically involved in distress, which we bought in distress form as the bankruptcy was coming out. Last year, we got very involved in the high yield market.

26:59We particularly liked 144A securities that were rated triple C. A lot of that is the rating agencies just look at the leverage statistics and tell you what the rating is. But when you go in and really examine these businesses, and remember, because they're 144A securities, you actually have to sign up to get that information. So what you see is that there's some very, very high quality businesses there. Not all of them are businesses that should trade at eight times EBITDA and are levered at seven times. Some of these are 15 times EBITDA businesses that are levered six or seven times. They're not high capex, they're very free cash flow generative, and they have a self -help story.

27:34When you walk through what creates the 144 opportunity set? It's typically an LBO and the private equity firms don't want public filings, but they can't just raise bank debt. So they raise bonds and they use this SEC rule that was for sophisticated investors who can look at these bonds. But as a result of that, the financial statements aren't generally available. You have to go to the company and sign up to get them. And so that market is a little bit more opaque. It's certainly less efficient than the equities market or even the investment grade market where folks can download that data and put it on their platform in a nanosecond.

28:12We think it's just a much more interesting area to play. We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium. Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? Partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead. When it comes to M &A innovation, SRS Aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches. Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game -changing innovation.

28:57So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRSAquium, the smartest way to run a deal. Learn more at srsaquium .com. That's S -R -S -A -C -Q -U -I -O -M .com. And now, back to the show. So across these three buckets of themes, how do you bring them together to construct your portfolio? What we try to do is run a concentrated best ideas portfolio. All the investment partners meet every day for anywhere from half an hour to an hour and a half. And we go through what's in the pipeline and what people are working on. What are the best opportunities we see? Do we think that we should be taking up positions or down positions?

29:44And we cross rough between the various themes. And because we all know the portfolio so well, we go through this exercise so regularly, it's a pretty efficient way of making sure that we're getting the money to the best ideas and dynamically adjusting them as market conditions change and as new situations arise. How do you run your short book? Part of what we do when we underwrite a long is how are we going to hedge it? And we hedge at each position level. And we ideally will find individual securities that we want to short against it. If not, we'll use a custom basket or an ETF, or if all else fails, a market hedge.

30:19And the idea of that, one is we want to underwrite our longs in terms of their alpha opportunity, not just we like it, it's a cheap stock, we think it's going to go up. And then also from a portfolio construction perspective, that keeps you pretty balanced. When you roll that all up, you can look at the portfolio. And if you're doing it right, you shouldn't have to make a lot of adjustments in terms of your overall exposures in the portfolio. We do look for factor tilts and if we think how we got more or less beta to the market than we wanted. But ultimately, what we're really trying to do is make sure that the hedging of the portfolio is done at the position level.

30:56We do alpha shorting. And when we do alpha shorting, we buy things long against it for the same reason. It's much cleaner from a portfolio construction perspective. It's also much cleaner from judging the quality of the position and the alpha generation of the position. How have you organized your team to be able to pursue these different themes and then bring it together as best idea portfolio? Pretty much the entire team has pretty good experience across at least credit and equities. And of the five senior members of the team, three have been involved in merger arbitrage a decent amount as well.

31:31So we have a pretty good understanding of each of the themes that we invest in. And so that really helps, that facilitates it. And Bruce Haggerty, who I've worked with since I hired him in 2006 with a brief hiatus when I left Eaton Park and he stayed, he and I have been doing this for a long time. a long time together. It's cliche, we finish each other's sentences and all that. But it really does work in terms of we're both really on top of everything that's going on. And Danny Yusuf and Fennel Gadadra have both done a lot in equities and credit. So we have a pretty good zone defense, if you will, or zone offense, if that's a term for how we look at the whole ecosystem.

32:09How do you align your partners and the people on your team with your objectives so that it all works in terms of decision -making? Well, the compensation structure for the partners is based on the performance of the firm. In 2022, we became really interested in credit. We had a really good equity portfolio. We realized at that point in time, high yield was trading over the beta of 40 or 50 % to the S &P 500. We were going to have to take down some of our exposure to start dialing up our credit exposure. We had a conversation about it. There wasn't a single dissent because everyone knew that what we were really trying to do was make money for the firm.

32:42And if we make money for the firm, we all participate in that. How do you view your competitive landscape? It really has changed a lot. For most of the time that I was investing before, say, the financial crisis, there were just a lot of really large shops that did merger arbitrage in the expansionary market and distressed when there was a contraction and a little bit of equities to top that up. And that all changed. I think it really began to change after the financial crisis. And I think part of it was that we all maybe didn't appreciate how much we were dependent on the rate environment to create these opportunities because we were looking at alternative spread products, off -the -run spreads.

33:22And as rates came down, but spreads compressed, so that entire opportunity set became much more anemic. So I think a lot of folks had to find new ways to apply their skills, and different firms had different levels of success with that. So what's happened is that that competitive environment has changed pretty dramatically. I would say on the credit side, the distressed market is much, much more sophisticated. It's much larger than it used to be. On the equity side, I think it's the opposite. It's a better competitive environment with maybe a somewhat more challenging opportunity set. But as I think we successfully adapted to that opportunity set, it's better to be in a less competitive environment.

33:58How has some of the size of, say, the modern multistrat, think of like pod shops, impacted what you see in the securities that you're looking at? the pod shops in merger arbitrage have become a very, very important player. Some of them do some amount of event -driven equities, but I think it's much, much more constrained because of the market neutrality that they run. But I think the biggest impact, I would say, is in merger arbitrage. And I think that part of the reason spreads are as tight as they are is because the pods really do have very, very dedicated effort to that. And they've done a very, very good job, but it makes it somewhat less interesting for us, at least with the safer, friendly deals.

34:37On the equity side, I think the pods have done just a terrific job in harvesting short -term alpha, calling the quarter and things like that. They're just very, very good at. I think where we can win is more in the intermediate term alpha and with the event dynamic. So that's where we try to spend our time. And I'm sure that they'll get better at what they do and we'll get better at what we do and we'll continue to duke it out. But they've done just a terrific job on the merger ARP side. You've talked about the 144A market. What are some of the other opportunities that you're really excited about?

35:07I would say right now, we're really excited about bank debt. I don't know the duration of this opportunity, but it's very, very attractive right now. Essentially, the bank debt market, leveraged loan market, I should say, has been really dominated by the CLOs. And that algorithm right now is broken. So CLO formation is harder now than it was before. There's less demand for the AAA tranches of CLOs. So what we're seeing, paradoxically is that actually the larger bank debt deals are harder to place and we're getting more concessions in that market. So we've been very active on the capital market side of the bank debt market.

35:43And compared to say friendly merger arbitrage, it just seems like a much, much more attractive opportunity set. So we've been pretty excited. We've been dolling up our exposure there a decent amount. What's an example of one of those larger deals that you've had attracted? We're participating in the transaction that Bausch and Lohm is doing. We think the rating is lower than it should be. It's rated B1 in part because they have this dynamic with their old parent valiant or what is now called Bausch. We think the pricing is really, really attractive on that. What are some of the biggest risks you're thinking about?

36:13There are a lot. There are all the macroeconomic risks. And we try to not be particularly directional on that, but you have to respect that. It's one thing for the economy to slow, but when you have a real recession, everything goes wonky. And we have to constantly monitor for that. As I said, we're not a macro fund. There are loads of people who do that. It's the same thing with oil or other commodity prices. I think at this stage, you have to acknowledge that climate risk is a big part of that and the disruptions from climate risk are real -time concern. Look at the tragic fires in Hawaii. We saw what happened in PG &E.

36:48Obviously, this has a pretty significant impact on PNC insurers and power generation and creates potentially some opportunities on energy transition from our own business, I would say the ones that we have to underwrite on a daily basis, a lot of it is regulatory and policy risk. When I spoke about merger arbitrage, I spoke mostly about the United States, but very few transactions are purely domestic anymore. And the role of foreign regulators in US -based situations is very dramatic. We've seen this with the CMA in the UK, obviously the various Chinese agencies that regulate transactions, they're a very big part of that.

37:23And obviously, China is increasingly a black box. It's very hard to do due diligence there. In fact, they've arrested people for it. So those kinds of risks are the risks that I probably spend the most time on. We're in what appears to be a real paradigm shift in terms of the relationships between countries. The trend towards globalization has clearly slowed dramatically, if not backed up. Those risks matter a lot to the kind of strategies that we run. I'd love to walk me through an example. And the one that's coming into my head is the Activision Microsoft deal where you have US regulatory of the UK and EU.

37:59How did you look at a situation like that and assess it as it went along the process? I wish I had gotten 100 % right. We originally were involved in Activision when Kodik had all of his problems because we felt that there was no way that he would last as a CEO. And we thought there were two ways that that would play out. One was that an activist would show up and the other was that the company would sell itself. We were fortunate that the latter happened. We were surprised where the spread traded. And as we dug into it, we felt pretty comfortable that the US didn't have a winnable claim. We certainly recognized the risk that the US would try to challenge it.

38:35The chair of the FTC, Lina Khan, is very, very transparent in terms of her view of these transactions. So we thought the US was the principal risk, Microsoft was saying all the things that they needed to say, we thought, for the Europeans to approve the transaction. When I started doing merger arbitrage, the European Commission was a non -entity to American arbitrageurs. But since then, they've actually become a very predictable and quite thoughtful regulator. So we felt pretty comfortable that the EU would do the right thing, but would approve the transaction. Maybe I should stop and say, there are essentially two ways that companies can address a concern from regulators.

39:13They can do what's called a structural remedy, which is essentially to sell off part of the business or to hive off some of the business, really sell, in a way that satisfies the regulators that there won't be a competitive problem. And there are nuances around that, whether the buyer will be able to really compete. And then there are behavioral remedies where the company commits not to do certain things. And the European Union is very, very willing to accept behavioral remedies, partially because I think their enforcement mechanisms are a little bit more efficient. So if they see a problem, they can address it, whereas in the U .S., the enforcement mechanisms are a little slower.

39:43And every administration comes in pounding the table that they're not going to take behavioral remedies, and eventually they ease up a little bit. We knew that there was a good chance they would challenge the transaction in the U .S., but we felt very confident that they would lose that challenge. We were not necessarily as concerned about the CMA. And the problem with the CMA is it's a little bit more of a black box. And we really had a rough time getting a sense of where they stood until they issued their policy paper. The work we did was really more about understanding who was on the panel.

40:14Who were the decision makers? What was their worldview? Were they populists? Were they Brexiteers? Or were they folks who thought more like the Europeans? And I think the work we did led us to the conclusion that they were more of the European mindset. Obviously, we were wrong on what was a pretty, I thought, surprising issue, which was the future of cloud -based gaming. I think in hindsight, we recognize now that there was more dialogue between the US and the UK than we had appreciated. And they were probably doing the US's bidding in a certain way, which is surprising. But then they really reversed course when the US lost.

40:49I think once they saw that the US regulators were over their skis legally, and it's still not done, but we feel pretty good that it's going to get done. I think we did the right work. The decision came out. It was a little bit of a surprise, but we've managed to weather it. And how did you trade that position along the way? This was all going on with an extremely volatile market. There was implied beta, as there should be in Activision, because it was probabilistically going to be worth X when Microsoft bought it, or it could be just a stock. And we did a bunch of option trades to manage our risk.

41:22I'm not going to say we got every zig and zag right. We didn't. We never do. The great thing about this business and the hardest thing about this business is a lot of folks who are in our industry, there are people who got 90s and plus on every single one of their tests. And in investing 50s, 55, 60s, pretty good. Now in arbitrage, that's not true. You have to be in the 90s on arbitrage. But still, this was a situation where we realized it was an extremely high beta situation. And I think overall, we did fine, but we probably reduced too much when the CMA said they were going to block the deal.

41:55Every indication was that that appellate process was not a real appellate process and the transaction seemed dead, but then we got re -engaged when it looked more likely to happen. What's an example of a position in your portfolio that you feel really emblematic of how you want Governor's Lane to work? Position that I'm most proud of is Luckin Coffee. It's a Chinese coffee retailer, the aspiring Starbucks of China. And it was a very controversial stock. I guess it was 2019. it turned out that they had committed significant fraud. And the company had a restructuring. It was a Cayman Islands restructuring with a US Chapter 15, where they, we think, cleaned house.

42:39They recapitalized the company. We bought some of their securities, both equity and converts, at the later stage of the bankruptcy. And we did a ton of work on it. And we really thought they had cleaned up the business. And they had not only cleaned up the business from a financial statement an integrity perspective, but they had also gotten the business model to work. They had gotten their ASPs up. Their problem back then was they were just solving for growth. They weren't really solving for the four -wall economics of their stores, and they had shut a bunch of underperforming stores. They had really turned around the business and were growing again.

43:12And they had also made some product introductions, which to this guy who grew up in Milwaukee, Wisconsin sounds revolting, but coconut latte was a huge hit. It was a scary stock. We knew a lot of people who had been burned in the prior iteration of it, and no one wanted to touch it. We bought a decent -sized position when the stock was trading low double digits, high single digits. And we did a lot of the work I was describing, a lot with the alternative data, some surveys. We spoke to franchisees in China about it, and we've sold a decent amount of the way up. What would you like Governor's Lane to become over the next five or 10 years?

43:50I really want to stick to our heritage. I can see the idea of expanding our product offering. Some people want only a merger product or some people want only a credit product or a venture of inequities product. We think about that as something that we'd like to do. But at the end of the day, I think that what's so critical to us is our success as a firm is the culture and making sure that we're always making capital decisions that are optimal. I want to grow responsibly, recognize the fact that the graveyard of hedge funds is filled with hedge funds that did what we did and got too big and to grow with discipline in a way that allows us to continue to maintain the culture that has contributed to our success.

44:35I think we've got some room to run, but if I could be doing what I'm doing now just better in five years from now, that's success. Ten years from now, that's success. Isaac, I want to ask you a couple of closing questions. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? I read a lot. I've been trying to teach myself chess, which is really one of the most humbling things I've ever done in my life. And losing to 10 -year -olds online, it's good for the soul, but it is very humbling. But mostly reading. I also try to spend a lot of time on fitness and exercise and yoga and mindfulness and all that kind of stuff.

45:13What's one thing that most people don't know about you that you find particularly interesting? I took a gap year after high school and worked on a kibbutz and farmed turkeys and fixed tractors. And what'd you learn from that? I don't like turkeys. I grew up, my father was an academic. My mother ran a group of healthcare facilities. I really came to respect agriculture and manual labor. There's something about the end of the day after doing that. You just feel like you've really accomplished something. And the people who do it and the people I did it with were incredibly thoughtful people. Someone who grew up around the university, you just forget that there's thoughtfulness and genius and imagination all over the place.

45:59What's your biggest pet peeve? I'll stick to investing. I think people fetishize multiples. And so often you hear people tell you, oh, the multiple is so low. we should be long or the multiple is so high we should be short. And multiples are a very reasonable proxy for the market's estimate of the net present value of the future cash flows of a business. But all a multiple should do at first is make you ask the question, why is the multiple there? Why do we think that's too low? Why do we think it's too high? And just the idea that the multiple is some exogenous thing that the market slaps on a stream of earnings just drives me up a wall.

46:38Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life? It's a hard question for me to answer. First of all, I've been doing this for a long time, and I had two very different careers. And I had some great mentors, including Arthur Lyman, in the legal profession. I've had some great mentors, including Eric Mindich, in the investing profession. So I'll quote the Talmud. There's a saying, some rabbi said, that I learned a lot from my teacher, more from my colleagues, and the most from my students. And I feel that way about my career. I've learned a lot from my mentors. I've learned a lot from my colleagues.

47:14But it's the people that I trained who then become my colleagues. Those are the ones who I've really learned from. So whether it's Bruce, Danny, Fennell, those are the folks who really, in the last eight years, have just had an enormous influence on me and have changed things that I thought for 24 years of my investing career. It's really that that has been the biggest influence. What's the best advice you've ever received? When I was launching Governor's Lane, I was talking to actually the wife of a cousin of mine who is a very, very senior person at one of the premier consulting firms. And she said to me, who's going to say no to you in your firm?

47:49And I thought that was a really, really good piece of advice. I had to find people to say no to me and I've succeeded. All right, Isaac, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? I think despite what I said about my year as a farm and I think really the importance of physical fitness and recovery to one's life. I grew up in a very, very academic environment. I was taught to read two languages before I was three, but sports were just not something that was on the radar screen. I'll never be an elite athlete. What I realize now is that it's so important for your mind and for your well -being to be active.

48:30And if I could have learned a sport and excelled earlier in life, that would have been great. And I didn't, and I regret that, but I'm doing my best now to make up for it. Isaac, thanks so much for sharing this really insightful look at modern event -driven investing. Thanks for having me. It was a real pleasure, Ted. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at CapitalAllocators .com, where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings, and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more.

49:05Have a good one, and see you next time.

From the publisher

Isaac Corre is the founder, CEO, and Portfolio Manager of Governors Lane, a hedge fund he launched in 2015 focused on event-driven strategies. Isaac describes himself as the least likely person to end up on Wall Street, coming to the business from an academic family and a legal background before finding a passion for the business.



Our conversation covers where event-driven investing was twenty years ago and where opportunities and challenges lie today across the disciplines of merger arbitrage, event-driven equities, and event-driven credit. Isaac brings the kind of thoughtful and methodical insights to event-driven investing that are required to succeed in the discipline.



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