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Podcast Episode Summary: Letitia Johnson - Concentrated and Long-Term at Amherst College (EP.382)
Overview In this episode of the *Capital Allocators* podcast, host Ted Seides interviews Letitia Johnson, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of Amherst College. Johnson manages the college's $4 billion endowment and shares her unique investment philosophy shaped by her extensive experience in institutional investing, particularly during her thirteen years at Cambridge Associates. This episode focuses on the intricacies of managing an endowment with a concentrated, long-term, and manager-selected approach.
Key Themes and Discussions
- Background and Career Path
- Early Life: Letitia describes her childhood growing up in various countries, which fostered her appreciation for different cultures and perspectives.
- Education: She attended Brown University, where she majored in math but also explored English and biology, highlighting her diverse interests.
- Transition to Finance: After a period of gardening and figuring out her career path, Letitia pursued an MBA at Yale, where her interest in investing was ignited.
- Experience at Cambridge Associates
- Diverse Client Exposure: At Cambridge Associates, Letitia worked with numerous clients, gaining insights into the varying needs and objectives of different pools of capital.
- Investment Committee Meetings: Attended over a thousand meetings, which deepened her understanding of decision-making processes and governance in investing.
- Manager Selection: Emphasized the importance of manager selection as critical to portfolio success, impacting both asset allocation and returns.
- Investment Philosophy at Amherst College
- Concentrated Investment Approach: Amherst’s strategy relies on a concentrated portfolio with a focus on long-term manager relationships, emphasizing quality over quantity.
- Bottom-Up Manager Selection: A preference for selecting managers based on deep conviction and long-term potential rather than traditional asset allocation models.
- Portfolio Structure: Less than 40 managers in the portfolio, with half of the assets in the top 10, allowing for deep understanding and strategic growth of manager relationships.
- Managing Risks and Liquidity
- Liquidity Management: Johnson stresses the importance of understanding the shape of the liability profile and managing liquidity to ensure consistent cash flow.
- Stress Testing: Conducts stress tests to evaluate how the portfolio would perform in extreme market conditions, focusing on cash flow needs over mere mark-to-market valuations.
- Governance and Decision Making
- Investment Committee Dynamics: Johnson describes the collaborative nature of her investment committee, contrasting it with past experiences where she felt more defensive.
- Long-Term Partnerships: Emphasizes the significance of supporting managers through challenging periods to maintain strong relationships and long-term success.
- Looking Ahead
- Future Opportunities: Letitia expresses excitement about potential investments in flexible capital managers and biotech, highlighting her anticipation for which managers will emerge as leaders over the next few years.
Key Takeaways
- Investment Philosophy: A concentrated, long-term approach focusing on manager relationships can be more beneficial than traditional diversified models.
- Quality Over Quantity: In portfolio management, building deep relationships with a small number of managers can lead to superior outcomes.
- Governance Matters: A supportive investment committee can significantly affect the success of the investment strategy and the confidence of the CIO.
- Patience in Investing: Understanding that long-term partnerships require time and resilience, particularly during market volatility, is essential in investment management.
Conclusion Letitia Johnson’s insights provide a fresh perspective on managing institutional investments, emphasizing the importance of relationships, concentrated strategies, and long-term thinking. Her journey from diverse early experiences to leading an endowment reflects the complexities and nuanced decision-making involved in effectively managing capital for the long term.
For more details and insights from this episode, listeners are encouraged to visit [capitalallocators.com](https://capitalallocators.com).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
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2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators.com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast. My guest on today's show is Letitia Johnson, the chief investment officer of Amherst College, where she manages the school's$4 billion endowment. After 13 years working with 25 clients and attending over a thousand investment committee meetings at Cambridge Associates, Letitia came to a view about how to invest that differs from many similar pools of capital, and she's put that to work over the last five years. Our conversation covers the subtleties of managing an endowment with a concentrated, bottom-up, manager-selected approach for the long-term, including portfolio construction, risk and liquidity management, long-term investing, and competition for capital.
4:03Before we get going, Capital Allocators has entered the world of AI. We've trained a large language model on all our transcripts to help you learn anything you want from seven years of conversations. We've affectionately called this model ChatGPTED. It's safe to say Hank Morgan and I have no idea how to build an LLM, train data, and get the outputs that ChatGPTED delivers. So a special thanks goes to our friends on the data science team at Adalia Capital, who took on the development of the minimum viable product from start to finish. What they've done for us barely scratches the surface on how they're using AI to enhance their investment process.
4:47But I'll leave that to you to discuss with them. Chat GP Ted is the latest add-on to our premium membership. To sign up for a premium membership and access ChatGP Ted to query all our transcripts, go to CapitalAllocators.com. Thanks so much for spreading the word about ChatGP Ted. Please enjoy a conversation with Letitia Johnson. Letitia, great to see you. Great to see you, Ted. Thank you so much for having me. Why don't you take me back to your growing up? I grew up overseas. I was born in Singapore, lived in London, Tokyo, and my parents moved to India when I went off to school. It was a unique childhood.
5:31And that international adventure was a huge part of my childhood and school. I loved school. From a very early age, I loved math and I loved reading novels. So right brain, left brain was something that has been the heart of my existence and, of course, carries through today. I went to undergrad at Brown, and Brown, like Amherst, has an open curriculum, so there are no requirements. I was a math major, and I finished that within two years. And then I took all English courses and bio courses. So this is incredibly nerdy, but the day that the course catalog came out was one of my favorite days of the year, which is so embarrassing to admit.
6:12but it really is true. And my college career really was like a survey of everything that I thought was cool. That international perspective, when you go to university in the U.S., what differences did you see? A big underpinning was what you get in a very natural, and it's almost like a passive way you just experience, completely different cultures, knowing that they exist and having an appreciation for them. And then the other piece in terms of impacting my career and how I think about the world. It's a very big world and there's a lot out there. So when you come through school with international perspective, math, English, classic liberal arts, what do you do with that?
6:53Well, so I had a ton of fun in college, but of course, zero skills, none. And we can talk about my funny couple of years right out of college where I did nothing that was even remotely investment related. I had no idea what I wanted to do. So what did you do in those wandering years? Well, I actually was a gardener. I moved out to California. My boyfriend got a job at Stanford. He is now my husband. I was a gardener and organic farmer in my summers in college. So I thought, well, I need to pay rent. I don't know what I want to do. I need to make some money right now while I figure out. So I started in the phone book literally back in the days when there were actual phone books, called every garden company in the phone book and got a job at Janet Bell and Associates.
7:38Didn't take that long. That was two years. It was truly a transition time for me. I was trying to figure it out. And at the end of that, I realized I never want to be in a situation where I don't have control anymore. And I thought getting an MBA would be a really good way to do that. And I was able to coordinate grad schools with my husband and we both went to Yale. I have to ask, what was that MBA application like from your gardening experience? I can't believe we're going to go into this. Well, I ended up running the maintenance crew for a garden company. So I was able to write an application about managing people because I had actually some views after that experience on how to manage people.
8:20My pet theory is that they looked at my application and were like, this is the weirdest application we've ever seen. And they just decided to take a chance. Were there any of those management lessons that you learned in that early year that you still apply today? Very basic things like treat your employees well and be honest. It's important how you're managed. And it matters in terms of the productivity of the crew and how profitable the business is going to be and who your next client is going to be. Oh, and by the way, how beautiful the garden is. It all matters. And it's funny because I had all of these jobs.
8:57I worked for an ecology grad student in college. I worked for a fruit fly lab. I did all these really random disparate things. And my main takeaway from all of those experiences was the most important thing in terms of your quality of life are the people. Doesn't matter what you're doing. Are you picking books? Are you pulling weeds? Are you trying to figure out some science? Doesn't matter. It's just the people. So how'd you get from gardening to Yale School of Management into investing? Okay. So I came to Yale. You might imagine that was a shock to the system. I really had no idea what I was getting into.
9:32And the first year was just drinking from the fire hose. In the later part of my first year, I read an article in the Yale Alumni Magazine about David Swenson. And there's a lot of connectivity between the School of Management and Cambridge Associates. So I just started finding out about this world. I had a very close friend from growing up who had actually worked at Cambridge Associates. Investing is the real world application of math and the human, which is, oh, my God, right brain, left brain. I love this. I took a class with Nick Barbaris, who's this amazing professor at Yale. It was his first year there.
10:06He taught us behavioral finance. And that just completely clicked in for me. I just thought this is so incredibly cool. I love this combination. So investing was very interesting. And then this idea of working for a school, this is catnip for me. I love school. So investing plus school equals endowment management. I was completely sold on the concept. I got incredibly lucky with Cambridge Associates that took a chance on hiring me. And that's how that happened. So I'd love to dive into the experience at Cambridge because you saw a lot, manager selection, portfolios, clients, investment committees.
10:46Why don't you take me through each aspect of that? so i started at cambridge in 2006 i was there for 13 years cambridge is separated into two general groups there's the client group and the manager group so i was in the client group when i started you got staffed on call it a dozen different clients but the clients spanned a bunch of different asset categories and different consultants so you got a taste for pensions hospitals endowments community foundations private clients you name it We saw it. And you're working with a bunch of different consultants, all of whom have quite different views on how to invest.
11:24Over that time, I had probably about 25 clients and I went to over a thousand committee meetings. What did you take away from investing for different types of pooled capital? In terms of the breadth, different objectives can have really meaningful implications for how you might manage it. And I'll just use an example. I worked very closely with Margaret Chen for many years, and I worked with her on the settlement trust clients. The quick and dirty on asbestos trusts is they tend to be low to mid single digit billions. So these are large pools that were created out of the bankruptcies of these companies to pay out claims against asbestos litigation for people who are exposed to asbestos, call it 10 to 30 years ago.
12:04they pay out half their value in five years. And then there's this very long tail. The way that these pools are managed and overseen is they hire an advisor and then they meet monthly with the trustees that oversee the trust, as well as all of the lawyers that are involved on the litigation side. And so this is a very different set of people than the investment committee for the Museum of Fine Arts Boston. So you actually have to come up with a completely different solution for how to invest these assets. That's just one example of how it obviously matters what it is you're trying to do and what is actually going on with these pools.
12:41And also endowments are super interesting. They are a passion of mine, but they are just a small slice in the globe in this institutional asset investing field. You mentioned that the senior consultants you worked with all had very different views on how to manage portfolios. So if you slightly normalize the type of pool that they're managing. What did you see across the spectrum of what those different views were? Oh, so many. When I first started at Cambridge, the head of research was Ian Kennedy, and he was looking for somebody to help him revamp what they called the investment planning review, which was all of the asset allocation and policy work and just goals work that you would do when a new client walked in the door.
13:23So of course, I was like, oh yeah, 100%, I would love to do that. Ian, I will work with you to do that. Basically, ever since that day, I have been grappling with this question of what is the right solution for endowments? How do you manage these assets? I mentioned this because I was going through this whole process of a top-down policy portfolio and asset allocation. You assess the needs of a client and you decide this is how we should invest based on the needs of a client. and then you go and you take that template and the idea was we're just going to push it out to the different consultants at cambridge and everybody's just going to use it because it's so efficient and this is the answer and blah blah blah and it turns out no no that is not what happened so you push it out and then all the consultants come back to you and they say this is not the way i do it and what i realized through that process is a few years in when we're in this Why is this IPR template not sticking?
14:23And the answer is the client is not the only driver of what ends up happening in the room. Obviously, the consultant is a huge driver of that. If you look at the different portfolio solutions that you arrive at, there are views from the consultant. There are views, of course, from the investment committee or any staff that is involved. I'm curious of the variability around that. So take an example of two pools that might have looked the same. And then you have behind that, two different investment committees and two different consultants. And so maybe there's a common sense asset allocation structure that fits for both of them.
15:01But how wide of a range would you get from that to what was ultimately in the client portfolios based on the people involved? In terms of just general portfolio approach in asset allocation. Asset allocation doesn't tend to vary that dramatically. Most endowments tend to have an equity bias. Their bonds are going to be somewhere between 5 % and 10%. There are shapes of the portfolio that are fairly common. There's a real difference that comes in in the manager selection piece. And I think one of the things that I started to realize over time is that the manager selection piece is as important and as impactful on the returns that you get as the asset allocation piece.
15:39And in fact, the manager selection piece meaningfully impacts the asset allocation piece because when you look under the hood, it turns out you can't neatly fit managers into boxes anymore. So the resulting portfolios, yes, they would look quite different and they would have different profiles even if you have a similar asset allocation. So once that gets brought to a committee, a thousand investment committee meetings, What happens in the committee meeting that creates the difference between a highly functioning group and one that struggles? So the first thing I'll say on that is that there is no one size fits all.
16:17The way that you make decisions and the way that you govern these portfolios has to take into consideration the portfolio itself, the history of the pool and the people around the table. And that includes the advisor that you've chosen. That includes the committee members. That includes the staff. The people are incredibly important. The history is extremely important. And the portfolio itself is really important. Every solution needs to reflect those things. And I would say when you are in the process of figuring that all out, the solution that you come to has to have very clear delineation of roles and responsibility.
16:54A lot of institutions fall down is if it's not clear who is deciding what. The other place where you can fall down is if you have a solution that might be clear, but it doesn't even remotely take into consideration the history or the portfolio itself, then the whole thing doesn't hold. So what you're really trying to do in any kind of a governance structure is figure out a solution that has the highest probability of sticking for the longest period of time. Because we are in the investment business, things don't work all the time. You need a process and a solution that is as robust as possible.
17:29And you can get that robustness through something that truly reflects the assets around the table. After some pretty reasonable stretch of time, like perhaps some other people before you, you left Cambridge to come to Amherst. What was that decision process for you? I always had in the back of my mind being a CIO. And by the time I had sufficient time under my belt at Cambridge, the choice before me was, you know, stay at Cambridge and act in that capacity or actually become a CIO. Towards the back third, I would say, of my Cambridge experience, I was starting to become totally disenchanted by the asset allocation model.
18:12I was looking at the way decisions were made and thinking to myself, this is not the way I want to make decisions. I am not good at predicting what asset class is going to do well over the next couple of years. I have some serious reservations about these long-term expectations around asset class performance. Also, all of these asset classes overlap. These delineations and asset classes don't actually reflect the manager opportunity set. I would much rather focus on decisions that I think I can have conviction in, which for me at that point were just bottom-up manager decisions. And I was trying to do that basically with some of my clients.
18:49And it is an incredibly hard thing to do in the governance structure. It's just so, so hard. And that mostly has to do with issues around short versus long-term feedback loops and thinking. So it's becoming increasingly clear to me that I would like to try and invest. It's hard for me to do that here. I would love the opportunity to do that somewhere else. Also, I would say having a bunch of clients is terrific. I loved all my clients, but having just one institution that you can work for is incredibly powerful and, of course, frees you up to do a lot of deep thinking in terms of the managers and the portfolio itself.
19:24So I have three children. And on my third, this is in the fall of 2017 during maternity leave. I first found podcasts and I started to obsessively listen to Patrick O'Shaughnessy and Ted Seide. And I will never forget sitting in my house. My baby Zelda's on my lap and I'm listening to your first interview with Andy Golden. And it was an amazing interview. I just absolutely loved it as you were going through it. And then at the end, I remember sitting there feeling a tremendous amount of angst because my main takeaway from that was, oh, my God, Andy Golden has figured it out. He has told everybody the playbook.
20:09What more is there left to do? I was like, why am I going to dedicate my life to being a CIO when Andy Golden has already figured it out? And he just told everybody, so we're not. Around the same time, Seth Alexander and the MIT team wrote the 10-year letter. And I read that letter and I was like, oh, my gosh, MIT is doing it. They're doing the bottom up portfolio management process. This is amazing. And then upon further reflection, I was like, wait, MIT is a very competitive place. Why are they telling everybody how they do it and telling their secret? Right before I started, I had lunch with a CIO that has a tremendous track record and is completely amazing and I respect them a ton.
20:52I asked them I was like what's your secret and they said to me people and process and I was like are you joking that's the answer and I share all these three things because basically I had this aha moment where I realized the plan is not the thing it's the execution that is the thing there There is no secret. And of course, I should know this. I went through all of Cambridge realizing there's no secret. I knew, but I thought, oh, the investment office world must be different because it's this amazing world. And it is amazing. But yes, there is no secret. So the idea is to have a great plan and then do it really, really well.
21:34So when you had that idea from the outside, how do you then bring it into an actual opportunity at Amherst. Okay. Well, so this is where I feel like I hit the absolute jackpot and I still can't even really believe my luck. When you look at the history of the Amherst portfolio, they have had unbelievable success and productivity in supporting managers for very long periods of time and really leaning into relationships. Across a wide variety of asset classes, we are talking 10, 15, 20, 30-year relationships being highly, highly productive in the Amherst endowment. And when I joined the Amherst team, I could see this and the committee itself was extremely supportive of an approach that leaned into that clear edge that Amherst had in its portfolio.
22:27I always talk about the Amherst portfolio as being a gift. It was an incredible gift. It's an amazing portfolio of relationships. And when you have that history of success, you can actually very naturally make this argument that this is what we should be doing going forward. They did have a more traditional policy portfolio that was written down in paper, but in actuality, the way that they had managed the portfolio over time was a much more bottom-up, flexible framework. The thing that Amherst gave me was this bridge from what I had learned at Cambridge to what we were doing at Amherst now, which is the way that you do the bottom-up competition for capital across the entire portfolio, more flexible framework is to lean into relationships.
23:14That's the door between these two realms. And it's been an amazing learning and something that we're leaning heavily into at the endowment. I'd love to dive into how that works. So there's this framework or lack of framework of asset allocation versus manager selection. How do you describe the approach? What we are trying to do is have a collection of relationships, partnerships in the portfolio where we have a tremendous amount of conviction in these managers. The conviction grows over time, which, by the way, is a huge thing and is not always the way the endowment world thinks about things. we need to have at least a 10-year thesis.
23:58If we are going to do this bottom-up competition for capital across the entire portfolio framework without the quote-unquote rules of an asset allocation policy, my view is that we need to have a very concentrated portfolio so that we can understand the portfolio deeply. So we have less than 40 managers in the portfolio. Half of our assets are in our top 10 managers. And the general framework is you initiate a relationship. If the relationship works well over time, you let that manager get big over time. So there's this journey from small to large in the portfolio that happens as the managers prove out.
24:34You make a tremendous amount of money on that ride. And then as managers reach our top 10, they're managers that we trust a ton. They're managers that have produced a tremendous amount of value for the portfolio. And then they become sources of capital because we need to spend, just as a reminder, 4 % to 5 % from the portfolio every year. So that's the shape. A few other things to say. In this kind of a framework, one of the central tenets is we are trying to really understand what it is we're investing in and make a decision about whether or not we want to be invested there. There's nowhere that we have to be.
25:06So there are no buckets that we have to fill. There's nothing saying you must be in European public equities or emerging markets equities or real estate. We have some very meaningful holes in the portfolio when you look at us compared to peers, one of which is real estate. We have very little private credit to speak of. We don't have any global emerging markets managers. There are all sorts of things that we don't have. The shape of the portfolio informs the pipeline. So we'll always be looking at stuff that we don't have as a way of pressure testing. Is this the actual right solution? But there is nothing that is forcing us to actually do anything specifically.
25:45With the idea being, we wanna be able to look at an opportunity and make the decision. And a very important aspect of that is that the manager decision is as important, if not more important than the opportunities that they are operating in. We do maybe one to two new managers a year. Some years we will do. None, we did none in 2023. So it's a very low turnover, long-term relationship-based approach. One of the other main aspects of this approach is that these portfolios end up developing power alleys. This is how I'm starting to think about it. Half of our portfolio is public, half is private.
26:24Of the private portfolio, we have a lot in venture and growth. And venture and growth is a real power alley for us. The quality of our relationships there is unbelievable. We learned a tremendous amount from those managers. And just as an aside, I think the ability to learn from high quality managers is an absolute superpower in these portfolios. So we have this power alley that's a big allocation for us. Basically, I think what this flexible approach allows you to do is it allows you to be OK with that and to lean into that power alley as long as you can create some difference in the portfolio at the total portfolio level.
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27:03A really interesting example of this is a lot of people look at a large venture growth allocation within privates and are like, man, you should diversify your private allocation. And I think that's one way to look at it. Or I could make sure I'm getting diversification across the total portfolio in another way without moving away from what I see as a real power alley in the portfolio. Yeah. So concentration is a key feature of the approach, especially on the manager side. But the approach in and of itself is not saying, oh, you should now go out and build a really, really high venture capital allocation within your portfolio.
27:37The approach is more play to your strengths and have the flexibility across the entire portfolio to make sure you have some amazing relationships and are meeting the high real return goals for the portfolio. When you look at the history of who these managers were coming in, and then you may have some biases or some places that you want to fill out to balance out some of the power alleys. How do you think about what the risk structure of this portfolio should look like after these organic manager selections take hold of the portfolio? That's a great question. Okay. There is, of course, risk at the individual manager level that generally I think of it as having to do with the risk that your conviction in a manager might fade over time.
28:24And that we obviously spend a tremendous amount of time on. That's one of the main motions, figuring out, do we really like this manager? I mentioned before, can we have a 10-year thesis on the manager? Can the conviction grow over time? There are all sorts of elements of the diligence process, mostly around the quality of the people and using our network to assess the quality of the people and the firm that they are trying to build to get us comfortable with the manager risk piece. So that's one thing. The second thing, especially for our portfolio, is liquidity. We spend a lot of time on liquidity.
28:55And the important thing there is understanding the shape of your liability profile and the shape of the asset profile that can support that. We focus on uncalled capital, spending on the liability side, and then cash, risk, and liquidity on the public side. So the source of funds and the uses of funds. What this approach explicitly does is it ignores private NAV. Our unfunded, just as an example today, is 12 % to support a 50 % NAV. It's extremely low. We have a very mature private portfolio. We're not trying to grow our private portfolio. We're just trying to continue to invest with our great managers.
29:40So I'm curious, if you go back a couple of years, this modeling of how you're going to size commitments to privates that isn't dependent on NAV, what does that look like compared to the alternative? Most private commitment modeling, there is a cell in which you input your private target. That's very, very typical. It really should matter what the rest of my portfolio looks like. So that's goal number one. Goal number two is build me a model where I don't feel better when my private portfolio is cut in half. I want to feel bad when that happens. And also the flip side of that, where we don't get punished when our private portfolio doubles.
30:27And then the other important piece is I need my private portfolio to produce its proportionate amount of cash. So we source spending every year. If I have half the portfolio coming in our privates, it had better produce half of my cash needs. So those were the key tenets. I have no control over private marks. The one thing that I do have control over is my commitment amounts. And oh, by the way, that's what gets me into trouble in times of crisis. The private NAV doesn't get me into trouble in times of crisis. It doesn't matter. The time that it matters is when it flows through to spending. But for Amherst, that is extremely lagged.
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32:31But through this entire time period, our portfolio has been cash flow positive. And I think that's a function of incredibly high quality managers that have continued to push capital back to us. I mention all of this because the key risk in all of these endowment portfolios, no matter what your investment framework is, is getting through periods of extreme stress. There are other risks, of course, but that is a key one. So we spend a tremendous amount of time stressing the portfolio and figuring out what we would do in those situations. You need stuff in the portfolio that you can use as sources of funds during that period of time.
33:03What you don't hear me saying is I need to make sure to protect the downside in terms of a mark to market on the value of the portfolio. That matters to some degree, but it matters a lot less than cash flow that I can get to meet my cash needs during stress. In a nice way, those two things do line up. But I think it's important to acknowledge that the way that many of these endowments are invested, the private portfolios themselves aren't mark to market. There's a lot of noise in terms of the actual mark on these portfolios that would cause you to make some weird decisions around asset allocation if that's the way you're mostly managing the portfolio, like this notion of beta basically becomes completely useless when you have privates.
33:44It's not helpful. So that's not the way we do it. We think about manager quality. We think about liquidity and managing through a crisis. And then the final piece, which I haven't mentioned yet, is we do position level look through across the entire portfolio. We know how much we have in the portfolio by stage of investment in terms of early stage companies all the way through to Publix, geographic sector. There are all sorts of ways you can cut the portfolio and look at it. I would say in terms of the loop back to decision making, obviously, we don't have full control over the look through. That's mostly a result of the decisions that we've made with the managers and then what the managers are doing themselves.
34:21What I will say is that it really helps us develop a deep understanding of the portfolio and how it behaves over time. The look-through exposures change, but for a portfolio like ours, it actually doesn't change that much. It's extremely helpful when it comes to comparing managers to managers. Just as an example, we'll spend time understanding how all of our different managers across public equities, growth equity, buyouts, some of our absolute return or more distress-oriented managers, how they're thinking about payments companies. We'll do that project. We can see those companies in our look through exposure.
34:59We know what manager they're coming from. Oh, this is very interesting. We have Visa, MasterCard, Stripe, and whatever. Let's talk to all of our managers about how they think about these things. It helps us develop a deeper understanding of how our managers think. It helps us develop a deeper understanding of how the portfolio is going to behave. And we can much better do this cross-evaluation of where should we be putting incremental capital and how do we compare our managers. Over time, when you have low turnover and you're allowing the managers to compound, you can imagine position sizes getting bigger, the types of positions those managers have being a little bit momentum driven.
35:35And I'm curious how you think about the way the composition of the portfolio changes when you're structuring it this way. Yes, it is definitely the case that, especially on that early journey, as a manager does well, they get bigger. and in the public markets context, you hear that and you think that sounds very momentum-y, which is what you just said, Ted. I think that's a fair analogy, but it's not quite the way I think about it. If you start overall with this concept that you want to have a fairly concentrated portfolio and you want conviction to play a role in position sizing, It is very hard to get to conviction immediately in a manager.
36:20You get to know people better over time. The conviction builds over time. They get more experience over time. It is also a very nice natural offset to what we know in investing, which is the fact that things get harder as you get larger. So wouldn't it be nice if we had a process where we could offset that to some degree by gaining conviction over time? I think it's fair to say that there will be times when we're riding momentum waves. Venture is incredibly cyclical. There are going to be times when our venture NAV really spikes and we just had that and then it's going to come back down. I am in absolutely no position to trade our venture NAV.
36:59No one is. So that's not what I'm going to do. I'm going to be a through cycle investor and support terrific managers over time. I also want to be partnered with people where this idea of mean reversion and performance is not a thing. We definitely do rely on our managers to help us understand whether or not their portfolios should be trimmed or added to. The other thing is we have to source money from the portfolio. So that is a way that we try to be counter cyclical in the way that we source funds. How do you think about the flexibility of pursuing an attractive investment opportunity that may not be present in your portfolio?
37:39That's hard. Our approach is not quite that. A nirvana for us is when our current portfolio produces our next portfolio. So we have amazing managers spinning out or our managers are calling us and saying, you better talk to this person. I know them from when I was just starting out in this business and I think they're amazing. You should invest with them. So we spend a lot of time developing those relationships so that we can get that call. A corollary to that is we try to be as smart as our portfolio. This all works extremely well if we have a really high quality portfolio that produces a really high quality portfolio and that gives us ideas on where to invest.
38:20What that means is the pressure is on to keep the portfolio as high quality as possible and to try and make sure within the parameters that we have set, which is super long term partnerships with amazing people that are trying to build amazing firms. we want to have as much difference as we can so that we see a lot of interesting things. An important result of that is that you tend to invest with generalists because we do not know what the market is going to look like in 10 years. We need these people to be building investment processes and have diverse enough interests that they can thrive across a number of different market environments.
38:57So we have a lot of generalists in the portfolio. We also specifically have several partners that are completely agnostic with respect to sector security asset type. So these are sort of our absolute return managers. And we see a lot of interesting things pop up into their portfolio. So I think the short answer to your question is, hopefully we see really interesting things in our portfolio. If we don't and we hear enough going on that this is an interesting space to be, we will take a look. Doing very niche-y things is generally not something that we're doing. We're trying to get those interesting kinds of investments through more generalist broad managers because we want to keep the manager concentration so high.
39:37You mentioned the importance of competition for capital. I'm really curious, how do you assess the relative merits of two things that aren't the same in terms of maybe their risk profile, therefore their return profile? One way to think about it is what is our ultimate goal here? AMRA's 10, 20, and 30-year return has been about 10 % compound annualized over that period of time. I will be thrilled if we can do that. So there are a bunch of things in the investment world that we can't do as a result of that goal. And we also know that the preponderance of the portfolio has to be invested in stuff that returns at least that, if not higher.
40:16We're going to be wrong on some things. Also, we have to hold some cash because of the way the portfolio is structured. We have to hold some more defensive stuff to get through a crisis, as I talked about before in the stress test modeling. It's not like I'm saying, do I want to invest in stocks or bonds? Because mostly I want to invest in stocks. The portfolio has a relatively stable balance between stuff that's there for relatively defensive purposes and the stuff that is playing offense. A lot of the conversation comes into competition for capital within illiquids because we are basically at the max that we can be in terms of unfunded capital.
40:55So there's a lot of discussion around, should I invest incrementally more money in this venture manager, this growth manager, a buyout manager? bringing defense in or lower returning assets into the private portfolio is basically impossible for us because the return threshold is so high because the relationships are so good. So you can get a sense for it. There's a competition for illiquid capital. And then on the liquid side, we're really trying to get as much difference in as we can while not lowering the threshold on returns. When you manage a portfolio this way, what does it take in terms of your governance and your Investment Committee to pursue an approach that doesn't have the same type of vocabulary or guardrails that people are accustomed to?
41:41Well, the committee has been amazing. And I will say it has been a journey that we have absolutely been on together. So it didn't happen immediately. I do think that this is an approach that was largely happening already. There is an element here where having a history of success doing this is extremely important and Amherst has that. So that's amazing. And having a committee that works together with the investment team and builds conviction alongside us. And in some cases, I have committee members that had conviction around this approach way before I did. So they have helped me. They're amazingly supportive and it's terrific.
42:17I make the joke that when I was at Cambridge, I loved my committees, but I would go to committee needles and feel like I had to strap on the body armor to go into battle. And now the committee is like a board of advisors. And I feel like we're all very, very focused on the best solution for Amherst and they are extremely supportive in how we're going about doing that. If you go back, say two years ago, the last time you had a new manager enter the portfolio, I'm curious what the path was like in that research process from the idea through your diligence and then entering the portfolio. This will not always be the case, but the last two have been what I would say are building out difference in the portfolio.
43:00So I mentioned that the shape of the portfolio informs the pipeline. Just as an example, we did a bunch of work on private credit a year and change ago, just didn't get there, but we wanted to pressure test that part of the portfolio. In the meantime, we've been doing a lot of work on trying to find relatively liquid managers that bring difference to the portfolio, but also produce a high return, which is very hard to find. So we've been looking and we found one. So that's just an example of we were on the hunt for something like that, because as just articulated, we have a fairly lumpy portfolio, especially in the risk profile of our private portfolio.
43:42So we need to make sure that we can get difference into the bubble portfolio to the extent that we can find it without lowering the return threshold. I think we are going to perpetually be on the hunt for that, but we're thrilled with the manager that we found there. And it's been a terrific underwriting process, and we're thrilled to be investing there. Another more recent ad has been a buyout. So we have some buyout managers, but it's a small part of the portfolio. We have some great partners there, but adding one or two more, I think, makes a ton of sense. And we found one that we're really excited to partner with.
44:13That won't always be the new things that get in. One of the very natural things that happens in a portfolio like this is you have a lot of capital with managers that you trust a lot, have long relationships with, but go through succession issues. So we need to make sure, especially for parts of the portfolio where we have these power alleys, we want to continue to actively invest in those. I think of it as an asset and we want to make sure we keep that alive. Some of our managers might not make the succession jump. We want to make sure we have people waiting in the wings to the extent that they don't.
44:45So that won't be adding something that's very different to the portfolio, but it will be adding something that we value a lot. So alongside the changes that can come from success and then succession that maybe doesn't work, to go back to the original analogy, I'd love to ask you about trimming the weeds. And so what about those mistakes that's in the portfolio? What's an example of something that didn't work out? So first of all, I will say I started five years ago. And maybe this is just a really good example of the long-term nature of the way that we do things. I've exited nothing that we have put in.
45:21It's way too early to do that, in my opinion. Something very dramatic would have had to happen and nothing, thankfully, knock on what very dramatic has happened. The full exits of things, sometimes it's very, very obvious. There's one of the co-portfolio managers can leave. Major organizational changes are very obvious triggers. One thing that is not an obvious trigger for us is not doing well. So, of course, there are things that we have put in the portfolio that haven't done well. That's the nature of this business. But we take this idea of long-term partnership incredibly seriously. And whenever we underwrite anything, the 10-year thesis is no joke.
46:04we are going through and making sure as part of that underwriting, if and when, and it's not if, it's when, when the manager does badly, how are we going to be comfortable? And what setup do we have to have to make sure we can support the manager through that period? So for sure, we've just had a really interesting market environment. We have some managers that didn't do well through that environment, and we're very supportive of them, and we're seeing how that goes. If you say, I'm going to be a great partner to somebody, that means you are a great partner through, I mean, this is so corny, but it's through thick and through thin.
46:37I mean, the whole point is to support them as they're trying to figure out what's going wrong. It takes time to fully acknowledge that something is going wrong. Then it takes time to diagnose it. Then it takes time to figure out what you're going to do to fix it. And then it takes time to actually fix it. The whole thing takes time. That's fine. That's what it is. One of the more interesting parts about our portfolio, when you look at managers that have done really well over long periods of time, some of the best performing ones are ones that had absolutely awful periods because those awful periods catalyzed an incredible renewal of the organization.
47:18And if you can stick with managers through that, it's so extremely powerful because first of all, access, of course, in our world is very, very hard. Having a reputation for sticking with somebody and sticking with a manager that will probably have access issues long term, it can be very powerful. Second of all, you see them go through a period of stress. You get to know them deeply. Your conviction in them builds. And then you're there for this whole other life, the compounding of the capital, the compounding of the relationship. It's an amazing journey to be on with them. Of course, not everyone is going to make it, but our experience has been it is well worth sticking around.
47:55The other thing I will say on this is I am definitely a real believer in the importance of that initial decision and the quality of the people that you are partnering with cannot be overstated. Our job in terms of looking from the outside in is so hard. It's very hard to know what is going on. As long as I've made the right decision on who to partner with, they are the ones who are going to tell me I trust them to tell me what's happening and to make it right. And if I haven't made that right decision on the initials who I'm partnering with, that's not on me. But if you set it up right in that way, it's this beautiful thing.
48:29You're on this journey with them together. How do you make the assessment that allows you to get conviction that you've gotten the people right? This is a great example of it is when you go through a tough period. Of course, there's the relationship with you. How are they managing their team through this period? When you go through that kind of a time, you learn a lot by observing how a manager evolves their business, their team, and of course, their investment approach over time. What are the things that you like to see when a manager is going through a tough time? It goes back to what I was just saying.
49:01It's like the stages of grief. From the outside looking in, we really have no idea. And sometimes it looks obvious, but it's not. Nothing is actually going wrong. This is just the market sending us false signals. That's it many times. We want to have very productive and engaged partnerships with these managers, but every manager is different in terms of the way they engage with LPs. And we take a flexible view there. We will meet managers where they are in terms of their preference on that. What you don't hear me saying is they have to call me monthly or they come and see me every quarter or whatever.
49:34There's nothing like that. It's more like I want to hear that you're acknowledging that there is something going on. You are letting us know at some point that this is what's happening and you are dealing with and being thoughtful about that. The other thing that I think it is important to note here is the ability for managers to actually just do what they think is right based on their wealth of knowledge and experience and all of the work that they have done is incredibly important. And that is so much about partnership and the LP base giving them the freedom to do that. And that's as much about me as it is about them.
50:18They need to have the ability to reflect, evolve, and problem solve. That's important. And then we need to have the patience and support and the ability to give them the space to do that. What are some of the biggest challenges with managing the endowment the way you do? One thing I would say is that the ability to cross compare is hard. It's something that we're learning about every day. And I would say that the main thing that we work on there is just, it gets much easier the better you know what it is you own and your managers. So it's very hard to compare two things that you don't know very well that are very different.
50:58It's a lot easier to compare two things that you know extremely well that are very different. So that's one thing, the ability to compare. And then the second thing, which is just to take it much higher level, is one of the fundamental challenges of just investing in general, which is figuring out if you're doing a good job. When you have a more traditional policy portfolio framework, there's a very clear benchmark for that. There are frameworks for doing performance attribution and things like that. For us, our benchmarks are much longer term than that, and they're the 70-30 and the peer median, which I actually think are very good benchmarks, and it's what our board and committee cares about, and it's what I care about.
51:40But we don't look like those at all from day to day. There's just such a long feedback loop between the decisions we make and when they bear fruit, and then secondly, when those actually translate into how we do versus our objectives. How do you work with your team when there's such low turnover of ideas? There's a low turnover of ideas, but we do spend a lot of time talking to new managers. It's interesting because I was trying to think about how much time do we spend with current managers versus prospective managers the other day just as a sourcing exercise. And it's actually somewhat hard to differentiate between the two because any time I sit down with a manager and I'm talking to them about some space or an asset or industry or whatever it is, you're learning about your current managers because they invest there as well.
52:32But I do think it is fair to say, though, that for this approach, it's not a sourcing-oriented approach, 100%, obviously, because we just don't do that much. It's more of a keep the bar incredibly high and very occasionally something will clear that bar. I'd love to ask with these long, deep relationships with these great managers, what are some important investment lessons you've learned from some of the managers in your portfolio? I learn so many small lessons from my managers every single day, and they're mostly around how to build high-performing investment organizations. Because we have a wide variety of different strategies in the portfolio.
53:16And one of the most fun parts is being able to see how an organizational design or the way that you think about paying and promoting people translate or doesn't translate from one organization to the next. There are so many different ways to set it up extremely well. So I feel like I'm just learning all the time from my managers on how one process or one investment philosophy does or does not pour it onto different things. I will also say one of the really fun parts about this job is that you are constantly in learning mode from your managers on things that are relevant to us specifically in terms of how we do our job.
53:53What are some specific examples of those? One thing that we talk about a lot, and this is more relevant on the public portfolio than the private portfolio generally, but it actually can be somewhat relevant to venture. But we tend to have more team oriented firms on the public side. One of the things we're constantly in learning mode on and thinking about is the dynamic between having teams that are more team oriented versus teams that are more what you kill oriented, what works and doesn't work in both of those frameworks. And it's interesting because it matters in a number of small and big ways.
54:27So if you're going to have a more team oriented framework, you need to make sure, obviously, that you pay people in an appropriate way that encourages teamwork over individual decision making and individual performance. but you have to make sure that you have a setup that adequately protects from the whole free rider risk you also need to make sure you are hiring the right people and getting rid of the people that don't fit within that you know so there are all these really interesting things like if that's what you want to do you need to make sure that the entire thing fits on the flip side if you have a eat what you kill framework you also need to make sure that the whole thing fits there the other really interesting thing to think about is team departures in that context matter in a different way.
55:16Also, interestingly, spin outs from those are more or less interesting. There are all of these really interesting things that I feel like managers aren't explicitly saying this to us. We can just observe it and we learn it from them over time. The other really interesting one, and this is somewhat related to the team stuff, but we think a lot about how close investment decisions are to the work itself. So the extreme of this, of course, is the analyst that is a portfolio manager. And that's great because there's basically no leakage between the work and the decision. So that's good. The challenge is that there's much less coverage.
55:54You're going to have a five or 10 stock portfolio. And in those situations, there's stuff comes in with the firm risk. So we learn a lot from our managers that have structured that well, and you can learn a lot from managers that haven't structured that well. To the extent that you have decision-making that is farther away from the work, you need to make sure that you pay people in the right way, you need to incent people in the right way, and you need to make sure you have a culture of communication that gets the appropriate work to the appropriate person so that they can make the right decision.
56:23These are just two examples of the sorts of things that we learn, but we learn that in space across the portfolio all the time. As you look at your portfolio today, over the next couple of years, where are you excited to be leaning in? What we are trying to do is invest with a collection of great people, and then some of them will do really well. I think there are some really interesting pockets of the world. I am excited for the opportunity set for our more flexible capital managers. I think this is a very interesting time for that because the world is changing, and it does feel like that could be a great opportunity for them, and some of them have done very well recently.
57:00So we're excited for that. I think biotech is a really interesting place to be investing in the public markets right now. But generally, what I'm really excited to watch is to see which of our managers are really going to capitalize in the next two years. I'm also really excited to hopefully continue to get some next generation managers into the portfolio. Well, I can't let you go without asking a couple of closing questions. What is your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? I have already talked about traveling and reading novels, which is what I do all the time. I love fly fishing.
57:33That's something I don't do it very often when I get to do it. It is absolutely amazing. My husband and I do it together and I'm basically obsessed. And it's an amazing way to get outside into unbelievably beautiful nature and have a mission, which is catching the fish. And by the way, it's catch and release for the animal lovers out there. That's something I love to do. What's one fact that most people don't know about you? So this is random, but when I was a kid, I was somewhat ambidextrous and my parents nudged me to be right-handed, but they didn't notice that I was brushing my teeth left-handed.
58:07So I still brush my teeth left-handed. What's your biggest pet peeve? My biggest pet peeve is I really like it when people are direct. Don't beat around the bush. So when people beat around the bush, I got into it. Which two people have had the biggest influence on your professional life? Okay, so my entire committee has been unbelievably amazing and supportive. And we've had committee members come and go since I started and that includes everyone. But two of my committee members that have been extremely influential and just a huge piece of what we've been able to build in Amherst so far are Simon Krinsky, my investment committee chair, who is the best investment committee chair of all time.
58:51and Ben Gomez, who is president of Pilot House, a family office here in Boston. And they have been both extremely supportive and the committee just in general has given me amazing bandwidth and space to try and figure out a great solution for Amherst, build this team and this process. And they've been extremely influential in terms of the solution that we arrived at. They've just helped me a tremendous amount in this journey. What makes for the best investment committee chair of all time? Simon has just been extremely helpful in terms of day-to-day tactics, team management, thinking about overall portfolio strategy, just helpful in a wide variety of ways.
59:29But I would say the number one thing is I'm sure that the committee spent time assessing me behind closed doors, and I'm sure they still do. But I never felt that. I always felt very supported. And I can't tell you how important that is for a new CIO. So feeling like the committee has your back and that you have the runway to actually figure out what you want to do is incredibly helpful. And again, is analogous to what we were just talking about with managers. This is the entire investment world. You need to feel like as long as you are highly motivated, smart, doing all of the hard work and have generally a good idea of what to do, the ability to just do it is incredibly important and remarkably rare.
1:00:12What's the best advice you've ever received? I think the best advice I've ever received is, you've got this. Just do it. It's going to be okay. All right, Letitia, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? The more pivotal points of my career have been things that have felt incredibly stretched and behind, in a sense, including when I went to Yale or when I started at Cambridge or starting at Amherst. The thing that I would want to just whisper in my ear is that feeling of being behind is you growing. You can stress out a little bit less about that.
1:00:47It's okay. Well, Tisha, thanks so much for sharing this journey at Amherst. Thank you, Ted. This has been a lot of fun. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at capitalallocators.com, where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings, and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more. Have a good one and see you next time.
From the publisher
Letitia Johnson is the CIO of Amherst College, where she manages the school's $4 billion endowment. After thirteen years working with twenty-five clients and attending over 1,000 Investment Committee meetings at Cambridge Associates, Letitia developed a view about investing that differs from many similar pools of capital and has applied that view over the last five years.
Our conversation covers the subtleties of managing an endowment with a concentrated, bottom-up manager-selected approach for the long-term, including portfolio construction, risk and liquidity management, long-term investing, and competition for capital.
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