[REPLAY] Adam Blitz – Inside Hedge Fund Allocation (Capital Allocators, EP.17)

29 May 2023 · 1 h 3 min

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Podcast Episode Notes: [REPLAY] Adam Blitz – Inside Hedge Fund Allocation (Capital Allocators, EP.17)

Episode Overview In this episode of the Capital Allocators podcast, host Ted Seides interviews Adam Blitz, the CEO and Chief Investment Officer of Evanston Capital Management, a $4.5 billion hedge fund of funds manager. The discussion dives into hedge fund investing, exploring strategic asset allocation, portfolio construction, risk management, and the evolving landscape of hedge fund performance.

Key Themes and Discussions

Background of Adam Blitz

  • Career Path:
  • Started with an interest in finance from a young age.
  • Worked at Goldman Sachs Asset Management and AQR.
  • Joined Evanston Capital Management at its inception in 2002.

Hedge Fund Allocation Insights

  • Evolving Perception:
  • The perception of hedge funds has shifted from being viewed primarily as return-enhancing vehicles to focusing on risk management and diversification.
  • Current average hedge funds are considered unattractive due to underperformance net of fees.
  • Selecting Hedge Fund Managers:
  • Importance of identifying managers with a sustainable edge and expertise in specific sectors.
  • Preference for smaller long-short equity managers with in-depth sector knowledge.
  • Distressed debt strategies favor larger managers with robust infrastructure.

Portfolio Construction and Risk Management

  • Bottom-Up Approach:
  • Focus on selecting individual managers rather than top-down macro views to drive allocation decisions.
  • Emphasis on diversification through long-short equity, which is often underestimated.
  • Qualitative Risk Framework:
  • Use of qualitative measures to assess how managers might perform in stressed market conditions.
  • Stress the importance of not over-concentrating on a single sector or strategy in the portfolio.

Market Insights

  • Current Market Conditions:
  • Low realized volatility across markets presents both opportunities and risks.
  • The potential for significant alpha generation amid market noise created by passive investing.

Manager Selection Process

  • Sourcing Managers:
  • Engage with over 200 new managers annually, often through current manager referrals or introductions from prime brokers.
  • Importance of personal connection and qualitative assessment of managers' passion and expertise.
  • Due Diligence:
  • Rigorous due diligence process that includes reference checks, background verification, and an assessment of qualitative factors.
  • Continuous monitoring of managers post-investment, with multiple touchpoints throughout the year.

Future of Hedge Funds

  • Outlook:
  • Anticipated resurgence of hedge funds if they can perform well during market downturns.
  • Potential for consolidation in the industry, leading to more opportunities for talented managers.

Key Takeaways

  • Hedge Funds' Role: Hedge funds remain a critical component of institutional portfolios, but their value proposition is under scrutiny.
  • Focus on Quality: Success in hedge fund investing relies on selecting high-quality managers with distinct competitive advantages.
  • Adaptive Strategies: Allocators must remain vigilant and adaptable, especially given the evolving landscape of market conditions and investor preferences.

Conclusion This episode provides valuable insights into the complexities of hedge fund allocation and the evolving perceptions of hedge funds in institutional portfolios. Adam Blitz emphasizes the importance of manager selection, risk management, and an adaptive allocation strategy in navigating the challenges of the hedge fund landscape.

Further Information

  • Follow Ted Seides: [Twitter](https://twitter.com/tseides) | [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/tedseides/)
  • Join the Community: [Capital Allocators](https://capitalallocators.com/)
  • Subscribe to Mailing List: [Subscribe](https://capitalallocators.com/signup) for updates.

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30 -something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager, majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink, provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

0:43As advocates of integrating culture research into the investment process and advancing wide -moat investing with the concept of moat trajectory, WCM has delivered differentiated returns while building concentrated portfolios designed to stand out from the crowd. WCM is committed to defying the status quo by dismantling outdated practices, believing in the extraordinary capabilities of its people, and fostering optimism to inspire each individual to become the best version of themselves. To learn more about WCM, visit their website at wcminvest .com. and tune into this slot on the show to hear more about WCM all year long.

1:27This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit wcminvest .com for WCM's ADV and further information.

1:55Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can keep up to date by visiting CapitalAllocatorsPodcast .com. My guest on today's show is Adam Blitz, the CEO and Chief Investment Officer of Evanston Capital Management, a $5 billion hedge fund -to -funds manager based in Evanston, Illinois, with a decade and a half of industry -leading performance. Adam joined Evanston at its inception in 2002 and leads investment research and portfolio management.

2:44Previously, he worked in the prime brokerage area and asset management division at Goldman Sachs and served as head trader at AQR. Adam earned a BS in economics at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Our conversation dives into the hedge fund category of investing, covering how a leading allocator in the space thinks about strategic asset allocation, portfolio construction, risk management, manager research, decision making, and monitoring managers. Adam's perspective on the evolution in how allocators perceive hedge funds, and the resulting unattractiveness of the average hedge fund today resonates strongly with how I viewed this widely discussed and recently scrutinized corner of the markets.

3:29Last week, you may recall, I suggested you reach out to your parents, help them learn how to use the podcast app on their phone, and recommend they listen to Capital Allocators. Well, my friend Matt let me know that after listening to that introduction while in his car, his nine -year -old son Aiden turned to him and his wife and said, Hey guys, have you heard about the Capital Alligators podcast? Keep those great stories coming and I'll do my best to keep the alligators at bay. And now, please enjoy my conversation with Adam Blitz.

4:07Adam, I'm so excited to have you here. Thanks for joining me. Thanks, Ted. Excited to be here. We're going to be talking hedge funds today. Why don't we start with your path to getting to where you are today, managing just south of the $5 billion hedge fund portfolio? Because I know you've been really involved in the hedge fund space from the beginning in different iterations. Sure. Yeah. I mean, it probably started as a kid, not the hedge fund part, but the part of being interested in finance and numbers and all that. Just always loved math as a kid. I don't know. I just always, from the time I was five or six, reading the sports page and computing the winning percentages of my beloved Philadelphia teams and usually more L's than W's, but still, that was always fun.

4:53And then just always seemed like finance would be an interesting place to eventually go into. So I went to Penn undergraduate, was fortunate to get a job in Goldman Sachs Asset Management out of college. And at that point, most people went into sales and trading, investment banking. So I kind of snuck into asset management, which wasn't very popular at the time. And I was fortunate within a few months to end up in Cliff Asnes's group, which was the quantitative research group, and eventually the group that became AQR. And that's really where I began to learn the chops, so to speak. And so you left Goldman and joined Cliff, right?

5:33Yes, exactly. Yeah, it was a fantastic time with the AQR team and kind of learned how hard it is to actually create strategies that have value, kind of net of all the fees and all that. And just tremendous insight, tremendous people. So you started with skepticism. Yeah, exactly. A very skeptical group. And that skepticism pervades still today. But I decided I wanted to see kind of the industry from a different angle. So I went to Goldman Sachs Prime Brokerage, which is really the part of Goldman Sachs that services hedge funds more from a perspective of enabling them to have leverage in their strategies, help them go short securities and long short equity strategies, for example.

6:14And then I was really fortunate, lucky break to meet David Wagner, who was the CIO at Northwestern University. And he was about to leave Northwestern, start a business and met him through some acquaintances and we hit it off. And yeah, that was really kind of how I got into the fund to fund business. Yeah. And that was back in 2002? Exactly. 2002, we started it. What was the case for hedge funds in 2002? And in particular, how much of that still applies today and what's changed? Yeah, I think back in 2002. So at that point, a lot of the top endowment and foundation investors had begun to go into the hedge fund area.

6:57And I think really it was to seek an alternative source of return. But I would say back then, it doesn't feel like that long ago, but back then, it really felt more return enhancing. You were trying to generate an absolute return that was very strong. And certainly some of the risk -reducing characteristics were part of it. But it was really viewed as this is access to the very best and brightest investment minds in the world. It's a way to access their talent in a way that's unfiltered and unconstrained by boundaries or guidelines or benchmarks or things like that. And I would say the industry has transitioned and morphed more into, it's become much more institutional, quote unquote, the focus on risk management, diversification, the risk mitigation aspect of it has probably usurped the return enhancement part of it.

7:47And that's not necessarily a bad thing, but I would say that it's definitely an evolution versus 15 years ago. We all know, and I need to talk about how hedge funds have struggled to generate those types of attractive returns the last bunch of years. Do you think those two things are tied together? That's probably true to some degree. I think the industry as a whole, and we've always felt the industry as a whole does not really add much value, if any value, net of fees. So the average manager isn't very interesting. And so as managers have probably underperformed, they've in many cases probably transitioned the story of why they should exist.

8:23And there's nothing invalid about risk mitigation in a portfolio, but you can mitigate risk through many different mechanisms. You can just go to cash, for example, right? So hedge funds still need to provide some source of alpha or unexplained skill or edge on top of what you would get from just going to cash. But I do think probably the disappointing returns have helped kind of shift the narrative more to that risk mitigation side. So for the last 15 years, you've been managing portfolio of hedge fund managers. What set of beliefs about investing do you start with to narrow a filter of, I don't know, there are 8 ,000 or 10 ,000 funds?

8:59I think you guys invest with 30. So where do you start? Yeah. The first place, and it really is so hard to find, is where's that skill coming from? And I think it's different in the different strategy areas. So long -short equity, which is a good part of what we do. We've always preferred smaller managers and managers with a sector of expertise, all else equal. It's just always made sense to us if you have a group of folks who are just looking at healthcare or technology or real estate or financials or what have you, they're not managing a ton of money, they can go into more interesting securities and names than if you're managing $15 billion and you might have a couple analysts in each sector.

9:42And so you're really looking for folks who know those sectors incredibly deeply. It's not so much a bet on our part that the sector is going to go up or down. It's more of a bet that there's going to be dispersion within that sector, you know, winners and losers. And there's constantly winners and losers in technology and healthcare, right? New scientific advances and whatnot. A sector like real estate is sort of a boring sector, right? There's not that many people who are looking security by security and saying, here's the characteristics of REIT A versus REIT B, right? It's not a particularly exciting area, but it's one with a lot of alpha in our view.

10:18And so that's a starting point for us on the long short equity side, tends to lead us into smaller managers, all else equal. Distressed debt is very different. We generally prefer larger managers there, managers who can afford the infrastructure, the legal expertise. They've been through multiple credit cycles. I'd argue in the recent period, managers who've done great, you would probably want to be more cautious of the managers who've done sort of mediocre because they might be chasing risk rewards that aren't very attractive. So we like folks who've been through multiple credit cycles and have kind of the infrastructure and bandwidth to drive outcomes.

10:54And then I'd say on the macro and sort of relative value types of strategies, it's much more fluid than that. But we have some folks who are big, some who are small. There's no kind of rule on that. But what we really are looking for is some sort of sustainable edge, something that's different about what they're doing, as opposed to, hey, I'm taking a tiny little spread of something, levering the heck out of it, and delivering a return that way. So in a classic like Markowitz mean variance optimization framework that Dave would have seen at Northwestern, And there's the studies that tell you that asset allocation is what drives performance more than security selection.

11:35How do you think about that in the hedge fund space? Do you start with thinking about the areas of those just broad opportunity sets that might be attractive? Or do you start much more bottom up with individual managers and let the strategy buckets fall out? Much more bottom up. You know, we think the scarce resource are really great, great managers. And, you know, we've learned this the hard way, right? When you try to say, here's my view of the world, let's shove a mediocre manager in to fit that view of the world that we need to have more macro or whatever it might be, you end up making mistakes.

12:07Conversely, you might say, boy, I've already got two technology managers. You end up passing on a third one where you feel that the talent is outstanding and you live to regret that decision. So I would say we have much more confidence in our ability to select managers who have a real sustainable edge over the long term than on our kind of tactical market sorts of moves. When it comes to the top down, we're really looking for more fat pitches, overused cliche, but distressed debt, for an example, we're very tactical on. So when defaults are high and spreads are wide, we'll tend to be much larger than in an environment like today where you have the opposite effect.

12:45effect. But even today, if we found a great distress manager, we would still want to invest in them, but we might size them more conservatively. So even then if you start bottom up and you create a group of managers, you do want to make sure you don't have 25 long short technology managers. So somewhere along the way, there have to be some bounds of what's acceptable on the playing field and when you're sort of going out of bounds. So how do you blend those two? Sure. Yeah. So we really through portfolio construction and risk management, and that's exactly right, that you have to have some sort of balance on that.

13:20So you're not basically taking one gigantic bet at the end of the day. We have a framework we call our qualitative risk framework, where effectively, you know, we think quantitative measures of risk work in 98 % of the cases, but it's the 2 % of the other cases that you really need to worry about. And it's thinking more qualitatively about each of our managers and how we think they'd fare in various stressed or shocked market environments. And it's not that we want no risk to those environments, but we want to be sure that we don't have too much risk in any one sort of negative shock. And if we ended up with 25 technology managers, it would probably scream off that page, you know, we're going to do horribly in an anti -growth environment.

14:02Or if equities, you know, were to tank and most of these managers have a net long bias, we would probably get hurt more than we would feel comfortable doing. On the other hand, I think we have some pretty off consensus views of how to build hedge fund portfolios. We actually think long -short equity is the strategy where you get the most diversification among underlying managers. I think prevailing wisdom is the opposite. But our view is that over time, a technology manager versus a real estate manager versus healthcare financials, very different sources of alpha or skills that are going to drive those managers' returns over a long enough period of time.

14:39So month in, month out, they might be highly correlated to one another if they have a positive beta to markets. But over a two-, three-, four -year period, we think the correlation among that manager group is probably going to be less than, let's say, among a distressed debt manager group or a vent -driven manager group where there's much more similarity of positions, which is why it's always been kind of the biggest area of focus, I would say, throughout our firm. And if you dive into that a little bit more, a long -short equity manager, if you think of it as the alpha piece is the spread, long -short spread, or how are the longs doing relative to the market, how are the shorts doing relative to the market, therefore how are they doing relative to each other.

15:17And then you also have the net exposure. so if you put together a bunch of different sectors as you said if they all have a certain exposure to the market they'll be correlated to the market and at some point in time if their exposure is too high that might dwarf the excess return they're deriving from security selection. What's your take on the sort of sweet spot of what you like to see in terms of the amount of market exposure and and the amount of presumably you know alpha or excess return they're generating? Sure. So if you look across our long -short equity manager universe, I would say the net exposure is probably between 40 % and 50%.

15:52So it's definitely the case then in any one month or quarter or even six -month period, that net exposure is a large explainer. Each manager's return and then the group of long -short equity managers as a whole. I would say, though, over time, as time goes on, it's going to be those individual manager positions that are really going to drive performance. So we might have managers in six stocks and they're 80 % net long. Certainly, if the S &P is down 10 % in a month, that manager is very likely to be down fairly significantly. But over a three or four -year period, if the S &P is down 10%, probably the stock picking dwarfs the market return.

16:34So we pay much more attention to that longer -term lens, if you will, and have a much higher tolerance, I think, than maybe others for mark -to -market volatility. If we think that over time, that from the managers, we're getting different sources of edge. And I think that's borne out over time. That, you know, if you said over a five -year period, the stock market's up 50%, it's very hard to say, I think the technology manager is going to do great or the healthcare one's going to do poorly. It's going to really come down to their individual stock picks. Let's circle back on portfolio construction.

17:09You mentioned that having a healthy amount in long -short equity is out of consensus. What do you think a consensus portfolio construction of a portfolio of hedge funds looks like at the strategy level? It's a good question because it's different from different people, obviously. Yeah, I think maybe 30 % to 40 % long short equity. There's certainly a performance chasing mentality in certain strategies such as quantitative CTA. Strategies like that have certainly been in favor recently. And so I think those quantitative types of strategies would find a role in most hedge fund portfolios. We have very little of that sort of exposure.

17:47Something like distressed debt, which is very on the investor's tolerance for risk and that sort of directional exposure. But I think 30 % to 40 % for long -short equity is probably... And then what fills the rest of the pie? Probably another 30 -ish percent event -driven, call it maybe 15%, 20 % relative value types of strategies in the remainder macro. And then that relative value macro piece, I think a fair bit of that is more quantitatively driven types of strategies. And yours is tilted more towards long -short equity today. It tends to be, yeah. If you look across the firm, probably about close to half is in long short equity, maybe 15 or so percent in macro, 20 % event driven and the remainder in relative value.

18:32Very little quantitative strategies and very little in the way of strategy that, in our view, utilize a high amount of leverage. And why is that? I think it's one of the biggest risks we think out there in the market right now is liquidity. We have a very high tolerance for, as I said, mark to market risk. So if a stock goes from 10 to 8 on the way to 20 and a manager owns it, we'll take that risk. We have a very low tolerance for when managers have to turn those losses into permanent losses. That can happen through investor redemptions where a weak investor base gets jittery at bad performance.

19:08They redeem, forces the manager to sell at probably the worst time. But margin calls on leverage can also spur that kind of activity. And when you start combining highly leveraged strategies with strategies that are crowded, where people are looking at similar factors in a market that we still think is fairly illiquid, in our view, those are risks that you're not particularly well compensated for. And so it'd be the rare case where we would invest in someone with a high amount of leverage, unless they're effectively getting that leverage, let's say, through a swap or futures contract or it's on something like a treasury bond or something extraordinarily liquid like that.

19:48How do you think about data analysis today, both in how you're operating and whether you're using data differently than you had a couple of years ago? And then also what you're looking for in managers, because a lot of what you've described as fundamentally driven managers probably tend to be bottom up stock pickers, which aren't necessarily the ones that are thinking as much about this sort of explosion of data and AI and all the things we're starting to hear more and more about. Yeah, we've started to think a lot about data analysis. I mean, certainly there's the simple data analysis of analyzing performance, looking back at historical periods, obviously simple stuff like what have their drawdowns been have they performed in a way that's consistent with our expectations.

20:35We think so much of manager selection and trying to figure out who's going to do well prospectively is based on much softer factors such as, you know, why is the person doing this? What drives them? Do they really love this? How competitive are they versus are they worried about their yacht or second house or something like that? And those are very qualitative, soft factors. But I've always thought there might be a way to use data to kind of suss out those factors. It's something we've started to think about a little bit. Like, what are some of the common characteristics of successful managers above and beyond what you can glean from their track record?

21:13Now, how you would get access to that data, you know, is it certain universities tend to produce better managers? Is it certain age groups, certain asset bases, certain investor base types? How you get at that sort of softer stuff without issuing them a survey of, you know, do you have a yacht or a second house is sort of challenging. So I still think it's going to be that qualitative element that there is always going to be that art piece in terms of figuring out who's going to do well. Now, you certainly could have strategies that are built on incredible data analysis and AI. And I think there's going to be a handful of firms who probably are the real winners in that space and have the best technology and infrastructure and are sort of a step ahead of the rest.

22:00I think that also means that some of these kind of newer quantitative managers or some of these newer funds that focus on Factor based investing to get really beaten by some of these funds who are you know couple steps ahead of that And so I think if you're gonna invest in those types of strategies However, you do it, you know You really need to think that they're at the cutting edge of those, you know those technologies So I'm really curious to dive into your manager selection process and a big part of the reason as I've observed for many years is You and the team at Evanston have invested across hedge fund strategies, so long -street equity, sure, but also macro, also in event -driven strategies.

22:39You've also invested in very large funds and startup funds. And so there hasn't been an easy filter from the outside to say, hey, we just don't do X. But at the same time, you've had great success in picking managers. And in some sense, you could say, hey, if there's a macro strategy, we're just going to give our money to Bridgewater because they're the biggest, baddest and best macro manager. That's completely different from the other end of the spectrum, which is backing a startup of which there are many. And I happen to know a number of the decisions you've made. And they have, with great consistency, been great selections, which is really hard to do in the startup space.

23:20So I want to start with how do you let's just go through the process. How do you source managers? Sure. So we end up meeting in a given year, call it north of 200 new managers that we weren't previously familiar with. And do most of those come to you? Or do you come to New York like you are today and run around? Most of them come to us for that initial meeting. Maybe I can kind of go through it from least likely to end up with us investing that maybe most likely. So the least likely would just be sort of a marketer calling up and saying, hey, we had a great year. We're coming through town. Take a meeting.

23:57Exactly. They usually don't call up after a bad year. We'll certainly take that meeting. You never know. Might be a needle in a haystack. We'll learn something from every meeting. But the hit rate on those kind of cold call reach outs has been very low. The prime brokers certainly introduce us to, especially to new managers, I would say, coming through Chicago where we're based or through their conferences. That's always very interesting just so you feel like you're in the flow of those new managers. And do you have standing instructions with the prime brokers that we only want managers who have come out of a north of a billion dollar hedge fund?

24:34We don't have standing instructions or hard and fast rules, but they generally know the types of managers that we would tend to invest with day one. And they tend to be more what I call blue chip launches. So whether or not they've garnered a lot of assets. Maybe they've run money as part of another team within a larger shop, and they're coming out. They have a very good pedigree. They're going to check the boxes in terms of having good operations and infrastructure in the business side from day one, as opposed to the two people in the proverbial garage. So they tend to know that. Our view, though, has always been to take every meeting, because almost in every meeting, you're going to learn something about, even if you might know within the first minute, we're not going to invest in these people, you're going to learn something about the markets, you're going to get some idea, maybe you wouldn't have heard otherwise.

25:24Maybe they have a view on a position that one of our current managers has in their portfolio that might corroborate the view or might have a very different view that might inform us asking a question of our manager on that position. And so we have a large enough investment team that it's not going to be seven or eight of us sitting around the table with that manager, but we do think it's worth one or two people's time to have that sort of meeting. Yeah, we've talked about this in the past, that I would surmise that that's impossible to have as a rule if your office was in New York City. Yes, that probably would be.

25:57You wouldn't have time to do anything but take those meetings. Yeah, exactly. I guess if you're in the suburbs of Chicago, it works a little bit better. That's right, if they'll make the effort. So those are some of those filters in terms of some of that initial screening. And so what is it that comes in your door that you end up being attracted to? So the higher quality introductions, if you will, come from, you know, we'll certainly always ask our current group of managers, you know, who do you know that you like and respect or might be invested in personally? And then we try to keep a small group of, you know, I call it kind of like -minded investors where we share ideas among that group.

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26:36And it's small enough that I think we avoid the groupthink that, you know, we're not checking and corroborating with everyone else out there. But, you know, we feel that if you can interact with a family office or two, an endowment or two, you know, I'd personally love to interact with just what I think of as eccentric investors who have no institutional process whatsoever, but might have a good nose for it, might have good instinct, might have a way of asking questions that get at the person behind the fund a little bit more. Those tend to be the best sources of introductions for us would be among that group.

27:13And certainly if we get wind that someone is leaving firm XYZ and we think it's likely to be attractive, we might chase them if we think that capacity is likely to be challenged. But you very rarely see that in today's environment. So from that initial meeting, what is it that lights a spark? There's probably a checklist and people tick off the checklist, but what is it that you see after all these years of experience that's, okay, that's someone we want to keep talking to? Yeah, I first go back to the soft stuff, which is just the passion and love for it. I think having done this for 15 plus years, you get that sense early on versus people who are like, okay, now I'm at the point in my career where I'm supposed to leave and start a hedge fund.

28:01Or maybe they're a team who left some big investment bank and everything checks the box of, boy, this group has worked together, but they seem kind of joyless and it just seems like a struggle. You just sort of get that sense, right? Now, just because you're passionate about it and enjoy it doesn't mean you're any good at it. But it's hard to see a lot of staying power, even if you're very good, if you're not enjoying it and feel that passion and competitiveness to do very well. So I think in that initial meeting, you know, you're never going to know enough to say, boy, we're going to invest in these folks, but, you know, that soft stuff will shine through.

28:36And then from an investment perspective, it's really trying to figure out what is their edge and why is it repeatable and sustainable. So this is the hard part. This is where the judgment might come in. I mean, the capital introduction folks at the large investment banks might help these people put together a nice presentation and everyone sort of sounds the same with their funnels of stocks that they look at. But just because someone sounds the same doesn't mean they're good, doesn't mean that they're not good either. But going back to the earlier discussion, within long -short equity, we're much more likely to get a feeling that they have an edge in a particular strategy if they're really expert in one area, right?

29:18So if you're meeting with a healthcare team and, you know, it's a bunch of doctors and a bunch of people who've been in finance and investing for years and years, and they've been through ups and downs, and they have people across the different segments of healthcare, and they clearly enjoy what they're doing, that's much more likely to be interesting to us than, hey, we pick, you know, undervalued stocks and, you know, try to short, you know, overvalued ones, you know, and, you know, it's just, it's kind of the first screen there. And then I think on the, you know, when you get into the more esoteric strategies, you know, I personally, I love trades that have that positive convexity or optionality and that thought process when you talk to people, you know, you can kind of tell a little bit if that's the way they think in terms of, boy, you know, here's my view of the world, but here's how I might want to construct a trade that kind of expresses that view with much more upside than downside.

30:14And when I was at AQR, one of the things I helped with was kind of the execution of trades. And I think it's so dramatically understated how important trading is in any investment strategy, market impact, implementation. I think in an initial manager meeting, folks tend to spend 90 % of the time on, tell me your three ideas and let's go into excruciating depth on them. I like to focus a little more time on, all right, you have these ideas. How do you put them together in an actual portfolio? And just asking that question in an initial meeting, there's no right or wrong answer. But what we found over the years is that the more folks are confident and have a handle on their own approach to portfolio construction, as opposed to kind of blowing in the wind on it, the much more likely they're going to be successful in it.

31:07So then as you continue to do your work, you have a bunch of meetings, usually face to face. Then you go offline and you do homework when you're not in front of them. What does that look like? Yeah. So part of that is, I would say, sort of clinical work, whether it's done by the investment team or ops due diligence team. It would certainly be reference checks in terms of who is the manager work with, what do they think of their success, their character, all those sorts of things. Having done this for 15 years, you look down those lists and you say, who's not on this list? Who should be on this list?

31:43And you try to find that person and try to figure it out. On the ops due diligence side, there's certainly a clinical aspect to that in terms of background checks, just corroborating their education and making sure there's nothing in there that shouldn't be in there. So those are kind of the clinical aspects. We'll certainly look at prior track record if there is a prior track record in a lot of depth. We'll look at old 13Fs and things like that and just old positions and just try to see if past performance, both the ups and downs is consistent with what we think their strategy should have generated.

32:20And a lot of times in the past, you might have what appears to be an optically good track record, but it was done on a very low capital base or there was some sort of issue that enabled them to do well out of the gates. But at any sort of larger size, you know, they're less likely to be to be successful. So that's kind of the, you know, the more the more clinical side. You know, I would say the the rest of it is more that intuitive, softer side. What's the feeling we're getting from this manager? You know, we have a term we just call sleaze factor, which is whether it's on the investment side or the operational side, if you're meeting with the manager and you're just not getting a great vibe from them, you're getting incomplete answers.

33:01Just it doesn't feel like a spirit of partnership or whatever. You can't even put your finger on it. We just tend to, you know, we just tend to walk away from that. I mean, we really want to think of these as, you know, as long term partnerships. As you get through that whole process, a lot of what you've talked about are very sensible ways of weeding out a manager. You're going to get to a point where there's more than one manager that actually meets all these criteria. What is the decision -making process that you use? And let's really get into it. Is it one person who's making the decision?

33:36And if so, what happens with the people on the team? How does a team make a good decision? We're an incredibly flat organization. So we have a nine -person investment committee that is the formal kind of investment body, if you will, of the firm. And we need unanimous approval of all nine of those investment committee members before someone makes it in the portfolio. Only really need one, though, to kick a manager out. So you need continuous unanimous approval, if you will. And what is that dynamic like? Because over time, boy, you have to get the approval of eight other people. How do you not degrade to kind of a group think?

34:14Yes, that is a great question. And really, I think the most challenging part of my job and the most important part of my job in the CIO capacity is to make sure we're not just making safe, easy decisions. Or one person raises their hand and has an issue or one person didn't like the way some question was answered. but in the scheme of things, it doesn't necessarily really matter. And so the overused cliche here, but the sausage making part of our process is a weekly meeting of our investment team. And that's where we'll bat around for an hour, often more just about all the meetings in the week, all the managers we're seeing, you know, where are we in the various stages of the process?

34:57And that's really where there's a pretty good debate among both existing managers and perspective managers where one person might say, you know, I'm concerned about X. And another person might say, you know, I, you know, I hear you on X, but I don't think it's a big, I don't think it's a big issue. Dave Wagner, our founder, I think is a tremendous people person. And I think one of the things that he's taught us all is when you have that sort of conflict or debate like that, instead of trying to necessarily forcing yourself to reach a resolution in the span of that meeting, you know walk away for the weekend you know come back the next week and revisit the topic and often people have moderated their views or often one person said you know i kind of see your you know your your perspective on that and it's it's really you know it's really served us well i would say we also have a rule in our firm that even if let's say there's people on the team who don't like a particular manager anyone on the team is free to keep doing work on that manager so So if I think there's a spark in a particular manager, even though maybe no one else does, I'm going to continue to do work on that and try to corroborate that spark and ultimately try to convince others why that's a good investment.

36:13So I think with that sort of process, again, the risk is that you make safe decisions. I think by having that healthy dynamic and walking away and having in your mind that we can't be safe, I think it's certainly helped us. But I think the pros outweigh the cons of that. I mean, I really think if we can't convince each other something's an interesting idea, it probably isn't an interesting idea. And we set up our whole, you know, we don't have anyone focused on any particular strategy. No one is compensated based on how their managers do. You know, there's none of that. There's none of that dynamic in place that might compel people to either push for against managers for any other reason than what's in the best interest of the portfolio.

36:59Yeah. So I'm having in my head like the jury scene in 12 Angry Men. It's nine not so angry Chicagoans, nice people. But how does that work? So does someone raise their hand every now and then and just say, look, I'm not seeing this. And I'm going to one person is going to turn down the minds of eight other investment team members. It happens more than you would think where we have people who just don't see it. And if everyone else sees it, it's not like we'll just necessarily just walk away and say, okay, eight to one and we'll just move on and forget that. We'll certainly try to convince that other person.

37:42But ultimately, if we can't kind of bring that other person around, we wouldn't make that investment. Like you said, it's all very collegial. But when I look at some of our best investments over the years, they often are the ones that have some hair on them, you know, in terms of, boy, that person was the number two person at some large hedge fund. And, you know, not every single thing that that person did or that that firm did was absolutely perfect. And so people who might have been in the larger hedge fund might not be investing in the spin out, you know, for those reasons. And you might not get a good reference from them, right?

38:18And so, you know, there's definitely very, very few of our best investments have had every single box check absolutely perfectly. And in fact, some of our more mediocre initial investments have been the things that kind of check every box. But again, that spark wasn't necessarily there at the end of the at the end of the day. It's not a bunch of angry people, though. That is that is for sure. It's all collegial. Collegial, we definitely have just a nice group of people, but very competitive. And it's a feeling that with the structure and setup we have, we should be making investments in interesting managers that not everyone is investing in.

39:00And I'd say when we do our day one investments, we do it with conviction and in size. And so, you know, we're not believers in, hey, you know, let's take a 10 basis point position in a manager so we can all pat ourselves on the back that we knew that that manager would be successful. They should be an impactful position, you know, right from the get -go. So once the managers are in your portfolio, what does the monitoring process look like? Yeah, so it's pretty intense. I mean, we want to draw that balance between we don't want to be a pest to the manager and kind of hyper analyze every single movement they make.

39:36On the other hand, we want to really know them extraordinarily well. And so by having a fairly small number of managers that we invest with across the firm, we feel we get to know these portfolios very, very well. And more importantly, the people behind these portfolios. portfolio. So we try to have five, six, even seven touch points with a manager in any particular year. Only a couple of those would fall into that sort of formal category where, hey, let's sit down and do a formal investment review or a formal operational review and go through everything in depth and kind of re -underwrite it, if you will.

40:12A lot of those touch points are softer. They're stop -bys. It might be take someone to dinner or breakfast and just, how are you doing? Are you having fun still, you know, what's going on. You know, we pay particular attention, I would say, when assets are going up in a firm. I mean, that's kind of an obvious statement, but it's probably the number one reason why we redeem from managers is the style drift that comes from asset growth. We pay a huge amount of attention to cultural change. This is just a critical factor. And And certainly after bad years for a manager, you just want to get a sense that morale is good.

40:51How are their investors doing? Are they sticking with it? But after very good years, you'd be amazed at people fighting for credit and feeling underappreciated and who needs to be coddled. And we have to be on top of all that as opposed to, hey, you had a great year, so everything is great. I think you have to monitor things like liquidity in the portfolio or things evolving in a way where we think they can continue to do well in the future. But even on this trip here, a lot of the meetings I'm having are much more related to the softer elements of it. How is a manager sort of evolving their portfolio now that their assets have grown?

41:30Are the people at another manager, they still love what they're doing? Or has it become sort of a bit of a burden almost? most, right? And those things are, you know, in many ways more important than, you know, kind of having a 30 -minute discussion of why their net exposure changed by 8%. What does your portfolio turnover look like? Turnover on average in a given year is about 15 to 20%. So five to seven year. That's exactly right. Now, you know, we certainly have some that are, you know, three or four years. We certainly have some that are, you know, 10 or 12 years. You know, We don't necessarily think that if we redeem from someone after three years that we didn't do our job right necessarily.

42:12I mean, it could be that if we're going into a trading -oriented strategy, which we don't do very often, but let's say we do, and we think they'd be effective at a small asset base but ineffective at a large asset base, let's get in them early at that small asset base. And if they're successful and raise a bunch of money, then great, and we can kind of move on. And it's obviously different from someone disappointing you and you wanting to get out early. But I'd say five, six years is the average. And where have you made mistakes? And what have you guys learned from them? Number one mistake gets back to that checking every box kind of mentality where the love and passion and risk -taking mentality just isn't there.

42:53And so I would say we tended early on to invest more in lift outs from investment banks, you know, kind of teams that lifted out from those banks. And invariably, those teams would say, oh, no, you know, being part of the bank was a hindrance more than a benefit. You know, I had all these names that I was restricted in, and so on and so forth. And, you know, being part of the bank and the flow and all that was really not that important. Well, you know, it kind of turns out that it probably was important, there was a lot of value to the seat. And it's just a very different mentality from going from a large firm where everything is sort of figured out for you to, hey, I'm running a business.

43:35My first three months haven't gone very well. How am I going to get the gumption up to take risk? And, God, am I really enjoying any of this? Or is it like what did I get myself into? So we definitely made mistakes in that regard. I'd say on the macro side, I feel we've definitely improved our process. Finding good macro managers is incredibly challenging because it's often hard to distinguish if someone's track record or history is a function of incredible skill and foresight or if it's just dumb luck. Hey, they got some call on the euro right eight years ago and they're kind of riding that out.

44:10And so I think we've gotten much better at saying, you know, even with things like macro, what's a sustainable edge that a manager could bring to the table? something like the ability to structure trades very well or, you know, say, hey, here's my macro view, but I'm going to position myself in such a way that if I'm right, you know, I'm going to do really well. And if I'm wrong, I'm going to, you know, lose a little. We view that as a much more sustainable edge maybe than even your calls from a macro perspective. So those are definitely some of the mistakes we've made. I think sometimes we've been a little slow to get out from managers.

44:46I mean, it's always that art of, you know, you want to stick with folks who might be struggling. You know, there can be a regret factor in investing. Boy, you know, God, I know this thing's about to turn around. I can't get out now. But if you start to sense, boy, the mentality of the manager is changing or something about their strategy or something about their love for the business is kind of changing for the worst. even if they're going through a drawdown, you're still better off probably getting out than, you know, kind of magically hoping for some bounce and then get out. And so I think we've been a little slower, you know, at times than probably we should be.

45:24And, you know, I think, like, any single allocator, I mean, in the world, no matter what they say, I mean, there's some element of performance chasing, and you just have to resist that urge to, you know, you want to be reducing when someone's doing well. You want to be adding when someone's doing poorly if everything all else is equal. You want to be investing in a new manager, at least new for our portfolio, after a period in which they've been struggling, not necessarily a period they've been doing great. It's hard to do that. I think we've gotten better at it, but yeah, we're certainly not batting a thousand on that.

45:57What opportunities are you most excited about in your purview? Some of them are boring, like long short equity. I just strongly feel that all this movement into passive investing is a real boon for really great long short equity managers. And I mean, I would caveat that with, we think 90 % of them probably add no value net of fees. And for that 90 % who probably have weaker investor bases, the fact that day in, day out, stock prices move in a way that often have nothing to do with fundamentals is probably going to hurt that 90 % of managers because they're going to get jittery. Their investor base is going to get jittery.

46:39For the 10 % who are really good, though, we just think that the distortions between individual stock prices and their fundamentals is just going to continue to grow because it's going to be influenced by ETF flows and index flows and things like that. And so fundamentally, we think there's going to be great opportunities. The cost for that is going to be higher volatility, though, because there's going to be noise in how stocks are priced. So a long way of saying we think long short equity has prospects for very high alpha going forward among the top managers, probably with higher volatility than it's had historically.

47:15The other major area I would say right now is volatility across almost all markets is unbelievably low. I think the realized volatility S &P in the last couple months has been something like 7%. You extend that to currencies and interest rates. We're talking in the lowest decile relative to history. We were talking with one of our managers in the volatility space earlier. They're saying the markets are pricing the environment as if it's the least uncertain fundamentally that it's ever been. And no matter what you think about, boy, passive might be reducing volatility, or you could get into discussions about that, it sure doesn't feel that this is the least uncertain environment we've ever been in.

47:58And so it just seems to us from a perspective basis with volatility at or near historical lows across a multitude of asset classes and the ability to structure trades that have very minimal sort of drag on your portfolio and maybe even have a positive carry in addition of being long volatility, we think is a great addition to a portfolio, albeit one that's been painful recently, and probably, you know, for all we know, could get more painful, you know, in the short term, but we think long term, that's just a phenomenal kind of mispricing in the market. And the sort of thing that as a fit in people's portfolios, to us seems like just a fat pitch.

48:40I mean, something that has a good expector return, but would particularly deliver when other parts of people's portfolios might hit a snag. How do people go about playing that? I mean, you're going out and identifying a manager, but are there simple ways if people want to express a regime shift in volatility that they can express that either in their own portfolios or through a manager? What do people do if you shared that view? It's challenging because probably the volatility index most people think of the most is the VIX, right? And equity volatility, while it's low relative to history, can be very expensive to have a long position in because the term structure of equity volatility, at least in the US, is still very steep, you know, upwardly sloping, which means that I might buy a futures contract on the VIX three months from now that's probably priced a couple points higher than and the VIX is priced at today.

49:39And if I just buy that futures contract and hold it, I'm probably going to lose a couple points and have strong negative carry. And so part of the reason probably people have, you don't see as many people in those trades on the long side is precisely because of that negative carry. There's much easier ways to structure those sorts of trades outside of the equity market. So things like interest rate volatility, currency volatility, have much more favorable kind of carry characteristics as opposed to equity markets, but they're much more challenging to find ways to implement as kind of an everyday investor or not through a manager who's expert in the space.

50:20I'd call it maybe an orange flag or red flag on the equity volatility side, as you're seeing a lot of people today go explicitly short equity volatility, and it's being packaged as a quote unquote alternative strategy. We think that that's a very risky proposition. You understand the appeal in that you can go short volatility through a VIX futures contract. It's probably ETFs that help you do this. You can earn a positive carry and a yield probably in excess of anything in the market. But there's so many people doing that strategy today that if you add even any modest volatility the other way, you could really get hurt and see some strange movements.

51:01So that That would be a strategy at these levels of volatility. Again, who knows when it'll break, but we would certainly, I wouldn't say necessarily avoid 100%, but just be wary of and be sure you explicitly understand what the manager is doing. And are there broad risks that you're paying attention to in your portfolio that you're concerned about? Yeah, I mean, I think liquidity risk is a major one. And are you talking about liquidity within the markets, or is it the structure of the hedge funds you're investing with and the liquidity needs of their clients? Or is it the whole? I think the whole package there.

51:34Liquidity in markets, I mean, certainly in the credit markets is still very, very low. I mean, it is simply hard to execute any sort of large group of trades in any credit market, whether it's high yield, structured credit, you know, what have you. So if those markets have any sort of hiccup and credit spreads were to rise, if people were to seek an exit from some of these strategies in a short period of time, I think it would be problematic. You know, even in the high yield ETF, a large percentage of the high yield bonds comprising that ETF don't even trade hardly on a day -by -day basis, even though the ETF itself is very, very liquid.

52:12And so that all works until it kind of doesn't work. Then within the hedge fund sector, like you're asking, I mean, you certainly have some managers who have a clear asset liability mismatch where they might have quarterly liquidity or some sort of liquidity structure where you say this is not consistent with the liquidity of their underlying investments. And if they were forced to sell these investments into the open market, they would take a huge haircut. And so as an investor, you have to pay particular attention to whether those terms make sense and then also who are the investors you're investing alongside.

52:49If a manager is running $700 million and $500 million of it is through an investor who you think might be a weak hand, that can be very risky then if you're alongside a bunch of endowments and foundations who've been there for 20 years. And so those are more qualitative judgments that you have to make. Even in the equity market, I'd say liquidity is not great. So much of the liquidity is due to, again, passive trading ETF flows, quantitative flows that if you actually need to buy or sell something or express a fundamental view in it, in a short period of time, if you're trading enough, you're going to move that stock pretty meaningfully.

53:29So I think liquidity is definitely a big risk. And then just, you know, I think other factors where you combine that illiquidity with leverage again. So certainly, you know, I wouldn't paint a broad brushstroke, but some of these quantitative approaches or factor -based approaches, if they're not constructed properly, you know, you could run the risk if you have a whole bunch of people kind of sort of doing the same thing with a whole bunch of leverage. and the rising tide has sort of lifted all of those boats to some degree. But if you have the opposite effect, it's not clear who's buying that stuff if folks are selling.

54:07Which wouldn't be a statement to avoid anything factor -based or alternative -based or anything like that, but just be sure that the strategy that you're in has been very thoughtful about how they constructed and how they would deal with that scenario. It's hard to go through a full conversation of the hedge funds and not talk about how challenging it's been and then maybe even like, what's this going to look like? So what do you think investing in hedge funds looks like five or 10 years from now? I would say that the, I hate to say this because it's not in one's control, but I do think the next performance node is a very, very important one.

54:40I think if markets struggle, hedge funds hang in there and do well, it kind of reminds people why hedge funds are in portfolios. Even most folks who are invested in hedge funds today They are still, at least mildly, probably disappointed with results over the last five years. So it'd be nice to have some sort of reinforcement from real data that hedge funds can play an interesting role in portfolios. So I think if markets sort of stumble, hedge funds do well, I do think there's the potential for pent -up demand into hedge funds. That'll fuel some of these startups that probably aren't getting started up because they can't raise money out of the gates.

55:18And I think, you know, the industry gets healthier again, especially for more boutique -y sorts of managers. I do think, though, the next node is the other way. You know, and let's say, you know, markets stumble, hedge funds stumble, markets, again, do a V -shaped recovery, hedge funds get whipsawed. It's just going to further kind of the negative momentum in the, you know, in the industry. Probably more money will come out and go into more passive types of approaches. And that's where, from a business perspective, right, having a diverse client base and just, you know, being able to ride through that period, you know, we think will be very important because that'll lead to a further shakeout of the industry, fewer managers, and probably more opportunities for the really great managers that remain.

56:04So I strongly believe that over a five, 10 -year period, the talented managers should deliver outstanding risk -adjusted returns, probably even more so with less competition these days. You just need to have a business and a path to sort of get there. And if you're probability weighting those outcomes, what do you think? I'm going to say, I'm going to go two -thirds on the side of the first one, where I think markets are, I mean, you know, certainly, even if markets continue up for another year or two, I think, you know, certainly most of the investors we talk to recognize that most markets, equities, credit are expensive relative to history and simply assuming they're going to continue to go up.

56:47I think very few at these levels of valuation are sort of willing to make that assumption. I think as interest rates rise, you know, which maybe they'll eventually do, that does raise the total return expectation for everything. And I think hedge funds should be, given all those dynamics we talked about, volatility that's incredibly low, less competition on the long short equity side, should in theory be able to ride through a period like that relatively well. I think there's always a tough period when markets sort of move to a more volatile regime, especially for long short equity, where in the middle of that, they might not do very well.

57:27But usually coming out of that, once the dust settles, they then tend to go on a very good run, especially the good ones. And so I think if you sort of explain to your investors and all that, that it's not necessarily the case that, hey, the market has one bad month and absolutely, positively, this thing is going to hang in there. You might be setting yourself up for trouble, but I think if markets have a sort of a prolonged malaise, hedge funds should do well. And if they don't do well, it's hard to see what the excuse would be at this point. Certainly, I think the other node, it's possible. I mean, every time we've hit a stumble, there has been a V -shaped recovery.

58:02I think a lot of managers during those periods have tended to overreact and change their portfolios and have gotten whipsawed. So we've seen that a little bit in recent periods. And so that would say at least there's some chance of that occurring again. But I think a lot of those managers have gotten sort of washed out, if you will. And I think that the conviction that they're seeing now at the individual security level probably would lead them to be less reactive this time around than they were in prior kind of V -shapes, if that's the outcome we get. Well, I guess time will tell. We'll have to see how this all plays out.

58:43Let's turn to some customary closing questions. What advice would you give someone early in their career? Cliche, but certainly do what you love and try to surround yourself with great people. I mean, I can't tell you, you know, like the AQR people as an example. I mean, they're great people, nice, you know, and, you know, when you're around people like that and smart people, no matter what your role is with that group of people, you just sort of put your head down, you know, work hard, listen to them, you know, you're going to learn an awful lot. And I think Sometimes younger people get so caught up in exactly what their responsibility is in a first job or a small difference in income or something like that, which is not to say that's not important, but certainly surrounding yourself and getting yourself with the best group of people possible.

59:32And again, it's very cliche, but I think it's true. If you're not doing something that you enjoy doing, it's very hard to have staying power to be really good at it. And so obviously it's important. What is your favorite thing to do that is a complete waste of time? Fantasy football. So I love fantasy football and really all following all sports. So I would admit to whiling away a few unnecessary minutes on Philadelphia Eagles message boards and things like that, that are not very productive time spent. So along those lines, I think I know what city we're going to, but what was your favorite sports moment, either as a participant or a fan?

1:00:11Well, I would have to say the 1983 Sixers Championship. Yeah, you've got to go way back in Philadelphia. I was eight years old, but I was just talking to my son about this as we were watching the playoffs. I mean, I remember jumping up and down on my parents' bed with just sheer joy. Then the 2008 Phillies World Series, because after so many dark years as a Philly sports fan, And actually make it over that hump felt good. And then the Eagles had some great moments in the early 2000s. And getting to the Super Bowl there and beating Atlanta in that championship game was great. What is your favorite book?

1:00:52What is my favorite book? The Complete Handbook of Pro Football. Yeah. No, I was reading a bunch of interesting stuff recently. I tend to remember what you're reading most recently. So... reading a book on just sports genes and what makes for a great athlete and kind of are you born with it? Is it the hard work predispositions some athletes have to, you know, those kind of heart disease and things like that? It was just a very interesting, kind of fascinating read. Who wrote that? Do you remember? I don't remember that. I don't remember. It wasn't John Wertheim from Sports Illustrated, was it?

1:01:30It was someone who's, it was Epstein maybe from Sports Illustrated? But yeah, very interesting book. It's on my mind. We'll dig it up and put it in the show notes that I don't have. If you could start over today, your career, money was no object, and you couldn't be an investor, what would you like to do? I would be one of these geeks who's involved in the data crunching for a sports team, probably for football, probably what those folks at the Cleveland Browns are doing now. I think that would just be great. I mean, I remember reading old Bill James books back in the early 80s, who was kind of at the forefront of all this.

1:02:10That would talk about a labor of love. That would be fun. What do you know now that you wish you knew 10 years ago? You know, I know I keep coming back to it, but just that soft side of it. I mean, I think, you know, in terms of just both managing the people within the firm, picking managers, interacting with investors, right? I think people have a tendency to make these things harder than they should be. And just picking up on those soft cues and really understanding what makes people tick and spending maybe more time on that as opposed to the nth degree of analysis, again, on position number eight, I just think is super, super important.

1:02:53Last one, you are 88 years old sitting in a rocking chair because that's what you do. and thinking about your life, what advice would you give yourself today? Boy, these are good questions. I think at the end of the day, I think treating people well and having a positive impact but being true to who you are, I mean, I think is, I think one thing about the people in our firm, I don't think we're cut out of that typical Wall Street mode and self -promotion and all those sorts of things, right? And so... I think for myself, it would probably be pretty quiet and understated, but kind of make a positive impact, you know, in terms of, you know, kind of using, you know, all the luck, you know, that I'd say, you know, I've had professionally, personally for good purpose.

1:03:45And, you know, I think certainly seeing, you know, my kids do what they want to do and kind of do it in an area that they love as well, right, instead of sort of forcing them in the rat race to keep up with the Joneses, so to speak. Great. Adam, thank you so much for taking the time. Thanks, Ted. It was fun. Thanks for listening to this episode. I hope you found a nugget or two to take away and apply in your investing and your life. If you've liked what you've heard, please rate a review on iTunes or Google Play to help others find out about the show. Have a good one and see you next time.

From the publisher

Adam Blitz is the CEO and Chief Investment Officer of Evanston Capital Management, a $4.5 billion hedge fund of funds manager with a decade and a half of experience managing hedge fund portfolios. Adam joined Evanston at its inception in 2002 and leads investment research and portfolio management. Previously, he worked in the Prime Brokerage area and Asset Management Division of Goldman Sachs and served as head trader at AQR.  Adam earned a B.S. in Economics at the Wharton School.

Our conversation dives in the hedge fund category of investing, covering how a leading allocator in the space thinks about strategic asset allocation, portfolio construction, risk management, manager research, decision making, and monitoring managers. Adam’s perspective on the evolution in how allocators perceive hedge funds and the resulting unattractiveness of the “average hedge fund” today resonate strongly with how I’ve viewed this widely discussed and recently scrutinized corner of the markets.

 

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