In short
Capital Allocators Podcast Episode Notes
Episode Title
[REPLAY] James Aitken – Macro Strategist Extraordinaire (EP.58)
Guest Overview
James Aitken
- Background: Australian-born, founder and managing partner of Aitken Advisors, a macroeconomic consultancy.
- Career Path:
- Started as a foreign exchange trader in 1992.
- Worked with AIG Financial Products and UBS during the financial crisis.
- Established Aitken Advisors in June 2009 after urging from clients.
Episode Highlights
- James Aitken's Perspective on Financial Crises
- Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008): Insight from his experience at AIG Financial Products as a front-row observer.
- Eurozone Crisis (2011): Discussion on the crisis and the implications for investors, particularly regarding Greece.
- Macro Management: What makes a great macro manager, emphasizing the importance of understanding complex financial systems and being adaptable.
- Central Banks and their Influence
- Views on Central Banks: Analysis of central banks in the US, China, and Europe and their impact on markets.
- Current Monetary Policy: Perspectives on interest rates, liquidity, and economic indicators.
- Investment Strategies: Importance of a broad mandate for macro managers and the need for careful client selection.
- Current Market Environment
- US Federal Reserve: Insights on the Fed's approach to interest rates and market reactivation.
- Emerging Markets: Focus on India and opportunities in its infrastructure development.
- Japan and Europe: Observations on Japanese equities and ongoing challenges in Europe.
- Lessons Learned and Advice
- Reflection on Career: Importance of being present, disciplined, and continuously learning.
- Investment Philosophy: Emphasizes understanding the interplay of risk and opportunity in capital markets.
- Constructive Paranoia: The mindset of being aware of both risks and opportunities in investing.
Key Concepts and Takeaways
- Macro Perspective: The significance of understanding the macroeconomic environment to make informed investment decisions.
- Crisis Management: Importance of being proactive and prepared for abrupt market changes.
- Cultural Collaboration: Successful fund managers foster a collaborative culture within their teams to encourage innovative thinking.
- Structural Changes in Markets: Recognizing the gradual shifts in global financial markets, especially concerning emerging economies.
Closing Thoughts James Aitken leaves listeners with the notion that while one can learn a lot from the past, staying informed and adaptable is crucial for navigating the complexities of modern financial markets. His focus on reflective thinking over reactive responses positions investors to seize emerging opportunities.
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Additional Resources
- Follow Ted Seides:
- [Twitter](https://twitter.com/tseides?lang=en)
- [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/tedseides/)
- WCM Investment Management: For innovative investment strategies and insights.
- Subscribe: Join the mailing list for updates and insights from Capital Allocators.
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This structured summary captures the essence of the podcast episode with James Aitken, providing insights into his experiences and philosophies in macroeconomic management and institutional investing.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30-something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street Groupthink provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.
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1:26This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit WCM invest.com for WCM's ADV and further information.
1:55Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can keep up to date by visiting CapitalAllocatorsPodcast.com. My guest on today's show is Australian-born James Aitken, the founder and managing partner of Aitken Advisors, a one-man macroeconomic consultancy based in Wimbledon, England, that works with approximately 100 of the most influential pools of capital in the world.
2:39James started his career in 1992 as a foreign exchange trader, moved to London in May of 1999, and in March 2002, joined the infamous AIG financial products team in London. In August of 2006, two years before the crisis hit, he joined UBS, where he deployed his knowledge of the inner workings of the financial system to help his institutional investor clients successfully navigate their portfolios through 2007 and 2008. At the urging of those clients, James established his own firm in June 2009. Our conversation covers James' perspective on the global financial crisis from his seat at its epicenter, the Eurozone crisis in 2011, subsequent process-driven opportunities in Greece, views on central banks in the US, China, and Europe, some brief observations on India, positioning for the current environment, and what makes a great macro manager.
3:35Please enjoy my enlightening conversation with James Aitken.
3:42James, it's great to see you. Thank you, Ted. Well, there's a lot we're going to talk about, I think. We'll see what happens. I wish you luck in editing this. Why don't we start with how you got started in this? I think it was almost an accident. I never had any inclination to get into financial markets, but my father was, and actually still is at the age of 81, a very good Australian value investor. So there was a little bit of financial markets and investing DNA there somewhere, but it wasn't until I was at university that I thought, okay, I'll make a go of that. and worked for Macquarie Bank in Sydney and foreign exchange and so forth.
4:15But I'll spare you the sad tale of my lamentable sell-side career. I think we're cutting to the chase is how did I end up running my own business for the past nine years and rather lucky than smart. And unfortunately, we have to get into my experience as an employee of AIG Financial Products. Yeah, the infamous AIG Financial Products. Thanks, Ted. That's very kind of you to remind everybody of that. But as you do when you're 31 years old, you think you're well-read and you know a bit about the world. And I started working for, believe it or not, the very vanilla trading business of AIG, which was commodities and foreign exchange in early 2002.
4:57And obviously, this is in London. And if anyone listening is in doubt, yes, I'm Australian. And I started hanging out with these two extraordinary men who were working at AIG trading. One was the late Sir Alan Walters, who was Margaret Thatcher's economic advisor. And the other was a very dear friend of mine, Bernard Connolly. Well, he's still a dear friend. And I realized, Ted, that far from being well-read and knowledgeable at the bright old age of 31, that as I was hanging out with these two extraordinary men, I knew nothing about everything that mattered. And that's quite a humbling recognition.
5:33Was there a moment early on where that aha moment came? Oh, I think it was in about the second meeting I took with Bernard and Sir Alan and all these references to philosophy and psychology and history and economic and history. And, you know, not just road to serfdom type stuff or canes, but all these other references and historical perspectives that, frankly, I knew nothing about. And that's when I mean, I've always been a very keen reader, but that's when I said, right, I've got to ramp this up. and my objective over the next couple of decades is to try to catch up to where these men are today.
6:06So it was a whole series of epiphanies, if you will. And then things got a bit lively in 2003 because Joe Cassano, who obviously we know was running AIG Financial Products, he took over AIG Trading. And as luck would have it, I was one of the employees of AIG Trading that Joe kept on, and I found myself working in that quite extraordinary dealing room in Curzon Street in Mayfair. I still get the tremors when I walk past it to this day. But it was, again, a humbling experience. And I thought I knew a little bit about markets. And the irony and perhaps tragedy, with the benefit of hindsight, of AIG Financial Products was that it was obviously opaque to the rest of the world because no one quite knew what was happening in the firm.
6:49But internally, I could walk 10 feet across the room, all sweet and innocent, and say, can you please explain to me what you're doing with that subprime insurance and how that CDO works and what do you mean by collateral and what's this counterparty risk and how come you're underwriting 29.7 billion euros of Dutch mortgages at 10 basis points? I don't quite understand that. So I kept my head down for four years. I didn't understand much, in fact, anything of what I was picking up, but I started to keep a notebook to write things down that I heard and I felt, right, I've got to try and understand what that means.
7:24And of course, one, I mean, there's many examples, but I think one key one was when AIG was first downgraded, I think it was 2005. And I started to hear whispers from more seasoned long-term employees of AIG financial products along the lines of, oh gosh, if we're downgraded another couple of notches, there's not enough collateral in the world to make us work. And Ted, I had no idea what that meant, but I thought, right I better find out so look I managed to stay out of trouble until the summer of 2006 by which time as it emerged Joe Cassano had been informed that you know look Joe there's some things we're doing here that are turning out not quite as we expected we need to be careful I was hired by UBS and again how lucky was I to be employed by UBS on a foreign exchange sales desk in London and they were kind enough to say look you have this expertise about other stuff from AIG Financial Products.
8:21You're not just an FX guy. UBS has this enormous toolkit. If you want to transact other products on behalf of your clients or advise your clients about, guess what, ABX, subprime indices and all these other things subject to compliance approval, you're free to do so. Wow. And off we went. Of course, the irony was that UBS had an awful lot of exposure to this kind of kit as well. But Ted, I started giving presentations from September 2006 onwards to various institutional investors around the world on what would happen if house prices stopped going up and how everything, what was happening under the surface, or as people know it now, the plumbing, how things work, how balance sheet works, liquidity puts, counterparty risk collateral, all the moving parts of the financial system.
9:08And of course, the premise was if house prices stop going up. We've got a problem. Because the whole structured credit machine could grind to a halt. And if there's ever a mark-to-market event, look out, because the whole system could grind to a halt because of all the connectivity. And suffice to say, it was a bit of an uphill battle to explain to clients, and I should add, policymakers around the world starting from late 2006 onwards, what was happening. And I know this will sound uncharitable, but it's true. it's very difficult to get a man to understand something if his salary or management fees depend upon him not understanding it right incentives incentives there you go there's a great book to be written on incentives isn't there yeah cldini did us all the favor with influence but i want someone to write a book on incentives because everything will become so clear so there i am sitting in this catbird seat with a front row seat at the circus now that's i think that's actually mixing metaphors.
10:02Let's just say I had a front row seat at the circus, right? And how lucky was I? And I keep saying it, but it's true. I worked at the institution that was the epicenter of so much that was going wrong or did go wrong in 07-08, and that was AIG Financial Products. It's a miracle. You mentioned that you had these questions as they came up. Were you able to talk to people and get satisfactory answers to those questions at the time? No, because as emerged subsequently, AIG Financial Products was not the culture where you question things too intensively. That was most sternly discouraged. But I did dig and I knew enough.
10:41And then to be fair to my wonderful colleagues at UBS, most of whom I'm friends with to this day, I was able to connect dots that I was unable to connect at AIG Financial Products by getting to know the repo guy who's now my long-suffering golf partner, or the guy who was managing counterparty risk, or collateral, or all these kinds of things. And it all started to fit together. And to give a tangible example, I mean, I think we've... Look, we're talking about events of 12 years ago, Ted, but these subprime indices, you remember this ABX, HE, 0602 BBB minus, and boy, did it turn out to be BBB minus.
11:24And for a long time, that index traded at par. And then one day, I think it was the second week of 2006, there was a tremendous seller in here in New York, the BBB minus, all the way through until September 06, it was trading at 100. And then one day it cracked and it closed below 100. And that was the first hint that the CDO machine was somewhat satiated in terms of their subprime bid. And then just to provide another tangible example of what was happening and how important it was to understand how things work. The summer of 2007, there's this mythology around August 2007 is when it all booted off, which is, I think, just not correct.
12:05You think about the end of the first quarter, start of the second quarter of 07, Merrill Lynch tries to make a margin call on Bear Stearns Asset Management. Now, as we may find out in the next couple, or we're starting to find out here in 2018, price discovery at the end of a tremendous liquidity and credit cycle can be an awkward moment. So by Merrill Lynch calling for margin for Bear Stearns Asset Management, who didn't have it, the emperor had no close. And then in July 2007, the rating agencies downgraded the tranches of the CDOs. And I know this might sound a bit complicated, but the CDOs were non-mark-to-market vehicles unless and until they were downgraded.
12:49And once they were downgraded, it was price discovery free for all. And that was the end of it. That was the point of no return. And we can talk about August. We can talk about how central banks, even at that point, had no clue what was happening. And then we get to Bear Stearns in May 2008. No, no, it was entirely mechanical. It was almost preordained as soon as US house prices stopped going up. and I'll just make a broader observation that when you falsify the key assumption underpinning any liquidity or credit cycle, you get mean reversion and then some. And it's the lesson of subprime in 06, 07, 08.
13:33It's the lesson of the Eurozone crisis, which guess what? We might have to talk about as well. I think we'll get there, yeah. And if I think about the present day, The key assumption underpinning the constellation of asset prices on my Bloomberg is that long-term interest rates can never go up, which means that discount rates can never go up much, which means the net present value of cash flow producing assets today is quite high. So you're at UBS through the crisis. At what moment did you set out on your own and how did that happen? Ted, it was entirely by accident. I have to say the idea that I'm doing what I do today and doing things like this, it's just absurd.
14:14It is totally absurd. I mean, the idea that I'm a classic case of eldest child syndrome, totally risk averse. I'm always the kid that had to be on time, have his shoe post. I mean, not a risk taker at all. And look at me. I mean, it's preposterous, right? And I got to work with more and more people at UBS, really interesting investors. And look, as you can tell from what we were discussing before, I was able to help a lot of people in 2007 and 2008 not lose money. And I was also able to help some people make a lot. And towards the end of 2008, where I was very lucky to have a job, many friends been ejected and disappearing.
14:57And there I was employed the greatest intellectual exercise of all time. the greatest, if not challenging, but certainly the greatest financial education of all time in terms of what's important. And eventually a couple of young fellows said to me, look, come and have a chat with us in New York. And I'd had people approach me and offer me jobs. I had one sovereign wealth fund say, oh, we'd like to give you a billion dollars to manage a long, short financial fund. And I said, well, that's great, but I can't do that. I don't even know what to do. I couldn't even construct. It's just not me, but thanks very much.
15:30And eventually of these two young guys out of New York said, look, we've got your back. Set up your own business. We're your first client. I'm like, whoa. Now, it only took me four months to make up my mind, right? Look at me, you know, Mr. Riskiverse. But that gave me the confidence to resign from UBS and off I went. And what was the intent of what you were going to set up? The intent was to help investors of all kinds understand how things work. That was the premise. And as you know so well, you can start with all these whiz-bang ideas and slogans of what your business is. But guess what? You learn by doing.
16:08So the first premise was, can my young family and I be at least as comfortable as we are today by having a go at this? And the answer was, yes, we can, so let's do it. And my wonderful wife was so encouraging. And I think, I'll paraphrase, but I think it was roughly, what have we got to lose? And that's what you need, right? You need that domestic support, right? And I was very lucky there too. And here's the amusing bit. So I drew up, had a spreadsheet of all these people who'd been receiving my, in inverted commas, insights during the crisis. and I divided my distribution list into people who were a slam dunk to sign up for Aitken Advisors LLP on day one, people who were 50-50 and then people who were no chance at all.
16:59And guess what? I start on day one and nearly the entire client base is people I had bracketed is never going to sign up. It just goes to show. It just goes to show. But look, I was very young. I got to work with extraordinary people. I got to connect with extraordinary people. And of course, by the time I finally kicked off on June the 1st, 2009, the world had changed. The bottom was in. And it was a very tricky time. You sit there at one o 'clock in the morning looking at a spreadsheet thinking, what the heck have I done? I'm out of my mind. The world's changed. I'm still writing about all this plumbing and balance sheets.
17:34It doesn't matter anymore. The fire brigade has arrived. The fiscal taps are on, the monetary taps are on. Who cares about counterparty risk or collateral? It doesn't matter. So I'm sort of digging a hole. I'm publishing every day, traveling, but loving it. And still clients are dribbling in and they were so good to me. They said, J.A., don't worry about it. Don't worry. Just do your thing. You gave us such support during the crisis. Just get after it, mate. We've got your back. I mean, how wonderful is that? and then we get to November 2009 and the Germans in their infinite wisdom decide to make an example of Greece and I'm going to use that word again as luck would have it at AIG Financial Products in London in the summer of 2005 when the Greeks announced that they would include the black economy in their overall GDP statistics we kind of smelt a rat it was most unusual thing to do to meet your debt to GDP obligations.
18:36We went through all the documentation, all the derivative documentation, all the counterparty documentation, securitization documentation, not just in Greece, but across peripheral Europe, all the fine print. And guess what? We get to November 2009 and it's all in play. And it comes back to that basic premise. When you falsify the key assumption underpinning any liquidity or credit cycle, you get mean reversion and then some. And the key assumption underpinning economic and monetary union, in fact, to this day, there's no default risk in peripheral credit of all kinds, whether it be sovereign or bank or whatever.
19:16And Ted, the Germans thought, here's an opportunity to teach everyone a lesson. And they hit a red button that took economic and monetary union to the brink. And you knew that as soon as they injected a risk premium into Greek sovereign bonds and counterparty risk and haircuts and everything else, they would start a process that would cause tremendous distress and dislocation, not just across economic and monetary union, but across, as we saw from time to time, the entire financial system. what an error it was an opportunity for me to explain in simple terms this is what is happening this is what they have done they have started something that's going to be awfully difficult to control so stand back be careful think about your counterparty exposure to european banks think about your exposure to euro just just be careful right now of course there were people out there that took advantage of it and said i'm going to short this i'm going to buy peripheral sovereigns you know, the usual stuff.
20:20But there's a big, big takeaway from all of this that I think is really important. From November 2009 until whatever it takes from the Draghi wizard in July 2012, we had mistake after mistake after mistake. And it's no secret that European policymakers, broadly speaking, have no strong like of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and these things called markets, you know, not very nice people. But when you step back from it and think about who did best from that Eurozone crisis, or dare I say the first Eurozone crisis, it was investors with a broad mandate who understood what was happening, were smart enough to step back from their exposures without wanting to change their mandate, without wanting to change their process and suddenly become a currency guy or a credit guy.
21:18But they did their homework and said, right, we understand what it is. We want no part of it, but we're just going to step back and avoid the worst of it, which is very smart and very disciplined, which brings us to the restructured Greek bonds. And this is the most brilliant lesson in the importance of culture. Dare I say, you and I have encountered a few hedge funds and other institutions where the founder tends to dominate discussions. That's fine. That can work well. but all the best fund managers I know instill a culture of collaboration where everyone from the intern to the founder to the CIO is encouraged to speak up if they spot something and they create a collaborative, inclusive culture.
22:03And it's easier said than done. And let's just set the scene. Here we are in Manhattan and it's April 2012. and finally they've decided to restructure Greek sovereign debt and a young lady speaks up at the morning meeting this is I'm going to paraphrase only slightly to protect the people involved but they're friends of mine and it's a brilliant example of how to think and not to react but how to think and be reflective and this young lady speaks up in the morning meeting and says boss the restructured Greek sovereign debt under English law is trading at a discount to the existing or remaining stock of Greek debt under Greek law.
22:48And Ted, you don't need to be a sovereign debt lawyer to understand that you'd think that a restructuring in English law is somewhat of a legal upgrade. Yeah. Yeah. Now, don't wish to offend anyone listening, but I think that's probably true. but it was a most unusual situation this young lady said i've done some reading i can find no history or no previous example of restructured sovereign debt under english law trading at a discount to the remaining stock under local law i think there's a lot of forced sellers who are missing the point and the boss said i'm going to put you on a plane from kennedy to athens tonight off you go.
23:29And she went to Athens and she spoke to people because not to mention her view, but to try to understand what she might be missing. And of course, she wasn't the only one. There were about a handful of people who were onto this. But again, a brilliant example of how you encourage people to speak up and think. Off she went. She triangulated what she thought she knew. She reported back to the boss and they bought an awful lot of restructured Greek paper under English law in the teens, which turned out to be the most fantastic investment. And what happened after that was a bonus. It was the original analysis.
24:08You know, Sam Zell likes to say liquidity equals value. It was like, if I'm buying the restructured Greek paper under English law in the teens and it goes to zero, that's going to be quite humbling. But you know what? I'm going to allocate X to it, knowing that if X goes to zero, we're still a going concern as a fund manager. And years later, they're selling those things in the 70s and 80s and taking profit and moving on. But the lesson there is for all the smash up in the Eurozone, all the policy mistakes, the people that ended up doing the best were the people who didn't try to be sovereign debt heroes.
24:46They didn't try to short all the banks, although Deutsche Bank is the gift that keeps on giving. They didn't try to be geniuses. They said, right, we know what's happening. It's beyond our circle of competence. We understand what the spillovers are, but we're not going to change our mandate just to participate. We're going to wait. And then along comes the opportunity. What a lesson. What a lesson in investing. What a lesson in process. What is it that makes a great manager, money manager, and what you've seen, and particularly in the macro space where there's a trading aspect to it, as well as sort of a, often a fundamental thesis.
25:24First and foremost, Ted, what makes a great fund manager is that they are long time. They are long time. They are never short time. They never give their time away. That's the first point. The second point, when we think about macro, maybe we should think a bit about what macro was and then what macro became. You think about macro in the late 60s and early back in the day. And you think about what quantum was. And if you read some of those early quantum shareholder reports and you compare them to the present day, it was like, this is what we thought. This is what we did. This is how we did. Thanks very much.
26:08Whereas in the modern day, no fund manager update would be complete without some reference to the Dalai Lama or I went to China and I saw an empty building. And then I was there just talking to my yogi and you know it's like who cares but but the serious point was part of the tremendous success of the true macro pioneers was the broadness of their mandate i will have a top-down view of the world but i will use any instrument under the sun to express it compared to the more recent past where macro has become institutionalized. In fact, too many macro businesses have become volt targeting. They take money from some asset allocator who says, don't lose more than X, and you can only trade equity indices, short-term interest rates, and FX.
27:00Is it any wonder that people have struggled? The point being that we went from a very broad macro environment where things moved to a very constrained macro environment, which made it difficult for people to express what they wanted to express. So what makes a good macro manager today? And, you know, of course, I'm replying from a subjective point of view because I know a few of these guys. Firstly, it has to be a broad mandate. To be able to use single stocks, for example, to optimize a macro view. To be able to trade exchange-traded Korean derivatives. if the mood gets you. I mean, it's an enormous liquid listed derivative market in South Korea of all places.
27:48To express a view on Japan by a particular sector or basket, as opposed to, I'm just long topics. Basically, to differentiate yourself from everyone else by taking advantage of things that may not be quite as crowded, the ability to avoid all the macro roach motels is the critical thing. Secondly, in fact, it might be the most important point, you need the right clients. You need the right clients. You can't have clients who ring you up every Friday saying, what have you done this week? That is just no way to manage money. But I'm afraid that's tended to go hand in hand with a lot of the institutional allocations that macro managers and headshot managers more broadly have changed.
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28:29They sit on your shoulder all the time, meaning that you feel you can't lose any money at all. And if you can't lose any money at all, then you don't feel terribly compelled to take any risk. So it's a pretty nasty circuit. Let's talk about today's markets. Maybe the place to start is the epicenter, the Fed in the US. What's going on in the plumbing? What are you talking about with your clients of things of concern and areas of opportunity? We'll come to the Fed in a moment, but you've just reminded me of an important point. It's dangerous when you're considered to be an expert on something. And I think it's still fair to say that people know me as the plumbing guy.
29:11But it's dangerous if you come to be known as an expert because it means you might shut your mind off to new ideas, new information. And the plumbing of the financial system is an extraordinary, complex, dynamic system. It's not a static system. It's dynamic. Of course it is. and yet there's so many people out there today ted putting out charts with two lines from relationships you know these infamous cross-country basis swaps or apparently the ebbs and flow of the treasury general account the deposits the u.s treasury has at the fed explains everything is happening in the world today which i think is just nonsense and they say oh look here's two lines that vaguely resemble each other one proves the other look out we're going to help it's like well know.
30:00And the key point I'd make that far from explaining to people over the past two years, what's going wrong in the plumbing, this notion of dollar shortages and stuff like that, which is a little bit off beam. My job is to be explained to people what's actually going right. What's actually going right. Opportunities arising from being able to lend dollars if you're a reserve manager in a sensible risk control way and earn a few more basis points, very controlled way, or to lend out your treasuries, or how Japanese institutions are lending their dollars in a much greater scale, which is lubricating global money markets and increasing the float of dollars.
30:42It's a change, right? So it's not what's going wrong, but it's explaining to people how relationships have changed. There's an obvious feedback loop between post-crisis regulation and what central banks have been trying to do. In fact, you might argue they're at cross purposes. But it's to try to help people explain how the plumbing is adapting and evolving. And I'm very fortunate to count key men and women in the plumbing as dear friends. So if I don't understand something, I can pick up the phone to my friend who's the treasurer at XYZ and say, am I thinking about this the right way? Or the CP guy, or the swaps guy, or the stir guy, and say, hey, look, have I got this broadly correct?
31:25And I find that immensely helpful. And really, Ted, if people think of me as a plumbing expert, it's not because I know anything about the plumbing, really, seriously. It's not. It's because, in my experience, the plumbing of the financial system is so complicated and constantly subject to change and ebbs and flows that nobody can know it in its entirety. So if I do know anything about how this works, it's only because I never stop asking questions. That's the key. And we live in this day and age where everyone seems to be entitled to their own facts and accusation is taken as evidence. And it applies as much as in political discussions as it does to observations about how the financial system works or how the Fed works or how the US economy is evolving.
32:24Oh, here's two charts. And we've all seen this. Here's two lines, one advance six months, we're going to hell. Great. That's fantastic. That's so helpful. I'm sure you and I, if we challenged each other in the next five minutes, we could go onto the Bloomberg and prove that mobile subscriptions in India drive dollar funding markets in Hong Kong. But if we lag it long enough, right, I'm sure there's a link. But, you know, that's the danger. So my challenge, in fact, when I reflect on most of the advice I've been trying to impart to my clients over the past couple of years, it's been more of the perspective of that's not right.
32:59Well, that's not quite right. Here's why. Here's a background paper. Or here's what this money market fund manager has actually said. Or here's what this U.S. corporate treasurer has said. or here's how banks are actually responding to US tax changes, et cetera. So it's to give people a broader perspective. And I think there's a phrase one of my clients like to use, which I think applies to investing in general, which is the mindset of constructive paranoia. Constructive paranoia. And you mention that to people, Ted, and they say, oh, you're one of them, you're one of those left-tail people. It's like, actually, no.
33:33Constructive paranoia when you're thinking about markets and asset allocation and investing is as much about, oh my gosh, am I overexposed to something that might go wrong, as it is about, oh my gosh, am I underexposed to this particular opportunity that people haven't re-rated yet. So it works both ways. The paranoia, the left tail, starts with US rates. And there's a simple case that we went from private debt to public debt in the US since the financial crisis, rates have been incredibly low. A very large asset swap effectively, right? Yeah. Should rates normalize? Can we afford this? And what happens?
34:14Take me through your thoughts. When I think about central bank reaction functions, first and foremost, I say to myself, what would I do if I was one of them? That's got to be the starting point. And we know so well, Ted, that there's been this great tendency over the years by market observers and commentators to project their opinion onto central banks. They will, they must, they should, they shouldn't. This is crazy. Doesn't matter. It just doesn't matter. and if you imagine what it's like to be sitting around that table when the Federal Open Markets Committee meets in Washington with their mandate and their institutional imperatives and not only that but everything they've had to do over the past several years, you too would be slow and gradual.
35:14And if inflation does perk up, that is a high class problem to have, given everything you've had to do. It has been the only game in town, particularly in Europe, and probably will be in most jurisdictions for a long time to come. So we can huff and puff about balance sheets, or we can say, what are these people most likely to do in their seat? What are their incentives? That's the key point. Now, the Fed gets criticized for their communication. And I have to say, over the past 18 months, they have been so transparent and so clear about what they're trying to do. And yet, up until recently, markets were fighting it.
36:02I mean, you had this extraordinary event in March 2017, where Janet Yellen thinks that her Federal Open Markets Committee have made it abundantly clear they're going to hike in March. And yet, the Fed funds market was not willing to price it in. And they all went, the key board members, into the financial media to say, no, no, we're actually going to do it. It was like an out-of-meeting rate hike because Mark was like, no, it's the Fed. They're nincompoops. They don't know what they're doing. Oh, it's the Fed. They're always wrong, which I think is a little bit unfair. I mean, they're not stupid people.
36:35They just move to the beat of a different drum to the rest of us. And they've managed four hikes in 2017. But let's go back a little bit to September last year and how people were able to do very well simply by paying attention to the Fed. You had the grand total of 0.2, i.e. no, rate hikes priced in to the US short-term rates market in all of 2018 and all of 2019. Now, you don't need to be a genius to think to yourself, that's probably a bit pessimistic. So people who understand how the Fed's thinking and looking at the economy with a broad perspective and estimating, guesstimating the probability of Republican tax cuts said, that's just silly prices.
37:25So they start tapping out a few euro dollars, putting on various curve trades, getting stuck into mid-curve futures, stuff like that. And then you get to the end of the year, and contrary to expectations, the Republicans have delivered a tax cut. And then, I know this is a tiny bit in the weeds, but it's very important, I think, to understanding where the Fed's going. And then you get to January the 11th of this year. Now, by the way, just as we entered the start of the year, something different started happening in financial markets, right? Now, we've been used to years of asset prices levitating and implied volatility across all asset classes coming down.
38:03But as we came through the first couple of weeks of January, asset prices are still going up. And guess what? Implied volatility stopped going down. Now, that's interesting. So you just write that down in the notebook and go, okay, something's changing here. Don't know what. But equity index implied volatility is no longer reacting the same way as it did previously. January the 11th, Bill Dudley, who's the outgoing head of the New York Fed, very important man, for a long time the world's favourite dove, but as the data evolves and the economy evolves, so too does Bill Dudley evolve, as you and I would if we were him.
38:37We're responding to new information. He gives a speech. He talks about this rather nebulous concept of our star, neutral equilibrium, real interest rate, you know, a whole bunch of gobbledygook. But it's going up. And that he thought, you know, three to four hikes in 2018 would be slow and gradual, and basically, you know, the economy's looking pretty robust, to say the least. Nothing happens. and I remember picking up the phone to one of my short-term interest rate friends and saying, am I following the wrong economy? If I misread this speech and he's like, we're sitting here thinking the same thing.
39:10This is like a really, compared to the baseline, this is a really hawkish speech from Bill Dudley and basically the front end of the US term structure has moved about a basis point. He said, look, I think this is wrong. I've sold some more Eurodolts and stuff like that. And then a week later, this is how the games work, right? A week later, Bill Dudley, I'm paraphrasing, but rings up the FT and says, I need to speak to you, grants an interview to Sam Fleming, who does a wonderful job covering the Fed at the FT in Washington, and goes to Sam and basically says, bang, bang, bang. No, I mean it. And then you start to get a little bit of more pricing in US short-term rates.
39:53And then a week after that, we get the high inflation prints. and then two weeks after that's on like Donkey Kong. Now the serious point is if you look at financial history, it tells you that when realized inflation goes up, not implied, realized actual inflation goes up, guess what? The correlation between stocks and bonds changes. Who knew? And the correlation between stocks and bonds and credit changes, as it should. And yet the world has become accustomed to the idea that the correlation between stocks and bonds is predictable and exactly the sort of amplitude and magnitude where it is today.
40:28And it continues to change. So the point is, if you've been paying even a moderate amount of attention to the Fed from the third, fourth, even all of 2017 onwards, and especially the start of this year, there's been an awful lot of money to be made. And then the challenge was to calibrate what the spillovers might be. Where the Fed's at today is still slow and gradual, working out how to retreat from forward guidance. And what J-PAL is trying to do is to reactivate the market mechanism. Now, notice I didn't say price discovery. Price discovery to a central banker sounds a bit scary because it might go further than you think.
41:13But to be fair, J-PAL is trying to find a way to reactivate markets while avoiding a rerun of the taper tantrum. It's tricky, but far from being concerned about a further tightening of financial conditions or further increases in realised and implied volatility, to them it would be perfectly logical and expected. And Ted, the whole point of tightening monetary policy is to tighten financial conditions and eventually bring asset prices down. That's the point. And yet the market continues to impose and project its view on the Fed. No, they're wrong. The yield curve's inverting. Believe me, if the Fed wanted to steepen the yield curve, they could.
42:08Oh, they could. They have the power to do it. Might be quite a dramatic thing, but they can do it. But this narrative that things are going wrong, and yet the Fed is like, slow, gradual, slow, gradual. And what the FOMC is trying to articulate to markets who are not willing to listen is that they think that they're going to keep hiking rates for a long time to come. And yet, no, no, no, they're Fed, they're idiots, here we go, global PMIs are rolling over. Well, I need to give it more study. But when I look at global PMIs, the reason they're declining a bit is because of capacity constraints. And capacity constraints and bottlenecks don't strike me as late economic cycle.
42:53They strike me as mid-economic cycle issues. So there's this disconnect. So my challenge is to pay attention to the Fed. They are an important central bank. They put tremendous effort into all their communications, unsurprisingly, tremendous effort. And they are going to be slow and gradual for a long time to come, barring a tremendous exogenous shock. And the final point I'd make is, look, let's step back a bit. This has been the first occasion since 1964 when a US economy perilously close to full employment has embarked on tax cuts. you would think based on that observation the probability is higher that in 2018 and 2019 the US economy will run a bit hotter than it has done over the past several years and while I think of it out of necessity all these morning calls around the world over the past several years you know these global calls have started with ambitious young women and men speaking to their colleagues on a speakerphone.
44:02It starts with which central banker said what? Who's up next? What did it mean? And then and only then do you get into discussion of what was Singapore non-oil exports or what's happening in Korea or best of all, what are we learning from our portfolio companies? And these global corporations are as sophisticated in their inventory management, logistics and order books as any hedge fund sitting in front of Bloomberg. the investment they've made in logistics infrastructure whether it be sap hannah software these guys have their finger on the pulse of the global economy and i'm struck by the disconnect between the consensus macro commentary on how the u.s economy is you know it's perilous or global growth is perilous or emerging markets are in dire strait i find that difficult to reconcile with the commentary that continues to come from global corporations about order books, forward order books, and everything else.
45:00And my sense is, subject to revision, that we're looking at late cycle asset price valuations. But shockingly, the US economy might be mid-cycle. And that might be the opportunity for people who are prepared to take a step back and look at things and look, to be fair, I wonder whether too many people are caught up by the first White House tweet every day. And that drives, oh, what he said now, oh, the man's done, oh, you know, they go on and on and on. And therefore, by looking at the world through the prism of the president, people are biased to look for what's going wrong, as opposed to what could be going right.
45:41I think there's an opportunity to step back from the consensus narrative and focus less on what central bankers are saying because they're reacting to the exact same data that we can see and they're reacting to input from US and global corporations. And in this age of crowded positions, leveraged exposures, if I'm going to wait for a central banker to give me permission to reprice something, it's too late. If I'm going to wait for J-PAL to say it's now okay to sell the long bond. It's too late. So James, some of the assumptions, these core faulty assumptions you talked about, you mentioned US rates will stay low forever.
46:29You mentioned in a real inflationary environment, the correlation of stocks and bonds changes. Are there other core assumptions that you think markets are making today that are faulty? I'm sure there's a great number of them. But of course, for me to assert that a market is faulty or the assumptions are faulty is you need to be careful that one is not too arrogant because Mr. Market is not always wrong. Sure. And markets, I think of them as a contest of ideas. So one guy working from a broom cupboard in Wimbledon needs to be careful how he... All right. Let me rephrase the question. Are there any things that you see that you suspect are common knowledge that you have a different opinion about?
47:18I am struck by the number of people who claim to be China experts because I don't know what that means. I encounter a lot of people who are very good at a particular part of understanding China. So there'll be the person who's very good on shadow banking and wealth management products and Chinese plumbing. which unfortunately tends to mean that they look at China entirely through the prism of their knowledge. And unsurprisingly, for the past 18 months, it's all going to hell, you know, deleveraging. And then there'll be the person who's looking at the Chinese technology giants and everything's going to the moon.
47:59And then there'll be the property person and everything's going to hell. And you go round and round. Look, let's face it, unless I'm on the Politburo Standing Committee, I'm not going to know too much as designed. I'm just not. And this narrative that China must, would, should, they have to, this, that, and the other, I think we need to be very careful with that. So the common assumption that worries me most about China is that they must have a subprime-like crisis at some point. I'm not sure about that. A financial crisis, some kind of credit cycle, liquidity cycle, defaults, for sure. But to use that subprime mental model and apply it to something as complicated as China or anything else, I think is a bit dangerous.
48:54When it comes to, for example, shadow banking and spillovers in China, what do we not know? We've had more and more information released. We know the stock. We know the flow. We know the players. We know the crosslinks. We can sign up with a WeChat account and talk to bankers onshore and the mainland. But it's just one part of the puzzle. And you have a man running the show for as long as he cares to, President Xi, who takes a long-term view. And he's trying to figure out how to rebalance the Chinese economy. It's a toughie. No one's tried to do what he's trying to do. And if we were him, we'd probably take a lot of time to figure it out, which is why I say deleveraging with Chinese characteristics.
49:47What Chinese financial policymakers would like us to focus upon would be the rate of growth in credit and shadow banking in the Chinese economy has declined abruptly. But the key thing there is that's the flow rate of growth. The stock is still rising. And perhaps I'm being simplistic, but I don't see how you ever deflate what is frankly a gigantic liquidity bubble rolling from asset class to asset class inside China without some pretty stern consequences for China's GDP. And that's the downside of being in charge of everything of your President Xi. If everything goes right, ta-da, I did it. But on the other hand, if you're all powerful and in charge and anything goes wrong, it must be your fault.
50:40I don't think the Chinese economy can afford too much deleveraging. Now, it doesn't mean there won't be mistakes from time to time, but you look at the new leadership of the People's Bank of China, they're very sophisticated when it comes to the plumbing. And while the People's Bank of China's balance sheet has been coming down, which I think has been underreported from my trip to China last year, number one takeaway is I will never understand this. I just can't. I just can't get my head around the enormity of it. I just want to be less wrong. So we're told for years that all these Chinese property companies and Chinese corporations are borrowed in dollars.
51:20If the dollar goes up and the Fed tightens policy, they're in a world of pain. And this young man managing a Chinese bank balance sheet in Beijing. Casually mentions, Ted, that, oh, we've got our$300 billion offshore balance sheet. I'm like, stop, what? Oh, yeah, we've got$300 billion in our offshore balance sheet. Oh, what do you own? Oh, well, there's a few treasuries. And guess what? Dollar paper issued by Chinese corporations. I'm like, wait a minute. You mean all these dollar bonds are stuffed into the Chinese banks in their offshore balances? Yeah. And then I triangulate it. I call a couple of large fixed income clients in the Far East.
51:58I say, look, you've expressed an interest from time to time in owning dollar bonds issued by Asian and Chinese corporates. How many have you been able to buy? None. Why not? Oh, it all goes into the Chinese banks. Ah. So you've got to think differently, right? And suffice to say, the Chinese like to support the home team. That's never going to change. Then there's another angle to this that I think is important, Ted. And rather than getting caught up in the game of predicting Chinese policy or economics or tariffs or trade or predicting what the PBOC is going to do with interest rates or the renminbi or whatever, is there anything happening that is a structural change that is not about predicting but is structural?
52:46And the answer is, of course, yes. and we're just at the start of Chinese onshore financial markets being plugged into global capital markets. And over a long period of time, I think that's going to change correlations everywhere. I really do. In what way? Well, global asset allocators out of necessity will have an increasing amount allocated to onshore remnambi assets. Now, of course, it is easier, and it's taken a while, to plug Chinese equities into the MSCI indices. Plugging in onshore credit and fixed income, which is a gigantic market, into global bond indices is much trickier. You've got to think about custody.
53:35You've got to think about can I hedge onshore. You've got to think about repo. And of course, plugging in onshore Chinese credit and fixed income requires further opening of the capital account because you and I are not going to commit X billion to Chinese government bonds if we can't get it out. That's just not going to happen. So the fixed income and credit bit is going to take time, but it's coming. Meanwhile, the MSCI inclusion has started. And over the past several years, the ebbs and flows of Chinese onshore equities have seen more about the rotation of the Chinese liquidity bubble. So this gigantic liquidity bubble inside China rotates from housing to bonds, to commodities, to stocks, and round and round it goes, whatever's hot next month, until the authorities say, don't do that anymore.
54:26So for a long time, Chinese equities have nothing to do with fundamentals and everything to do with liquidity and speculation. But what's interesting over the past, say, three to six months is to observe and to work with clients who are picking Chinese stocks onshore and to notice how Chinese equities seem to be slowly more aligned to what we in the West might call fundamentals. So responding more to earnings results, better calibrated with multiples. Now, this is an iteration. There's a wonderful friend of mine told me the other day that some of the best performing external fund managers he's had since the early 2000s have been onshore Chinese longshore equity hedge funds.
55:14There's a structural shift occurring. We can be as sceptical as we like about Chinese policy in economics. In fact, we should be. We should be. But is there something that's structural that's changing? I don't recall any country being included in the MSCI indices to be subsequently excluded. But I'm afraid the facts are that whether it be passive money or active money, over the next several years, there will be increasing allocations to Chinese onshore equities, and that's not going to go away. I know that this is going to be a powerful change for global capital markets, so I need to find a way to calibrate it.
55:56I need to find a way to think about this structural shift and how there's probably a great opportunity for stock pickers in the mainland, if I can find some. And I need to calibrate that structural change against the deleveraging, the complexity of deleveraging, the way China's trying to come to grips with this extraordinary stock of debt and shadow banking and trying to calibrate the trade-offs and most of all, trying to be proportionate about an immensely complex, gigantic economy about which, by design, Westerners will never know much. So let's turn to something that's been more stagnant and always seems on the cusp of change, which is Japan.
56:40It seems every few years there's an anecdote. There are people still in the graveyard from shorting JGBs. There's structural reform in the corporate sector. What are you seeing in Japan? I'm seeing a lot of opportunity because it's boring. I love boring. Boring compared to everyone being an expert on why Abe's three arrows were going to drive Dolly into infinity and all that kind of stuff, right? And all these people projecting that, oh, this is the greatest macro opportunity of all time. It's quite striking how few of them actually made any money out of that. But look, Japan's still ticking away, a little bit of a setback in the economy in the first quarter, but by and large, it's looking pretty good.
57:19The Bank of Japan sort of waffles from time to time about exiting their asset purchases. I don't see how they can. I really don't. And I could get myself into a lather about what it eventually means for the JGB market and everything else. Or I can step back and say, are there Japanese corporations that are absolutely the best in the world at what they do? And the answer is, of course, yes. And it's not just about robotics. It's about a whole range of things. There's even activists getting involved in Japanese equities. By the way, under Abe's patronage. He's like, look, if I can't convince my countrymen to do it, can you come in and give bit of kick.
58:00And it's been a good opportunity so far for people with a mandate to do that, whether they be here in New York or elsewhere. And it makes sense. But there's still these companies out there. I think it's quite cliched these days to say, own Japanese banks, but I've liked them for a long time. And I like to stick with them because I know how much they've invested in their risk management technology. I know how much they've upgraded their personnel. I know how keen they are to understand how they've run their balance sheets and stuff like that. So I think they're in pretty good shape and there's further re-rating.
58:34So I think of Japan as I need to keep an open mind. I need to keep an open mind. I think there's less excitement surrounding Japanese equities broadly. And my suspicion is that I need to retain a core minimum allocation to Japanese equities more broadly. And if in doubt, I'll just stick it in an index fund. And actually that's what we have. And I just want to sit it over there and just ride it out. So let's go from boring to exciting. get back home for you so you don't have to talk about being a guy from Wimbledon thinking about China how about Europe? oh it's all good Ted, it's all good look what is it about these people that they always want to play chicken with their own financial system what is it?
59:18there's been this obsession with the Draghi wizard as I think of him for the past several years, which is fair who's an extraordinarily accomplished, fiendishly market-savvy man. But look, people have sweated and obsessed over everything he's said, which is important, about short-term interest rates, about quantitative easing, about lending, about everything he's done, which is important if I'm trying to duck and weave through FX trading, trading Uribe or trading various curves in the Eurozone. But I took a step back from all of that the other day and I just read through the transcripts of the opening statement he has made at every governing council meeting since whatever it takes.
1:00:05And when you step back from all the what's he saying now, you realise that he opens every governing council press conference with a plea for structural reform and nothing's happened. He basically says, well, he's saying two things. A, if it goes wrong, it can't be our fault because the ECB has done things that it was never designed to do, which is true. And then he also says that, look, you really need to follow up. Please, Mr. Politician, follow up on structural reforms, but you keep promising but never delivering. There's no banking union. There's no capital markets union. And arguably, given the setbacks, the self-inflicted setbacks that Merkel has had, the probability that we're going to get widespread structural reform is going down by the minute.
1:00:51And then we have this extraordinary episode over the past few days. And I'm afraid I was not nearly as astute as some of my clients were in March when you had this election. And a couple of them said, hey, this doesn't smell good. And I was like, okay, I was more focused on US rates, which was a mistake. And then you get this Mattarella, not denying that Italy can't have a referendum at some point on the euro, but basically denying these two guys who wanted to form a government come charging in and saying, right, this is what we're going to do before they put it to the Italian electorate. So guess what?
1:01:30We had some pretty spectacular price discovery. And I'll say straight up, I'm not sure what this all means yet, but at a minimum, it's refocused people on unfinished business in economic and monetary union and perhaps permanently unfinished business. and how the heck can the ECB, which is the only game in town, ever step away from asset purchases? How can they? And we sometimes forget that we're talking about global growth being X or realised inflation being Y and the Fed's balance sheet is still$4 trillion plus, the ECB is still buying assets and the ECB's policy rate is minus 40 basis points.
1:02:14what on earth might be the market clearing price of risk with regards to eurozone peripheral credit were it not for minus 40 basis points and a certain amount of ecb asset purchases so when i look at what's happened the past couple of days people are already stepping in to buy the dip and i'm not sure that's right i'm really not sure that's right now as a tactical opportunity go for it. If I can scoop up a few BTPs at 300 over Bunz, great. But at 300 over Bunz, effectively, that is implying, I mean, this is subjective, but effectively implying a 30 % probability of some kind of re-denomination or tactical default in Italy.
1:03:0130 %? My word. That's not good. So the tactical trade, go for it. But the structural problem, not going away. But there's a bigger lesson, Ted, if I may. Central banks, with the exception of the Bank of Japan, have been signaling for a year or more that they are trying to reactivate financial markets. And financial markets don't want to hear it. there's a very fine fellow called Jeremy Stein who was at the Board of Governors until 2014. And in his last speech before departing the board, he reflected upon the taper tantrum in 2013. And I've reflected a lot about that too. It's popularly believed that the taper tantrum was a colossal communication error by Ben Bernanke.
1:03:55I'm not so sure about that. He was telling people via his speeches from February 2013 onwards that he thought US long-term interest rates were too low and people just refused to listen. And in reflecting upon that period, Jeremy Stein delivered this tremendous speech and he talked of leveraged quantitative easing optimists. in other words people who were fully invested in the idea that central banks would have their back forever and i think that pretty much describes where we are right now but the last 10 years that's been the winning strategy that assumption you're dead right has been the winning strategy you are dead right but from time to time we get attempted regime shifts by central bankers attempted and that's when we need to be on guard and when central bankers privately and publicly tell you over and over again that we're trying to reactivate markets and when they go on and on about oh geez implied volatility is too low they're actually saying that our tolerance for some kind of market correction is higher which makes sense when in some parts of the world and particularly here you're trying to tighten tighten policy as you look around the world to asset markets as opposed to rate markets or currency markets.
1:05:18Where do you see risk? I think the number one risk is the assumption that long-term interest rates can only go down. That's the number one risk. That underpins, I think, nearly every major asset allocation around the world. The assumption that we are perpetually mired in some sort of secular stagnation. But Ted, secular stagnation is a euphemism for policy failure, meaning that secular stagnation is a choice. And we're just starting to see in this country, now the long-term consequences of going for it with tax cuts, not to mention the extra 300 billion spending that they shoved into the budget in January at this stage of the cycle, well, there'll be some consequences.
1:06:00But one of those consequences might be sharply higher long-term interest rates in this country, which means that the discount rate that people need to apply to evaluate various assets for the first time in many years goes up potentially a long way. And I don't think markets are ready for that. And I think the market's ability, as we've seen recently in BTPs, to intermediate an abrupt change in thinking is impaired compared to previous cycles. So where the institutions have been piling their money are in these long duration assets. More and more in private equity, you hear about private credit.
1:06:36And on the one hand, from an investment perspective, that's nice because they get out of their own way. For sure. They own an asset for a long period of time. On the other hand, the longer the duration, the more the risk that they're going to get hit if rates do eventually move up. Of course you're correct. Let's think about incentives. And this is where central bankers get muddled. And many of them say to me, James, we're trying to tell people that we'll tolerate more volatility and we're not interested in holding the market's hand anymore and it's time for people to think for themselves. I'm like, yeah, that's great.
1:07:10I get that. People appreciate that. They just don't believe you. But then from an asset allocation perspective, think of it this way. If central bankers keep saying over and over and over again that when they're done hiking this cycle, they'll end up at a number much less than previous cycles, which seems reasonable, frankly. So Fed funds doesn't get to 525 basis points like it did in 06. It gets to something like, let's say, 300, which I think would surprise some people if we got there, but that's where I think it's the minimum. And if you, Mr. and Mrs. Central Banker, say that when we're done, terminal policy rates this cycle will be much lower, you're advertising to every long-term asset allocator, nearly all of whom are chafing under heroic, if not absurd, return targets, mid to high single digits.
1:08:00You are telling them that if terminal nominal policy rates are going to peak out at a much lower number, then the nominal return on risk assets is going to be lower. And the only way I am going to meet these absurd return targets is by remaining fully invested and owning duration, which is great right up until the point you made. Because if I'm assuming a steady state discount rate, great. Yeah, no problem. But then I sort of add 100 basis points to it. Oh. If you're in front of the chief investment officer of a pension fund or an endowment, different liability structures, how do you take and synthesize the information that you have and advise someone on how to shift or think about their portfolio differently for this period of time coming up?
1:08:56I start by trying to understand if there's been any changes in their process or any changes in key personnel or are they under pressure, you know, trying to understand their incentives. I've had this conversation with one very large pool of money. And he was actually saying, this is a great example, actually. It was during the Eurozone crisis. And we got into a great discussion about what was going wrong. And he said, James, you know, I get all of that, but I'm sitting on top of$100 billion and given my mandate, I just have to bull through it. Yeah. And I thought that was a great lesson. He said, I've just got to stay in the game.
1:09:35I can't duck and weave. I can't flip. I can't hedge. I just got to suck it up. And that's important. It's often overlooked. Frankly, I don't want my pension fund clients and endowment clients and family office clients to be in and out of stuff and trading. That's really counterproductive. But my number one challenge is to explain some of the things we've discussed about the Fed in a simple, understandable way to be able to condense it into this is what's material to you. And some of the things we talked about, like one of the topics that comes up a lot, is how should I think about my exposure to onshore Chinese assets?
1:10:18The other thing is a lesson on liquidity and what markets are like today is in nearly every discussion. If you're waiting, as we said earlier, for Mr. and Mrs. Central Banker to tell you it's okay to rebalance, it's too late. You've got to have a strategy. You've got to have a plan. So it's a whole range of things. But also, Ted, the most interesting part of the discussion with a pension fund or endowment or family offices, what are people not talking about? And that's where you learn so much. Hey, what are people not talking about that you think is really interesting? And what's the answer to that question today?
1:10:51India. India. And here's what I'm wondering about. It's a big place. It's a complicated place. It's a bureaucratic place. It's not going away. And in the not too distant future, it'll have more people in China. And some of the conversations that are starting to come up, I find fascinating because it forces me to broaden my knowledge and get outside of my comfort zone. So here's this country that is probably a structural opportunity. So take one example. We're all experts on Chinese technology giants. My gosh, these things are juggernauts. I mean, just juggernauts. And we all know the valuations.
1:11:34Let's say, simplistically, that the market cap of the Chinese technology giants is a trillion dollars, subject to what the next tweet from the White House says. What's the total market cap of Indian technology companies? Now, it's not a big number. Now, if we include Tata or not, Infosys and so forth, let's say, for simplicity, it's$20 billion. What? And again, we could debate whether we include flip card or not, but in private placement, put it this way, it's a very low number. And yet you have these immensely talented Indian men and women doing extraordinary things in technology all around the world, not to mention running important companies in the Bay Area.
1:12:18I'm like, yeah, that doesn't make sense. Now, it's not as if the Indians are about to allow foreigners to throw money into the Indian equities. And it's not as if Indian authorities is about to let foreigners jump into Indian credit and fixed income. In fact, it's often awkward to do so. It's like, wait a second. I'm not thinking about India properly. I'm not. But that's one dimension. Here's another. China, China, China, China, China, China, China, China, China, every conversation, China, China, China, one belt, one road, one belt, one road, one belt, one road. Yeah, it's important. And the reason we hear about it all the time is because China is the master of propaganda.
1:12:54Yes, of course they are. So we're inundated with commentary about one belt, one road, one belt, one road. But look, it's big, it's real, and it's China getting people to buy into the China dream. We know that. Why is nobody talking about the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor? And I'm ashamed to admit it was not until I had lunch with a great friend who lives on the same street in Wimbledon, who's this great emerging market equity investor. He's so enthusiastic and he put up a slide dmik i'm like what he's like yeah delhi mumbai industrial corridor was there last week here are all the companies developing it unsurprisingly ted you know delhi to mumbai captures an awful lot of humanity and here's what they're doing the roads here's what they're doing the railways here's what they're doing with the infrastructure india's getting it right and it's not getting much coverage i'm like and he's like it's investable and I'm loving it because it's investable today.
1:13:51No one's talking about it. I allocate my capital patiently and if I've done my homework correctly and Modi's backing it and the whole government apparatus in India is backing it, I feel comfortable with that and then I'll come back in a few years and so forth. And I've started reading about this and it comes back to the China narrative. Oh, look how many people we've lifted out of poverty. We have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. Yes, you have. how many million people is Modi going to lift out of poverty right I reckon it might be more than the Chinese have but just whisper it but then there's another dimension to this now because it's India and because it's happily a democracy it's going to take longer to do things than the Chinese where it's just like hey do that or you know you're on the next bus to Mongolia So there's going to be frustrations.
1:14:46There's going to be bureaucracy, but it's happening. But here is the next observation. What if India today is at the same point of its commodity demand cycle as China was in 2003? Now that could be big. and my suspicion is that that hunch could explain part of why global commodity markets and energy markets remain fairly well supported. And I need to do more homework on that. But you recall in years gone by, we used to reflect on what the filling of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in Louisiana salt caverns meant for the energy markets when they were topping that up. then we were experts on China topping up their strategic patrolling reserve and you look at India's strategic patrolling reserve they got a long way to go so I'm trying to learn as much as I can about India because like China it's not going away it seems to be undercovered from my perspective it seems to be under discussed and yet structurally I feel like I need to know much more about it.
1:16:04And I'm encouraging my clients to think about it. It's not to trade it. It's not to sort of punt it. It's to think about where India is in its cycle and what could go right in a day and age where every conversation is dominated by China. I want to ask you about your time. You mentioned that Warren Buffett has an empty calendar. You sent me a book list of books that you clearly have read that were, let's just say it's a long list. And in this day and age, there's so much happening on social media, which is the opposite of a book. So how do you spend your time and how do you think about what's important and what distracts you?
1:16:51We are in a world that preferences the reactive over the reflective. And I would have thought if one is hoping to succeed as an investor, an allocator of capital over a long period of time, you must preference the reflective over the reactive. So you invert what too many people are doing today. And as Shane and other people and Mr. Buffett and others advise, the most precious asset all of us own is not some stock or bond or private equity investment or whatever. It's our time. And since I've been working for myself, one of the things I've had to learn is to say no. That's the most important thing.
1:17:39And my dream week is to open the calendar and other than family commitments, there's nothing in it. That's my dream week. I'm not always able to do that. There's always someone interesting to speak with or talk to. But I find that all the mistakes I make are either because I pretend or I get caught up in a narrative that I don't understand and I haven't adequately reflected upon. Or, heaven forbid, I get caught up in the groupthink. Or I go down some ridiculous rabbit hole on Twitter, which is apparently insight, although I do have my doubts. So it's a battle, but it starts with discipline, and I continue to work on that.
1:18:26And when I started working for myself, I really ramped up my reading. Why? Because I could. If you're sitting on an investment bank sales desk, you can't sit there with a book in your hand. You'll be out in the street. I really ramped up my reading, and it's humbling. Every day, I walk into my library, and I look at the shelf of unread books. My wife often asks why I've not been invited to join the board of Amazon. Goodness knows I give him a bit of support. But I look at all these books and I think, my gosh, how could I not read that? How could I have not known that? How could I? Oh, my God. I've not heard of her or him or that or that event.
1:19:02This is terrible, right? I'll say delicately, you know, midlife-ish. And I benefited from a wonderful education in Sydney. Thanks to mum and dad, I went to the University of Sydney. But I got to say, I feel that my education truly began when I started working for myself. And I started carving out huge chunks of time just to read and think and reflect. And it's a journey. And look, I'm not saying that I've got it sorted out. I'm not saying that I've figured it out. Far from that. All I know is that the more disciplined I am with my time, the better I seem to understand issues of the day. And I say to my clients that related to your question, I'm just trying to be less wrong.
1:19:57I'm trying to be less wrong. And if I can come to grips with that and I'm patient and I read, then from time to time, I'm hopeful there'll be opportunities that I can steer my clients toward, whether they be being sensible after Brexit, whether they mean the investing opportunities in January 2016 when you had certain Asian equities trading at Asian crisis lows. I mean, that's just absurd. You know, well-run businesses with good balance sheets. The opportunity in US short-term interest rates, sometimes you have to wait a while, but the more you step back and create the space to reflect, my hunch would be you're more likely to be less wrong.
1:20:39And that's the challenge. All right. I think we could go on and on, but we probably should turn to these closing questions before everybody stops tuning in. So here we go. What was your favorite achievement from your youth? What age does youth go up to? 40. Good.
1:21:01I'm going to say getting a single-figure golf handicap. Nice. Yeah. All right. My handicap today is three children under 13. Exactly. Who I love dearly. Keep that in. what's your biggest investment pet peeve that from time to time i've pretended to know something that i don't understand that's my number one pet peeve is that for too long i was impulsive and reactive and so i'm calling myself out as opposed to what other people do if i'm thinking about what other people do, one of my pet peeves is people that jump up and down and up and down, up and down, up and down, up and down. And they say, I told you so.
1:21:50Now, maybe I'm old fashioned. If I was providing independent research to people sitting on top of prodigious piles of capital, I could think of no better way than to antagonize them, let alone upset them, by when something I've been predicting for years suddenly happens and then I say, I told you so or we nailed it. So there's two angles to your peeve question. What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you? Being present for your family, number one. I think about the heroic effort that our dear late mother put in to the point of exhaustion most days to feed three very hungry sons in Sydney.
1:22:40The shopping involved and the cooking involved. I mean, she was magnificent. And then dad, who had a very busy job, he was always, I know it sounds cliched, but he was always there for us. And I think that's the number one lesson, being present for your family. not just in the room, but being present. And that goes back to being disciplined when it comes to technology. You can't lecture two preteen girls about the evils of the iPhone, which I sometimes do, if you're walking around your living area with an iPhone in your pocket. It just doesn't work. So the number one lesson for mum and dad was being present.
1:23:20And there's nothing more important. What information do you read that you get a lot out of that other people might not know about? There is a tremendous amount of information in testimony provided to various parliamentary committees around the world. Now, I know that sounds awfully anorak, but I'll give you a very important example. By definition, if I'm testifying to a House of Commons or House of Lords committee, I am doing so under oath, meaning that it's likely to be more reliable than what you read in the Times or the FT, which will be an interpretation of what's happening in the world. In other words, someone else's view of what's happening.
1:24:08And when it comes to social media companies, the House of Commons Digital Media Committee has been holding hearings in London and Washington about the role and activities of these social media platforms. And not just because I'm personally interested in it, but I've been reading the transcripts of these committee hearings, and it's absolutely awful. And the sanctimonious hypocrisy, not to mention borderline lawbreaking, that comes screaming out of these transcripts is just appalling. and it's there in the public domain and when it comes to a facebook or a twitter or some of these other platforms there are real problems pending and i found it very helpful well ahead of this cambridge analytica stuff to just go to the website of the house of commons and calmly read it and it is the most appalling now self-indictment's a strong term but metaphorically the self-indictment that you can read in these transcripts.
1:25:16The disconnect is appalling. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in your life? That as much as I liked to read from a very young age, I should have done even more. That's the number one. Yeah, that's the number one. I could have done so much better. I could have been so much smarter related to which with the way I approach things. I could have been so much smarter with process, discipline. Things as seemingly mundane as getting up the same time every day, doing the same thing over and over again. And I'm glad we kind of almost by accident got into this, but the common thread across all the most successful investors I have the great, great fortune to work with is their absolute obsession with process.
1:26:01Absolute obsession. If they've got three offices around the world, good for them, but they're identical. and having that comfort, knowing your process, doing the same thing every day for decades. The pen's in the same spot. The mouse is identical. I mean, it sounds inane, but it helps you be anticipatory and remain in control in what remains a very, very emotional and often hyperventilating world. So two things, Ted. I wish I'd done even more reading across all sorts of topics and I wish I'd paid greater attention and been more disciplined with how I allocate my time every single day. James, fantastic.
1:26:43Thanks so much for the time. What a treat, Ted. I mean, who would have imagined that you and I'd be doing this even six months ago? Amen to that. Look, it's such a pleasure and such a treat and I can't thank you enough for inviting me on. Hey, before you take off, I've started sending out a monthly email that shares a small selection of what caught my eye over the month. I get a lot of emails like this, and I'm sure you do too, so I'm only going to send no more than a handful of the very best things that caught my eye. If you'd like to receive that email, hop on my website at capitalallocatorspodcast.com and join the mailing list.
From the publisher
Australian James Aitken is the Founder and Managing Partner of Aitken Advisors, a one-man macroeconomic consultancy based in Wimbledon, England that works with approximately one hundred of the most influential pools of capital in the world. James started his career in 1992 as a foreign exchange trader, moved to London in May 1999, and in March 2002 joined the infamous AIG Financial Products team in London.
In August 2006 he joined UBS, where he deployed his knowledge of the inner workings of the financial system to help his institutional investor clients successfully navigate their portfolios through 2007 and 2008. At the urging of his clients, James established his own firm in June 2009.
Our conversation covers James' perspective on the Global Financial Crisis from his seat at its epicenter, the Eurozone crisis in 2011, subsequent process-driven opportunities in Greece, views on Central Banks in the US, China, & Europe, some brief observations on India, positioning for the current environment, and what makes a great macro manager.
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