In short
Podcast Notes: Capital Allocators – Inside the Institutional Investment Industry
Episode Title
[REPLAY] Matt Whineray – Leading New Zealand Super Fund (EP.108)
Episode Overview
- Guest: Matt Whineray, CEO of New Zealand Superannuation Fund (Super Fund).
- Introduction: The Super Fund was created in 2001 by the New Zealand government to manage funds for retirees. As of now, it oversees NZ$42 billion.
- Focus: The episode discusses the Super Fund's investment philosophy, strategy implementation, and various operational approaches.
Key Topics Discussed
- Background of Matt Whineray
- Transitioned from law to investment banking.
- Joined Super Fund in 2008 and became CEO in 2018.
- Creation and Purpose of the Super Fund
- Established to mitigate the rising costs of the universal pension due to an aging population.
- Fund was set up to gather government contributions to support future pension payouts.
- Investment Philosophy
- Guided by four competitive advantages (endowments) and nine investment beliefs.
- Endowments:
- Long investment horizon.
- Known liquidity profile.
- Operational independence.
- Sovereign status.
- Investment Beliefs:
- Importance of governance.
- Strategic asset allocation is key.
- Long-term investors can outperform short-term investors.
- Mean reversion in asset class returns.
- Importance of ESG factors in long-term returns.
- Implementation of Investment Strategy
- Risk Allocation Process:
- Reference portfolio as a benchmark for liquid assets.
- Long-term risk budget with tactical targets across five risk baskets.
- Active Management:
- Use of both internal and external managers.
- Internal strategic tilting program to exploit market inefficiencies.
- Risk Allocation Framework
- Five risk baskets:
- Structural: Diversification through assets like timber and farming.
- Market Pricing: Market-focused opportunities across various asset classes.
- Real Assets: Infrastructure and real estate.
- Credit and Funding: Internal credit mandates and distressed credit.
- Asset Selection: Active management in equities and private equity.
Key Takeaways
- The Super Fund's long horizon and known liquidity allow it to invest in illiquid assets.
- Operational independence is crucial for governance and investment performance.
- A systematic risk budgeting process enables effective allocation across different asset classes.
- The importance of aligning with external managers to leverage their expertise while maintaining control over investment decisions.
- External Manager Relationships and Strategic Tilting
- A preference for fewer, deeper relationships with external managers.
- Emphasis on flexibility in mandates to adapt to changing market conditions.
- Internal management of strategic tilting for better alignment and control.
Future Priorities
- Development of domestic venture capital markets in New Zealand.
- Scaling operations to accommodate increasing assets under management.
Closing Reflections
- Matt Whineray shares personal insights on the importance of life experiences and personal values in forming an effective investment strategy.
- Encouragement for listeners to consider the long-term impact of their investment decisions, emphasizing resilience and adaptability.
Additional Information
- Follow Ted Seides on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/tseides) and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/tedseides/).
- Visit [Capital Allocators](https://capitalallocators.com/) for more resources.
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This detailed summary encapsulates the themes and insights shared in the podcast episode with Matt Whineray, providing a comprehensive overview for those interested in institutional investing strategies and philosophies.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOMatt Winirey's Background and the Superfund
0:45 to 2:44
Matt Winirey shares his journey from law to finance and the inception of the New Zealand Superfund.
“The New Zealand government created the Superfund in 2001 to help defray the costs of retirees in the country in the decades to come.”
Creation and Purpose of the Superfund
2:44 to 6:40
Discussion on the legislative background, funding structure, and long-term goals of the Superfund.
“Well, let's just start with your background and how you got to this lofty seat in the first place.”
Investment Philosophy and Endowments
6:40 to 11:28
Exploration of the Superfund's investment philosophy, competitive advantages, and long-term investment strategies.
“So a long horizon with absolutely no liquidity needs for a long time.”
Investment Beliefs and Governance
11:28 to 14:04
Matt reveals the Superfund's nine investment beliefs and the importance of good governance.
“Operational independence is probably the most fundamental of all of them.”
Exploring Investment Beliefs and Facts
14:04 to 15:49
Learn about the distinction between investment beliefs and facts, and their impact on investment strategies.
“Now, of course, there's a lot in that, right?”
Constructing a Reference Portfolio
15:50 to 17:45
Understand how to create a reference portfolio focused on low-cost, liquid assets for long-term growth.
“of how to implement on these endowments and beliefs.”
Performance Metrics and Value Addition
17:46 to 18:59
Discover how portfolio performance is measured against a reference portfolio and its significance.
“The board says, okay, let's land on the reference portfolio.”
Target Operating Model for Investment Decisions
19:00 to 21:18
Learn about the target operating model and its role in managing investment strategies and manager relationships.
“What the target operating model says is we want to have simpler processes.”
Risk Allocation Process Explained
21:19 to 23:15
An overview of the risk allocation process and how various investment opportunities are categorized.
“and then we can start allocating risk to them and so that was the sort of the genesis of our risk budgeting process.”
Dynamic Risk Allocation Practices
23:16 to 26:03
Explore how risk allocation changes over time and the decision-making process behind it.
“We want some merger arbitrage or we want some global macro, go and find those.”
Show all 29 chapters
Comparing Reference and Strategic Asset Allocation
26:04 to 28:00
Examine the differences between reference portfolios and traditional strategic asset allocations.
“We moved nine years ago to the reference portfolio, 2010.”
Accountability in Strategic Asset Allocation
28:00 to 29:00
Learn how strategic asset allocation enhances decision accountability and management responsibility.
“and then also you're able to much better attribute accountability for decisions because in an SAA world you can never actually be at 5 % infrastructure so why are you not there?”
Internal vs. External Resource Decisions
29:00 to 30:50
Discover the key questions guiding decisions on whether to manage resources internally or externally.
“We start with a few questions like, can we get satisfactory alignment?”
Strategic Tilting Explained
30:50 to 32:40
Explore the concept of strategic tilting in investment and its reliance on derivatives for liquidity management.
“because then you've got a team who's sitting there going, twiddling their thumbs and going, well, what am I doing?”
Measuring Market Equilibrium
32:40 to 34:30
Understand how to assess market equilibrium using DCF models and economic indicators.
“because we're more confident at the whole of market level of being able to say, what do we think the long run equilibrium prices or value is?”
Sizing Active Risk Budgets
34:30 to 36:50
Learn how to size active risk budgets and the role of strategic tilting in active risk management.
“what we can make in terms of active return versus the risk that we take.”
Building External Manager Relationships
36:50 to 38:55
Discover how to foster deeper relationships with external managers for better investment outcomes.
“You did mention you'd like to have fewer of them and deeper relationships and aligned.”
Team Structure in Investment Management
38:55 to 41:20
Examine the organizational structure of investment teams and their roles in asset management.
“larger managers are more conducive to being able to help you the way you're looking to?”
Investment Teams Structure
42:00 to 43:01
Learn about the structure and roles of the investment teams at New Zealand Super Fund.
“So we've got what we tend to call them as access point teams.”
Active Management in New Zealand Markets
43:01 to 44:21
Discover the unique characteristics of the New Zealand equity market that favor active management.
“So one is the notion of markets that are conducive to active management and the ability to generate alpha.”
Lifecycle of Asset Classes
44:21 to 46:34
Explore the life cycles of various asset classes and their implications for investors.
“although that might also be declining over time.”
Thematic Investment Strategies
46:34 to 49:06
Understand the challenges of developing and implementing investment themes in portfolios.
“And it just feels like the excess returns in that space have compressed as well.”
ESG Integration and Engagement
49:06 to 51:49
Learn about the integration of ESG factors in investment decisions and engagement efforts.
“I know you spent a bunch of time on ESG efforts.”
Future Mandates and Growth Plans
51:49 to 54:49
Gain insight into upcoming mandates for domestic venture capital and growth strategies.
“What are your priorities for the coming year as you look at the things you're working on and how you're going to continue to try to evolve this model?”
Organizational Culture and Values
54:49 to 56:01
Discover the values that drive the investment organization and its culture.
“functions, on operations, on IT, on finance and all of that.”
Core Values and Culture Development
56:01 to 57:08
Learn about the core values that guide team culture and decision-making.
“And so that culture is fundamental and is an ongoing part of what I'm looking to do.”
Personal Interests and Insights
57:08 to 58:08
Discover Matt's hobbies, pet peeves, and investment philosophies.
“Yeah, well, let's turn to some closing questions.”
Investment Perspectives and Market Realities
58:08 to 59:19
Explore the misconceptions around volatility in private market assets.
“So you get this bit, which is, oh, these things aren't volatile.”
Life Lessons and Advice for the Future
59:19 to 1:00:16
Hear valuable life lessons and advice for young professionals.
“You're not trying to achieve some level of sort of disinterest.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:04Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can keep up to date by visiting CapitalAllocatorsPodcast.com. My guest on today's show is Matt Winirey, the CEO of New Zealand's Superannuation Fund, or Superfund, one of the highest performing, most innovative, and well-regarded large-scale investment allocators in the world. The New Zealand government created the Superfund in 2001 to help defray the costs of retirees in the country in the decades to come.
0:55Matt joined the organization in 2008 and became its CEO in 2018, where today he oversees 42 billion Kiwi Our conversation starts with Matt's background and the creation and objectives of the Superfund. We then walk through the Superfund's investment philosophy, which is guided by four competitive advantages or endowments, as he calls them, and nine investment beliefs. From there, we dive into the implementation of the strategy, covering the risk allocation process, reference portfolio or benchmark using liquid assets, long-term risk budget, and medium-term tactical targets across the five risk baskets.
1:36We discussed the difference between these risk allocations and a traditional asset class structure, the hybrid structure employing both internal and external managers, internal strategic tilting program, the structure of the team, his current perspectives on asset classes, ESG, scaling activities to support upcoming inflows, and culture. Before we get going, you can sign up at CapitalAllocatorsPodcast.com to receive three different sources of information. Using the buttons on the homepage or the email list tab, you can receive an email from me once a month with the best things I've read and listened to over the month.
2:18While on that page, you can also sign up to receive our blog of industry news. Lastly, hop on the premium tab and subscribe to get access to the library of transcripts of podcast shows. Feel free to forward the emails you receive to friends to help spread the word. Please enjoy my conversation with Matt Winirey. Matt, thanks so much for joining me. No trouble, Ted. Great to be here. Well, let's just start with your background and how you got to this lofty seat in the first place. So I started life originally as a lawyer. I was at university. I did law and commerce. I came out of that. I worked as a lawyer for a few years, but I always wanted to go and work in New York.
3:05And so at that stage, it was harder to do it as a lawyer. You had to go and study in the U.S. So I had a good mate who was in investment banking. I knew that team well. And when he went to New York, I essentially took his job here at Credit Suisse in New Zealand. And then a couple of years later, got myself up to New York. So worked in investment banking for about 13 years altogether between here, New York, back here, and then up in Hong Kong. And then got a call one day about a role at the Superfund on the private market side. So that was in about 2007. seven. And I thought that would be an interesting time to switch from the sell side to the buy side and was looking for something different and met Adrian and thought this would be the place.
3:49So then I ended up Superfund originally in the private markets role and then subsequently in the GM investments role and then the CIO role. And then when Adrian went off to that reserve bank, I was lucky enough to get the big one. Great. So why don't we circle back a little bit to the creation of the super fund? The legislation was passed in 2001 and then there was a setup period. So our first monies invested were in September 2003. And it came about because the government at the time could see that we were going to have this increase in the cost of the universal pension in New Zealand because New Zealand, like many other developed countries, had an aging population, you had a bigger ratio of retirees to workers or taxpayers, and they could see that that cost was going to increase.
4:42And the Minister of Finance at the time, whose name was Michael Cullen, now Sir Michael Cullen, promoted the creation of a fund which would see money put away along the way and invested and then used later on to smooth out the cost of that universal pension. So this is not a total pre-fund, this is a way of just smoothing it out. So put some aside today, harvest it later, and smooth the whole cost out. So that structure, there was no capital in that then. And let's just circle forward to 2003, 16 years. How much is there today? About$42 billion today. It started with no money. And then the way the legislation worked is we would get some money every two weeks.
5:25We'd get a check from the government every two weeks, and that would add up to roughly$2 billion a year. And so we start getting that money in 2003, start investing it. And then through to 2009, where our contributions got cut off, we received contributions. And then from then until a year before last, where contributions got started again, we just invested the money that we had. So now we've got roughly$42 billion. And so let's frame out the rest of the other side of this, the investment equation, which is the purpose this serves. When do you expect to start seeing money coming out? So what the legislation does, it has a formula in the legislation which is aiming to smooth out the cost of national superannuation over a 40-year period.
6:10So it makes a bunch of assumptions around what our returns will be, what GDP growth will be, this type of thing. And then it produces a cash flow model that says the government needs to contribute to us at a certain rate. And then at some point, we will start contributing back to the government. And so at the moment, that model shows some withdrawals from the fund in the mid 2030s. But it's a function of the way that model is working, that there are some withdrawals then, but really the big withdrawals start in the mid 2050s. But even after those big withdrawals start, the fund is still forecast to continue to grow through the end of the century.
6:46So a long horizon with absolutely no liquidity needs for a long time. That's right. Yeah, really key part of our investment approach. So we take that as the problem. How do you approach it? So we start by saying, let's have a look at the mandate. So what the mandate says is we need to maximize return without undue risk. We need to use best practice portfolio management, and we need to not prejudice New Zealand's position as a responsible member of the world community. So those are the three parts of our mandate. And then we say, OK, what is it about us? What's special about us? And we call that our endowments.
7:21and others might call those advantages, but what's innate to us? And so the things that we think are our endowments are our long horizons, so we've talked about that, our known liquidity profile. So we're not going to have the government ringing up tomorrow and saying we need a big withdrawal. So we know what the liquidity profile looks like. Our operational independence, really fundamental, and our sovereign status, so we're related to the Crown, that gives us some advantages in some places. So we spend a bit of time saying those are our endowments. And then we say, well, what are our investment beliefs?
7:53How do we think markets work? And so we've got a set of investment beliefs. I think there are nine. These cover things like asset allocation. They cover things like mean reversion, governance, the importance of governance, beliefs around manager skill, beliefs around life cycles, around the importance of ESG, that type of thing. And those investment beliefs are really important because they have to ultimately underpin any of our strategies. So we have a set of endowments, we have a set of beliefs, and then we say, okay, this is how we do it. In the beginning, we started with a strategic asset allocation.
8:28From 2010, we switched to a portfolio construction approach where we use a reference portfolio. And so we say, all right, we want a core portfolio, which is something that we can get on a low-cost, passive basis that represents a genuine risk benchmark for us. And that is a decision for the board. And we're just going through the process this year to review that again, do it every five years. And we come up, and that is the view of the board's risk tolerance. So how much risk does the board want to take over time? But really importantly, our belief is that that reference portfolio would meet our mandate, those three things I talked about.
9:05That's the starting point. So that's an expression of the board's risk tolerance. The board then gives us a bit of active risk. So the ability to depart from that reference portfolio, but to create the actual portfolio. And then the actual portfolio is the difference between those two is the management team are accountable for that. So we've pretty much covered everything. So we just have endowments and beliefs and a reference portfolio. Why don't we walk through a little bit more granular detail? Start with these, what you're calling endowments, and how you think about each one. So long horizon.
9:39So what does a long horizon mean? This is quite interesting. We've published a bunch of white papers, which are the outputs of the debates that we have internally. And we've published one on what it means to be a long-term investor. Because when you ask people that, what does it mean to you to be a long-term investor? And people leap straight to oh it means that I can invest in private equity. We're like well actually let's sort of unpick this a little bit and say what does it really mean? Ultimately it means you're never forced to sell something. Your long horizon allows you to hold things through cycles and allows you to withstand volatility as long as it's combined with that liquidity, the liquidity profile allows you to do that.
10:19So you can do those things and you can hold things for a long time but you don't have to hold things for a long time. So that long horizon is important because that underpins some of our decisions around the level of risk that we take. And then some of the other strategies that we use, like strategic tilting, which rests on our belief in mean reversion. And if you've got a belief in mean reversion, things might not mean revert for a long time. And actually, you might be wrong about what the mean is. So you've got to be able to hold these positions for a while. So the long horizon is a really important one for us.
10:52It's the combination of the long horizon and the known liquidity profile that allows you to invest in illiquid assets if they're more attractive. Because we think you bring illiquid assets in, they bring just other risks in. They bring illiquidity risk in. You can't rebalance illiquid assets, that type of thing. So they might be attractive, but they're not per se attractive. So that's why they don't exist in the reference portfolio. The reference portfolio is just a pure passive listed expression. Those two can interact, the long horizon and the known liquidity profile, and become really important to a few of the strategies that I'll talk about in a bit.
11:32Operational independence is probably the most fundamental of all of them. And so that's related to our investment belief that good governance is a critical part of investment performance. And that operational independence, so our separation from the crown, our board and management's ownership of all of those investment decisions is really probably the most fundamental belief and where you see investors struggle is where that operational independence has been compromised somehow and other people are making the investment decisions for them and then finally the sovereign status one what does that do well it means that sometimes we're a really interesting counterparty for people it also means that in some jurisdictions we get sovereign immunity in terms of tax.
12:16So that's a slight advantage that accrues to the crown. That sovereign status is a smaller one, but it does mean it is important when it comes to partnering because we have a restriction in our legislation that says that we can't control any entity. So we can't own 100 % of a private business. We have to have partners. And so that sovereign status bit is important to that partnering because people look at us and say, okay, well, they're part of the New Zealand crown. That makes them attractive. Sometimes people might think that makes us unattractive, but that is a benefit. So we have spent, particularly around the horizon and the liquidity, quite a lot of time debating what does that actually mean?
12:54So because when we come to our strategies, our strategies have to rest on what we want to do with strategies is exploit those endowments and make sure they're consistent with those investment beliefs. And so it's really important to have a decent debate about what it actually means, because it's really interesting when you first throw that one open about, you know, if you go to a conference and you say, what do you think it means to be long horizon? You're going to have a lot of really different, some people think it makes you take massive amounts of risk. Some people think it means you can be completely illiquid, really different perspectives on the thing.
13:28So I know we're going to overlap with these. You said there were nine investment beliefs. Why don't you just list them out and then maybe we'll pick out a few to talk more depth about. So there's one about governance. Good governance is important and that relates to that operational independence. There's a statement that asset allocation is the key investment decision. So the bulk of the outcomes are determined by what your asset allocation is. There's a belief that an investor that has a long horizon can outperform an investor with a short horizon over the long term period. There's a belief that asset class returns are partly predictable and revert to a mean.
14:04Now, of course, there's a lot in that, right? So how do you predict them and what the mean is? There's an important belief that manager skill is rare. So the ability to consistently beat a benchmark, it's really hard to identify in advance. Sometimes it's often hard to identify after the fact, right? So the fact that someone's beaten a benchmark, was that because they were good or because they were lucky? Good is good. Lucky is not necessarily repeatable. There's another belief that says that some markets are conducive to managers being able to generate active returns. And there are some features of those markets that make them more conducive.
14:40It might be less information or more illiquid or inefficiency. There's a belief that asset classes have a life cycle and that as more institutional investors get into an asset class, then perhaps the excess returns decline over time to possibly zero or worse, less than that because of fees. And then lastly, there's one which is that investors need to have regard to ESG factors because they're material to long-term returns. So a few years ago, we had more beliefs than this, and we went through, we said actually some of these are just facts, right? Because beliefs are not facts. They're things that we believe that are supported by empirical research and data.
15:21The mean reversion belief is, it's a belief. It's not an absolute fact. Whereas often you'll see in people's beliefs, costs matter. Well, that's just a fact, right? I mean, if you have less cost from an investment perspective, you have better outcomes. That's not a belief, that's a fact. So we went through and said, okay, let's just sort of break these down a little bit so that we can be really clear about the ones that we're resting these strategies on and we'll call those our investment beliefs. And that's what they are. So we turn then to the beginning of the strategy of how to implement on these endowments and beliefs.
15:55And you mentioned the reference portfolio. You mentioned having a very long time horizon. Reference portfolio, you're saying, is low cost, easy to implement. What does that look like in terms of the underlying assets? So low cost, easy to implement, passive is the other one, means it's liquid listed assets. So that means for us, global equities, global fixed income, and New Zealand equities. And the global equities we split into developed market and emerging market. So we have three bits of equity risk in there, developed market equities, global emerging market equities, New Zealand equities, and then global fixed income.
16:34And what's the mix of equity and fixed income? 80-20. So it's a pretty growthy portfolio. So there's 65 developed market equities, 10 emerging market, 5 New Zealand equities. It adds up to 80 and then 20 % fixed income. Why would you have as much as 20 % in fixed income when you have such a long duration liability? Because we don't have a bunch of explicit liabilities against us. I think that what that does is it provides a bit of a buffer that allows us to rebalance that portfolio. It provides some diversification benefit. So it is not obviously as volatile as, for example, a 100 % equity case.
17:15When we talked with the board about the reference portfolio last time, we did show them different mixes of those, which included 90 % equity, 100 % equity. And really, ultimately, it comes down to a desire for the institution to be able to survive through the long term, you want to be able to control those drawdowns a little bit. So we want to have exposure to that equity risk premium because we think that's the big driver over time. But the fixed income provides us some diversification as well as some liquidity provision for rebalancing. The board says, okay, let's land on the reference portfolio.
17:52And then what the board is wanting to know is how's our actual portfolio performing versus that reference portfolio because that's the decisions that management are making in order to try and improve it. And for the large part, we've added value, I think we've had 11 positive value add years over the last 15. We've added nearly one and a half percent a year, which is worth sort of eight billion to the New Zealand taxpayer. So that's been good, but that's by looking at the reference portfolio. When we go into the process we're doing at the moment where we think about the reference portfolio itself, then you start thinking about what are the alternative risk profiles that you could take and how would they have gone?
18:29And of course, if you're going to say, okay, well, let's look at it versus what a 100 % portfolio would have done over the last period where equities have been strong, then whatever your ratio of equity is going to be is going to determine that outcome. So let's dive into this operating model of how you have gone about competing against your reference portfolio and beating it over time. Like most institutional investors, actually, we love acronyms. We use far too many of them. So we call it the TOM, which is the target operating model. And that was a bit of work that we did a number of years ago, which said, okay, let's be clear about the principles on which we will do things internally or where we will use other people to provide those services for us.
19:10What the target operating model says is we want to have simpler processes. We want to have more control over the allocation, that is the risk allocation, as opposed to the individual investment decisions, but the risk allocation. We want to have fewer manager relationships, which are bigger, so we become a bit more important to those managers and we get a bit more over time. So we created this reference portfolio in 2010, and that was quite a big change for the organization because we went from a strategic asset allocation to a reference portfolio okay so in the saa there's you know five percent for timber or five percent for infrastructure or five percent for private equity or whatever and the people who are looking after those in the investment teams know i can you know take the total portfolio and times that by five percent and this is what i've got to go and invest when you go to the reference portfolio there's none of that in there it's a total notional listed low-cost portfolio and then you've got to build an actual portfolio And so we had to build something in the middle to help us be systematic in that active risk.
20:14And that's where we said, OK, we have this operating model, which helps us make the decisions about who's doing it. But really, we've got a decision before that, which is where are we most confident that we can improve on the reference portfolio? And so we said, OK, we took the investment committee away for a couple of days and we talked about this. And we said, all right, we're most confident where we can see and articulate the drivers of the opportunity, where we can change our risk allocation to that over time. So they then said, all right, so let's look at all of the things that we could put in.
20:48There's forestry, there's global macro, there's life settlements, there's our strategic tilting program, which is like dynamic asset. There's all these things. We need to have some confidence ranking of those things. we've got to have some way of being able to compare them say you know do we want three lots of forestry and one lot of global macro or do we want seven lots of life settlements and one cat bond or whatever we created a thing that we call the risk allocation process which says okay what are the expected risk adjusted confidence adjusted returns from these different things and then we can start allocating risk to them and so that was the sort of the genesis of our risk budgeting process.
21:26So the risk budgeting process says, all right, we've got a bunch of opportunities. We'll put them into these five different baskets is what we call them. And then we'll allocate some risk through time to those things. And then the teams are then tasked with going and getting that exposure, what we call finding the access point. That's the process by which you go from reference portfolio to actual portfolio, because you've got to have some structure for working out where you're going to place your active bets. And what are those five baskets that you mentioned? So what we do is we've got a bunch of opportunities, investment opportunities.
22:00Some of them are sort of like asset classes, but they're slightly different, perhaps more slightly more granular. And then we aggregate them into those five baskets by saying, what are the sort of the similar type of opportunities? So we've got the first basket is called structural, and that used to be called diversification. So that's got things in it like timber, farming, life settlements, cap bonds or our factors, our equity factors programs, things that are driven by structural impacts on the markets. That's the one risk basket where we think we'll have some exposure through time always to those things.
22:34So that's the structural basket. Then we have a three, we call market pricing. We've got a real assets basket, we've got a broad markets basket, and we've got an ARB credit and funding basket. And those have different opportunities in them that relate to those. So real assets has things like infrastructure and real estate. The broad markets basket has things like our strategic tilting program, mostly things like global macro. And then our credit and funding is where we do our internal credit mandates. We also have distress credit. We have a couple of other more credit related, funding related opportunities.
23:10And then finally, our last basket is one called asset selection. So that's one where essentially the basis for those opportunities is manager skill and that thing we've got active equities in New Zealand active emerging market equities some private equity so what we've done is we chunk up those baskets and then we allocate risk to each of those baskets and within the baskets to the opportunities and then say to the teams the investment teams okay we want a bit of risk in farming go and find some exposure to that we want a bit of risk in forestry you go and find some exposure to that. We want some merger arbitrage or we want some global macro, go and find those.
23:48And then that's the construction of the portfolio. So there's a risk allocation process first, which has us all thinking, what's our confidence in the relative merits of these different opportunities? And then there's the second decision, which is, okay, well, how are we going to get that? And that's where the target operating model comes in. Do we do that ourselves? Do we have someone else do it? So strategic tilting, biggest chunk of active risk in the fund, we do that ourselves. We just don't think that we can structure the relationship with the manager to make that work. Other things like stress credit, we'll use Canyon or Bain because we're not going to be able to have that expertise in-house.
24:26But some things we will do ourselves, some things we'll do externally. How dynamic are the changes in the risk allocation across these five groups? So we have this concept of budget and target and actual. So the budget is the long run kind of through the cycle that we say we want to have X basis points of active risk for merger arbitrage, for example. For each of those baskets, we have a team and the team is drawn from people across the investment group and the portfolio completion group. And there's those small teams and they are the ones who are the subject matter experts for those opportunities.
25:03They get together frequently, every so often, maybe monthly, sometimes quarterly, and say, what's happened in terms of the attractiveness of this? Is Mujerab more attractive or less attractive? Is Timber more attractive or whatever it happens to be? And then those teams then make a recommendation about a target. So that's the right now, how much risk do we want in that? And then the actual is how much we've actually got in it. So then the investment team's job is to get the actual as close to target as they can. so the target does move around the budget doesn't budget we should be looking at every few years because that shouldn't be changing much i mean what's your relative confidence in timber versus global macro versus distressed or whatever it happens to be that shouldn't change but on a month-to-month basis some of these things will move a bit more and that's where we're changing that target and then the actual is is responding to that so some of them are slow moving structural is slow moving you don't expect that to change a lot from a target perspective some of them like broad markets market pricing that's going to move around a bit asset selection again that's not going to change a lot because is the market structure changing in new zealand active equities slowly it's the one in the middle the market pricing ones that move around a bit more and then when you add up the current portfolio let's say using the framework you're using with risk allocation and budgets.
26:26And then if you compared that to the older way of doing it with strategic asset allocation and assets, and maybe you have like a absolute return bucket for the things that you might have in structural now, how different are those two portfolios? We moved nine years ago to the reference portfolio, 2010. And since then, what it means is that we can be a bit more dynamic with opportunities. So we don't have to try and jam it into one of the SAA categories. And when we had the SAA last, we had things like timber and infrastructure and private equity. And we had this thing called other private markets, which was like just a whatever else you got kind of chuckling at.
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27:06This one is a more granular approach. Doesn't require us to go and change the whole SAA construct to add an opportunity. So an opportunity can be added on the recommendation of the investment committee and the approval of the CIO. We can then allocate risk to it. The board has given us the overall umbrella of how much active risk we can have, but then the job of allocating that across the vast opportunities sits with management. And so I would say always you're going to be anchored a little bit from where you started with, but we have moved that quite a way. So what I guess we wanted to get away from with the SAA was the SAA says you're going to have 5 % infrastructure, whether you think it's attractive or not.
27:51you can have 5 % of timber whether you think it's attractive at the time or not we wanted that to be a little bit more dynamic and a little bit more responsive and not just put it in just because we've made an SAA call to do that and then also you're able to much better attribute accountability for decisions because in an SAA world you can never actually be at 5 % infrastructure so why are you not there? Are you not there because management has chosen not to be there because they don't really like the asset that much or because they just can't get there? And this one, it's really clear. You've got a reference portfolio.
28:28When we add a new asset to the portfolio, we sell a chunk of that reference portfolio to fund it. And we can measure the difference between those two things, the returns we would have made versus the returns we actually made. And it's really clear who owns that. Management owns that. In a fair amount of the implementation, you've touched on things like strategic tilting. There's a blend of what you're choosing to do internally and what you're choosing to outsource to external managers. What questions are you asking to determine whether you're going to try to bring the resources in-house or hire externally?
29:00We start with a few questions like, can we get satisfactory alignment? And that probably is one of the biggest drivers. Not so much a cost one, because while you can get some cost improvements, I think the bigger driver of our decisions, especially where we are down in the bottom of the Pacific, it's going to be very hard for us to build teams in the US or in Europe or whatever and replicate what we might get from managers. So the cost one is less of a thing. A lot of it is alignment or we can't get some sort of critical risk control that we might want or the ability to move it. So strategic tilting is a good example.
29:37Strategic tilting is entirely managed through derivatives. It benefits from the liquidity management that our portfolio completion team runs and the counterparty risk that we represent as a fund as a whole. But also, the thing about strategic tilting is that you can be, for a long time, underwater. And because you're waiting for these markets to mean revert and they might be slow or they might move further away from whatever you think the mean is. And so that one we thought is really hard to get alignment with external managers. And also what we've seen is where managers are running those types of programs, sometimes they have a pooled program and other clients in that program start to lose their nerve and want them to take the risk off and that's exactly the wrong time to do it.
30:23And so this allows us to control that and we're responsible for it. We manage it and that feels like a happier place to be. When it comes to other things like, for example, merger arbitrage or cat bonds or life settlements or that stuff, there's expertise externally that we don't want to build internally. It gives you more flexibility if you're using those externals and sure, you're going to pay for that. But in a construct like ours where through time we might be in those, we might not be in those, it's very hard if you've built the team internally to say, actually, we just don't want to invest anything in this opportunity.
30:59because then you've got a team who's sitting there going, twiddling their thumbs and going, well, what am I doing? It's really around alignment, ability to manage risk in a way that is critical to us, a bit of cost, and also just being clear-eyed about who's got the expertise. Can we actually get the expertise here in New Zealand versus what we need? And that strategic tilting effort, what different asset classes are in that mean reverting strategy? It's got global equities, global bonds, currency. It's got some credit, so it's sovereign and credit. We've just recently introduced a small bit of risk in commodities, so we're starting to tilt those as well.
31:36So the big global equity markets, big global bond markets, large currency markets. So these are all liquid things that we can use either futures or TRSs on and can trade, and that team will trade pretty much every day. And are you going down to the security level? So you could do mean reversion across markets. You could do it tilt to value and growth. You could get into sectors. You could get into securities within sectors. How far down are you going? The genesis of it was it started with basically two levers. It was either a view on global equities versus global bonds, and it was a view on the Kiwi versus the basket of currencies.
32:12So those are two things. And then over time, we've significantly increased the breadth of it. So now we've got global equity markets like Japan, Canada, US, Europe, UK, emerging markets. We've got the same bond markets. We've got about four different credit markets, Australia, Japan, US, Europe. We've got all the major currencies. So we haven't gone down below to sector or individual securities because we're more confident at the whole of market level of being able to say, what do we think the long run equilibrium prices or value is? And then compare that to the current price. When you get to individual sectors and individual securities, we're just much, much less confident in that.
32:58So you can increase breadth, but I think you reduce confidence. And so we probably don't improve the performance of that by doing that. I think that's the key is to have breadth of non, hopefully uncorrelated positions, but without destroying the confidence by just getting to a point where we just can't have a view. And what metrics are you using to determine equilibrium and markets that move away from equilibrium? Yeah, so the team builds DCF models for all of these markets. We have long run views on the big drivers, so growth, inflation, real interest rates. And then that's which come from our internal economics teams, as well as gathering data externally.
33:39And then with those, we form views on what the long run equilibrium values are. we use particularly in the rates and the impacts on the currency as well we use the sort of the near-term market pricing because what we're not trying to do is is forecast where things are going over the next couple of years what we're trying to say is is there some sort of reasonable difference from the long-run equilibrium value and then if we think it's a little bit lower then we'll buy it you know if it goes down at that point we'll buy some more and we'll do that incrementally and then if it starts to go up then we'll start to sell it so long-run economic drivers is try to have economic identities so that you don't have these sort of divergent models, but they are all ultimately consistent with each other.
34:23How do you think about sizing the strategic tilting effort as a percentage of the whole? We have a view on what we think the overall information ratio is, what we can make in terms of active return versus the risk that we take. Then we have individual views on the different markets, how confident we are. So there's a sizing thing going on within tilting about how much we allocate to equities versus bonds or currencies versus each other's or whatever. For strategic tilting itself, strategic tilting is the biggest chunk of our active risk budget. And that comes from being really consistent with our beliefs and our endowments and us having a lot of confidence in our ability to execute that, which has sort of developed over time.
35:04So we look at what we expect to make on that. So our risk-adjusted return expectations, we adjust that by our confidence versus every other thing that we'd allocate active risk to, and that gets the biggest chunk of active risk. And where do you end up? The budget for tilting at the moment is about 2.5 % active risk at the fund level, within a total active risk budget of 4%. But of course, things don't add up because they're not necessarily correlated with each other. So it is definitely the biggest chunk of active risk that we've got. The other internal effort you mentioned was the completion strategy.
35:40How does that fit into the puzzle? The portfolio completion team is what a lot of other organizations might call their treasury function. And so they're the team that do all of the market trading. So all of our derivative trading, all of our FX hedging, all of our transitions or rebalancing. So their job is to basically take the actual portfolio, compare it with where we want to be from a risk perspective and then rebalance to get back to that by using those liquid ones, as well as execute the strategic tilting trades, as well as do the FX hedging, as well as trade the New Zealand equities that we might trade internally.
36:19So that's a really important team. We created that after the GFC. So going into the GFC, all of our stuff was outsourced and we didn't have great views of almost anything, liquidity or risk or any of that. So it's a big program to create some critical functions, which allows us to have visibility and control over our liquidity management. And then also, you know, a window into where markets are. So that team is a team that is doing all the market facing activity. Can we talk a little bit about the external manager relationships? You did mention you'd like to have fewer of them and deeper relationships and aligned.
36:58how do you go about and how does the team go about picking those managers that fewer deeper came from go right back to when you're an saa and you're saying okay we've got five percent of pe so then we want to have a whole bunch of different managers to give us some sort of broad exposure to a world where we said okay under the reference portfolio we're going to allocate to something if we think that there's really something about that market or that that manager that gives us great confidence that we're going to beat the reference portfolio. In doing that, we'd necessarily become a bit more concentrated.
37:31We want to allocate more, but also what we want to do, because I talked about the confidence. We've got more confidence if we can change that risk allocation. So that fewer, deeper one said, okay, we want to try and make these flexible mandates. And so what that means is you go to a manager like Bain and you say, I'd like a European distressed mandate and they say oh we've got a fund and say okay well yeah that's great but actually we'd like it to be a bit more flexible so we can allocate capital to it according to our view of the attractiveness of that opportunity over time and so you can't do that if you're turning up with a 50 million dollar check what we found is actually around about 200 you start to have the ability to create a flexible mandate you can say okay we will we'll set this up so that you can draw it down but periodically we will reassess the attractiveness of the market and if we say if we really like it we can allocate more if we don't like it we can just rule it off at wherever it is it's more intensive to manage so you need fewer of them and you want to be closer to those managers so that you're getting a feedback loop as to attractiveness that's something that we worked on but also what we want to get out of those managed relationships is a bit more IP, a bit more input into our teams that we can use for just getting our people smarter and our processes better.
38:52And as you filter through those manager relationships, do you tend to find that larger managers are more conducive to being able to help you the way you're looking to? Yeah, it tends to be like that. If you think about it from a manager's perspective, to be able to manage the allocation process that you've got to go through, if you've got a bunch of different mandates and you've got a fund, for example, and you find an asset, you've then got to say, okay, well, I'm going to give three bits to the fund and one bit to this mandate. That sort of allocation infrastructure, I think, means that they have to be bigger and more sophisticated, generally speaking.
39:28That probably pushes you more up this size. You mentioned that you want these managers to be able to help you with the flexibility and shifts in asset allocation and strategies. How much do you come to those judgments on your own? And how much are those inevitably informed by the very managers you're giving the money to? Often they are, at least partially informed, but also you get quite a bit of information by their activity because generally speaking, if a manager is slow from allocation perspective in terms of, well, slow versus what, but not seeing lots of opportunities, that's pretty useful information for us because that says, well, actually, maybe this isn't that attractive.
40:12So you often probably, if you really looked at it, you'd say there's a reasonable correlation between the pace at which managers are allocating risk and our view on attractiveness, as you'd expect, because they're close to it. And if they're not seeing opportunities, then our other indicators will probably tell us that we don't think it's that attractive either. Do you run the risk that the managers as a group sort of form a consensus? And as a result, you're tilting towards a market consensus instead of, as you want, a mean reverting kind of contrarian approach? Possibly, but that's where having a bunch of them, and particularly a bunch of them who think in sort of different ways is quite useful because then you're not totally driven by a single information source or data source.
40:55You can talk to them and what's really useful from some managers is notwithstanding that they might not be in a particular asset class, they've got sort of frameworks and structures for thinking about how they would view the retractiveness. So that can be really helpful outside of their immediate area for us for thinking about that. And the other way we try to deal with that is those risk basket teams have got a bunch of different people in them so that it's not just the person who is dealing with the manager at the access point level who is doing the target allocation. It's that team that's doing it.
41:27So you get a bit of protection against capture, if you like, through that process. What does the structure of your team look like across the investment side of the organization? Yeah, so we've got two GMs involved. So Stephen Gilmore is the chief investment officer, and he looks after the investment group. And within the investment group, there are four teams. There's a responsible investment team. There is a team called external investments and partnerships, and that's our external manager team in large part. There is a direct investment team, and there's an asset allocation team. So we've got what we tend to call them as access point teams.
42:04Our access point teams are the external investments and partnerships team and the direct team. And then so outside of Stephen's group, there's a group called the Portfolio Completion Group. So that's headed up by Mark Fennell, who is the GM of Portfolio Completion. And that has within the Portfolio Completion team that does all the market trading and another team called Portfolio Investments, which is generally running our internal credit mandates and a strategy we call the direct arbitrage strategy, which just looks to take advantage of dislocations in markets. So yeah, four teams under Stephen, two teams under Mark, and the whole lot represents our investment function.
42:41How many people are in each of those teams? So there's about 50 in the investment group. There's about 10, I think, in the portfolio, the overall portfolio completion. So maybe we're in the sort of the 55, 60, somewhere around there. So I'm going to circle back to two of the beliefs you talked about and really bring them into the present market. So one is the notion of markets that are conducive to active management and the ability to generate alpha. Where are you seeing those markets today? We don't see that many, to be honest. So we do think that in New Zealand. So the New Zealand active equity market is an interesting one in the sense that the median manager has been able to generate alpha or excess returns over time.
43:27Why is that? Is that because there's a bunch of real special managers or is that because there's something about the benchmark or is there something about the structure of that market? So we think that the New Zealand market is one of those that's conducive to it. So as a result of that, we have actually relatively few listed market active managers. So I could count them on pretty much one hand. We've got two managers in New Zealand that run active equities. We've got one global emerging markets active manager. And that's it. So we don't have any developed markets active managers. We don't have any fixed income market active managers in those listed spaces.
44:07And that's really because we look at those and we say, in those really large developed markets, there are lots of really smart people trading with each other. And we don't think that there's a persistent production of excess return. Contrast that with the New Zealand market where we think there is, although that might also be declining over time. And we think what's happening in the New Zealand market is that the New Zealand market is made up of retail investors, international institutional investors, some international strategic stakes and the New Zealand active month. And the relative proportions of those mean that generally speaking, we think the New Zealand active equity managers managed to trade off those other groups and get their alpha off them.
44:47Whereas you go to the US market, there's a lot of active managers in there. And on average, the whole market is paying fees, but not generating alpha. Yeah. And this may be tied to a bit, this belief about understanding that there's a life cycle of asset classes. As you look at the markets today, where do you think we are in a variety of different asset classes in their life cycle? I think about sort of forestry Forestry I think is you go back from an institutional investor perspective maybe 10, 15 years started, the TMOs started and institutional investors started to allocate timber and then you had all this big trade where all of the timber assets went from the integrated forest product companies to investors who had lower cost of capital and then now there's just a lot fewer of those big things So I would look at forestry and say, I think that has moved through the life cycle.
45:42I think of other ones, I think life settlements is probably a little bit like that. So life settlements is a shorter timeframe, but a lot of capital allocated to it. And the big trade was large insurance companies selling these books to mostly these private managers. And those big tertiary books are kind of done, right? So now there's just sort of less there. where are the ones where it's sort of a little bit newer? I think farming and agriculture is still earlier in the life cycle one. I think that because it's just hard to get scale in that, right? So whereas you might be able to buy a billion-dollar forest, you can't buy a billion-dollar farm.
46:23You come to New Zealand, you want to do dairy farms, you're going to do them$10 million at a time or$20 million at a time. So I think that one still there's barriers to getting into it for the large institutional investors. When you think about others like private equity, it just feels like there's just more and more allocation to that. And that market, which might have been much more inefficient for unlisted companies in the$200 million to$400 million range a few years ago, just feels like it's much more intermediated now and there's competitive bids for everything. And it just feels like the excess returns in that space have compressed as well.
47:01So that's the thing is for us to be a bit realistic when we're allocating to these things to say, well, where is the real source of excess return? What is it? Is it a manager skill thing? Is it a leverage? Is it a luck? Is it something that there's just inefficiencies in the market that mean that managers are able to find these things? We have to be reasonably honest with ourselves about what the source of that return actually is. So I know that in addition to starting with a reference portfolio and creating these risk allocations and budgets and balancing what's internal and external and all these different levers of return, you also think of themes and pursue themes in the portfolio.
47:38So talk a little bit about how you develop the themes and how you implement them in the portfolio. Yeah, themes are hard, I would say. And actually, in the last few years, we haven't done nearly as much with those things. So where we started with themes was we said, all right, so we think there are some themes which are sort of long run changes happening and things like resource scarcity and things like the development of emerging markets, those types of things. And what I guess you find with themes is that we were using them to say, OK, let's try and help the teams with finding the most sort of fruitful areas of opportunity.
48:17Where are those spaces which we think have a tailwind from a theme and therefore are sort of conducive to us finding opportunities that will get paid more for the risk than the risk that we're taking would imply? And what you find, I think, a little bit is that you can almost back any investment you like into whatever theme you've defined. Because the other danger is that you set the whole portfolio up on the basis of a theme and then some other theme overtakes it. So we haven't really applied those themes that much of late. Probably the biggest one that we've now picked up as an investment strategy is around climate change.
48:52It's a very long run change in markets, but it didn't come out of that theme activity, if you like. But the emphasis on themes has declined a bit because I think in practice, it's quite hard to really implement them. And you go and you look at thematic managers around the place and the records aren't necessarily fantastic, right? I know you spent a bunch of time on ESG efforts. Yeah. And why don't you walk through a little bit of the history, and then certainly there's been a more recent one with the tragedies that happened locally and the impact from social media. So ESG breaks down into two big chunks, the integration piece and the ownership piece.
49:32And so integration is about understanding what the ESG implications of risk allocations are right from the start. So when we're doing that risk budget work, what the RI implications of a particular opportunity are. So we'll factor that into that risk allocation process. Then thinking about what happens at the access point and making those decisions where you're choosing either we're investing directly or we're using a manager, what are the RI implications. So that integration is really important at that end. And then the ownership chunk is about voting and engagement and just being an active owner in relation to those things.
50:08So that's how we sort of think about the two big bits of work. And there's another bit that comes out of really the integration, I guess, which is exclusions. And that's a really small part of ESG, but it's the bit that gets the most attention because people look at it and go, oh, you've excluded this company, why? Or you haven't excluded this company and the Norwegians have, so you must be evil, you know, that kind of stuff. But actually the exclusions are a relatively small part of what we do in ESG. On the ownership side of things, yeah, we've got an active voting program. We brought that in-house last year.
50:43We vote all of our shares globally. And then we also have an active engagement program. We do that directly with companies domestically, and we use a BMO to help us on the global engagements. But the notable one that you mentioned was post the Tragedy in Christchurch, we together with another group of the New Zealand Crown investors, we got together to lead an engagement with the social media companies about the, well, aimed at preventing the live streaming of objectionable content and subsequent distribution. And so that's a program that's underway at the moment. We have, I think at last count, like 81 investors from around the world, a big chunk from New Zealand, a big chunk, slightly more from offshore than domestically.
51:31And those investors, between them, manage assets of about$10 trillion. So a big group of investors who are concerned about this issue, and so that engagement is with the likes of Facebook and Google and Twitter, aimed specifically at preventing that distribution and live streaming of those things. And how has that played out in the engagement so far? That's early days in that engagement. We're in touch with the local entities. What we've been doing through this first few months is getting that group of investors who want to be involved, defining the basis for the engagement and really doing the work from our perspective on what the potential solutions might be so that we're in a good position to sit down and have these discussions.
52:12And that's the next phase. And we'll be getting into that shortly. What are your priorities for the coming year as you look at the things you're working on and how you're going to continue to try to evolve this model? So the government announces its budget in May every year. And so in this new budget, the government announced a new mandate for the Guardians to manage. And that is a mandate for the development of domestic venture capital, domestic venture capital market. And there's quite a chunk of work at the moment going on. OK, well, let's define what that mandate is going to look like. Let's help with the drafting of the legislation.
52:50let's deal with the entity that's going to manage that for us which is a crown entity called the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund and define what the terms of that mandate are and so there's quite a lot of work across the organisation to figure out how to do that because to date we've got the Guardians which is us that's our investment management company and then we've got the fund and the Guardians had one mandate and one purpose and that was fantastic we've now got an additional mandate which we've been given because government regards us as competent investors. So they've said, right, you can do this as well.
53:24So now we're going to run these two mandates. The new mandate's small comparatively. It's only going to be about$300 million compared to$42 million. So you've got a lot of disparity, but actually it's going to take quite a bit of work to set that up. That's a big one is getting that going. We've got within the investment teams and then more broadly within the support functions as well, We started last year a bit of work focused on our long-term target state. And that's because, go back to December, December 17, the government restarted the contributions. And the restart of the contributions means we're going to grow faster.
54:00So we'll get a couple of billion dollars a year. And touch wood, we'll get some investment returns on top of that. And so we'll grow quite a lot faster. So fast forward six, seven years, we could be$80 billion. so then we've got a question which is okay what does that mean for our active investment strategies at the moment what does it mean for the likes of portfolio completion can we scale these things because not all these things scale well direct investment is a challenge to scale some things are strategic tilting is easy to scale but some things aren't and so we've been working a lot on that and that's that's leading to a discussion with the board which is around investing in our strengths?
54:35Where do we want to add resources in the next two to three years, which will support that growth in assets under management and allow us to continue to generate the active returns that we've enjoyed in the past? And then, of course, with that growth comes the impact on the support functions, on operations, on IT, on finance and all of that. So there's a conversation going on around that at the moment. The other bit of work that we've been doing that we've been active on for a long time is around culture but more recently since I took over we've run a values project to I guess be clearer about what our values are as an investment organization which was quite a neat project where we got we just gathered stories we said to everyone give us a story about a time when you've been proud to work for the organization or you haven't been proud to work for the organization or you've you've had some difficult decision to make and how you've done that we got this really great set of stories 120 120 stories out of 130 people 100 something like that and we were then able to go through that and pull out the themes from those which which revealed the value so you're not going to someone saying oh what are you value you're going to someone say tell us a story and those stories are really powerful and we got great engagement with it and came up with a new set of values for the organization because ultimately we rely on being able to attract really good people into New Zealand, which is a long way away from the big global financial markets.
56:00And we've got to provide a really good proposition for people to come here. And so that culture is fundamental and is an ongoing part of what I'm looking to do. What are those values? The values are we stand strong. And that goes a little bit to the way we use frameworks, the basis of our approach, our long horizon, our ability to withstand the swings of markets. Our decisions are principle-based. We support each other, which is just a humanistic value. We're future-focused, which is really focusing on the long run and, again, the swings and roundabouts of markets. And Team Not Hero is the final one.
56:40So that our focus is on the broader team and Not Heroes. And actually what we've done is we've created a set of cartoons that go with those because those cartoons are evocative And so also what those cartoons do is provide a little bit of constructive ambiguity because these things mean slightly different things to different people, but ultimately are really important to how we all operate. So that was quite a neat part of the continued development of our culture that we went through last year. Yeah, well, let's turn to some closing questions. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family?
57:14Snowboarding. The deeper the better. Yeah, definitely snowboarding. when you get some deep snow and i have done a little bit in the last few years of heli skiing so in alaska when you get left at the top of a ridge and the helicopter goes away and it's all silent and you've got this completely untouched pitch in front of you it's just fantastic it really is marvelous what's your biggest pet peeve this is funny i was talking to my wife about this and she pointed out that my biggest one is the absence of the keys from where they ought to be. So the keys not being in a consistent place when you go looking for them.
57:56Yeah. How about your biggest investment pet peeve? I think it probably comes down to when you're receiving pitches, people have what I think of as kind of imaginitis around the lack of volatility of private market assets. So you get this bit, which is, oh, these things aren't volatile. It's like, okay, well, why is that? Well, the best evocation of that I've seen is, if you imagine a bat flying and the bat is quite jerky and it's flying all over the place, then it flies into a pipe and then it flies out of the other end of the pipe and what these people who think about this volatility of illiquid assets would have is that the bat is actually flowing in a straight line from one end to the other because that's where they've measured it at the start.
58:38I think you'll really find out how volatile those things are when you're going to try to sell them in a difficult market. And that's probably my biggest one. What reading do you almost never miss? I am always smarter for having read something from Cliff Asnes. And I think he, especially he's been, over the last year or so, his value has had a hard time. In fact, he's had a difficult time. And he's written some really good stuff that has been quite pithy. That's quite useful for dealing with the board, I find. some good ones which are around how do you assess strategies which aren't performing well?
59:16What's the process you go through? What are you trying to achieve? You're trying to achieve resilience. You're not trying to achieve some level of sort of disinterest. And how do you do that? What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you? Destroy the evidence. If you're going to take the last biscuit in the packet, get rid of the packet. and then no one will know that the packet was over there. So that was just be careful. Last one, what life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? The first year of work after you get out of uni is really not that important for where you end up.
59:53So don't feel that you've got to rush into, you know, whatever is the first job that you managed to get. Go and spend some time overseas and get some life experience. And I would strongly recommend that to my kids and anyone else to just get out there and live a little because you'll find 10 or 20 years down the track that actually whether you've done that or not doesn't make any difference and in fact might enhance where you've ended up because you've learned a bit more about yourself. Terrific. Well, Matt, thanks so much for taking the time. Really appreciate it. No worries, Ted. Thanks for listening to this episode.
1:00:28I hope you found a nugget or two to take away and apply in your investing and your life. If you'd like what you heard, please tell a friend and maybe even write a review on iTunes. You'll help others discover the show and I thank you for it. Have a good one and see you next time.
From the publisher
Matt Whineray is the CEO of New Zealand Superannuation Fund or Super Fund, one of the highest performing, most innovative and well-regarded large-scale investment allocators in the world. The New Zealand government created the Super Fund in 2001 to help defray the costs of retirees in the country in the decades to come. Matt joined the organization in 2008 and became the CEO in 2018 and oversees NZ$42 billion.
Our conversation starts with Matt's background and the creation and objectives of the Super Fund. We then walk through the Super Fund's investment philosophy, which is guided by four competitive advantages or endowments and nine investment beliefs. From there, we dive into the implementation of the strategy, covering the risk allocation process, reference portfolio or benchmark of liquid assets, long-term risk budget and medium-term tactical targets across five risk baskets. We discuss the difference between these risk allocations and a traditional asset class structure, hybrid structure employing internal and external managers, internal strategic tilting program, structure of the team, current perspectives on asset classes, ESG, scaling activities to support upcoming inflows, and culture.
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Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant (https://thepodcastconsultant.com)


