[REPLAY] - Mike Trigg – Defying the Fade at WCM (Capital Allocators, EP.162)

5 Feb 2024 · 53 min

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In short

Podcast Notes: Capital Allocators – EP.162 with Mike Trigg

Episode Overview This episode features an in-depth discussion with Mike Trigg, a partner and portfolio manager at WCM Investment Management. The conversation focuses on WCM's growth, investment strategies, the concept of "moat trajectory," and the importance of culture in investment management.

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Key Themes and Takeaways

WCM's Growth and Evolution

  • Background:
  • WCM has grown significantly from $25 billion to over $66 billion in assets under management since the last podcast episode featuring Paul Black.
  • The firm successfully navigated the challenges faced by active managers, particularly in a market leaning towards passive investment strategies.
  • Current Position:
  • WCM sold a minority stake to Natixis and continues to outperform market expectations despite industry trends against active management.

Mike Trigg's Journey

  • Entry into Investing:
  • Inspired during college, Mike began his investing journey writing for The Motley Fool, leading to a role at Morningstar focusing on equity analysis.
  • Transition to WCM:
  • Joined WCM in 2005, initially facing significant challenges, including underperformance and cultural issues within the firm.

Investment Philosophy

"Moat Trajectory"

  • Concept Explained:
  • Moat: The competitive advantages that protect a company's profitability.
  • Moat Trajectory: Focuses on assessing whether a company's moat is widening, stable, or narrowing.
  • Key Criteria for Assessment:
  • Runway for Growth: The market should have significant potential left for growth.
  • Cost of Failure: Services should be small relative to the customer's overall costs but carry high stakes if not performed well.
  • Customer Base: A fragmented customer base is essential; reliance on a few customers can be dangerous.
  • Value Chain Movement: Companies should consistently move up the value chain, enhancing their offerings.

Cultural Insights

  • Importance of Culture:
  • Culture is seen as a critical component of a company's success and its ability to maintain a competitive advantage.
  • WCM emphasizes the need for adaptability and alignment within company cultures to ensure long-term viability.
  • Cultural Assessment Techniques:
  • Trigg discusses questions and methods used to evaluate a company's culture, such as assessing adaptability and alignment with strategic goals.

Challenges and Learning Experiences

  • Initial Challenges at WCM:
  • Experienced a steep decline in assets and performance shortly after joining, leading to cultural and operational challenges.
  • The firm learned from early mistakes, shifting its focus from traditional valuation methods to qualitative assessments of businesses.

Future Directions for WCM

  • Expansion Plans:
  • WCM is exploring new avenues for growth, including global emerging markets and developing new investment strategies.
  • The firm aims to create a platform for new investment talent, enabling them to pursue innovative strategies.

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Conclusion Mike Trigg's insights highlight the dynamic nature of the investment landscape, the importance of evolving investment philosophies like moat trajectory, and the critical role of company culture in achieving long-term success. The episode provides valuable lessons for investors and allocators in navigating the complexities of the institutional investment industry.

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Additional Resources

  • Follow Ted Seides on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/tseides?lang=en) and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/tedseides/)
  • Visit [Capital Allocators](https://capitalallocators.com) for more insights and episodes.
  • Access premium content and transcripts through a premium membership on the Capital Allocators website.

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30 -something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager, majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink, provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

0:43As advocates of integrating culture research into the investment process and advancing wide -moat investing with the concept of moat trajectory, WCM has delivered differentiated returns while building concentrated portfolios designed to stand out from the crowd. WCM is committed to defying the status quo by dismantling outdated practices, believing in the extraordinary capabilities of its people, and fostering optimism to inspire each individual to become the best version of themselves. To learn more about WCM, visit their website at wcminvest .com. and tune into this slot on the show to hear more about WCM all year long.

1:27This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit wcminvest .com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital Allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.

1:55What if data wasn't just a bunch of raw numbers, but a clear and decisive language to help connect investment strategies with long -term investor needs in a constantly evolving market landscape? Morningstar created that language, bringing order and utility to insight -rich data so you can prepare for your next opportunity, no matter the asset class or market. Visit wheredataspeaks .com to see what Morningstar data can do for you.

2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can keep up to date by visiting CapitalAllocatorsPodcast .com. You may remember my popular first meeting from a few years ago with Paul Black of WCM, then a $25 billion asset manager in Laguna Beach, California. Well, since then, WCM has gone up and to the right in every way. They sold a minority piece of the business to Natixis, continue to put big numbers on the board, and have grown to north of $66 billion, defying the fade of active management outflows.

3:26My guest on today's show is Mike Trigg, a partner and portfolio manager of WCM's focused international growth strategy that comprises the majority of the firm's assets. We discuss Mike's background, arrival at WCM in 2005, the near implosion of the firm shortly thereafter, and the rising of the international strategy from those ashes. We then dive in deeper to the core tenets of WCM's approach, discussing how the firm analyzes widening moats and cultures tied to competitive advantage. Lastly, we talk about how WCM's growth has impacted the firm. Please enjoy my second meeting, if you will, with Mike Trigg from WCM.

4:12Mike, great to see you. Great to see you, Ted. Well, this is going to be fun. We did a nice overview at WCM, I guess a couple of years ago now with Paul, and it's going to be fun to dive in a little bit deeper on what's become increasingly just such an interesting story. So why don't we start with your initial interest in investing? Before we get into that, I was thinking about Paul's podcast and how I enjoyed it as well. In the situation I'm in, it reminded me of having to go after the guy at a rehearsal dinner that just gave a really great toast. I don't know if I'll be able to top it, but I am happy to be here and dig more into the firm and our story.

4:51I have a bit of an unconventional background, I think, by investment management standards. I really probably fell in love with investing when I was in college. And back then we had a computer lab. And so you'd go to the library, you'd study, and then you'd inevitably go take a break. And that was in the late 1990s. And so it was a pretty exciting time to be in the stock market. And you could invest and you could throw a dart at the wall and make two or three times your money. So my buddies and I would go up there and talk about different stocks. And I ended up stumbling across the Motley Fool message boards.

5:24And The Motley Fool was a website that wanted to empower the individual investor. And then they had these message boards with all these really interesting, smart people that you could sort of interact with. It was kind of like, you think about all the stuff that's happened in social media now. They were kind of way ahead of their time and started learning more about investing. Obviously, I was a finance major, so I had some practical schooling as well that was going on at the same time. And when it came time to graduate, I did conventional type interviews, tried to interview at a couple big money management firms, some big banks.

5:55And I thought, hey, just on a whim, I'm going to throw a resume at The Motley Fool and see if they respond. And lo and behold, they did. And so they called me up and I flew out there and I ended up getting a job writing for the website. And so literally just imagine you're 22 years old, you know, really next to nothing about investing. And then a website like The Fool comes to you and says, hey, we want you to write like two articles a week about pretty much anything you want. So I hope most of those articles are deleted from the EMC tape storage that they're probably on somewhere. But so I did that for about a year and a half.

6:31It was an awesome experience. I mean, so much of The Motley Fool, what they're about really resonates with me. So there's like an irreverence to what they do. David Gardner, one of the founders had this portfolio called The Rule breaker. And a lot of it was about empowerment, right? Like, hey, this industry hasn't served individual investors well. You guys can do this on your own. And so much of my story too has just been about being a self -taught investor. I became a really good writer while I was there. And I still, to this day, think being a good writer is a really great tool to being a good investor.

7:11It's important to be able to, I think, articulate how you're thinking about things. It's important to be able to simplify your ideas down to a few key principles. Writing's a really great way to do that. The Fool was on a major growth curve at that point. So I joined just kind of at the very peak of the internet euphoria because I graduated school in 2000 and thinking that things were going to continue to grow a lot. So the headcount probably doubled or more in the time that I was there. And 18 months later, when I left, there was 30 employees. So I remember like calling my dad on the phone and being like, I can't believe I joined this company.

7:47And he'd always be like, you are getting the better education than you would ever get at business school or anything like that. And so as that situation kind of unwound, Morningstar proactively reached out to The Motley Fool, knowing that they were laying off a significant percentage of their editorial staff and within a couple of weeks actually had taken and interviewed and accepted a job at Morningstar. And that was fun because it was more of a traditional equity analyst role. Morningstar at that time is 2001. They're just really building out their equity research capability. And unlike the traditional sort of sell -side research coverage model, they really wanted to have a singular philosophy that drove how the analysts would look at the stocks.

8:30And it was sort of rooted in, I'd say, more of a classic Warren Buffett methodology. It was every business has a moat or should have some type of moat. There's six or seven pretty well understood moat sources, things like network effects and switching costs and economies of scale. So understand those. See if they apply to this business. based on some backward -looking analysis and your sort of qualitative assessment of the moat sources, give it a moat rating. So every business would either have a wide moat, a narrow moat, or a no moat. And then there was a valuation methodology. So we had a discounted cash flow model.

9:09Every company would be valued and there'd be an estimate of intrinsic value. And then the star rating or the level of conviction that the recommendation had would be based on the discount to your intrinsic value. So where the stock was trading relative to what you thought it was worth. And depending on the assessment of the moat, you might demand a smaller discount to intrinsic value for a wide moat business and a bigger one for a no moat. I was given a lot of freedom, a lot of autonomy, and then also indoctrinated in this way about thinking about competitive advantage. How did you end up going from Morningstar to WCM?

9:42So I was there for about four and a half years. And after about three years, my boss at the time had come to me and asked me about writing a newsletter. She and I were sort of kindred spirits along with probably Sanjay that there were some inherent flaws in Morningstar's process. And we were kind of missing these growth companies. She said, hey, what about writing a newsletter about growth stocks? I had been toying with this idea of buying moats that weren't just big moats, but small moats that were going to grow. And so kind of a core feature of that newsletter was this watch list called Emerging Moats.

10:18And it was kind of like, hey, buy the wide moat businesses of the future today. And Paul and Kurt both subscribed to that newsletter. And I found that out later. But one day I was sitting at my desk in Chicago. Paul called me up, left me a voicemail, said, hey, I'm Paul Black, one of his big, very enthusiastic voicemails. I'm Paul Black from WCN Investment Management. I'm a big fan of your work. I'd love to be in Chicago in a couple of weeks. would love to have lunch. And I thought it was really just like a portfolio manager looking to fill a slot of a day of consultant meetings or something in Chicago.

10:47And so we had lunch and it was very clear that within a couple of minutes that they had been reading the prior, I don't know, nine or 10 months that I had been doing the newsletter. And we had a lot of similarities in terms of the way we thought, and he was looking for an analyst. And I had no intentions of wanting to leave Chicago. I was just so taken with the conversation that I had with Paul that I ended up coming out here. When I look back at that lunch, it was an Italian restaurant with one of those paper table covering. And he had taken out a pencil and he was like drawing up the org chart and like had all these arrows and things and was kind of like a coach almost planning out the next five or 10 years of the firm.

11:30And I just loved his energy, loved his enthusiasm. And I think he asked me at the end of the launch, what do you want to do? And I'm like, I want to go on the buy side. And so that was my opportunity that just sort of came and found me. What was WCM like when you got there? From what I could tell before I joined the firm, it was really successful. I mean, they had grown a ton in the last, say, five years. It was about $3 .9 billion in assets at the end of 2005. So this was, when I met Paul, it was December of 2005. They had started to build a pretty good institutional business. The overwhelming majority of those assets were in a domestic large cap growth product.

12:09They had had a rough year in 2005, which was largely explainable by what was going on in the market at that time with commodities and energies and things that they were nowhere close to investing in. And so Paul basically sort of pitched it as an opportunity to come in and have a big impact. I had two analysts at the time, wanted a third. And it seemed like a really no brainer, great culture, great people. But then when I got there, you never know what it's going to be like, right? Until you actually, I mean, I always ask that now of CEOs, like, okay, well, I know you took this job and you probably had some idea of what the culture was like before you took it.

12:43But like, what are the big surprises? I mean, I've lived that, right? Like you only know until you actually walk in the door and are a part of it. And so it turned out to be quite the wild ride. And what I think I pitched to my wife when we moved out there, turned out to be something that was very, very different. I really thought it was like, okay, there's a lot underneath the hood here. But candidly, when I got here, I remember in the first couple of weeks, just starting to pick up that Paul and Kurt, they're clearly great business people, but they're not investor first people. Paul's passion was really running this business.

13:19And philosophically, everything they talked about, I completely resonated with me and was well thought out. And you go through the pitch book and it was pretty flawless, but it seemed like that wasn't their focus. And in fact, they were kind of looking to me to really help, not just like be part of the team. It was like, what are the next names? I just got here like two days ago, you know? And remember I was 27 or 28 then. So I had an unconventional background with a limited set of experiences. So there was all these crazy places where you could go have lunch around that Lake Forest office. And I finally got up the courage to tell Paul, I don't think we have the horses, basically.

14:00And he's like, what do you want to do? So just imagine me moving out here. I got Paul basically being like, you know, what do you think we should do? So on the one hand, it's great that someone looks at you like that. They're like, yeah, we really need you. But at the other hand, I didn't know what to do. I was still trying to figure it out for myself. And so, you know, I really just tried to do what I was hired to do, which was try to find ideas for the portfolio. But we're underperformed by over 2000 basis points in the first five quarters that I joined the firm. Very quickly, there started to be emotions and cultural issues.

14:40And I think it was maybe the first year having a meeting with the whole company and Paul basically saying to everybody, like, hey, everyone in here needs to be prepared that our assets are going to get cut in half. And I was like, whoa, okay. And back then, you still are kind of naive enough to think like, okay, yeah, it really does just take one great idea and we'll be back rocking and rolling again. And you don't realize that two bad years, three really bad years of 800 basis points under the bench annually. Those aren't things you really come back from. And then at the same time, from a process and portfolio management point of view, things kind of unraveling because of all of the pressures and disappointment around performance.

15:24You can read about the dysfunction of investment committees, but until you're on one and you actually hear people say the stuff, You don't really realize that it's real and it happens. And that's exactly what was taking place. I went to my first investment committee meeting, which were these big three -hour track -on marathon meetings. And the book Wisdom of Crowds, it just came out. And so everyone in the firm basically would go to this investment committee meeting. And then at the end, when it came time to make a decision on the portfolio, which it seemed like there was always an intention if there was a meeting to have a decision at the end of the meeting, which probably isn't a great idea either.

16:06Every single person in the room, I mean, you could be in operations, you could have been in sales. I mean, everybody wrote down on a piece of paper what they thought we should do with the next trade in the portfolio. And then all those votes were tallied up and looked at what the consensus was in the room. And if you actually read the book, Wisdom of Crowds, you realize that that's not the most appropriate application of it. So what seemed like a rocket ship and a growth engine suddenly had some really significant headwinds. You join a firm, you think it's going to keep growing, you're excited just to be part of the team, and then suddenly you're a year and a half in and the product that you were hired to be an analyst on is looking like it doesn't have a future.

16:43I needed to find other sources of growth. and something really fortunate and dramatic happened, which was one of my partners, Pete Hunkle, had been incubating a international strategy that was loosely based off the domestic strategy in that it was concentrated and had a quality orientation and focused on growth companies. And so the idea was sort of hatched. Okay, this is an opportunity to go build something. And Mike, Why don't you team up with Pete and go try to build something? Where'd the assets go to at the time? The assets ultimately bottomed out at less than a billion dollars. And so that created a couple interesting challenges.

17:29One was the firm's reputation at that point in the institutional market. I don't think it was all that great. And we were known for this domestic strategy that had significantly underperformed. And so I think it was by the time 2010 came, we had gone from $4 billion when I started to a little under a billion dollars in assets. So there's lots of things I could talk about during that period, but the most important ones are, first, nobody left, which is pretty remarkable. I mean, if you think about the challenges that a business can face when it goes through performance and business struggles like that, I don't know if other stories of firms where that happened and basically everybody stuck together and committed to seeing it through and hopefully getting to the other side.

18:15So that was fantastic. And I think we all agree, forget about what we're doing now and what we've done. It's like that in and of itself is one of the proudest moments I think we all have. The other piece is we learned a lot from some of the mistakes that were made with that domestic product. None of us would be the investors and the people we are if not having gone through those experiences. and a big one being coming back to this idea of moats and moat trajectory. I mean, the big mistake I think that we made was really focusing on really big moats, really wide moat businesses, and trying to buy them as cheaply as possible.

18:59And so our valuation discipline, which was largely sort of rooted in doing a lot of DCF work, continued to overtake the investment process and philosophy. And if you look back in time, I mean, we were buying Dell instead of Apple, eBay instead of Amazon, Yahoo instead of Google. I mean, those three trades alone would have had, had they been done differently, would have had dramatically different results for that domestic product. And so it was that experience combined with some of the stuff I had brought into the table from my Morningstar experience combined with some of the successes we'd had with the International product and other folks that were here that said, hey, this is really what we think we've kind of unlocked the key element here when it comes to growth investing, which is really rooted in this idea of buying wide -mode businesses and not only finding great investment ideas, but also steering you away from companies that are essentially big value traps.

19:55I don't think those insights would have been had or been as acute if not for going through the struggles that we had. And what was interesting about that as well is I knew we had learned so much and gotten so much better because of that. It took a while for other people to believe us. I think we outperformed by 900 basis points annually in the first six years of the product. And it still took us that long to get to a hundred million dollars. So much of investing is, I think, getting out of your own way and letting your, the importance of staying humble and recognizing that you're not perfect. And people today, I think, look at us and see what we've done and how big we've gotten and think, oh, you know, these guys must have huge egos and think they know everything.

20:41And it's like, well, not really, actually. Let's dig into the history here and tell you where we came from. And so I still think that how we run the company, how we treat people, how we think about our investment process is it all kind of traces back to that experience and knowing how fragile the business can be if you don't continue to get better, if you don't continue to innovate, if you don't continue to treat people right. This is a fun business when it's working, but it's a really difficult one when it's not. So there's a big difference between those starts in the international product after six years being 100 million and where you are today.

21:15And we had talked to Paul about the sort of two key features of the investment process. But let's start on this question of moats and widening moats. How do you think about assessing companies through that lens? It's been a huge evolution, right? I think if you asked anybody intuitively, they'd say, okay, yeah, I get it. Why wouldn't I want to own a business with a set of advantages or a mode that's strengthening? But how do you detect that? How do you do that with any sort of consistency? And we've done it a bunch of different ways. The first thing we really started doing was case studies actually on companies.

21:53A lot of it is rooted in backward -looking analysis, which is funny because I think a lot of people are attracted to this industry for kind of the immediate gains, the cause and effect relationship of investing. And maybe that explains why people don't do more backward -looking work. But we started doing case studies on companies, like great companies, and tracing the full life cycle of the business and trying to figure out, okay, what is this company's moat? What were the early signs that this moat was actually developing and being built? What did the market think about the company at the time?

22:28And then going all the way through to say, okay, and then what were some of the early warning signs when this mode maybe started to peter out and then ultimately maybe even start shrinking? And so we did that on a bunch of different companies. And the interesting thing was we started to see patterns amongst companies. And sometimes those patterns were not just several companies in the same industry that had done really well, that shared certain characteristics. But oftentimes, there were companies that shared business model attributes that were in totally different industries. And so from that, we created a set of typologies or frameworks really rooted in this idea of pattern recognition.

23:10And so we have a bunch of these things where if we're looking at an outsourcing business model, as an example, we think we've isolated the four things that are really consistent with long -term mode expansion for an outsourcing business model. And when we look at a new company, there's lots of different outsourcers in lots of different industries. If they sort of pass these four criteria, then it gives us a lot of confidence that it's a business that's going to be able to sustain its growth and grow its returns for a really long period of time. And then more importantly, I think it also helps you tune out all the noise that you're sort of inundated with companies.

23:45In that example of the outsourcers, so what are those four criteria and what's an example of where you saw that across different industries? The first thing we would look for is we want a runway of outsourcing. You don't want to invest in outsourcers when the majority of the market has already been outsourced. And that can take a really long time, to be honest with you. These things are actually pretty slow moving. Even in some of the other industries that we're involved in today, things like outsource clinical trials or outsource pharma manufacturing, you're looking still at well under 50 % of those markets being outsourced.

24:19And then the second piece is you want the outsourced service to be relatively small part of the customer's P &L, but the cost of failure to be really high. So if it's a really high piece of the expense line. Oftentimes, you don't get the pricing. It becomes a little bit more contentious. And so you want more of a cozy relationship. And it's easier to achieve that when the actual service cost is relatively small. And then the other one is a fragmented customer base. And that too is pretty apparent. You don't want an outsourcer that's largely relying on two or three customers, that can become also something that's not going to lead to the same amount of durability or not the kind of durability, at least that we're interested in.

25:11So you want some level of customer fragmentation and high barriers to entry. And then the last one, and this is probably the most important one, is you want evidence that the outsourcer is continuing to move up the value chain. That's ultimately what's going to really extend the growth curve of the business. and that's a fairly qualitative assessment. But if you go back and you study what the great outsourcers have done over time, they started doing pretty routine, basic things. And then over time, just became a lot more essential. Their role in the ecosystem became a lot bigger. And a lot of that's just by becoming more of a, effectively like an outsourced R &D arm for those companies.

25:52Pi One Semiconductor is the one that we've owned, the outsourcer that we've owned, the lawnist, But this is kind of a playbook that's been pretty successful in lots of companies. For many years, we owned a company called Christian Hansen, which is they make cultures and enzymes for yogurt, milk and cheese. So they serve the dairy industry predominantly. And Nestle, Danone, you know, companies like that used to largely produce all those cultures and enzymes in -house. And over time, they just became big branding and distribution businesses. And so they realized that they could outsource somewhat a capital intensive business to companies like Hanson.

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26:29And when the company first came public, the narrative was not that different than what you saw with Taiwan Semiconductor 20 years ago, which is why would you want to own an outsourced culture and bacteria company? You know, like wouldn't you want to own brands and wouldn't you want to own distribution? And these are the kinds of companies that are going to play to the emerging middle class consumer. There's nothing really sort of all that unique. But if you dug into it, you realized in the same way they were moving up the value chain. And that is, companies like Danone wanted to basically make certain feature claims about their products, either being sugar -free or being able to be stored at certain temperatures.

27:09I mean, a lot of it ended up being about health and wellness. All that stuff was like getting enabled at the supplier level. And so they were becoming an increasingly important partner to those customers. And that over time just manifests itself in not just great growth opportunities, but also opportunities for more margin. And so when we looked at the company initially, its margins were around 20%, I think, when it first came public. And we sort of obviously didn't look at it as an ingredient supplier like most people did. We looked at it as more of an outsource business. And so if you looked at the other outsourcers that we'd studied, and to us, it was clear that this could be a 30%, 35 % operating margin business.

27:52And that turned out to be the case and actually much more. So that's a form of pattern recognition that we do. And I think it's kind of enabled in part by the fact that we're not just a bunch of specialists. We're global generalists. We cover the world. we can kind of see some of these patterns, I think, that we wouldn't be able to if we were all stuck in certain lands, just covering certain countries or certain industries. With the outsourcers, there's this typography. You've kind of figured out there are these four key criteria that help you figure out what's happening with the moat. What are the other ways that you've tried to measure these widening moats across either different typologies or industries?

28:32Yeah. Well, one thing that we realized eventually with the case study approach was there is some selection bias that comes with that. If I know intuitively that most outsourcers turn out to be great businesses, okay, I can give you a list of 10 that we should go study, but I kind of forget about the ones, or I never knew about the ones that tried and failed, right? And so certainly you can study the life cycle of the moat and figure out what potential sources of deterioration there are, but it's hard to know what the failed examples were. And so we've also done this, I think, in a more quantitative way by taking an industry and all the participants in the industry and then study what's happened to them over the course of a few decades.

29:15So as an example, luxury goods is, if you're a global investor, odds are you've spent a lot of time looking at luxury good stocks over the years. And we studied about 50 luxury companies over the course of 30 years and tried to find what were the markings of the ones that really compounded returns at really high rates for a lawn period. I'm not the ones that, you know, sure, there's many of them that had their day in the sun, but what are the ones that were really lasting and enduring? We're the real coffee can investments in that group. And when we did that, it was really clear that there was two criteria.

29:49One, the higher the price points, the better. So the more aspirational the brand, the more enduring it tends to be. And then the other one is controlling your own distribution. So direct sales, not heavily relying on wholesale channels. And that in and of itself explains to you probably why the companies we've been involved in in the past are things like Louis Vuitton, Hermes, Ferrari, they all sort of fit that criteria. And then at the same time, we've been reluctant to invest in stocks like Caring Group or Jones Gucci. Not that they haven't done extremely well in recent years because they have, but it doesn't really fit that framework that I'm talking about.

30:29And oftentimes we think that if anything, the frameworks or the typologies, one of the things they really do is help you make distinctions between what's just momentum and what's actually really structural differences in companies that's going to lead to long lasting above average growth. It doesn't mean they're always right, but more often than not, they're going to be very helpful in that regard. So that, along with the filtering piece that I mentioned a second ago, right, like kind of tune out all the noise, I think is probably two of the more important things that they do. The other really important part about mode trajectory, and, you know, to be honest, we talk about this internally all the time.

31:08It's a mindset, right? Like it's sort of steers a lot of the questions that we ask companies. It's as good as it is for finding great ideas. I think actually it's probably more valuable in just steering you away from bad ideas. And I think so much of successful investing is you're going to make mistakes. And so you want to minimize the frequency and then the damage when they take place. I think that's an unappreciated part about it. And particularly growth investing, I think. Maybe that's historically partly why growth investing got a bad name. Another way to kind of think about moat trajectory is there's the moat, and then there's the growth formula.

31:44And those two things combined give you a positive moat trajectory. And depending on the type of business that you're looking at, for some, you have to be more sensitive to the moat. And then for others, you have to be more sensitive to the growth piece, right? So if you're looking at a consumer staple company, take Pernod Ricard. Their moat is pretty well understood. It's not going to change. It's brands, its distribution, its scale. But what's going to dictate whether that's a good investment or not is their ability to execute on growth. But if you contrast that with something like Shopify, which is another name that we own, the growth piece of the Shopify thesis is pretty well known.

32:30Everyone can look in pretty quickly and realize, okay, Shopify is going really fast and they've got a huge TAM and they've got probably 7 % of their total adjustable market in terms of merchants and they've got a massively growing ecosystem. What's going to derail that investment is really things around. It's going to be disruption. It's going to be their moat. It's going to be competition, right? And so we have different sensitivities that we'll sort of focus on. Those are all designed to, once we own the name, obviously just make sure that we don't end up owning, in the case of the Pernos, a bunch of dead money, high quality stocks.

33:02And in the case of things like Shopify, businesses that we're going to wake up one day and there's going to be a significant change to the competitive landscape. And we're going to find that there's been a really significant impairment in the valuation of the business. We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium. Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? Partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead. When it comes to M &A innovation, SRS Aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches.

33:42Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game -changing innovation. To leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Aquium, the smartest way to run a deal. Learn more at srsaquium .com. That's S -R -S -A -C -Q -U -I -O -M .com. And now, back to the show. How do you think about valuation of some of these companies? Because when one or the other aspect of what's creating growth, whether it's growth or the mode is well -known. Often the market prices that in.

34:30And some of the names you mentioned are traded at traditional looking valuations pretty expensively and have for some time. I've gone through a full life of learnings when it comes to valuation. My first lesson really in investing coming out of 2000 was the importance of valuation. And then I gravitated towards discounted cash flow models because there's something so seductive about that, especially when you're young and very impressionable. I remember the first time I did a discounted cashflow model and I put in what I thought were some reasonable estimates for growth and for margins and capital expenditures.

35:08And then I looked at what the price was and I thought, oh my goodness, I'm actually pretty close to the current stock price. Like I actually might be decent at this. And so there's this like false precision that I think can become pretty seductive. But over the years, for one, I've learned that it's just ridiculous to think that you can precisely determine what a company's worth. I mean, things are changing constantly. And particularly if you're investing in companies that are in growing industries with moats that are growing and then with cultures that are super adaptable and finding other ways to grow, your valuation work is going to look so wrong in a very short period of time that it's not really worth all the effort and problems that come from relying on discounted cash flow models.

35:56not to mention the fact that focusing a lot on DCFs there's false precision it gets you very focused on the short term when in the reality most of the value in a discounted cash flow model resides in that terminal period right which you spend zero time actually thinking about and if you're a long -term investor that makes no sense and we've kind of actually come up with this term called defy the fade is one of the big mistakes that you see people make when you do modeling is you look at a company and you're very focused on the short term and the company's growing five or six percent today you think okay i like the business things are going well six seems pretty good that's close to company's guidance maybe they'll do that again the next year but after that it's probably going to be five and then it's going to have to go down to four and then before you know it it's down to gdp and the same is true for your return on invested capital assumptions in a discounted cash flow model.

36:52And so what really Mo trajectory and culture are designed to do are identify those companies that can defy the fade, defy that inevitable fade. So we're not saying that fade will never take place, but by focusing on the companies with its attributes, they're going to maintain that competitive advantage period far longer than anybody thinks. And it's that delta between what the market's expectations for the fade are and when they actually take place is where all that alpha generation opportunity exists. And I think we've just come to a place where focusing on the qualitative assessments of a business around moats and culture and how that translates into the durability of a company's growth rate, I think that is far more predictive of a successful investment than trying to find things, waiting for price breaks on businesses of reasonable quality, that there's some sort of short -term impact that's like disrupted the stock price and you jump in at a 20 % discount, close that gap, earn a little bit of the cost of capital on top of that, and then you're out of the business in a few years.

37:56I think a much more successful way to invest is the way we do it now. So you touched a little bit on culture and this notion of culture being aligned with that competitive advantage that creates that growing mode trajectory. And Paul's talked about that. You've mentioned it a bunch of times. What does it actually mean to do the analysis on a company's culture that's aligned with their competitive advantage? It's been a huge evolution here. So when I came to WCM, actually, Paul and Kurt were already talking about culture. They had experienced a huge transformation in their own lives, which Paul talked about, I think, in your conversation and became convinced that culture really, if it mattered for our company, it should matter for the companies we invest in.

38:35But the truth of the matter is that at the time, I think there was a pretty narrow view of what a great culture really meant. In fact, I think Paul would tell you that basically what we were trying to do was just go find a bunch of companies that sort of smelled and tasted like WCM. Hey, if they talk about the same things that I'm talking about, and I'd really want to go work at that company too. If I was in that industry, then that must be a company with a great culture. And over time, we just realized that that's a really flawed way to kind of look at things. That number one, there's no perfect culture.

39:08And particularly, what culture works in one industry might not be right for another, right? So the joke that we've used for years is Google's infamous for unstructured time that they give developers to go work on pet projects and create things. And that's a huge part of their culture. And Canadian Pacific, which is a railroad that we've owned for a long time, that is a very operationally driven company that's all about sweating its assets and operational excellence and efficiency. you know, if suddenly they decided to give everybody in the company unstructured time, I mean, there's going to be a serious problem in terms of the company's competitive advantage.

39:46And so at the same time, if you applied some of the things that Canadian Pacific does from a cultural perspective to the developers at Google, I mean, there's going to be a pretty big revolt. So there is not one perfect culture that you have to start from it there. And you have to make sure that your own personal biases of what is and isn't a good culture actually get in the way. That's another key piece. And the ultimate question is, let's try to understand what the company's strategy is to grow their moat. Like every company has a strategy to differentiate itself from its competition, to grow its business, to take market share, to whatever their strategy for shareholder value is.

40:28Let's try to understand what that is. A lot of that comes through in the mode trajectory analysis. And then once we think we understand that, then we want to talk to the company about what the behaviors are that they think are necessary to achieve that strategy. So what are the parts of your research that you'll go into the company and kind of ask about to tease that information out? What we've done over time is developed a bunch of questions that we think are really helpful in terms of teasing those things out. So there was a period of time, not that long ago, I mean, five, six years ago, when unfortunately, we'd sit down with companies and just say, hey, will you do me a favor and just describe your culture for a little while?

41:07And most companies can't do that, interestingly enough, particularly if you're reserving the last 20 minutes of an hour and a half meeting to ask them that question. And what that really hit home with me a number of years ago, we were actually going up to visit Tencent. Tencent has a fantastic culture. We've done extensive amounts of research into it, but we had never really had just a dedicated culture meeting with them. And so we were talking to one of the senior executives there, and I started off and I asked that stupid question. and they just described your corporate culture. And he immediately just gave a horrific answer, to be honest with you, and started talking about having to pay programmers more money because of competition from Alibaba.

41:48And so I sort of pivoted the conversation and ended up asking them about a decision they'd made to close down their search business, which they had spent a bunch of money on. And he said, oh, that was a, I go, well, talk to me about that decision and why you did it. And this is when they were trying to build a competing product with Baidu. And he said, that was a really easy decision. our product managers came to us and told us we should shut the business down. And I said, well, that's pretty impressive that they felt comfortable enough to do that. I mean, after all, they were probably responsible for a lot of the product.

42:16And he said, well, actually, it was pretty easy for him because we compensate people based on user satisfaction, not based on revenue growth. And that really is sort of the core of what Tencent's culture is all about. It's an obsessive focus on the user. That was a pretty light bulb moment for me that we weren't asking great questions. It was kind of like the straw that broke the camel's back. I kind of already knew it intuitively. And so we set on a journey to figure out how to have good conversations with companies about their culture. And we just talked to lots of folks and built some relationships with people that had spent a lot of time talking about this in the academic community, tested a lot of questions, asking CEOs, and ultimately have come up with a series of questions around one, around alignment, because that's a huge piece of it.

42:57And then two, around adaptability. That's the other big hallmark of a great culture is one that's adaptable. And so there's certain trappings or things that we look for in adaptable cultures. And we have questions that we ask around that. So as an example, we're trying to get it alignment, which is like I said, it's sort of like behaviors. We'd ask, first question would be, let's hypothetically say the son or daughter of a good friend of yours is going to work at the company. They start next week. You're going to have coffee with them this afternoon. What are the three pieces of advice you're going to give them to be successful?

43:35That's a much easier question for a CEO to answer than saying, hey, just describe your culture. Tell me what it's all about. So you have to prime them and put them in a place to answer the kinds of questions that give you the information that you want. And then like things like on adaptability, ultimately for adaptability, you're looking for a learning orientation. And, well, what does that require? Lots of candor, learning from mistakes, external awareness. And so we'll ask companies, it's a pretty simple question, but you could ask a company about mistakes. Like what's a mistake that you made that you look back on now and you're like, wow, I'm so glad we made that mistake because we're so much smarter because of it.

44:15And when you ask that, you'd be surprised. Sometimes you get really good answers, but oftentimes you don't. When we ask that question and somebody starts talking about some $10 million acquisition they made three years ago where they misjudged the people and they had to write it off. I'm like, seriously, you're a $50 billion company. Give me a real mistake. That would be kind of a yellow flag that maybe there's not as much adaptability here as I thought. So it's that. We do that with management. We do that with former employees. And then really the next big foray for us and things we're spending a lot of time on now is more data -oriented culture work.

44:51And I think that's going to become a source of meaningful differentiation. And some of that's being enabled by a lot of the work that's going on in the ESG landscape. There's just going to be more data to look at and to glean cultural insights from. And so I think that'll be the next big push for us in the next five years. As you've gone through this incredible trajectory in the firm, even in the last three years that we've known each other, how do you turn that lens onto WCM? So how do you think about what's happening with WCM's moat and what's happening with WCM's culture? We're all of the view that nurturing and protecting and keeping the culture as healthy as possible is probably the single most important thing we can do.

45:36And I think the cultures, obviously things are going to change. They change with size, but we spend a lot of time trying to articulate where we've come from, the difficult periods, the behaviors that we think were essential to get us where we are. I worry honestly when you have people that have come in and all they've done is experience a tremendous amount of success and prosperity and they don't have a big reference class of experience to look at that they might miss certain attributes that I think have been sort of core to making this place successful and I worry that they stop trying to make the firm better because they think it's already so great we talk about the core values of the firm which are fun and gratitude and I think Paul went into those in your conversation.

46:21But on the research team, we have our own core values as well. And they're think different and get better. And in some ways, the firm embodies those as well. But the research team went through its own process of establishing core values. And it was a very similar process to what the leadership team did when we came up with fun and gratitude. A lot of it's like just looking back and saying, okay, how did we end up here? And what really makes us different than everybody else? It's not talking about smart people or hard work, that sort of permission to play in the investment community. But like, what are the behaviors that I think have really made us successful?

46:56And as we went through it, think different and get better just bubbled up to the surface. And if you step back, it actually makes perfect sense. Because when you think about the industry, and one of my other partners, Sanjay Ayers, does a really good job articulating this, and we've now dubbed it the WCM platform. But if you think about the industry where you've come from in your career, it's really difficult to detect and know whether somebody's talented or not. And some of that's because there's really long feedback loops in the industry. You know, it can take 10 years or longer to know if somebody's actually a really great investor.

47:34There's a lot of noise. There's a lot of luck involved. And so because of that, these rules emerge in the industry, like these unwritten rules, Everybody sort of acts the same way. They dress the same way. I mean, if you go to an investment conference put on by one of the big banks, it's a little sad almost how much uniformity there is in those rooms. And people tend to look at the same schools for hiring. Everybody watches and reads the same things. And so from that, you get, I think, these really counterproductive behaviors that largely explain why active management struggles. And it's a lot of groupthink.

48:14People are worried about standing out from the crowd. They're worried about careers. So they play it safe. They hug the benchmark. They focus on a lot of short -term information. They become information gatherers, largely, not trying to stick their neck out on really unique insights. And then they have a fixed mindset. They perpetuate that myth that there's like just some people that have the it factor in this industry and some that don't. And they want you to think that they're smarter than everybody else, even though everybody in the industry is already pretty darn smart. And so think different and get better is kind of the antidote to that.

48:54If there's a lot of groupthink that's part of the problem, like, okay, well, let's totally flip that on its head and make the whole culture about being different. Let's run really concentrated portfolios. Let's, again, focus on things where there's compounding knowledge like mode trajectory and culture where we can actually get better at assessing those things over time. Let's not focus on developing insights that are going to be worthless in six months once they come to fruition. And then let's pound this idea of being irreverent and scrappy and just a little different than everybody else. And then let's really make the firm about this journey of getting better.

49:32And what does that take? Well, it takes a lot of candor. It takes a lot of trust. You got to be willing to talk about your mistakes. And you got to lean into them. You got to make them not just an opportunity for you to learn, but from the whole firm to learn. Hey, we're not perfect. We've made mistakes. But what I think we've always done is really learn from them. And I think that that's been core to the success of the firm. And so when new people come in and I think about, well, how the culture is going to change, I mean, I'm actually pretty confident if people can just continue to think different and get better, then I think the firm is going to be in really good hands.

50:03Mike, I'm curious, as you've grown and you think about the business, so much of that incredible growth has really come in one product. Have you thought about just trying to get better and better at doing that one thing and mostly international growth compared to taking the skill set and broadening out in different investment strategies? Yeah. I mean, I think that's going to become a huge part of our story in the next 10 years. It's interesting because I think growth is kind of a dirty word in investing. And I look at it slightly differently and say growth is such a huge part of our story and what makes this a fun place to work, why people are so engaged.

50:45And so we need to continue to find other avenues of growth. So we've done that out of the global equities team by moving into global emerging markets, international small cap, global launch short. We have a China fund now. And there's a lot of interesting things that we're doing. And I think asset classes that we're exploiting some major inefficiencies, and we're going to develop some great businesses out of those products. But then also what's really exciting is trying to make this a platform for other people. I mean, I think I look at it and say, we are the luckiest guys in the world to be sitting where we are.

51:22And what better thing to do than give other people an opportunity to do what we've done. And so we started doing this actually a number of years ago, we brought a team in that's now does small cap value that's based in Cincinnati. We've got a team in St. Louis that does small cap growth. And then we've got an ESG team in Denver. And I hope we continue to do those. I mean, our intention is to continue to find people that are passionate about what they do. They've got a good idea. Maybe they've been stuck in a bank or an insurance company, or they've been at a firm or something went sideways and they just haven't had that really true moment and the time needed to really make it work.

51:58And we have the resources and the platform that they can come in, plug into, and then really just have the freedom to go chase whatever it is they're most passionate about. I think that that's definitely something that at the firm level that we'll continue to pursue because I think there's just a lot of opportunity that we can give to people. If you make it this far each week, you're probably ready for the closing questions. But wait, there's more. If you sign up for a premium membership, you can access our premium feed, which includes an additional set of closing questions each week and removes all the ads from the show, including this little pitch to subscribe.

52:36Hop onto the website to sign up. Thanks. And let's get on with it. Great. Well, Mike, can't let you go without asking a couple of closing questions. So what is your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? I love cooking. I think that's one of my favorite things to do. It's one of the few things I can do that actually distracts me from what else is going on in the world. So there's something pretty meditative about chopping an onion. And in California, we're obviously blessed with an unbelievable amount of great produce. And so like right now we're transitioning from the summer of corn and heirloom tomatoes into blood oranges and stone fruit.

53:16And it's kind of fun to watch that happen and take advantage of that in the kitchen. What's your most important daily habit? You know, I try to start every day doing some type of spiritual related reading. And well, the thing I find that's so helpful with that is starting your day that way, is it just kind of grounds you a little bit in what really matters, gets me a little bit more focused on what's to come in the day, how to handle it. And it makes me worry a little bit less, actually. So everyone has their own version of what spiritual is to them, but I think that's just a fantastic way before you pick up your phone and start plowing through emails or check your Twitter account.

53:54Doing something like that, I think, has been, for me, really, really helpful. What's your biggest pet peeve? Probably the biggest one is people that just lack self -awareness. I find that to be a hugely important thing here in the firm. People that aren't self -aware, they tend to be really, really difficult to deal with. They get defensive without recognizing it. And it sort of chokes off the ability to, I think, get better, right? If you're not self -aware about what you're good at and what you're bad at, then it can become pretty difficult to attack those bad things. So I think probably lack of self -awareness is the biggest one for me.

54:28What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you? I think my dad was always really good about when I made mistakes, like looking at them as learning opportunities. So that's part of the reason I feel so strongly about some of the stuff that I mentioned earlier. And then I think my mom, I came from what seemed like a dysfunctional family at times. And I remember as a kid complaining to my mom about that. And she'd be like, yeah, you just don't realize every family's got their issues. As I got older, I started to realize, hey, that's actually really true. And the more you can have open, trusting relationships with friends and deal with those types of things and not bury it, I think that that leads to really good relationships.

55:05So that's probably what my mom taught me most. All right. Last one. Now, as you know, we're going to tack on a few more for our premium members. But here's the last one for everyone who's listening. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? The biggest one is where to look for wisdom. I think, at least in today's world, I think we're led to believe that wisdom is going to come from people with big balance sheets and celebrities and athletes. And the more I've interacted with people like that, the more I realize that it can oftentimes be disappointing, more so than not.

55:42And that really wisdom comes from talking to people that have had struggles, that have made mistakes. and oftentimes it could come from a teacher, it could come from a cab driver. And so creating those moments of just random interaction and talking to people and hearing about people's stories and journeys and looking for it in unusual places, I've really leaned into that idea in recent years and I wish I would have known that at a much earlier age. Mike, it's great. Thanks so much. Thank you. Really appreciate it. Thanks for listening to this episode. I hope you found a nugget or two to take away and apply in your investing and your life.

56:20If you'd like what you heard, please tell a friend and maybe even write a review on iTunes. You'll help others discover the show and I thank you for it. Have a good one and see you next time.

From the publisher
You may remember my popular first meeting from a few years ago with Paul Black of WCM, then a $25 billion asset manager in Laguna Beach, CA. Since then, WCM has gone up and to the right in every way, they sold a minority piece of the business to Natixis, continue to put big numbers on the board, and have grown to north of $66 billion, defying the fade of active management outflows.

My guest on today’s show is Mike Trigg, a partner and portfolio manager of WCM’s Focused International Growth strategy that comprises the majority of the firm’s assets. We discuss Mike’s background, arrival at WCM in 2005, near implosion of the firm shortly thereafter, and the rising of the international strategy from those ashes. We then dive in deeper to the core tenants of WCM’s approach, discussing how the firm analyzes widening moats and cultures tied to competitive advantage. Lastly, we talk about how WCM’s growth has impacted the firm.


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