Richard Sandler – The Prosecution of Michael Milken (EP.372)

4 Mar 2024 · 1 h 1 min

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Podcast Summary: Richard Sandler – The Prosecution of Michael Milken (EP.372)

Overview In this episode of *Capital Allocators*, host Ted Seides interviews Richard Sandler, who has served as Michael Milken's personal attorney since 1983. Sandler shares his insights on the events leading to Milken's prosecution, the media's portrayal of Milken, and the broader implications of the case on the legal system.

Key Themes

Background on Michael Milken

  • Milken's Early Success: The episode outlines Milken’s rise to prominence in the financial industry, noting his innovative approach to high-yield bonds and his philanthropic efforts.
  • Legal Troubles: Milken pled guilty to six counts related to securities law violations in 1990, leading to a two-year prison sentence and a lifetime ban from the securities industry.

Perception vs. Reality

  • Media Influence: The podcast emphasizes how public perceptions of Milken have been shaped largely by media narratives, such as the book *Den of Thieves*.
  • System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking: Seides and Sandler discuss how immediate beliefs (System 1 thinking) often overshadow critical analysis (System 2 thinking), particularly in the case of Milken.

Richard Sandler's Insights

  • Personal Connection: Sandler shares his history with Milken, detailing their long-standing friendship and professional relationship.
  • Defense Strategy: Sandler explains the legal strategies employed during Milken's prosecution, including the concept of a joint defense agreement and dealing with grand jury subpoenas.

The Prosecution Process

  • RICO Charges: Sandler describes the implications of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) used against Milken and its broader implications for financial firms.
  • Government Strategy: Discussion of how the government offered immunity to other witnesses to build a case against Milken, emphasizing the power dynamics at play in high-profile prosecutions.

Consequences and Settlements

  • Drexel's Settlement: Drexel settled with the government, separating from Milken which further impacted his reputation.
  • Plea Agreement: Milken eventually settled by pleading guilty to lesser charges, but the stipulations of his plea deal were shaped by the government’s demands, leading to further controversy.

Key Takeaways

  • Misconceptions: The episode reinforces the idea that public narratives can often be misleading and oversimplified.
  • Impact of Prosecution: Sandler discusses the lasting effects of wrongful public assumptions and the need for accountability in prosecutorial actions.
  • Personal Reflections: Sandler highlights the importance of understanding the human element in legal cases, noting that people can be falsely characterized based on incomplete narratives.

Conclusion Richard Sandler’s reflections provide a compelling counter-narrative to the well-known story of Michael Milken’s prosecution, shedding light on the complexities of the case and the legal system's impact on individuals. The episode serves as a reminder of the importance of critical thinking and the dangers of unchecked media narratives.

Additional Resources

  • Richard Sandler's Book: *Witness to a Prosecution – The Myth of Michael Milken*, which delves deeper into his experiences and perspectives on the case.
  • Capital Allocators Community: Listeners are encouraged to join the community at [capitalallocators.com](https://capitalallocators.com/) for further discussions and insights related to institutional investing.

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30-something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

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1:26This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit WCM invest.com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.

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2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators.com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast. A long time ago, 33 years to be exact, Mike Milken pled guilty to six counts of violations of securities laws, went to jail for two years, and received a lifetime ban from the securities industry. He was, at the time, the most successful and powerful man on Wall Street, and remains one of the smartest and most successful backers of talent in finance, cancer research, and education. Most of us have formed beliefs about Mike based on accounts in the media or books written like Den of Thieves.

3:51We might think Mike was guilty of insider trading, for example. The way we form beliefs is problematic and rooted in survival from a time long past. We hear something and almost always immediately believe it's true. Danny Kahneman calls that system one thinking. Here's one example. We think Mike was guilty of insider trading. In fact, he was not. His plea of guilty did not touch insider trading. And another, the attorney general who aggressively pursued Mike to bring him down and presumably catapult his own political ambitions, was none other than Rudy Giuliani, himself indicted, arrested, and disbarred some 30 years later.

4:37Last week, Mike discussed how he emphasizes research and facts in his work. This is system two thinking that requires us to think on our own without being infected by the beliefs of others. So what really happened to cause us to have such negative views about a man who has done so much for the world? My guest on today's show tells a very different story based on facts from being in the room where it all happened. Richard Sandler has been Mike Milken's personal attorney since 1983, having joined Drexel three years before the U.S. Attorney General first subpoenaed Mike. He wrote a book last year entitled Witness to a Prosecution, The Myth of Michael Milken that describes his account of what happened based on the facts.

5:28Our conversation covers Richard's perspective on the history, motivations, and proceedings that led to both Mike's imprisonment and the public perception of him that formed as a result. I encourage you to set aside any preconceived notions you have about Mike Milken in listening to this conversation. I hope you enjoy the show. And if you do, this week, if you happen to be in a married or committed relationship, and one night you turn to your partner and say, hey, babe, what do you think? And they turn back and say, sorry, hon, not tonight. I have a headache. Why not turn a lemon into lemonade by responding, I have a better idea.

6:07Let's listen to the Capital Allocators podcast together. You can snuggle up and share a night of stimulating intellectual bonding. Thanks so much for spreading the word to your partner. Please enjoy my conversation with Richard Sandler. Richard, thanks so much for joining me. Thank you for having me today. I'm looking forward to the discussion. I'd love you to take me all the way back to your original relationship with Mike. Going back a long time to before when you were born, probably, Ted. I met Mike's brother, Lowell. Lowell and I are the same age. He's my closest friend in the world. We became close friends when we were in the first grade.

6:48Six years old at the time. Mike was the older brother, a couple years older. In those days, a couple years was a generation. but I certainly grew up much at their home as Vol grew up at my home. As kids, we went to camp in actually my parents' backyard. They had a large yard and there was no camps in the San Fernando Valley really at that time. And a lot of parents got together and decided they would fund a camp. My older brother and myself and Mike were all in the camp. So we were campers together probably from the time I was nine years old. So we've interacted pretty much from that time on. We all went to college together at Berkeley.

7:28By that time, that generation of two years really shrunk and we just got to know each other really, really well. What was he like as both a kid and in college? He was always an outgoing guy, a leader. People were drawn to Mike. So he had a competitive nature, but he was always easy to get along with and very popular in school. He was head cheerleader in high school. I think he was the prom king at his prom, but he didn't have any airs about him. So you never saw that part of him. He did really well in college. The story people like to tell is when he was in his last quarter at Berkeley, needed whatever it was, 10 units to graduate.

8:08And he had worked at Touche-Ross, the accounting firm in Los Angeles during the summer. And he stayed in LA and continued to work for the accounting firm during that quarter. He came up a bought the books, read the books, looked at notes of other people he knew and passed all his classes. So he was always a person that was easy to admire and he worked hard. So if you circle forward now to 1983, when you joined Drexel, where was Mike at the time and what was Drexel when you joined? Mike had moved from New York to Los Angeles in 1978 and moved his whole department with him. So you knew at the time that he was successful in what he was doing since he was allowed to move a department.

8:56He and his wife were both from Los Angeles. I think they always wanted to move back to L.A. And his father had cancer. He had two children at the time, two or three children. And he wanted his father to get to know his grandchildren. So he did come out at that time. I think Drexel was starting to take off. I think 78, late 70s, was around the time that they started the new issues. of high-yield securities for companies that couldn't get investment-grade ratings. So Mike was known as being pretty successful as he moved back to Los Angeles in 78. By 83, there was a lot of articles written. I think there was a cover story in Forbes magazine.

9:37Mike himself always was media shy. I don't think he ever cooperated or gave an interview in any of these articles. But clearly, a lot of transactions were getting done. I, as a lawyer, from the time they moved out to 83, started doing more transactions of investments that Mike and other people in the department were making. So it was natural when they asked me, do you want to leave the practice of law? We're putting together a small consulting group to help structure and oversee our investments. I was ready to do it. So you joined in 1983. How were those first couple of years for you? They were fascinating.

10:19I actually realized that thinking as a client, working on transactions, trying to structure deals, working with lawyers is a different really mindset than actually representing a client as a lawyer. So it took me probably at least a year before I felt that I'd made the transition is basically how I thought about things from day to day. But it was fascinating. I went to a lot of roadshows, a lot of major companies that became major companies that were doing financings for Drexel would be coming out there, met a lot of interesting people. They had a bond conference, a research conference every year, where they brought in all the buyers, all the companies, and then also some people from government and health in different areas, not that different from what the Milken Institute Global Conference has become, to look at the world, met a lot of really interesting people during that period of time and learned a tremendous amount.

11:16So a couple of years in, your role shifted. And so why don't you take me to what happened? One afternoon on a Friday, November of 1986, when the market closed, somebody came down to my office and says, did you see what just came across the tape? Ivan Boski is pleading guilty to a crime and he's paying a huge penalty, which really is huge news, I had worked on a transaction where we had invested in a financing that Drexel did for Boski the prior March. And I got a phone call that there were federal marshals downstairs and others serving subpoenas that related to that transaction and referred to a statute I'd never heard of called RICO.

12:06They came from the U.S. attorney in Southern District in New York. This was something I had no prior relationship with, no prior knowledge about, and it changed our lives dramatically. What happened from there in Mike's involvement in all this? Well, the first thing we did is we realized that this was something that we didn't know anything about. And we needed to get advice from people that did know something about it. And it was late in the afternoon, that Friday, November 14th, that we gathered. And one of the names that Mike had mentioned that he had met before was Edward Bennett Williams, who at the time was probably the best known defense lawyer in the country.

12:53He was one of the founders of the major law firm that still exists today, Williams and Conley in Washington, D.C. We reached out and we got him on the phone to try to talk to him about what should we do? What are we thinking about? I had a good conversation with him. We called other lawyers we knew to get recommendations since this was all centered in Washington, D.C. and New York City to get names of lawyers on the East Coast and planned that next Monday to be in New York and start interviewing lawyers. What were your expectations at the time? Quite frankly, I didn't know what to expect. My expectation, I'm pretty naive.

13:32I was probably most people. Number one, I used to think that if the government was investigating you, they must have had a good reason. And if they didn't have a good reason, they'd figure that out and you'd move on with your life. In my probably Pollyannic view of the world, felt that we're going to get into the latter situation. There was some confusion here. Boski must have said something to them. But when they found out it wasn't true, we'll just get back on with life. but we got to get lawyers to make sure we do this the right way. In retrospect, quite naive. So what happened as that played out?

14:04Well, we got involved in an investigation. We hired lawyers. We had subpoenas. We started complying with those subpoenas, gathering documents, trying to figure out what was going on. We entered into something which I'd never heard of before, called a joint defense agreement. Drexel got lawyers. Mike got lawyers. His brother got his lawyers. And others that got subpoena got lawyers. I learned from all of them what the process was and realizing just almost immediately the incredible power that the government had in a criminal investigation. I remember saying to one of the lawyers, these subpoenas are so broad.

14:42They're asking for stuff that's really confidential. And I'd rather object to some of these things. I don't really want to produce all these files and things they want. And this one lawyer who worked with us from Paul Wise, who was a former prosecutor in the Southern District of New York, said to me, do you realize that if the U.S. attorney wants to tomorrow, they could take the subpoena, they could back up a truck, and they could empty out every file in this building, okay? This is not a civil litigation. I just still remember that to this day, that we're going to be now going through this process, trying to figure out what was going on.

15:21You have really no rights as a person under investigation. You don't have a right to ask them questions. When they subpoena documents, you don't get a copy of the subpoenas documents they get from other people. They subpoena people to appear in front of grand juries and take testimony. You don't get a copy of that testimony. You don't get to find anything out. All you have to do is hopefully, if their lawyers are cooperating with your lawyers, you'll get some secondhand knowledge of what's happening. And that's how it started out. And then we had the other issue, which was the media. All of a sudden, articles are appearing in the paper that we got the subpoenas, that there was insider trading, that they're looking at this, they're looking at that.

16:03Obviously, someone was leaking information to the media. And for a number of years now, we're in a constant delusion of trying to figure out what's going on. What are they looking at? What are we giving them? What are others giving them? And where is this investigation going? So it sounds like on request, you're providing a lot of information, but you don't even know at this point in time what they're accusing Mike of or Drexel of. Is that right? Right. We knew it was an insider trading investigation. Earlier that year, a guy named Dennis Levine had pled guilty to insider trading. He actually was working at Drexel in their corporate finance department at the time, but most of the things he pled guilty to was related back to a time I think he was a kid or Peabody.

16:48He apparently had put together a group of people, of lawyers, other bankers, they were exchanging information and trading on this information on deals that they knew were coming up. And he pled guilty. You never knew he was under investigation until the day he pled guilty. And then come along November that day, Ivan Boski pled guilty. You didn't read any articles that there was an investigation, but he pled guilty. And again, it was about insider trading. Then you got our subpoenas. Don't forget the other two cases. it wasn't in the newspapers till they made their deal, till they pled guilty. We're in the newspapers almost from day one.

17:27So we knew that we weren't involved in insider trading, but we started looking at every transaction that Bosque might have been involved in, any transactions he might've been involved in with Drexel and try to figure out what somebody might be saying happened. From there, when more subpoenas came in, they may be looking at something else. All we would know, they'd be looking at XYZ transaction. Then we'd pull out all our files on the XYZ transaction and try to figure out what was going on. So to put it in context, who was Bosque at the time? Ivan Bosque was probably the most revered and respected risk arbitrageur on Wall Street.

18:04He had accounts with every firm. In fact, he did very little trading with Drexel. He was probably the largest equity buyer of securities of stocks at the time for any firm where he had an account. Yeah. All of this is happening. You're still not sure what's going on. Why do you think Mike was the one that they were subpoenaing and going after? Well, clearly, Ivan Boski, who made really a great deal for himself, when you really think about, he was trading on inside information. He was the largest purchaser of securities. He was buying huge volumes. He was paying for the information he was getting literally in suitcases or bags of cash that he was giving to people.

18:49And yet he only pled guilty to one count. He got a relatively light sentence because he was, as the government said, one of the greatest cooperators of all time. And clearly he was saying that certain illegal transactions he did, he must've done with Michael Milken. Michael Milken was probably the most successful publicity-shy person, a financier on Wall Street. He had totally revolutionized the industry. The idea of a new issue of a high-yield security, our new issue of debt security for a company that could not get an investment grade was unheard of when Mike came to the market. He studied this area.

19:31He studied companies that had below investment grade ratings. He studied the company. He met the management of the company. He looked at the industry. And based upon that, he started buying securities that were at that time at great discounts because most of them probably had been originally investment-grade security. Got in trouble, their ratings dropped, and their prices dropped in the market. But Mike always realized that if he was right about a company, if the company is able to pay its interest and pay its principal and its due, then he'd get paid no matter what it was selling for in the market.

20:08And he was very successful. the investments that he had made at Drexel with the money that Drexel had given him to invest. He had gone out and talked to a lot of major institutions and investors about this area of the market. They started investing with him through Drexel. They were successful. And he created a marketplace where people were interested in the securities that he was recommending. Then they started doing the new issues and a whole industry had developed and Drexel dominated the industry. No one understood it as well as they did. Nobody worked as hard or researched it as much as Mike and the team did.

20:47And then they started representing people who saw value in established companies that they thought were undervalued. And they were able to get financing from Drexel, which they never could have gotten before, and started making tender offers for companies. Some of these were considered hostile because the company didn't welcome it. And those companies did not like the fact, they called them corporate raiders at the time, that these corporate raiders were coming after their companies. They complained to their investment bankers. Their investment bankers didn't like the fact that this new industry had begun on Wall Street and they weren't participating in it, yet they were going after their clients.

21:27So Mike was an attractive target because he really wasn't liked by a lot of people in the business roundtable and in the established firms. He was getting a lot of publicity. He was very successful. And so people complained to the SEC. They complained to Congress. And now you had a guy who had admitted to committing securities crimes saying that somehow Mike Milken was involved with him. So how did the investigation proceed from there? It took a long time. We started this in the late 1986. We're getting all these, as I say, leaks to the press going on. You would find over a period of time the different witnesses that they would bring into the grand jury.

22:11Now, the only defense you have if you go into the grand jury is you could refuse to testify under the Fifth Amendment. You could say, I'm not going to testify. But they can make you testify if they give you immunity. It's another major weapon that the government has. So if they say that as long as you tell the truth, nothing you say will we use against you personally, we're going to give you immunity from prosecution for anything you tell us as long as it's true. They started giving people immunity. Some Drexel clients, some Drexel employees. We didn't necessarily know what they were saying, if their lawyers would tell us.

22:48And we saw the investigation was moving in multiple directions. It wasn't just insider trading anymore. There was this whole idea of securities parking. Did you sell security to somebody with an agreement to buy it back so that they really weren't at risk? Did they sell you a security with an understanding that you really didn't own it? All these theories that had not really been subject to prosecution before we were learning about, more and more people were making their deals to testify for the government. And we didn't always know what they were saying. So we always felt the risks were getting greater and greater during this period.

23:24Now, there were two investigations going on. You had the Security and Exchange Commission doing an investigation, and you had the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney doing a criminal investigation. So the first movement was by the SEC. They filed a complaint against Drexel, against Mike, against his brother, against a few others. I believe it was in 88. They alleged all kinds of different securities violations. Some would have related to insider trading, some relating to some of the other things we're talking about. And then in 1989, the indictment came down against Mike and his brother.

23:58Between the SEC complaint and the indictment, Drexel made a settlement with the government. We think of the legal system as innocent until proven guilty. And what you're describing sounds like a bunch of gathering information up until these cases or indictments are shown to you. You don't even know what's happening. Is that how the process works? Right. You don't get any information from the government as to how they're doing it. And at this point in a high profile, highly publicized case, you're really not innocent in the court of public opinion. The articles are about they must have done this, they must have done that.

24:38The expectation now is that you did something. The other thing I learned is that the Southern District in New York, they consider themselves the prime office of the Justice Department, and they can't be wrong. Their job is to protect their reputation. So once they allowed the information to be leaked, that this investigation was heading towards indictment against whether it's Drexel or Michael Milken or whoever else, they can't be wrong. They're going to prove that they're right and they're going to defend themselves. One of the reasons I wrote the book is so people understand that today the process is no different than the process was when we went through it.

25:17And the government has tremendous power. Prosecutors were given this power so they could put away bad guys. But their job is to see that justice is done. Their job is to seek the truth. And as was said by the Supreme Court, it's not to necessarily win a case. It's to see that the guilty are punished and the innocent are not. That's their job. What I found was these young guys, they're not bad guys. They're young attorneys. They're aggressive. They're trained to believe in what they're doing. The guy wouldn't be under investigation if he didn't do something wrong. Now go figure out what it was.

25:54And they use their power to win. It's not a level playing field because they have all the tools until you get indicted. Until the day you get indicted, you're not entitled to any information. But remember I talked about they give immunity to a witness. So they go to a witness and they say, we're investigating the ABC transaction. And we see the transaction happen. And we believe that there was some illegal understandings and agreements here. Can you help us in proving our case? because if you can, we'll give you immunity. If you can, we don't want you to lie. So if you can't, we won't give you immunity.

26:32But if we learn later that you were involved in these transactions and we do bring a case, then we're gonna indict you. This is a RICO case. Under RICO, your assets are in jeopardy as well as your freedoms in jeopardy. They have that tool. If I go to the same person and I say, look, you're still working for Mike. Your bonus is coming up in a few months. We'd like your cooperations. This is what we believe happened. And we really do believe this happened. Do you remember it that way? This could be helpful to us. It could be helpful to you. Get indicted for obstruction of justice. I can't do that.

Read the full transcript

27:07All the power, all the weapons are in the hands of the prosecutor. And if the prosecutor's goal is to win, somebody said to me early in the investigation, a defense lawyer who'd been in the Justice Department, that if the government wants to get you, they're going to get you. And I can't believe how committed the Justice Department in this case is to Michael Milken. I don't know why, but that's it. And they want to get him. At the time, I dismissed it. Later on, it kept haunting me, that comment. You'd like to think that knowing they have that power, they wouldn't proceed in such a way unless they felt like they were doing their job and seeking truth.

27:49So what were their motivations in going after Mike if, in fact, you don't think he did anything wrong? Well, they made a deal with Ivan Boski, and they made a deal predicated on him making other cases for them. and the prime case that he was going to give them was Michael Milken because of what he'd accomplished and what his position was in the industry at the time. So they had an incentive to say, well, we didn't make a bad deal. They had an incentive to say that what this guy was telling them must be true. And if we could get other people to tell pieces of it or whatever else, It must be true.

28:32I think that's how they're trained. They're trained to say, we made a deal with this guy. He said this guy did this. We bought onto it. Let's find out if he did it. And by the way, it's in our interest to find that he did do it. And what's he doing in our office anyway? We didn't tell Ivan Boski to do business with them. They did business together. So I think the motivation is that's how they get ahead. The prosecutor, as I can quote him in the book, who came to my class later on, said that the way that prosecutors get paid is not in money. It's in being successful. And that helps our career. The more notice the case gets, the more important it is for us to be successful.

29:15And the problem is, Ted, at least that I see, is they should be trained to ask themselves, what if we're wrong? We're dealing with human beings. This guy has a wife. All these people do. They have children. If we're wrong, what are we doing to their lives? But they don't ask themselves that question, or at least in the cases that I saw, they don't ask themselves that question. So it's not that they're bad guys and they're out to do something wrong. They believe in what they're doing. They believe they're witness. One of the flaws in the system is they never get to know the person under investigation.

29:53They only get to know the witnesses that they've immunized or that have pled guilty to them. Those are the only people they get to know. So how does that work? Is there in the process of getting documents and talking to people? Is it they never interact with Mike, who is the subject of what became the indictment? They never do. Certainly as a lawyer. Well, you know what? We want to cut this off, Mr. Prosecutor. Why don't we bring our client in to meet with you and you'll see that he's telling the truth? So you can do that. The problem is nobody would do that because the risks are too great. The risks are too great that they won't believe him, but they'll take something that he said and they'll use it against him.

30:37And now you're disclosing to them your defense. The only thing that they don't know at this point is what your defense is. So now you're taking the person that has all the power, who's trying to destroy your life, and you're telling them whatever you want to tell them. They're not telling you anything. And so nobody does that. To me, that's the flaw of the system. I really think it would work a lot better if there was a method for people to come in and talk and get to know each other. They do have different things. There was something they called queen for a day. Well, you could come in and have immunity for one day.

31:13But that doesn't mean they can't use it against you later because you only have immunity if you tell the truth. And if they learn something later and you didn't tell them the truth, they can use that against you. So nobody ever does that. Nobody ever brings the witness in early on when they are really the subject of the investigation. When the indictment comes down, you now know what it is they're targeting. What happens from there in the process? I think there were 12 transactions in the indictment. 98 counts. If there's one transaction and you mail three letters, that's three mail frauds. So now we study all the transactions.

31:49We look into it. So now we have an idea what the charges are and we start repairing our defense. That's what we're doing. Meanwhile, the pressure is building. You have these articles that are not accurate, that are appearing almost on a daily or weekly basis in major newspapers and magazines about what a horrible person you are. In this case, you got your brother is under investigation and then indictment. And he wasn't even involved in most of these transactions. So you know he's there only because he's got the same last name you have, which is borne out. History's proven that to be true. And you're looking around and some people that work for you are all getting immunity.

32:30People that work at your clients are getting immunity. And now Drexel has settled. They've pled guilty saying that they didn't have enough information to dispute the accusations. They settled with the SEC and the U.S. attorney. This is before you've even been indicted. Now you talk about innocent until proven guilty. It's part of their settlement. They had to fire Michael. They had to separate from him. Then they had a provision in the settlement of the SEC that said that no employee of Drexel was allowed to talk to Mike about any business transaction Drexel was involved in. So now you have a person that hasn't even been indicted, let alone proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, who has now been declared guilty by the firm that he helped build and work for because they're going to get rid of him and they're not allowed to talk to him.

33:22So now you have the entire firm against you where you work. You're not working there anymore, which is what you did every day for 14 to 18 hours a day. Your brother's exposed. You're exposed. You know what you did and didn't do. But then you've got Ed Williams, who unfortunately passed away early on this, but who said to me early on, everything I've seen shows that Mike is innocent here. But my biggest fear is I can't tell a jury that this guy made this much money because he made an incredible amount of money. He's not guilty of something. That's my concern. And now he's exposed to 20 to 40 to 80 years of prison because of RICO and everything else.

34:09And the pressure's building to a point where he says everybody else is making a deal. What are my options? When Drexel settled, what did they admit to the government in that? They admitted on certain of the transactions that were in the indictment. They said that we don't have the information to dispute it, and therefore we are willing to plead to have done. I don't remember the counts exactly what it was. They paid a very large fine. I think they paid$650 million out. Part of that went as a criminal penalty, and part of that went as an SEC disgorgement fund because they settled with both the SEC and the U.S.

34:47attorney because they had to do with it. It could have been some of the transactions. It could have been a 13-D violation. I don't know. I mean, a lot of this stuff was very regulatory, but the biggest issue was the fact that Mike was now gone from Drexel. He wasn't there anymore. And the firm had an interest in being cooperative with the government. In fact, had a requirement to cooperate with the government. And so where the firm had been fighting the charges before, it was now cooperating on it. All the forces were coming against us. we're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about srs aquium want to make sure your m &a processes aren't stuck in the past partner with a company that's been defining the future of deal making for nearly two decades instead when it comes to m &a innovation srs aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches.

35:45Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game-changing innovation. So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Aquium, the smartest way to run a deal. Learn more at srsaquium.com. That's S-R-S-A-C-Q-U-I-O-M.com. And now, back to the show. Why did you think at the time that Drexel agreed to settle if they didn't think there was anything that had been done wrong? A couple of things had happened. The government indicted a firm called Princeton Newport, which was a Drexel client.

36:35The prosecutors at the time had told the principals and the lawyers for Princeton-Newport that they're going to run over them. They're going to destroy them unless they help them against Michael Milken and another case that was under investigation at the time, a guy named Bob Freeman, because they had relationships with both. And they brought a RICO case against Princeton-Newport, which was a very respected firm. Case went to trial and Princeton-Newport lost. The firm was out of business before the first witness was called in the trial. because under RICO, you could create a freezing of assets.

37:10And as a financial institution, that's very, very difficult. So even though Princeton-Newport case was reversed on appeal and then the government never retried it, the fact that Princeton-Newport was out of business before the trial started really got the attention of Drexel. What's going to happen with our lenders if we go to trial on a RICO case? What are we going to do? Likewise, there was a particular assistant that worked in the high-yield bond department who was indicted for perjury. They went after her. It was an important case in that she was an innocent individual that the government, I don't know if it was the FBI or the postal inspectors, came to her house at 9 o 'clock one night and started asking her questions.

37:57And then she started answering. Then she stopped answering. And then later, in front of the grand jury, they said she was perjuring herself. And they went after her. and they convicted her. That also sent a message to Drexel that none of our employees are safe. So Drexel was scared they were going to go out of business if they didn't do something. They had 10 ,000 employees and they felt their obligations went beyond just one person. So whether I agreed with them or not really isn't important, but that's why they decided to settle. You've mentioned this RICO hearing. What is RICO? RICO is the, I think it's called Racketeering Investigation Corruption, whatever act.

38:35It's an act that was passed by Congress that was really intended to give prosecutors even greater powers when it came going after organized crime. Under RICO, if you're a criminal enterprise, they could freeze all the assets of the enterprise during the investigation, and you have to forfeit all those assets if you're found guilty. The amount of time that you would have to spend in prison for every count of RICO you violated is much higher. So in a securities fraud, it's five years. RICO, it's 20 years. So it's a very powerful statute that really was not designed to be used against a financial firm.

39:16In fact, when I talked to Ed Williams that first day in November of 1986 and I read him the subpoena, and he heard it had a RICO in it, he says, it doesn't surprise me. That's not what RICO's for. But Rudy Giuliani, who is a U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, is the biggest piece of political meat I have seen since Tom Dewey. And for those that don't remember Tom Dewey, he was a U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, and he used his position for a political career. He went on to be governor of New York, and later ran for president of the United States, almost got elected against Harry Truman in 1948.

39:57Rudy Giuliani clearly had a political ambition, became the mayor of New York, and as we all know, had aspirations to become president of the United States. Now that this is happening, Mike's been fired from Drexel, he's off on the side, Drexel is settled. What do you do? Well, we prepare to go to trial, figuring that we could win the trial, but we have to convince a jury. But at the same time, we started exploring the idea of how do we cut our risk? And we started having conversations with the prosecutors. And those discussions got to a point where we realized we probably could settle without making cases.

40:37Don't forget, up to that time, if you wanted to settle, the way you settle with the government is you make cases against others. That's what Mr. Boski was able to do. That's how you get a good deal in settling, make cases against others. Well, Mike didn't engage in criminal activity. So he wasn't in a position to make cases against others. Number one. Number two, I don't think his personality is such that he could make cases against others. So once they said, you don't have to make cases for others, we started negotiating with them as to, so what do we have to do? and it came down to, we need six counts because Drexel pled to six counts.

41:15You're going to have to do the same thing and you're going to have to pay$650 million because Drexel paid$650 million. We said, look, we're not Drexel. We're not a corporation. I don't care what they did. We're not paying what they paid, et cetera. And we finally got to a point where we could pay, I think it was 500 and still had to be six counts. And then they said, one of the counts has to be insider trading. So we said, well, we're not pleading to anything we didn't do. So let's not talk any further. They said, well, okay, okay. Well, one of them will be conspiracy. We got to find five transactions.

41:51Three of them had to be with Boski. And that's what we did. We actually found things to plead to, none of which had ever been subject to criminal prosecution before, many of which hadn't probably even been enforced as regulatory violations before. But we found things that he could admit to. We came to an agreement on the money. Most people probably don't accept this, but like I said, I've known Mike my entire life. Money was never the issue. Mike made a lot of money because he knew what he was doing and he was really good at it. His view was he can continue doing that. Whatever it costs to settle is what it costs.

42:27We had to figure out a number. He didn't want to do what Drexel did because he just didn't want to be painting with that picture. We came to a dollar number to pay. We paid a way to do it, and we came to transactions to plead to. So he decided to settle. And in the course of the settlement, we got to a point where we got stalemated, and they came back to us and said, well, if he'll settle, we will also drop all charges against his brother, which was unheard of in the Southern District, which was a confirmation as to why he was in the case in the first place. So what were those violations that Mike plead to that you said hadn't really ever been prosecuted before and might not even be regulatory violations?

43:11Take one would be aiding and abetting another person in filing a false 13D. So what did that involve? Mr. Boski owned stock in a company called Fishback, and he had more than a 5 % interest, and he filed with 13D as he was required to do. He complained to Mike that it was a bad deal because he'd asked Mike, what did Mike think about it? Mike says, it might be a good deal because a client of Drexel's had made a public statement that he wanted to acquire this company. So it was in play, and he never acquired it. So Boski complained to Mike that he never acquired it. Mike's comment, well, you know what I know.

43:50I didn't give you any inside permission. It was not my fault. And just to get him off the phone one day, he said, and I know this sounds kind of funny, but he said, fine, if you actually lose money on that, I'll make it up to you. I guarantee he didn't have any idea how he'd make it up to him. The idea being that, hey, someday I'll find a good security, something that I think is valuable, I'll recommend it to you legitimately and everything else. But anyway, the violation was since a 13D is supposed to disclose everybody who has an interest in the security, theoretically, Mike Milken saying, I'll make it up to you means he had an interest in the security.

44:26So Boski should have amended his 13D. So these are the kind of things he pled to. Do you really think that Mike Milken was thinking at the time, I wonder if he's going to amend his 13D or not? But he aided and abetted. I don't think anyone's ever gone to prison for a false 13D filing, let alone aiding and abetting another person by not amending it. There was a net capital violation that Boski, apparently he went to somebody else that he dealt with at Drexel that worked for Mike and said, I got to get some securities off my books because otherwise my capital is going to drop below the regulatory requirement.

45:02So if you'll buy these securities, I'll buy them back from you later on, which would be inappropriate. Never prosecuted, but inappropriate. What Mike pled to is he didn't make the deal with Kowalski, but he heard about it. He approved it, but instructed the person to sell it back to him right away. I don't want to keep it on my books. So that was a neck capital violation. They were all things like, I'll make it up to you, whatever else. Interesting enough, when the judge assessed the economic damage to the marketplace from everything Michael pled to included on the three counts that related to Bosque, that the total economic effect of these violations was zero.

45:46Not one penny was lost. With another client, he had a high yield fund and Drexel was charging Mike's department with commissions it was paying to its salesmen for selling the fund. So he went to the money manager of the fund and goes, look, I'm paying all these commissions. I want you to do certain trades where I'll give you credit. Every trade is done. There's a bid and an ask. It's a bond. So your bid is 91 and a quarter. My ask is 91 and three quarters. You settle somewhere in between that. So Mike's comment was on certain transactions, if you're buying it, I want you to buy it at the ask. And if you're selling it.

46:29I want you to sell it at the bid, all within the market, but we won't negotiate and I'll give you credit. And Drexel's management agreed that he could do that. Well, what he pled to was a mail fraud because the confirmations on these trades did not disclose that there was a commission involved in it. I promise you, nobody's ever gone to prison for recouping commissions on trades before. So those are the natures, the things he did. But should he have done it and not done it, that's a different issue. But should a person go to prison for that, another issue. So let's talk about what happened after that plea and maybe start with what happened to Drexel.

47:10Drexel announced when they pled that after they paid their fines and penalties and everything else, they still had over a billion dollars of unincumbent equity capital in the firm. So the firm was in good shape financially to proceed. So Drexel now was operating for the first time ever since it had become a major player on Wall Street without Michael Milton. What had happened is to prove they could still get deals done, they were taking a lot of securities that they couldn't sell into inventory. And they were financing it by issuing commercial paper in the commercial paper market. So in financial parlance, They were borrowing short and lending long.

47:51When the commercial paper market dried up for Drexel, because they had all these securities in their inventory, they couldn't meet their financial obligations. And within a year, they declared bankruptcy. So that also didn't help Mike because everybody said it was Mike's fault that they declared bankruptcy, though he was gone. And then what happened with Mike after the plea? Between the plea and sentencing, the way the process works is the government files a sentencing memorandum as to what they think the sentence should be. And you file a sentencing memorandum as to why this is an aberration, these aren't that serious, and why the penalty should be much less.

48:35In this particular case, because Mike pled to six counts, we were very concerned about the fact that there was so much leeway in what the sentence could be. and we made a deal with the government that at the plea, Arthur Lyman, Mike's lawyer, would stand up and say, Your Honor, because of the circumstances of this case, we have an agreement with the U.S. attorney that they will not recommend consecutive sentences. That means you would be capping the largest sentence at five years. And we figured if it was capped at five years through our arguments and through our sentencing memorandum and everything, maybe we can get it down to two or three.

49:14That was our goal. And the government agreed. They stood up and told the judge, that is true, Your Honor. We have in the past done that, but we're not doing it here. And our agreement was also they weren't supposed to recommend a sentence. So we filed sentencing memorandum. Now, we were supposed to exchange drafts of sentencing memorandum for whatever reason, which was to me a huge mistake we never did. Their sentencing memorandum was devastating. It accused Mike of being one of the worst human beings in history. His entire life was supposed to be a fraud in the markets, and he did this, and he did that.

49:48And what he pled to was just scratching the surface. And here's all the other terrible things he did. And we want you to take that into account. And we filed a sentencing memorandum saying he never did anything else other than these regulatory things that he pled to. And look at the life he's had. Over 100 letters of people, of what he'd done in philanthropy, what he had done in the community, how he cared about people, how his business was so legitimate, and how he changed the world and all these different things. So the judge is sitting here with these two different memorandum, and she decides to hold a hearing called a Fatico hearing.

50:24Maybe the first time a Fatico hearing has ever been held in a white collar matter. Anyway, she held the hearing and she said, government, you said he did all these other things. He says he didn't do anything else. I'll give you 20 hours. Show me anything else he did. Pick one, two, three, four, whatever you want, you pick it. Show me he did anything. And if you can show me he did anything else, I'll take that into consideration. We thought that was not a fair process because we had to prove a negative. They're going to say we did something and all we can do is we could prove we didn't. We asked, can we use some time to prove the legitimacy of his business and what he accomplished.

51:05The court said, no, can't do that. So they picked three transactions. One they said was insider trading. One they said it was stock manipulation. One was they bribed money managers and all these different things. And we held this hearing. It went on for several weeks. And the judge concluded that they proved not one thing that they said that they could prove. He didn't commit any other crimes than what he pled to. That's it. Unfortunately, in the course of the hearing, you had certain witnesses saying that, well, Mike told me that I couldn't produce anything I didn't have. Or Mike told me if I want to get rid of anything, now's the time to do it.

51:48And when they were asked, well, did you get rid of anything? No. Did he ever come back to you and ask you if you got rid of anything? No. Well, what do you think he met? Well, I'm not sure. And then one person said, he did ask me to give a booklet I had about my relationship with one of my clients to somebody else, and I never saw it again. Now, Mike didn't testify at Fatico, but denied any of those things happened. The person that they said he gave the booklet to denied it ever happened. But the judge concluded at the end of Fanico. Government failed on transaction one, two, and three, but there's an indication here of obstruction of justice.

52:28And she gave him a 10-year sentence, which number one, negated what we thought was a cap of five years because she gave him two years on five counts to do serve consecutively, not concurrently. It was actually a devastating blow because nobody would settle in this kind of case if they thought they were going to get a 10-year sentence. Eventually, obviously, we got that reduced. After all this time, there have been things written. There were books written about it at the time. I think the one that people know best was Den of Thieves that talked about all these things that certainly painted Mike in a bad light.

53:07And I'd love to hear your response from being there of a book like that? That book we knew was being written at the time. It was written by a then reporter for the Wall Street Journal named James Stewart. We knew he was writing a book because he was interviewing as many people as he could. At one point, he reached out to our media consultants and said, we'd like to talk to somebody in the Milken group because we're willing to put in his side of the story. So I met with the guy a couple of times. and the way he represented it to me is, I want to give your side of the story. I want my readers to make up their own mind.

53:49Ted, I don't think the name of the book is readers should make up their own mind. But that's what he told me. I got these transactions. If you could tell me your side, I will put it in the book. So we went through the transactions. We found that his theory of the transactions was totally wrong. I showed him why it was wrong. and he published the book and most of what I told him was not in the book. And if it was in the book, it was in the end notes of the book. It was not when he described what he considered the wrongdoing in the transaction. And what I found very interesting about it is in the foreword of the book, he talks about how he wrote the book and how many people were interviewed.

54:28And he said, everybody mentioned in the book was either interviewed or had a chance to be interviewed about what we said about them. And if there was a discrepancy between two people, I would decide based upon my reporting which one was telling the truth. And I would put the other side in the end notes of the book. He said, the biggest discrepancy I found was between Boski and Milken. Now, if there was a discrepancy between Boski and Milken, if he talked to Boski, then he heard from Boski, I'm the source for Milken. And he said, I chose to believe Boski because he'd already made a deal and he had no reason to lie.

55:04Plus, Milken first said he was innocent and then he pled, which I found interesting since what I pled to isn't what he was indicted for. But that's not how he represented to me when he interviewed me. Plus, I'm mentioned in that book. Now, he said everybody mentioned in the book had an opportunity to be interviewed about what they said about him. He met with me twice, never asked me one question about things he said about me in the book, some of which are not true. So to me, obviously, you could say that I'm prejudiced. The book doesn't have a lot of credibility. Clearly, if he talked to Boesky and he took Boesky's side of the story, that's the basis under which he accuses Mike of things that the government never accused him of.

55:48But remember, the judge who sends Mike, who held the Fatico hearing, wrote a letter to the parole commission on Mike's behalf, indicating that she held the Fatico hearing and she did not believe that any further wrongdoing other than what he pled to could be shown, even by a preponderance of the evidence as a result of her Fatico hearing. This happened, and Mike served his sentence a long time ago, 30-something years ago. I'm curious, why tell the story in your book now? And why did it take so long to decide to do this? It's an excellent question. It's something I've been thinking about for a long time.

56:34And once you don't do it immediately, just all of a sudden has a way of just accelerating. So initially, I wasn't going to do anything because these other books were out there and Mike had just served a sentence or was even serving a sentence at the time. and I felt we were just up against a tidal wave. I was going to let time pass. And then as time passed and some of the same lies kept getting repeated, you went to jail for insider trading or you went to jail for fraud in the bond market, none of which was true. I said, you know what? I was there. No one's ever written that was there. I'm going to write something myself.

57:11So I decided that the best way for me to write is if I could teach a class on the subject, it would cause me to the discipline of gathering all my notes, all the information and getting it organized. And about 10 years before I wrote the book, a friend at Stanford said, I'll do this class with you. And we taught at Stanford Law School, pretty respected law school. And the class was really well received and it got me all my information. Plus, the prosecutor came to the class and I transcribed what he had to say and other government and other lawyers came. and I had all the information and I was gonna sit down and start writing the book.

57:47A few more years went by. I taught the class again. COVID happened. I'm sitting at home. I just got done teaching the class. I said, I'm doing it. And I sat down and started writing the book. I think it's still relevant today because Mike is still a public figure today. Obviously people respect what he's done in philanthropy. They have no idea what he accomplished as a financier or what happened to him before. So it just seemed like, you know what, it's not too late. And plus there's a message here. The prosecutorial process that we were subjected to still exists. The power of the prosecutor is still there.

58:27It can be used for political or other purposes as it has been and probably continue will be. And people should understand how one-sided it is. So those are the reasons that I still think it's relevant. Because I think Mike's still relevant. And I think the process certainly is still relevant on what's going on today. So I finally did it. I'm glad I did it. Mike was on the show last week. At the end, I had asked him about a life lesson that he learned he wished he knew earlier in life. And he talked about being media shy and not telling his story. And if you don't tell your story, someone tells it for you.

59:06I'd love to ask you, knowing Mike as long as you have, what do you think some of the mistakes that he made were that led to what happened? Mike's nature is very non-confrontational. I saw it growing up. I saw it in the fraternity. Biggest mistake would be when somebody said it's your fault and it's not your fault, stop doing business with them. Rather than say, I'll make it up to you, I'll figure it out later or whatever else. That's a non-confrontational way because someday I will make it up to you. Let's figure it out. But I think that really ended up hurting him. It's not a terrible quality, not to be confrontational, but to allow this to happen.

59:46And then the other thing is what he pointed out, to allow others to define you instead of defining yourself, especially today, even more than it was 30 years ago, is something that you can pay a price for if circumstances happen as they happen to us. Others wanted to find you negatively and as a person different than who you are. What do you hope happens by telling this story now? First and foremost, that historically there is a record of what really happened by somebody who was there firsthand and knows what had happened. I know for a fact that There are business schools that teach finance that when they talk about this period will recommend a book like A Den of Thieves or something else.

1:00:33I want there to be another resource. Certainly don't have the power to eliminate other resources, but I want there to be really a true historical record. I think Mike deserves it and his family deserves it. He's got children. He's got grandchildren. I think there needs to be an historical record. Number two, I would like to see the process viewed in a way so that there's downside for abusing the process on behalf of prosecutors. So they at least think about what I said earlier. What if I'm wrong? Right now, you go through a criminal process and you go to trial and you get acquitted. You still lost.

1:01:12There's a famous case. I think the guy's name was Donovan, a secretary of labor. He was accused of a crime, went to trial and was acquitted. And when they asked him afterwards, how do you feel now? His response was, tell me where I go now to get my reputation back. Because people believe the headline. They never know the rest of the story. They just remember, oh, that person was indicted, must have done something. So if you're under a criminal investigation, you have nothing but downside. If you're a prosecutor and you're wrong, you have no downside. All you're trying to do is help your career.

1:01:46I'd like to see the process somehow more balanced. I would love to see a situation where the people could get to know each other. The people without there being a downside to the person under investigation by sitting down with the prosecutor. This is all about people. People are complicated, but there are people. And I would like to see prosecutors understand that the people they're going after have lives. and they have families, and what if they're wrong? What do you think might have happened, speculation to be sure, if the attorney general's office at the time, in the way you're describing, had a chance to meet Mike?

1:02:27I think it would have changed dramatically. I think they would have realized that he doesn't seem to be this person that has been described to me. Maybe he made a mistake somewhere, but maybe we shouldn't be bringing a RICO prosecution here. Maybe this should be an SEC matter. Maybe we shouldn't be dealing with this at all. Let the SEC, they're dealing with it, let them deal with it. One of the things I talk about in the book that I was always sorry about was Mike didn't testify at the Fatigo hearing. Nobody explains what Mike does better than Mike. He's very persuasive. He's very knowledgeable.

1:03:01He understands it. He's a great advocate for himself. And here he went to the most important process of his life at that point in time. Don't forget, he got prostate cancer later. But he's going through there. He's going to be sentenced. He's going to be subjected to whatever he's going to be subjected to. And everybody has discussed who he is but him. So do I think it would have made a difference if there was a way to do it? Yeah, I think it would have made a difference. Richard, really appreciate you taking the time to tell this story that is so different from what public perception has been for so long about Mike.

1:03:40Well, I thank you for the opportunity. I think it's important for people to know that everything you read isn't necessarily true and that people are people and people have feelings, people are complicated. This is a human being. Thanks, Richard. Thank you, Tim. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at capitalallocators.com, where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings, and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more. Have a good one, and see you next time.

From the publisher

A long time ago, 33 years to be exact, Mike Milken pled guilty to 6 counts of violations of securities laws, went to jail for 2 years, and received a lifetime ban from the securities industry.
He was at the time the most successful and powerful man on Wall Street and remains one of the smartest and most successful backers of talent in finance, cancer research and education.

 

Most of us have formed beliefs about Mike based on accounts in the media or books written like Den of Thieves. We might think Mike was guilty of insider trading, for example.


The way we form beliefs is problematic and rooted in survival from a time long past. We hear something and almost always immediately believe it is true. Danny Kahneman calls that System 1 thinking.


Here’s one example. We think Mike was guilty of insider trading. In fact, he was not. His plea of guilty did not touch insider trading.


And another, the Attorney who aggressively pursued Mike to bring him down and presumably catapult his own political ambitions was none other than Rudy Giuliani, himself indicted, arrested, and disbarred 30 years later.


Last week, Mike discussed how he emphasizes research and facts in his work. It is System 2 thinking - that requires us to think on our own without being infected by the beliefs of others.
So what really happened to cause us to have such negative views about a man who has done so much for the world?


My guest on today’s show tells a very different story based on facts from being in the room where it all happened.


Richard Sandler has been Mike Milken’s personal attorney since 1983, having joined Drexel three years before the U.S. Attorney first subpoenaed Mike. He wrote a book last year entitled Witness to a Prosecution – the Myth of Michael Milken that describes his account of what happened based on the facts.


Our conversation covers Richard’s perspective on the history, motivations, and proceedings that led to both Mike’s imprisonment and the public perception of him that formed as a result.


I encourage you to set aside any preconceived notions you have about Mike Milken in listening to this conversation.

 

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