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Podcast Summary: Capital Allocators – Episode 331: Sachin Khajuria and Brendan Ballou – Private Equity: Profit or Plunder?
Episode Overview In episode 331 of the Capital Allocators podcast, host Ted Seides moderates a discussion between Sachin Khajuria, a former partner at Apollo and author of *Two and Twenty*, and Brendan Ballou, a federal prosecutor and author of *Plunder: Private Equity’s Plan to Pillage America*. The episode dives into the merits and criticisms of private equity, exploring themes such as the incentives of private equity firms, operational effectiveness, investment duration, fees, and the legal environment surrounding private markets.
Key Participants
- Sachin Khajuria: Former partner at Apollo, seasoned professional in private equity.
- Brendan Ballou: Federal prosecutor, special counsel for private equity in the Justice Department's antitrust division.
Main Topics Discussed
- Core Thesis on Private Equity
- Sachin Khajuria:
- Views private equity as a crucial component of economic value-add.
- Highlights a $12 trillion industry that he believes will grow significantly.
- Emphasizes the importance of people in private equity, where individual judgment and culture drive success.
- Brendan Ballou:
- Critiques the legal frameworks that govern private equity, arguing they create misaligned incentives that can harm workers and consumers.
- Proposes that the focus should be on reforming legal structures to improve outcomes in private equity investments.
- Incentives and Time Horizons
- Khajuria argues that the transaction-based nature of private equity—invest, improve, exit—shouldn't be seen as negative, as similar practices occur in other forms of investing.
- Ballou counters that shorter investment horizons can lead to risky behavior and poor long-term outcomes.
- Operational Effectiveness and Improvement
- Khajuria illustrates that private equity firms often enhance operational efficiencies due to their focused investment approach and expertise.
- Ballou shares concerns that some private equity firms may prioritize financial engineering (like leveraging) over sustainable operational improvements, citing case studies like HCR ManorCare.
- Legal Environment and Liability
- Ballou points out how private equity firms can shield themselves from legal liabilities, which can lead to irresponsibility.
- Khajuria responds by advocating for a balanced view of responsibility across different types of investments and emphasizing the need for transparent regulation.
- Fees and Financial Metrics
- Ballou expresses concern about how management fees have evolved from just covering operational costs to becoming significant revenue streams that can misalign incentives.
- Khajuria defends fee structures as necessary for retaining talent and ensuring operational effectiveness, stressing that firms should deliver value commensurate with fees charged.
- Impact on Society and Regulation
- Discussion highlights the growing significance of private equity in funding retirement systems and its influence on societal issues like sustainability and social justice.
- Both parties agree that while there are problems, there is potential for private equity to positively impact society through responsible investing.
Key Takeaways
- Complexity of Private Equity: Both participants acknowledge the complexity and dual nature of private equity, where good practices can coexist with problematic structures.
- Need for Regulation: There’s a consensus on the necessity for improved regulatory measures to better align incentives and protect workers and consumers.
- Long-term vs. Short-term Thinking: The debate between immediate financial gains versus sustainable growth remains a central theme in discussions about private equity.
Conclusion The episode encapsulates a nuanced discussion about private equity, revealing both its transformative potential when executed well and the risks associated with its operational models. The conversation highlights the need for better regulatory frameworks to ensure that private equity serves broader societal interests while continuing to deliver investment returns.
For more detailed insights and the full conversation, listeners can visit the episode webpage [here](https://www.capitalallocators.com/podcast/private-equity-profit-or-plunder/).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
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2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators .com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions and securities discussed on this podcast. Today's show is a panel about the merits of private equity. On one side is Sachin Kajuria, a former partner at Apollo and 25 -year veteran of the industry who recently authored Two in 20. Sachin was a past guest on the show discussing his book, and that conversation is replayed in the feed. On the other is Brendan Bullough, a federal prosecutor who serves on the special counsel for private equity in the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and recently authored Plunder, Private Equity's Plan to Pillage America, highlighting controversy and potential flaws in private market investing.
3:55Our conversation begins with Sachin's view on private markets as an essential value -added element of the economy and Brendan's thesis on the inadequacy of the legal structure surrounding the activity. We discuss incentives, investment duration, failed deals, fees, operational effectiveness, legal environment, risk, and broad education about the space. While the titles of their books might suggest a point -counterpoint discussion, the thoughtful nuance Satya and Brendan bring to the table offer more commonality and food for thought than difference. Before we get going, it's been a strange summer in the skies and on the fields.
4:36The weather by me was unseasonably cool, then a little too hot, and interspersed with some ridiculous rainy downpours along the way. On the diamond, neither my beloved Yankees nor the crosstown Stevie Cohen -owned Mets seem to be able to get much going. And yet Hank's beloved Atlanta Braves can do no wrong. If you told me going into this year that the big seven tech names would be up 100 % in the first half, I would have told you not to make any bets on active management, especially against Warren Buffett. And if you also told me that tech would bounce back, I might have suggested watching the forgotten crypto ecosystem, which, last I checked, is still there.
5:14I really can't figure out any of this, but that's why I love talking to some of the smartest minds in the business who try. You know where this is going, so I'll get there. If you want to figure it out, I can't think of a better place to spend your time than listening to capital allocators or private equity deals. Or if you want to really understand how the sausage gets made, you might try investment management operations. Just saying. And as you enjoy your favorite summer pastime or just find yourself passing the time away in the hot summer sun, go ahead and share the love with whoever is getting a tan next to you.
5:47Thanks so much for spreading the word. Please enjoy my conversation with Sachin Kujuria and Brendan Ballou. Brendan, Sachin, thanks so much for joining me. I think to lay the table, why don't we start with each of your core thesis? And Sasha, why don't we start with your experience of the value of private equity? So I think we're talking about private markets, not just private equity. The industry has evolved over the past three decades or so to be much more than just leverage buyouts. So there's no point really today talking about barbarians at the gate or some deal from the 1980s or even 1990s, frankly.
6:27It's a $12 trillion industry. It's bigger than the GDP of most nations. And I think it's headed to grow further in the next decade, perhaps to $20 trillion or more. And at the core of the work that I've done in 2020 and over the course of my career, it's become very clear to me that this is fundamentally a people business. This is a people business where people act and think like principals, not like advisors. These people are equitized, they have an alignment with their investors, and there's nothing really automated about it. There's a lot of talk about AI these days, analysis of big data, machine learning, all those things can be incredibly useful to look at the heat maps of what's coming out of portfolio companies and so on.
7:10But at the core, you're looking at the judgment of individuals. And what I've tried to break down is what are the winning cultures and traits that I've seen over the last 25 years across different firms. And when deals fail, which of those traits are not working out or absent or forgotten? And I think given the size of the industry, given how we cannot rely on just the public markets and treasuries for our returns, for our retirements, and given fundamentally this is an industry that's serving the needs of retirees, we should acknowledge that most portfolios, if not all portfolios, including more retail as finance becomes more democratic, will involve some portion of private markets at some point, whether that's 10%, 30%, leading up to 50%.
8:01And that's why I'm focused on those who do it well, the principles that I think that drive them to do it well. And when we're looking at mistakes, problems, things that need to be improved, try to break down away from the politics and the polarization, try to break down why that happens. Brendan. Thank you for organizing this. I think this is going to be a really good conversation and a really useful one. And I should say at the outset, of course, that I'm speaking in a purely personal capacity and not on behalf of my employer. I obviously come to this from a more critical perspective. The title of my book is Plunder, Private Equity's Plan to Pillage America.
8:37But I always try to make clear whenever I'm talking to folks that my critique, such as it is, is not of the people in private equity or related to it, but rather the legal system that we have surrounding it. And I come to this story as a practicing lawyer. And what I see is to my mind that lawyers like me have created this series of rules and regulations that have changed the incentives for investors that often works for the private equity firms, but may not necessarily work for workers, for customers, even for other investors. And so that if we're going to have better outcomes for private equity investments, private capital investments, because I completely agree with Sachin's point that this is an enormous industry that's really only slated to grow, we need to think critically about what those incentives are and if they're working for everyone.
9:28Well, let's start pulling apart some of that and maybe go right to that first big word, incentives. Brendan, when you say the incentives aren't working as they might, as they should because of legal constructs, what do you mean? I often say that there are three basic problems with the typical private equity business model. And this is not to say that every private equity deal is a disaster. You both know and every listener knows that that's not the case. But they're incentives that shift behaviors so that the chance of bad outcomes for companies, for workers, for employees increases relative to non -leveraged buyouts.
10:05And those three problems are this. One is that private equity firms typically invest for a few short years, three, five, seven years at a time. And that changes their perspective about how long to invest in a given company and how to think about that company's future. The second is that companies that are bought by private equity firms often are levered up with a lot of debt, and the private equity firms are often able to extract meaningful fees from them. And then the third, and this is the part that interests me the most as a lawyer, is that private equity firms typically are able to insulate themselves from liability.
10:39So if something goes wrong at a portfolio company, the private equity firm is rarely held legally responsible for that. And so those three issues shift the incentives, to my mind, of private equity firms away from long -term investment, away from investments that might help customers and employees and towards a shorter -term perspective. Now, I'm a lawyer, so I always have to caveat everything. It's just in our nature. But that is, again, not to say that every private equity deal is doomed or every private equity firm is going to hurt workers and consumers. These problems are more dials than they are switches.
11:13But the more you turn the dial up, the more likely it seems that you might have poor outcomes. All right, Sachin, let's go counterpoint on some of these. So Time Horizon, something that does seem to have gotten shorter over the decades for private equity firms. Love your thoughts on Time Horizon. Is that a problem? Is that an opportunity? By definition, this is a transaction. Invest, improve, work with management, hopefully great management to improve outcomes for the investors, the community, everybody, and then exit or monetize at some point. That return could be a loan or bond instrument getting to maturity.
11:56It could be some other kind of refinancing. It could be to sell a stake or it could be to sell the whole entity, ultimately in, improve, create value out. So by definition, it's a transaction. So I think there's no sugarcoating that fact. And I don't think that anyone is trying in the industry to sugarcoat that fact or somehow disguise the fact that it's not a multi -generational long -term investment like you might find a strategic player would make. But let's really look at that in a fair way and say, well, what restrictions are there on a private individual buying a company and then selling it maybe even after a week, let alone after 10 years.
12:40Or a public company buying an asset, changing it a bit, merging it with something else. It happens all the time. And in our market -based economy, you've got to be very careful about saying there's one form of investing where the horizon is ideal and another form of investing which may have very similar horizons, but that horizon is not ideal. So I think it's a good point to say, is the way this investment is being made, run, in the interest of multiple stakeholders, a social impact, clients, the community? I mean, there's moral questions. Is it the right thing to be doing? And I don't think that is unique to private markets.
13:25And that is absolutely not to say that because it's not unique to private markets, we should forget about it. We should be looking at it very carefully in every deal that happens. But then we should also be looking very carefully at every deal that public companies do or private individuals do. So I think on time horizon, look, I've seen deals as short as 18 to 36 months, particularly when there's a distressed element involved out of bankruptcy or something like that. I've also seen deals upwards of seven to 10 years. And that could have been because it didn't go right in the first place, but they have patience and capital and temperament to see it through.
14:00In isolation, that's a tough one. When you layer that onto some of the other points, that I think it's fair to say we should be looking at closely at these deals like we look at every deal. All right, Brendan, before we start putting the layers on the layer cake, any thoughts on that? No, I think that's exactly right. And I think it's important to talk not just areas where we may have differences, but areas where we agree. I think all of us really believe in a capitalist market. It's not an issue that I really think about that much as a lawyer, but in the course of this project, I think I became much more enamored of a working capitalist system and also a working financial system.
14:39As long as you want to build a new factory or hire new people, you need investment. You need people who are willing to take the risk and try to make those things happen. I agree that the problem of time horizons is not unique to private equity. I do think that there are certain things that we did in the law that empowered this, whether it's changes to ERISA in 1979 that revised the prudent man standard, or to go back to our earlier point about insulation from liability and piercing the corporate veil. Well, when you have a situation where it's typically very hard to hold the investor responsible for the actions of the company that invests in, which often makes sense but may not in a situation where somebody has a majority stake in the company, that insulation encourages a slightly shorter term thinking.
15:25Because if things go well, the investor is going to be rewarded. If things don't go well, they can typically walk away without anything beyond the money that they stake. So I think if we don't change that piercing the corporate veil issue, which it's not a question of capitalism or non -capitalism, it's really a question of in the weeds, how do we design our business system? I think we're going to have increasingly short -term thinking. Before we dive into that issue of liability and the implications, I'd love to ask about this question of duration from a slightly different lens, which is traditionally the private equity fund structures are 10 years with extension.
16:02So it's a long life. Over time, we've seen deals have, as you mentioned, Brenda, a three to five year life. And more recently, we're seeing private equity firms looking for ways through continuation funds or investing from fund to fund of extending the life. So very specifically about the duration, Sasha, maybe I'll turn to you. Yes, these are transactions, but is the common duration of these investments a problem? I don't think it's a problem. Remember who they're doing this for. Of course, there are incentives. There's carried interest in all of that. And there's other forms of compensation.
16:40But ultimately, these returns are paid back to investors in cash. It's not paper money. And those investors require those returns in cash to meet their own obligations. Some investors need that cash turning over at a certain clip. certain velocity over a certain timeframe. Others are pretty happy to take dividends over a very long timeframe. Others are very happy to take capital gains over a very, very long timeframe. Some are happy with continuation funds where actually there's more work to do, and they don't necessarily need that particular pot of capital return straight away. Others want to start off with, hey, if you're raising a permanent or perpetual capital vehicle, I want to put some of my capital in that vehicle because that portion of my balance sheet, I want to be managed in that way.
17:33Durations match, broadly speaking, the requirements of the underlying investor. And the reason that you're seeing increasing diversification in those durations is not just because the industry is growing, and therefore it's growing in different ways, different products, different slices, different ideas, different angles, different themes, but also because it's taking a little bit more share of the pie of the balance sheet of what investors are allocating to managed investments. And therefore, the requirements from investors may change a little bit. So I don't think in and of itself, duration is an issue.
18:10I think what's important is to ask, is the right thing being done? And I think the answer to that may also have an element of, well, which sector are we talking about? It could well be that you're investing in military technology has a slightly different answer than if you're investing in one of the chapters of my book, Charlie's Cookies. Charlie's Cookies is one example. I know in Brendan's book, there were some that maybe weren't as tasty as Charlie's Cookies, as it turns out. Brendan, And I would love you to walk through one of these examples where this combination of risks caused some issues.
18:47Sure. So I'll go through an extreme example, but I also know Sachin, I think, has an admirable nuanced perspective on private equity. So I should endeavor to have the same level of balance here, but I'll give you an extreme example. So in 2007, Carlisle bought HCR ManorCare, which was at that point, the second largest nursing home chain in the country. Roughly, I believe it was an acquisition for $6 billion, obviously overwhelmingly financed with debt. Carlyle, as I understand it, was essentially able to recoup its initial investment in Manor Care through executing a sale lease back, selling the assets and then leasing it back.
19:26And then it executed other tactics that are obviously familiar in private equity in terms of transaction fees and management fees and so forth, ultimately cut staffing at the nursing home. As a result, or at least afterwards, health code violations spiked. There were complaints about rodents and roaches and things in the nursing home chains, and at least one resident died. But this is where I'm getting to what I see crux of the legal issue that we've got, is when the family of that resident sued for wrongful death, Carlisle was able to get the case against it dismissed, saying that it was not the technical owner of the nursing home chain, but rather merely advised a series of funds whose limited partners through several shell companies owned the chain.
20:10And that was enough to get the case against it dismissed. And ultimately, there was no money transferred from Carlisle to the family whose mother died. I bring up that example just to say that it shows how oftentimes private equity firms can effectively have operational control over the companies that they buy, but may not necessarily be held responsible if things go wrong. And if you have that legal structure, which is not the fault of anybody that works at a private equity firm, it's the creation of lawyers like me, it can lead to short -term high -risk thinking that is ultimately harmful, not just for patients and employees and things like that, but for the company itself.
20:49ManorCare, for instance, ultimately went bankrupt and was acquired by a nonprofit. There's an interesting aspect of timing of that. You're talking about a 2007 transaction going into the financial crisis. I'm curious, as you looked at ManorCare, you could look at that from two lenses. You could look at that as they're bringing out costs and don't care about the service. Or you could look at it in a lens that a lot of people talk about today of sustainability. In theory, Carlisle wanted to sell this asset to somebody else over a period of time. And to do that, you couldn't just turn all these facilities into something that was worthless and no one wanted to buy.
21:26So as you looked at it, what's your assessment of the cause and effect in that particular example of why it played out the way it did? Carlisle raises interesting arguments when you read the reporting on this. Look, ManorCare ultimately went bankrupt, not because of anything that we did, but because of changes in calculations on how Medicare disbursements happened. So this really was not our fault. I'm not in a position to argue otherwise because I'm not in the weeds on Medicare disbursements. In theory, the interest of the portfolio company and the private equity firm should be aligned. The challenge that we've got is because we've got these dual problems, corporate fail -piercing, so sort of an insulation from liability, and that ultimately, typically, the debt to finance the acquisition is held by the portfolio company and not by the private equity firm.
22:13And the private equity firm typically puts up a relatively small amount of the acquisition price. It means that it changes the incentive calculus so that things go extremely well for the private equity firm if things go well. But it's not to say that there's no loss, but there is comparatively less loss if things go poorly. It's not an equal upside and downside. And so that, I think, people just acting rationally, encourages some riskier behavior than might otherwise exist. Sash, any thoughts on that? It sounds like a tragic example. As you know, it's not a deal I worked on. So I should be careful not to comment on that deal specifics.
22:52But I think what you're getting at is, is it asymmetric that if it was to work out a deal in general, whether it's healthcare or education or any particular sector where you're dealing with people in particular, if it works out, does the private equity firm benefit disproportionately relative to if it goes badly? Where does the debt sit? Where does the legal liability sit? Directors and officers insurance, key people insurance, all of that sort of stuff. I would point out it's different jurisdiction to jurisdiction. So when I've done deals outside the United States, there are plenty of jurisdictions in different industries, in Europe, for example, where whether you look at nursing homes or whether you look at insurance banks, whether you look at other sectors, there is a fair difference in the way that there's personal responsibility treated.
23:41Sometimes that puts investors off to sense, well, hang on, we're going to be more liable. There's less of this corporate veil buffer. I think you're alluding to, Brendan. I think that, again, you've got to look at it and say, is this particular sector, is it adequately regulated if something were to go wrong, irrespective of the buyer or particularly for one kind of buyer. And if it's one kind of buyer, and it's a group of legal entities that we can call a fund or a series of funds or investment vehicles, again, I think you run into a lot of issues because these are really mainstream forms of investment these days.
24:22They're called alternative, but that's only because they were once thought of as a small alternative or niche alternative to traditional stocks and bonds. These days, it's pretty mainstream. So I think you have to look at it in general and say, well, if anyone was to invest in this particular sector, take healthcare, as you've said, and it was to go wrong, let's look at what would happen, if anything, to the way that the public company owner of those assets would have liability or not, whether it would be insured away, structured away, mitigated in some way, diluted, or the private markets owner or the individual et cetera.
25:01And I think it's a question a little bit like duration of saying, for some sectors that are particularly sensitive, do we as society feel that our regulation is adequate if something goes wrong? And particularly, obviously, in this horrible case, you mentioned of loss of life. If there are proven examples over time where regulation in a particular sector is not up to scratch. Of course, we should be looking at that, but not just because the owner is a private markets firm, but irrespective of the owner. Brendan, I want to touch a little bit on fees, and we could talk about this broadly. As you mentioned, there's a management fee, there's deal fees.
25:46There's also the instances, if you tie in leverage, where there's a recap of the deal. We'd love your perspective on how you think about the problems of fees and private equity? There's nothing illegal about fees and there's nothing inherently wrong about them. I think it goes back, however, to sometimes a misalignment of incentives. As I understand it, I think Sachin mentioned this in his book, a lot of these fees that were originally designed to keep the lights on in a private equity firm's office have really become their own revenue streams. Management fees for a portfolio company, as I understand it, used to be a de minimis part of the deal and have grown over the years.
26:26Potentially, transaction fees are a new opportunity for private equity firms to make money off of what we were talking about earlier, sale, leasebacks, and so forth. Dividend recapitalizations are obviously an opportunity here. One of the examples that I was looking at was Blackstone's acquisition of Apria Healthcare, which ultimately had to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice department because of allegedly selling medical devices that were never actually used or were never actually delivered. As I understand it, Blackstone was able to more than recoup the fee that Apria had to pay through dividend recapitalizations and other transaction fees.
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27:04Looking at this as an outsider, the general model, two in 20, suggests that generally you're entitled to 20 % of the profits, but you get 100 % of the fees, obviously. And what I'm a little concerned about is, does that create an incentive where you get 20 % of the upside if the company does well overall, but 100 % if you extract money through fees, whether or not that helps the company in the long term? Sachin? I have a reasonably clear view that fees are not the reason to be doing deals. If the total return on the deal is rescued by the fees and the performance is terrible, That's not a good outcome for investors.
27:43And I would urge investors to think very carefully about whether that's a sustainable or even correct outcome for them going forward. It certainly doesn't feel like one, does it? But I'm also very happy to say that A, I haven't seen it at all, but B, I haven't seen it as a motivation on a transaction, which is we're not entirely sure about how we're going to end up here, but let's just charge a load of fees and say this fee for that, this fee for that, and so on. The industry is much bigger. And 2 % is an industry benchmark. I think you've got to ask and say, really, what is that fee? Is it to genuinely retain great staff, put money into the IT, into the big data, expand your network of experts, paid advisors, all those important aspects of having a library of intelligence, good compensation, all those things.
28:37I think those are fair questions to ask for investors. And I think it's also fair that given some of the biggest firms are publicly listed, you only have to listen to an analyst call or look at any analyst presentation. One of the big attractions for equity analysts is, well, look, this is a big firm. It generates a lot of stable fees. Let's put a higher multiple on that than the incentive fees, because we don't know whether they're coming or not, or they may be lumpy, or they're less predictable. A secure, stable earnings stream that's growing seems to be valued at a higher valuation than an earnings stream, which could be big, but also could be small.
29:12And that's not something you can necessarily guarantee. I think that if the firm is performing and the stated band of outcomes on the deals is in accordance with what they're selling, whether those deals are placed in one kind a vehicle or another, it seems to be that, well, they're doing their job. They said they'd get you a net one and a half times, two times money, whatever the multiple invested capital happens to be. They told you off front, they're going to be charging you 100 basis points, 150, 200 basis points, whatever the fee happens to be. And they've delivered what they said. So that's fine.
29:51If of course the performance is below the performance hurdle, it could be a percent and you're not getting the performance that you were hoping for and doing the hypothetical exercise, which is always fun in hindsight, of what would have happened if I put that capital into treasuries or the stock market or something, and you find that that firm and that fund is not performing, it's very fair to say, well, why would I trust you to do it again? I think what you see with the winners in this business, and I think there's going to be a thinning of the herd. I think there's going to be a slimming now that the conditions are tougher.
30:27I think you'll find that those who are not able to perform consistently will find that issues such as this, am I getting good value for money by putting my commitments with you, will impact their ability to raise money. And conversely, those who are able to consistently demonstrate an outperformance against the market, the S &P is generally delivering you this over this period. We're generally adding 100 basis points, 1 ,000 basis points, 5 ,000 basis points, whatever it happens to be. They will get more allocation. So I look at this question as, well, what are you getting for that active management they're doing?
31:10They're doing it on your behalf. Are you getting value for your money? And if you're not, you should be asking the right questions and potentially taking your commitments elsewhere. We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium. Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? Partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead. When it comes to M &A innovation, SRS Aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches. Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game -changing innovation.
32:01So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Aquium, the smartest way to run a deal. Learn more at srsaquium .com. That's S -R -S -A -C -Q -U -I -O -M .com. And now, back to the show. Sasha, I'd love to ask about the premise that private equity firms make companies better. There's really two lenses we could think about, right? There's the financial part of it, which you're bringing in leverage. And then there's the operations, the ability to improve operations. whether that's growth or cost cutting. We just love your perspective from your experience on what actually happens on the ground with private equity firms and the companies they buy.
32:52So when you're talking about acquiring companies, significant stakes for the whole thing, there's a few things that the good ones do over and over well with a very diligent investment process. So first is focus. Now we may say, well, that's a function of the fact that it's a transaction. There's an exit horizon at some stage and you have to get a result, otherwise you failed. So there's amazing focus. And this focus you find in plenty of terrific public companies, but not all of them. And I would say that it's probably sharper and clearer in the private market situations that I've seen. And of course, that focus doesn't just mean from one person, It means from a team, a team, usually a relatively small team, a deal team of very focused individuals working together hand in glove with a good management team.
33:42The other part of that focus, number two, is that they tend not to ditch the transaction if something goes wrong. They don't just quit their public company post and move on to another job saying, well, I was all too hard. The market was this, the market was that. They tend to stick with it. And if you think that you can just hop jobs from one deal to another, good luck. That's not going to work because people are going to want to know your track record and what you've done. And so there's a certain degree of commitment, tenure, to see it all the way through to the end. And I've seen that over and over at the best firms, being part of the GP now as an LP across many firms and funds.
34:22The third thing is, are they making it better? I think their chances of making it better are generally higher. That doesn't mean it's always going to happen. And their chances of doing it better are because just like in public companies, good ones, just like in good entrepreneurial settings or family -backed businesses, you have smart people. In this case, you have a great incentive. You have a lot of focus. You have alignment. And they have a lot of tools. Now, some of those tools are financial tools to provide discipline to the capital structure, to improve the efficiency of the capital structure.
34:58Does that mean sometimes using or often using debt as part of the capital structure? if it makes sense rather than equities using different instruments with different costs of capital. Sure. But acquisitive public companies do the same thing. Private enterprises do the same thing. LVMH Tiffany. I mean, take your gigantic international company that may have a family holding or may be publicly owned and look at the way it buys companies. Sometimes they have very similar characteristics to what private equity firms do. So there's financial tools. The most interesting are the operational tools, being able to use a bench of experts across the world to benchmark results, to bring people in as conditions change.
35:40These are things that tend to be harder for public companies to do to this extent. And I think it's not true to say, well, public companies just can't do that. They're typically buying within their focus area. They're not generalists. Let's just buy what seems to make sense. They're like a generalist investment fund. And so I think that they can rely on those operational experts, perhaps change that bench over time. And it's the combination of all those factors with obviously, hopefully the smarts of let's time the investment well on the way in, let's refinance it opportunistically and let's time the investment and structure it and price it well on the way out that mean that usually everyone wins where it's gone wrong is where of course some of those stars are not in alignment where things get out of kilter and then could you say that the risks are higher of it going wrong i'm not sure i'd like to say that the best private equity firms are very good at offense, they're exceptionally good at defense.
36:48So if something's gone wrong, they're like, well, we need to fix this. This is our mess. And there's usually a tremendous bearing of the teeth where that happens. And when it does go wrong, I think the criticism is warranted as it would be for any acquirer. Brendan, curious what you've seen as you've looked across the industry. What's your sense of whether private equity firms are improving the businesses that they own? I really appreciate Sachin's model here. And I think that is sometimes what private equity is and what I hope through proper regulation, it can be even more. My concern is it goes back to the initial problems that we were talking about.
37:29The duration of focus, reliance on leverage and fees and insulation from liability means that oftentimes private equity managers' incentives are different from those of the portfolio companies and leads to bad results. We can go through some of the anecdotes that also is borne out at least in some of the sort of quantitative studies, suggesting, for instance, that private equity -owned portfolio companies are 10 times as likely to go bankrupt as non -private equity -owned peers. In the best circumstances where firms are thinking for the long -term, taking responsibility, bringing that focus that they need to bring, it can lead to positive outcomes.
38:06The example that I keep coming back to is when a firm bought a timber mill in Arkansas, invested for a decade or longer, used very little, if any, debt, continued to maintain investment even after it sold its majority stake and kept two board seats. Ultimately, they helped revive this plant and helped to revive a whole town. I think where things are going wrong is when people are applying their expertise, not necessarily to building better companies, but to using and growing the legal loopholes that we have surrounding these operations. One of the most important of these would actually be the bankruptcy code.
38:42To pull just one example, when Sun Capital bought Friendly's, the diner chain of the Northeast, they did a lot of the tactics that we were talking about, push the company into bankruptcy, but they were not just the largest equity owner in the company, they were also the largest lender. And so using credit bidding and a 363 sale, they were able to essentially flip their ownership structure and sell Friendly's from itself to itself. And in the course of that reshuffling, they were able to push off the pension obligations of Friendly's from the company onto the pension benefit guarantee corporation, essentially saying that's now the responsibility of this quasi -government agency.
39:19So my concern is that oftentimes private equity firms are less exemplifying the best of capitalism and more exemplifying the worst of the legal profession, in a sense. And I say that as a practicing lawyer and using these loopholes for their advantage rather than trying to build better companies for the long term. So Brendan, in an industry, as Sachin said, that's $12 trillion, how do you get your arms around the significance of this problem? There's always going to be good actors and bad actors in any industry. The anecdotes don't sound good, that's for sure. What's your sense of how pervasive this is?
39:57As Sachin said, it's an enormous industry and it's growing in the sense that the quote -unquote private equity firms do so much more than private equity, whether it's credit, infrastructure, hedge funds, insurance, and so forth. And in some sense, they have, in my observation, sort of supplanted in importance the investment banks of a generation or two ago. We lawyers have this incredible ability to invent a flawed business model every 20 years. Right now, I would argue that it's in large part private equity. 20 years ago, it would have been subprime lenders. 40 years ago, it would have been SNLs.
40:2960 years ago, it would have been conglomerates. 100 years ago, it would have been trust. Oftentimes, unfortunately, as a result of a crisis, but sometimes not, in the case of conglomerates, we have managed to improve our laws to hold firms more responsible for their actions and align the incentives of the various parts of our economy. So I think that there are actions that our national legislature, Congress could obviously do. There are things that federal regulators, the SEC, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and so forth could take on. There are also things that states and localities could do, famously our laboratories of democracy to say, okay, if a firm acquires a company in our jurisdiction, we're going to place some reasonable limerence on the amount of leverage.
41:14Or we're going to say that if something goes wrong in this company, ultimately, if you had operational control over it, you should bear some of the responsibility. And with those sorts of changes, I would argue we can make private equity a much more positive and productive force in society. Brennan, I want to push on that. With your knowledge of the legal system, what's practical? In theory, we could say there are all these things that all the states and municipalities and the federal government could should do to make this better. What can we actually do? This is, I think, a very fair rejoinder, which is at some level, is this a insoluble challenge or it's existed for all of time?
41:57Can we ever change it? My rejoinder, again, it's a bit of a straw ban argument, not necessarily what you said, is that this is a legal issue that is a relatively recent creation. And if we created, we can solve it. And I would say that it's really interesting. People that are passionate about these issues in specific industries have actually been enormously successful. So we were talking earlier about the case of nursing homes. Activists have been enormously successful, for instance, in pushing rulemaking to establish minimum staffing criteria in nursing homes. And rulemaking is going on at HHS right now on that.
42:31When we're talking about prison services, which is an area where private equity is particularly active, I'm really astounded. A handful of passionate people were able to pass legislation starting in a few cities, then in the states. So Connecticut, I think, was the first state to pass legislation establishing cap fees for prison phone calls. And just last year, there was national legislation that was passed on the issue. A certain amount of pessimism is completely understandable. I think it would be irrational to think that the legal challenges that we've got can be solved in a moment. But I think we have demonstrable instances in our recent history where we've had progress.
43:09Sasha, I'd love to turn to some of your thoughts about the impact of private equity. A bunch of different constituents involved, and maybe we start at the top of the food chain with the investors in private equity funds. It's true, I think, that you cannot meet your obligations as a retirement system, a pension provider, probably even as many retail investors, if you rely on just one way to save and invest. The impact of and the impact on the institutional investors in particular, because they're the biggest ones historically, they're still the biggest ones today, has been that they're able to fund more of their retirement obligations.
43:54They're trying to get to a 7%, 8%, whatever the annual target is. Their understanding of the methods which are used to generate these returns has improved and increased. In other words, they're part of this democratization of knowledge. And let's remember that the industry has changed from institutional investors going into funds with perhaps less involvement to now co -investing alongside funds at more attractive terms to some very large institutional investors having their own direct investment teams, often staffed with people who used to work at private equity firms to take a cut of deals or even, if not lead, then co -lead transactions as if they were a private equity firm themselves.
44:45And therefore, they're trying to skin the cat various ways and say, well, look, this much money in our balance sheet, we want to allocate to private markets. We're going to put this much into a bunch of funds that are charging us X and Y. And we've got this much, we're going to manage ourselves in our direct investment team, whether we're based in Abu Dhabi or in Qatar or in Canada or Australia, wherever. And we're actually going to get better economics off that because we're learning ourselves how to do it in a way that suits us. So we're getting closer to the action, to the transactions, but not necessarily taking over the role, I think, to some intermediating private equity.
45:22And so I think those are some of the impacts we've seen. I think the other impact that's very important to me is that the more the LP base reflects more of society, the more society focuses on the industry. So it's not just high net worths and large institutions that don't have a website, as it was resembled quite some time ago. Issues of sustainability, of social justice, of diversity, all these things come to the fore because of what's happening in society, but also because of who's investing in private equity. The kinds of things they invest in, one hopes, are not only driven by which investors are sensitive to those end industries, but you don't see many private equity firms going into tobacco, the arms industry.
46:12I think some do alcohol in one form or another, but not all of them do. Most of the major firms have pretty sharp focus these days on the environment, climate change. All of those things are a result of the democratization of the LP base. And I think that is set to continue. We may find, and this is probably not the ideal solution Brendan is looking for or is hypothesizing or is part of the mix, is actually as that process continues and the industry continues to grow, we're going to find that any mistakes that are made in the investment process and results actually are an even greater focus. Because the people whose money is at risk and whose money is being spoken for, their names are on the line.
47:00Their reputations are on the line when you buy into a school or a nursing home or what have you. They don't want to see price gouging in drugs, as we saw a few years ago. Hopefully, no private equity firms are doing that. They don't want to see any of these other bad things happen. If they do happen, And they hopefully want them to have lessons learned and moved on. Brendan, thoughts, good or bad? I think that's right in that in an interesting way, I think that there's more leverage for social good through pension funds than there would be, for instance, through publicly traded companies where power is so much more dispersed.
47:33So I definitely think that that's an avenue. I continue to be concerned about the level of education of pension fund leaders, not the technical experts, but often political appointees and so forth. Do they understand the nature of these investments and the fees that are involved and so forth? But I agree. I think that that is a potential leverage point for change. I'd love to get your thoughts on risk. Brendan, you made a comment that private equity -owned firms are 10 times more likely to fail, undoubtedly having something to do with increased leverage on their balance sheet. Part of investing is the balance of risk and reward.
48:08So we'd love your understanding of how does this fit together? as Sachin said, the diversification for some of these pools to meet their spending needs might require the higher returns. To get the higher returns, you have to take risk. And you're looking at the aggregate. So just would love your thoughts on whether the failure rate by definition is a bad thing, or is that just part of the process? In a sort of perfectly competitive market, you'd have a sliding scale of risk that everybody can choose their point along the curve that they want to stick to. I don't think that there's an inherently right amount of risk in our economy or to take for given companies.
48:49I think my concern is more that in a lot of different industries, we've set up an area where the firms can take risky actions, but can essentially walk away if things don't work out. And to use a different example, for instance, private equity firms have gotten very active in the insurance industry, investing in them, buying them outright. There's very interesting reporting about then selling those assets to offshore affiliates that have lower capital requirements, which potentially increases the risk for the insurance companies and for the policyholders. And that is within the legal right of the private equity investors or owners.
49:24The challenge that we've got is if these insurance companies fail, the responsibility for paying the continuing obligations will essentially default to the state guarantee corporations in which the insurance companies are incorporated. So if you have an Iowa insurer, for instance, that goes bankrupt, it'll be the Guarantee Corporation, which is funded by other essentially more responsible insurers that'll be responsible for picking up the tab. Whereas the private equity firm that owns the insurer will likely be able to walk away. In that sense, it's not about what is the right risk level, what percentage of companies should go bankrupt in order to have a functioning economy, but rather are the people who are making the risk decisions going to be held responsible for the consequences?
50:13Sachin, any thoughts? I think you have to start by looking at the consequences. Are we seeing increasing levels of bankruptcy problems, just like you'd look at credit card loans, auto loans, and consumer corporate measures of problems? If we look at all those kinds of KPIs, are we seeing big upticks in this as the industry is growing as a proportion of the deals happening? I don't think we are. And we're also not seeing the sort of systemic issues that we saw with some of the other bedfellows. We heard earlier that Brendan said, well, you got subprime X years ago, you got private equity Y years ago.
50:54Those other examples that we're talking about were often systemic problems. We're not seeing systemic problems with private equity. the very few that go bust. And I think not just because of the corporate veil point, but I think also just the way their own risk management is set up. It's inherently very conservative. I think what is fair to say is that do the regulators fully understand the risks that are being taken? Do policymakers fully understand those risks? I hope so. Does there need to be much more education at a practical level. So not necessarily by academics, although their input is great, or journalists, because their input is also great, but as practitioners, of course, I've written a book, but I mean, there's hundreds of different ways you could do it.
51:47No nonsense, plain, blunt English, direct understanding. Because if there was a big issue, you would imagine there might be people sitting in front of some committee, Congress, saying, well, you know, tell us about this, what happened here, what happened there. You don't want it to get to that point. I don't think we see the measures of risk as in problems getting worse. I do think that it is important to continue to mitigate that risk by engagement, education, and collaboration. And that doesn't mean saying it's either perfect or it's terrible, as we've seen so much of our lives these days. Politics is either perfect or terrible.
52:29The media is either perfect or terrible. Private equity is either perfect or terrible. It just doesn't work that way. And I worry that in the environment we're in, where there are some people really gunning for this industry, which I don't agree with, and there's also people who say, well, this industry is perfect, which I'm not sure is true either, that we have enough of that collaboration and education. And the more plain speaking there is, the more understanding there is the people who are setting the regulation, people who are making the policies, I think that's healthier for the industry.
52:59I think it's healthier for the investors, and I think it's healthier for society. Brendan, I know there are some other pieces that have come out of such and mentioned that are trying to say private equity is bad. Are there other arguments that have resonated with you, either in your work or others, that you think pose challenges for private equity? I do think that there is some evidence to say that private equity investments are riskier or have higher bankruptcy rates than non -private equity investments. But I think the broader point is well taken. In terms of other issues to be concerned about, I think it's a more meta, almost political concern in that I think private equity firms have been uniquely successful in lobbying and not just using the rules of the game, but shaping them.
53:47Every industry lobbies. It's certainly not a crime or anything like that. But I think that there is something about both the amount of money spent and the people private equity has managed to attract to work on its behalf that has made it much more effective than some other industries. For instance, it's well known the lobbying stories around the carried interest loophole since back when Barack Obama was a senator was campaigning around this. He worked on it when he was president, failed. President Trump was opposed to the carried interest loophole, was unsuccessful in changing it. President Biden was as well.
54:15I think that story is well known, but there's also a thousand smaller stories, for instance, lobbying around surprise medical billing, which was really crucial to some of the business models of the few private equity portfolio companies. They were successful installing legislation for a number of years. And then when it was passed, blunting the force of some of it and accepting from the scope, some key sub industries. So I worry in that I think sometimes private equity firms through a concentration of assets under management, and then bringing in some of these really, really big names from government, have managed to not just play the rules, but also to make them.
54:52Sachin, thoughts? Are private markets firms fundamentally better than other American businesses in lobbying politicians and other decision makers? I'm not sure. I think if you look at the biggest lobbying budgets, it's reasonably diverse of sectors, industries, companies, public, private, whatever. Often it's things that touch us every day. It's consumer goods, it's household names. To address directly carried interest, is it a loophole? I think you have to ask, is the spread between carried interest taxation and income taxation, because that spread has changed over time. Is that at the right level, given the needs of society, given the size of the industry, given the fiscal needs of society, given the need to incentivize and so on?
55:47Those are fair questions. I think it's important to take head on all of Brendan's points about these three presidents looked at changing this and it didn't happen, but it has also changed over time. So I think it's a question of really looking at, has it changed sufficiently? And it sounds like the outcome is that more people or those who take these decisions think it has changed sufficiently rather than insufficiently. But I think it'll continue to be an area of focus, particularly as our society needs taxation revenue and all those things. But I would say that at its core, private equity is about taking principle decisions.
56:27They're not consultants. When they don't behave like principals and things go terribly, well, there's no carried interest to make any return. So I think that's worth bearing in mind. Certainly not smart enough or knowledgeable enough to be able to say the right level for the next five years is going to be X. But I do think it's changed over time. I personally think it's important to maintain an incentive. The question is the level of that spread and the level of that incentive. And I don't think that lobbying is so by implication, so out of control that it has to be reined in for this industry versus either reined in in general or looked at from a broader perspective.
57:08I'd love to ask each of you a closing question. And Brendan, why don't we start with you, which is what's your biggest investment pet peeve? I feel like I'm so not knowledgeable about personal investing. And as a government employee, I should not be either receiving or getting investment advice on a public podcast. I appreciate the question. Sachin, what's your favorite aspect of private equity? The focus and alignment. When it works out, I've seen really transformational change at companies for everybody. Life -changing events, improvements in personal circumstances, and not just financial, learning, career prospects.
57:58I've seen it. I've seen the people who never thought their industry would get beyond X or Y, and it's gone all the way. I've seen people who never thought they'd be able to afford this or that. And through a transaction, they've really been able to make big personal changes. And I'm talking about people who never thought they'd be able to buy a house and they were a mid -level employee at a company and now they can comfortably because they worked in a couple of buyout situations. That is the most satisfying I've seen. And I have seen it over and over, but of course it doesn't happen all the time.
58:31I hope we see more of it. Sash and Brendan, thanks for sharing your perspectives on private equity. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thanks for listening to the show. If you like what you heard, hop on our website at capitalallocators .com where you can access past shows, join our mailing list, and sign up for premium content. Have a good one and see you next time.
From the publisher
Today’s show is a panel about the merits of private equity. On one side is Sachin Khajuria. a former partner at Apollo and twenty-five-year veteran of the industry, who recently authored “Two and Twenty.” Sachin was a past guest on the show discussing his book and that conversation is replayed in the feed.
On the other is Brendan Ballou, a federal prosecutor who serves on the special counsel for private equity in the Justice Department’s antitrust division and recently authored “Plunder: Private Equity’s Plan to Pillage America,” highlighting controversy and potential flaws in private market investing.
Our conversation begins with Sachin’s view on private markets as an essential value-additive element of the economy and Brendan’s thesis on the inadequacy of the legal structure surrounding the activity. We discuss incentives, investment duration, failed deals, fees, operational effectiveness, legal environment, risk, and broad education about the space. While the titles of their books might suggest a point-counterpoint discussion, the thoughtful nuance Sachin and Brendan bring to the table offer more commonality and food for thought than difference.
For full show notes, visit the episode webpage here.
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