Worldbuilders: The Largest Infrastructure Project in History with Evan Conrad (SF Compute)

13 Mar 2026 · 43 min · 25 chapters

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Village Global Podcast Episode Summary

Episode Title

Worldbuilders: The Largest Infrastructure Project in History with Evan Conrad (SF Compute)

Guest

Evan Conrad, Founder & CEO of San Francisco Compute Company (SF Compute)

Guest Host

Sumeet Singh, Founder & Managing Partner of Worldbuild

Episode Overview

In this inaugural episode of the "Worldbuilders" series, Sumeet Singh interviews Evan Conrad about the evolution of SF Compute, the largest infrastructure project in history focused on GPU computing. They discuss the economics of GPU compute, the risks surrounding AI bubbles, and the future of supercomputing.

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Key Topics Discussed

  1. The Scale of GPU Buildout
  2. Largest Infrastructure Project: The current GPU infrastructure development is compared to significant historical projects like the Apollo program, emphasizing its monumental scale.
  1. Origin Story of SF Compute
  2. Accidental Business: SF Compute began as an audio model company that shifted to a GPU infrastructure provider after being stuck with a GPU lease.
  3. Adapting to Needs: Initially focused on training models, the company pivoted to subleasing their GPU capacity to other startups.
  1. Economic Insights
  2. GPU vs. CPU Economics: Discussion on multi-year contracts required for GPUs and how that contrasts with CPU contracts.
  3. Oftake Contracts: Defined as long-term agreements that reduce risk for both suppliers and users, crucial for financing and stability in GPU cloud operations.
  1. AI Bubble Considerations
  2. Bubble Misconceptions: Evan argues that the actual bubble is in the equity of companies raising substantial funding not necessarily in GPU cloud contracts.
  3. Liquidity as a Solution: SF Compute aims to provide liquidity options to reduce the risk of companies failing due to long-term commitments on GPU contracts.
  1. Business Model of SF Compute
  2. Marriott Analogy: SF Compute is likened to Marriott in that they manage GPU clusters owned by other parties but do not necessarily own the hardware themselves.
  3. Pricing Strategy: SF Compute focuses on providing the best price possible for GPU access while maintaining reliability and security.

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Key Takeaways

  • Infrastructure Scale: The GPU buildout is unprecedented in scale and is critical for advancing AI technologies.
  • Adaptability: The journey from an audio model company to a GPU infrastructure provider highlights the need for adaptability in tech startups.
  • Economic Realities: Understanding the nuances of GPU economics and the implications of long-term contracts is essential for companies in the AI space.
  • Bubbles and Risks: There is a significant risk in the equity of startups overleveraged by GPU contracts rather than in the GPUs themselves.
  • Future of Supercomputing: SF Compute envisions a calm future for supercomputing, with a focus on sustainability and stability rather than hype-driven growth.

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Conclusion

Evan Conrad’s insights into the GPU landscape and SF Compute’s position within it provide a vital perspective on the future of computing infrastructure. By emphasizing reliability and affordability, SF Compute aims to address the challenges posed by the rapid growth in AI and GPU demand.

For more updates, listeners are encouraged to subscribe to the Village Global newsletter and connect with the podcast on various platforms.

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Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

Tap a time to open that second in VO

Introduction to GPU Infrastructure

0:00 to 1:02

Learn about the unprecedented scale of GPU infrastructure projects.

“The current scale of the GPU build out is the largest infrastructure project in the history of the world.”

The Origin Story of SF Compute

2:16 to 4:35

Explore how SF Compute evolved from an audio model company into a GPU infrastructure provider.

“Excited to talk more about the world that you're building here with the San Francisco Compute Company.”

Challenges of Initial Operations

4:35 to 6:43

Understand the difficulties faced by SF Compute in its early days and their impact on business.

“And they're often willing to go down on prices for that.”

Adapting to Market Needs

6:43 to 7:45

Learn how SF Compute pivoted to meet market demands and the resulting operational changes.

“Or, I mean, you try to get acqui-hired by someone that actually does have endless compute capacity, endless compute budgets, et cetera.”

Accidental Brokers of GPUs

7:45 to 8:36

Discover how SF Compute became an accidental broker of GPUs and what that entailed.

“And it was initially just me and my co-founder at the time.”

Transitioning to a Financial Market Approach

8:36 to 9:05

Examine SF Compute's shift from a software cloud to a financial market model.

“And meanwhile, try to build some sort of minimal experience around it on almost no venture capital because we had spent the first few hundred thousand dollars on the first month.”

Building the First Compute Market

9:05 to 14:02

Learn about the creation of the first compute market and its implications for the industry.

“You had essentially become an accidental broker of GPUs.”

The Evolving Compute Market Landscape

14:02 to 15:00

Learn about the various compute markets and the unique approach taken by the speaker's company.

“Almost like financial derivative products, though, it seems.”

Risks in Long-Term GPU Contracts

15:00 to 15:48

Understand the risks involved in long-term GPU contracts and the impact on businesses.

“And you need to be able to get out of that contract because if you don't, your business blows up.”

The Importance of Offtake Agreements

15:48 to 16:56

Discover the significance of offtake agreements in the AI compute industry.

“basically lost money or blew up or made less money than they should have.”
Show all 25 chapters

Building Effective Offtake Engines

16:56 to 17:48

Explore what it means to build an offtake engine and its components.

“Nobody in their right mind would do that today.”

Negotiating Long-Term Contracts

17:48 to 18:44

Learn about the negotiation dynamics of long-term contracts from the demand side.

“to your financier, the person who's providing the money of some sort, either internal capital or external capital, and you say, I'm financing against the credit risk of this offtaker.”

The Role of Venture Capitalists in AI

18:44 to 19:27

Understand how venture capitalists influence the contract dynamics in the AI compute market.

“It is so much better to get the one that you can sell back than not.”

Challenges of Building a GPU Cloud

19:27 to 21:04

Examine the challenges faced when building a reliable GPU cloud infrastructure.

“And the person who's paying for that is a venture capitalist.”

Creating a New Model in AI Compute

21:04 to 22:55

Discover how SF Compute aims to reshape the AI compute market and provide stability.

“does something with the building that generates a revenue stream that comes back to you.”

Innovative Financial Strategies in AI

22:55 to 24:15

Learn about the innovative financial strategies that help mitigate risks in the AI sector.

“They're participating in this model economy is what I call it.”

Understanding Customer Demands in AI

24:15 to 25:59

Understand what customers really want from GPU cloud providers and how it shapes the market.

“So it's a different way to get exposure.”

Future Paths for Neoclouds

25:59 to 28:01

Explore the potential paths for neoclouds and how they may evolve in the market.

“So now we know if SF Compute doesn't exist, how the story ends.”

The Cloud Landscape and Managed Services

28:01 to 29:38

Discussing the cloud's competitive landscape and SF Compute's focus on managed services.

“Because the amount of expertise and experience you need in order to land a cluster that is signed off by OpenAI is a lot.”

CPUs vs. GPUs: Understanding Margins

29:39 to 30:48

Explaining the economic differences between CPU and GPU cloud services and their impact on pricing.

“We're specifically trying to make the prices go down.”

The Bitter Lesson in AI Economics

30:49 to 32:52

Exploring the economic realities of AI compute demands and the implications for pricing.

“In CPUs, the customers of the cloud are SaaS companies.”

Navigating the GPU Bubble

32:53 to 35:33

Analyzing the GPU market bubble and SF Compute's approach to mitigate risks.

“That doesn't mean we're sacrificing our reliability.”

SF Compute's Anti-Bubble Approach

35:34 to 38:30

Discussing SF Compute's model as an 'anti-bubble' company and its operational strategy.

“But I think it's just you make it possible.”

The Future of Supercomputing: A Calm Vision

38:31 to 42:05

Envisioning a stable and thoughtful future for supercomputing amidst hype.

“So I think that was the way that we were framing it at the time because it seemed like the easiest way to get the point across.”

Long-Term Thinking in Business

42:05 to 42:40

Learn about the importance of long-term planning for business success.

“state that doesn't let you make good decisions about what you're doing.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00The current scale of the GPU build out is the largest infrastructure project in the history of the world.

0:05Evan Conrad:Larger than the cost of wars. It is multiple times the Apollo project. We are the company that takes no bullshit. Our entire culture is we never had the opportunity to be fake. You will never see us say we're going to democratize, compute, or powering the AI revolution or something. It's like, no. We sell GPUs. We rent them to you. The reason why you use us? Price. Reliability. If there is a bubble, here is where the bubble is. In order to afford a large GPU contract, you go out and you raise the big round. So the bubble isn't in the GPU cloud? I don't think so. Instead, I think the bubble is in whoever owns the equity of those companies that just raise a whole big round.

0:48Evan Conrad:Because if they don't succeed, they can't get that capital back. And there's also nothing else you can do with that.

1:01Sumeet Singh:I'm Sumit Singh, and I'm guest hosting a new series for the Village Global podcast called World Builders. I run World Build, a thesis-driven investment firm that backs creative technologists. We spend our time exploring rabbit holes because some of these rabbit holes are actually tunnels that open into the future. In this show, I'll be taking you down those tunnels. We'll have conversations with the people shaping what comes next, break down the frameworks for where value accrues when the rules are changing, and figure out what the builders actually see that the rest of us don't. So come take the leap with world builders.

1:32Sumeet Singh:My guest today is Evan Conrad, the founder and CEO of the San Francisco Compute Company. SF Compute provides GPU infrastructure to AI companies. They make it easy to get access to the compute you need to train and run models without the long-term commitments and complexity that usually comes with it. What I love about Evan's story is that SF Compute started as something completely different. an audio model company. They bought a big GPU cluster, realized they couldn't get out of the lease, and ended up building an infrastructure business almost by accident. Now, they're at the center of what Evan calls the largest infrastructure buildout in human history.

2:06Sumeet Singh:We talk about the real economics of GPU compute, where Evan thinks the actual AI bubble is and isn't, and what it looks like to build a company that sells the picks and shovels in a gold rush. Enjoy. Hey, Evan. How are you? I'm good. I'm good. How are you doing? I'm good. I'm good. Excited to talk more about the world that you're building here with the San Francisco Compute Company.

2:25Evan Conrad:Oh man, you said the name.

2:26Sumeet Singh:There you go. There you go. You know, you have an amazing origin story with the San Francisco Compute Company or SF Compute for short. You know, you started as this AI lab that was trying to train music models. You bought a year long GPU contract, used it for a month, and then you had to sublease the rest or go bankrupt. Can you walk me through and the audience through like the first 12 months? What does don't die mode actually feel like when you owe$500 ,000 every 30 days? It was not very fun.

2:54Evan Conrad:San Francisco Compute started as an audio model company. We were going to make something kind of similar to Suno or UDO, but prior to their sort of launch or existence. And the first thing you do is you buy a big GPU cluster. In order for us to buy a big GPU cluster, both at the time and now, the scale that we needed, you had to reserve for a long period of time. So think about it in the same way that you can't get a lease on an apartment, typically month to month, unless you're in some weird situation like you're renting from a friend.

3:27Sumeet Singh:Right. No landlord would want that. Yes.

3:29Evan Conrad:The landlord wants a year-long lease, sometimes multiple years, especially if you're getting a bigger or nicer place. And we were in the same situation. We went to all the GPU clouds, all the GPU clouds, sorry, several-year lease. And like, of course they did, because if you're a GPU cloud, you have to go get financing for your cluster. And your loan is for, you know, three years minimum, or that's the payback time on that loan. And so if you sold month to month and your customers dropped off, you're bankrupt. You're left on the hook. You're left on the hook. So you really want to lock in a price for a long time.

4:05Evan Conrad:And obviously, you maybe don't want to work with the two-person startup in a San Francisco Victorian. But nonetheless, we found a GPU cloud that would, but as long as we signed up for a year. And we didn't.

4:19Sumeet Singh:That was their bare minimum, essentially?

4:20Evan Conrad:That's the bare minimum. Most people want three years. That's the, actually, most people want five years, but most people are going to settle for three years.

4:27Sumeet Singh:And these would be the core reefs of the world, the nebbiest of the world, et cetera.

4:30Evan Conrad:All the GPU clouds. Any GPU cloud that exists, their financial structure is going to make them want as long of a contract as possible. And they're often willing to go down on prices for that. That's sort of the advantage of you working with them on that. But obviously, they want long-term contracts, and they should. The problem for us is that we really only needed one month. Our goal, and the goal of basically every startup, especially ones that are training models, is to use as much compute as possible to get your model out the door as quickly as possible. So that way, you can get a product out the door and then raise your next round.

5:01Evan Conrad:So that way, you can then get another big model. MARK MANDELAVANIUSSKI - Right, buy more compute. MARK MANDELAVANIUSSKI - Buy more compute and continue on the cycle. MARK MANDELAVANIUSSKI - It's a very bitter lesson, PILD. Yes. If you instead took a shorter, like a smaller amount of compute and had it go longer, that's very suboptimal for you because somebody else who did the opposite will beat you to market. They'll get compounding advantages over time. So our goal with our cluster that we had bought was, okay, so we've signed up for a year. We really only need one month, you said. We only need one month because we can get a first thing out the door in one month.

5:39Evan Conrad:And our plan was we have about$500 ,000 raised. Every month it's about$500 ,000 to pay for the cluster. I think it's actually a little less than that, like$400 ,000 or something like that. And so that meant that month one, good to go, totally fine, excellent. Month two, that's a problem. And so there's two solutions that we had at that time. One solution was immediately raise another round. Like take your seed capital, immediately raise another round, a big round. This is what all the startups do. They go out and they raise the monster round at massive valuation, pre-revenue, all this other stuff.

6:14Evan Conrad:The problem of that is that if you then deploy and spend that monster round and you don't make a product, you can neither sell the company because the preference stack messes you up, nor can you raise another round because no one wants to do the, like you're already so high value, makes it very difficult to raise another round. So you're sort of in like shut down the company or recap or like zombie company forever. None of those are good options.

6:42Sumeet Singh:Right. Or, I mean, you try to get acqui-hired by someone that actually does have endless compute capacity, endless compute budgets, et cetera.

6:51Evan Conrad:Which is what happens to some people if you're like super lucky. Most of those people, of course, had much better backgrounds than we were. We were like two kids in a Victorian. And so, assumed that wasn't going to happen for us.

7:02Sumeet Singh:But it is true that there is the same constraints breed creativity. And I guess it actually happened.

7:07Evan Conrad:Yes. So, what we did is we thought, okay, we've got a year's worth of compute. We can use the first month. We'll just sublease the other 11 months. We'll find somebody else who wants to take it off our hand. And those people are probably in the same situation where they also want one month. Another Victorian next door. Yes. And they literally were in Victorians next door. That was the gist. And so we called it the San Francisco Compute Group. That was the idea. And we would just have this sort of come and go, hacker house style supercomputer. So the problem of that is that you are then operating a supercomputer.

7:46Evan Conrad:And it was initially just me and my co-founder at the time. And you don't have a lot of other time on your hands to do the model thing when you are also functionally running a cloud for lots of other people. The clusters break all the time. Because we didn't own the cluster, like we didn't control it, we didn't build it, we didn't have any supervising over it, had very little ability to fix it for other people. We could identify the problems. We could go to the person that we had bought the cluster from and try and get them to fix it. But if it broke, we were blamed, obviously, as you should and would.

8:27Evan Conrad:And so a good portion of the first year was try to sell the next month of Cluster. Cluster has broken. We don't have the ability to fix it very well because we don't have control over most of the hardware. And meanwhile, try to build some sort of minimal experience around it on almost no venture capital because we had spent the first few hundred thousand dollars on the first month. And we would make, so we would charge more money per hour than we were getting. So we were making some money on it, but not enough to hire a massive team.

9:05Sumeet Singh:You had essentially become an accidental broker of GPUs.

9:09Evan Conrad:We were an accidental cloud initially. Initially, we were just a cloud. And not one that was trying to be a cloud. Definitely one that was just trying to train a model and get out of the situation. It was only after we agreed that, OK, we are in this situation where we are now on the cloud. And I distinctly remember this moment, because I had fallen onto a couch being like, OK, what if we just did this as the thing? We had to basically agree that, OK, we're not going to get back to training models for a moment. And we have to figure out what to do with this GPU cluster. So this is just the company now.

9:49Evan Conrad:We have to make this good for the people who are using it. We'll try that.

9:52Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELSONIUSSKI - What was the moment for you where you went from that sort of accidental GPU cloud to, wait a second, there's actually a massive structural opportunity here? MARK MANDELSONIUSSKI - Yeah. MARK MANDELSONIUSSKI - That led you to sort of doubling, tripling down, instead of going back to, OK, we sold. We took care of our risk, and now we can go back to training models.

10:11Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELSONIUSSKI - Once we had the cluster and we had agreed to do to the company. Then the next part was, how do we make this into a thing that works? And so our initial thought was we would do the same thing everyone else does, which is, we're going to make great software. And because we make great software, customers will reward us with higher margins on our GPUs. And because we have higher margins, that means we don't have as much risk of not selling the next month. If we made a bunch of money this month because we were rewarded with high margins, then even if we missed a month, it would not be that big of a deal because we'd made it up before.

10:47Sumeet Singh:This is very similar thinking to how traditional clouds charge, make money, extremely profitable, high multiples in the public markets.

10:54Evan Conrad:Yes. This is the model of every CPU cloud, and it is what all the GPU clouds at the time were attempting. The difference between us and all the other GPU clouds is we had no money. And when we went out to try and fundraise, obviously everyone looked at us and said no, because we were a underwater like crazy, had basically no reason to do this, and were objectively a terrible investment at the time. Thank you, Elena Coyle, and you yourself, and other folks who eventually, and lots of other people along the way. The problem with that is because you have no money, you have to do the right startup thing, which is you go and you talk to your customer and you try to pre-sell them.

11:34Evan Conrad:And if you pre-sell them, maybe you can say, OK, if we build this product for you on this spec, will you pay X dollars per GPU hour? And everyone said, ah, that's a great product. I'm super glad for this thing you're pitching me, except for the fact that I would never pay you an additional markup on your GPUs. Obviously, I can't do that because I am in the position where I raised the monster round. And I have$40 million to spend. That$40 million, if you charge an additional markup on it, well, now I have to spend$60 million. And do you understand how there's only$40 million in the bank account?

12:12Evan Conrad:They can't pay for software. They can't. They can't. Obviously, they cannot. There's no product that you could possibly do that would justify you increasing your margin by any reasonable amount because the money's not in the bank account. There's no more money. That's it. That was it. Now we have two failed, three failed things. The audio model is not working out. The initial sort of whatever the hell we were doing with trying to sublease our cluster was not working out. And also, no product that we seem to ever pitch could ever do a higher margin activity. So then we were stuck with, what do we do to make some sort of thing that works?

12:51Sumeet Singh:I view them as glass ceilings to break through, by the way. So you did break through.

12:54Evan Conrad:I guess so. And so the only thing we could think to do at the time was technically we have a website that says you can buy GPUs. And technically, people come in and ask us for GPUs, more GPUs than we actually have. And we also know where to get these GPUs. And so why don't we become brokers for a moment? And that will help us, you know, figure out what to like get enough money to kind of continue on and figure out what to do. And so then we would do that. And while we were doing that, we built up a manual order book of all the clusters that we were operating and selling and buying and selling.

13:26Sumeet Singh:So no longer necessarily building a software cloud, but actually building something more akin to a financial market? Yeah.

13:32Evan Conrad:Yeah. So this was spreadsheets. It was two people on the phone. It was like Eric and Ethan who would sit on different ends of a room and basically one person would be on the phone, one person, and another person would be on the phone. Slug GPUs. Yes. And this plan eventually turned into an automated order book for it. The way that we had designed the order book, because as far as I understand, we are the first compute market in existence, as far as I know. There are lots of other people who are trying to do various compute markets now.

14:05Sumeet Singh:Almost like financial derivative products, though, it seems.

14:07Evan Conrad:Yeah, there's people doing derivative things. There's people doing aggregators. All sorts of stuff. The thing that I think is different about what we were doing is we explicitly built the market to solve the problem that we initially had. Which is we had bought a big slug of GPUs, like a big block. And then we had to sell capacity back over a time dimension. Meaning that you're not saying, oh, I have some GPUs now and it's on demand. And then I can sell those GPUs and release them. It's more saying you're selling blocks of time over some period of years. And that was the thing people actually cared about.

Read the full transcript

14:48Evan Conrad:Because if you would raise the big round, you would raise the big round to buy a long-term block of compute. And then if your product didn't work, you were in the same position that we were, just on a bigger scale. And you need to be able to get out of that contract because if you don't, your business blows up.

15:04Sumeet Singh:Back on the hook.

15:05Evan Conrad:Yeah, because at the time that we were doing this, businesses blew up. Like, there is no maker of, like, I don't know if I want to say the name. But there were big AI labs that sort of imploded because they had bought too many GBUs because they had like a$100 million contract. And if the revenue doesn't come in to support that, the company doesn't exist anymore. Why did the suppliers on that side take that credit risk essentially then? I think they were assuming that it would work like CPUs. In CPUs, people take credit risk all the time, just at a much smaller scale, typically, relative to their balance sheet.

15:44Evan Conrad:I think everyone who took credit risk at that scale basically lost money or blew up or made less money than they should have. So coming soon, there's not really going to be on demand at any serious scale for the next chips. So like in A100s and H100s, yeah, Yeah, people built speculative clusters, and then were trying to sell them on demand, or were taking on a lot of credit risk. And so it meant that you could kind of get this. In Blackwell, you just can't. The customer has to sign a long-term agreement before the cluster is built. MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHERSON WONG - Why is that? What's the sort of key difference, you think?

16:22Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHERSON WONG - Because everyone got wiped out. MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHERSON WONG - They just learned from the last cycle, basically. There was a cycle that happened, and insiders know. Outsiders don't necessarily see that.

16:30Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHERSON WONG - Correct.

16:31Sumeet Singh:Yeah, we saw it because we were the brokers.

16:33Evan Conrad:And we had an order book. And we could buy H100s for$0.40 an hour on us. Because the people that owned the chips actually

16:42Sumeet Singh:had to get rid of them as well.

16:43Evan Conrad:Yes, because they had built speculative clusters and needed to get out of their speculative position. And capacity on that time was idle, and so prices went down. Nobody in their right mind would do that today. People will build Blackwell clusters, the new chip, in small scales and then offer that on demand at really high prices. But nobody's going to give you a really big Blackwell deployment unless you sign up for a contract up front. Small scale, totally. That's reasonable and it's a good decision to do. But big scale, you have to get offtake. That's the key word for anyone outside of the industry.

17:26Sumeet Singh:So what can you explain, like, what do you mean by an offtake engine, right? You recently raised a Series A to build this offtake engine. Yeah. Like, what does that mean? What are the different parts of it? What are the different components? Like, what does it actually mean to build an offtake engine for the world?

17:40Evan Conrad:Offtake is like the most important word in all of AI. Offtake is the contract that you get, presumably before you build the cluster, that you take to your financier, the person who's providing the money of some sort, either internal capital or external capital, and you say, I'm financing against the credit risk of this offtaker. It's a long-term contract. That's all it means. We're building a company right now. So the way that we've designed our order book is specifically to generate off-tick, to make it so it's really easy for someone to get off-tick. That's what we do. How do you make it easy to get off-tick?

18:20Evan Conrad:Everyone who is in the position of being an off-taker, someone who's willing to sign up for a long-term contract, was in the same position that we were as the beginning of SF Compute. And these would be people on the demand side of your equation. So anyone who's an AI lab that is trying to buy capacity right now, when they are positioned with two options. One option is I can sign a three-year contract or I can sign a three-year contract that I have the ability to get out of. To sell back. To sell back at some price. It is so much better to get the one that you can sell back than not. However, none of the GPU clouds want to do this because you will obviously make less money if you do that.

18:54Sumeet Singh:What is going through the head of the demand side customer here, the AI lab? Like they're thinking, hey, if the demand for my product changes, I'm still on the hook for this contract that I've signed with the cloud, right?

19:04Evan Conrad:I think if you were a smart AI lab, you were looking at all the AI labs that blew up, like a lot of them did. And we don't talk about them anymore. And they wiped out everyone involved. Including the suppliers? So the suppliers, sometimes, yeah. Sometimes the suppliers got hit pretty bad from it. Sometimes, actually, the people that got wiped out was the venture capitalists. If you were smart, if you were a smart cloud, what you did is you got payments up front. And so what happened when the cluster was idle and you weren't bringing in any money is you just wiped out that initial capital that you paid down.

19:37Evan Conrad:And the person who's paying for that is a venture capitalist. So both, I hope the venture capitalists are being smart and encouraging people not to sign long-term contracts. Like, to be clear, the GPU cloud should always ensure people sign long-term contracts. But the demand side... Right, they're financially incentivized. They're financially incentive. Everyone, if they were operating smart, would be trying to do the opposite. They're negotiating the midpoint between us.

20:03Sumeet Singh:Yeah, I often describe SF Compute's role then actually as helping solve for the Rubik's Cube of problems that the supply side is facing and the Rubik's Cube of problems that the demand side is facing. Yes. That is the offtake engine. Yeah. And so what does that end up ultimately shaping up to be this offtake engine? The different components, different paths that you could take here.

20:22Evan Conrad:Yeah. So are you asking, what are we doing today? Yeah, what are you doing today? Yeah, OK.

20:25Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELAVYSKI - It's been a journey since the early days. MARK MANDELAVYSKI - It has.

20:28Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELAVYSKI - OK, so the first thing is that we're building our own clusters right now. But the way that we're doing that is we're working with outside financial parties who would like exposure to compute. We build clusters for them. We then list them with us.

20:40Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELAVYSKI - And they're viewing, these are new participants to the market?

20:43Evan Conrad:Are they viewing this as a new? MARK MANDELAVYSKI - Not always. Sometimes it's people who have already been doing this for a bit. But a lot of the world's money would like to turn into GPUs. We help them do that. We look like a property manager. So if you're used to investing in real estate, you might work with a property manager or a developer who builds a building for you, who then operates some sort of rental agreement on it, a hotel, does something with the building that generates a revenue stream that comes back to you. That's what we're doing. We're taking, we're basically cutting out the GPU cloud in the middle.

21:19Evan Conrad:And the reason why we ended up doing that is because we couldn't get access to the rest of the components of the cluster. So our problem in the beginning was we had this cluster, and it would break all the time, and we didn't have the ability to fix it.

21:35Sumeet Singh:Right, it wasn't yours.

21:36Evan Conrad:It wasn't ours. And we also ended up having to build all our software stack that is built on top of the hardware the worst possible way. So in a big GPU cluster, there is the node you are selling, the bare metal node you're selling. But there's also everything else. There's the switches and the DPU and the BMC and the UFM. It's like all these other components around it. If you don't have access to these other components around it, you end up needing to go down a technical path that is much, much, much harder to do. And you kind of can't use any off the shelf components. and some things you can't do at all.

22:17Evan Conrad:That's very painful. So to solve that problem, we ended up saying, we're going to design the bomb. We're going to build the cluster, and then we're going to own the whole thing.

22:29Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHER You're going to build the cluster and build a cloud,

22:31Evan Conrad:essentially, as well? MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICHER So we built the cluster. Well, build here, meaning we're working with other vendors to do the physical construction and so on. But we're designing the bomb, the bill of materials. Because we have built and owned the whole cluster, We also operate everything like a cloud does. That's a much better technical position to be in than the one that we were in before. But what we do is we work with other financial parties who would like to own clusters and like to get the revenue stream from them because they're taking a position on the industry of compute, the industry of AI.

23:03Sumeet Singh:They're participating in this model economy is what I call it. Yes. As you said, they want exposure to this asset class, to this economy. It has essentially become its own economy. It's the model economy, as I call it.

23:14Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELSKI - This is an objectively worse way to build a cloud in some ways because we, as a company, end up making less money than other GPU clouds. And that is kind of on purpose, because what we're doing is we're splitting that money with the capital party that's putting down the capital. MARK MANDELSKI - Right.

23:30Sumeet Singh:You don't take your own capital risk. You don't take your own credit risk.

23:34Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELSKI - Yeah. So the trade-off here is, we have less risk as a company. We're very happy to do that, because of our early days as being massively risky. We really don't like that. So we get to be a stable entity. The benefit of that is we're selling that risk to someone else who's going to make a lot of money from it. That's a pretty good tradeoff from, I think, both parties' perspective because it gets the financial party exposure to AI. It gives us stability so we can build a product that's great over time.

24:04Sumeet Singh:And these financial parties are not necessarily AI people or cloud people right there? Sometimes they totally are. Sometimes they totally are. They're funds. Interesting. Yeah. Yeah. That want exposure to this.

24:15Evan Conrad:Yeah. So it's a different way to get exposure. It's a way to diversify what you already have. It's a way to not depend on a specific cloud provider. Like you could invest in a particular cloud provider, but if that cloud provider's contracts go bust, you are not in a great position. So it's a way to diversify your portfolio. And then it's also a way to just get more direct access instead of having this like intermediary between.

24:35Sumeet Singh:If SF Compute didn't exist, how do you think the story ends for both sort of, like neoclouds, these financiers, even startups.

24:44Evan Conrad:MARK MANDELAVYSKI - One of the things I think that SF Compute does is it reduces prices for Compute broadly. The way almost all the clouds have set up their capital structure and the way their company works is we're going to make great software, we're going to charge a high markup for it, and then we're going to get really great margins from it. The problem of this is this is divorced from what customers want. It's what the public markets would like them to be. Like, this is why they will present this. But it is not what any buyer of GPUs wants. What every buyer of GPUs wants is they want reliability, they want security, and then they want better price, and then they want shorter contracts.

25:25Evan Conrad:And as long as you are reliable and stable and you are secure, you are mainly focused on price.

25:34Sumeet Singh:They view it as a commodity, but the reality is, like, it's not as simple as a commodity, I guess.

25:39Evan Conrad:Yeah. So the caveat of this is there are lots of little details in GPU clouds that matter tremendously. Reliability, security, price, contract duration are the key things. On the micro scale, it's like little tiny details about the way that your system is implemented.

25:59Sumeet Singh:So now we know if SF Compute doesn't exist, how the story ends. But if SF Compute does exist and we do exist, Like, what do the other clouds do? Like, what should everyone else in the market be doing? If you're a neocloud, you have two paths that you could go down.

26:16Evan Conrad:And many clouds today are doing both. One path is you go straight to the top of the market and you deploy large clusters without a lot of services on them for reasonable prices to open AI and Anthropic. You get offtake from the biggest buyers. and those biggest buyers are cost sensitive and they have internal teams that can do most of the managed services that you offer. And you should totally try and sell your managed services to them, but you should be okay if they don't buy them because you're mainly trying to scale volume for your clusters. The other thing you should do is you should make managed services.

26:55Evan Conrad:The other path. The other path. So this is things like offering a great Slurm product or great storage products, Or, you know, you can push really high up and offer something that looks closer to like modal. Modal is an excellent managed service. But I think these things are hard to do in the same company because you end up focusing your resources on both at once. And they kind of don't necessarily overlap with each other. An amazing example of this is modal's product is amazing and really good. They are an excellent managed service. they do not build clusters.

27:32Sumeet Singh:They focus exactly on that one thing.

27:34Evan Conrad:Yes. And as they scale and they raise VC and they make profit, their money goes into making their thing even better. And their managed service is leagues ahead of any GPU cloud, any normal cloud. It's way better than anything anyone has ever produced because they have focused directly on that. Meanwhile, modal cannot sell like a big GPU cloud or GPU cluster to OpenAI. Like, I don't think that's going to happen. Because the amount of expertise and experience you need in order to land a cluster that is signed off by OpenAI is a lot. And I would suspect that you will see pretty much every cloud split into doing one of the two.

28:18Evan Conrad:Probably a lot of them will keep going on one side or the other. But the winners will be the ones who specialize in one area, is my guess.

28:26Sumeet Singh:Where do you think amongst that sort of two paths does SF Compute ultimately end up sitting in them?

28:31Evan Conrad:Our goal is to sell to people who look like managed services. Part of what we're doing is trying to make the best cloud provider that would sell to managed services. It is a place in the market that's almost underappreciated because if you're a big cloud, the big clouds have competing incentives right now. One is the public markets want them to have managed services because they want them to be a high margin business. But then OpenAI comes along and says, here is a massive contract. We're going to make AGI. Would you like this money? And obviously, you should do the OpenAI thing. And so they try to do both.

29:15Evan Conrad:And we think the thing we're trying to do is split those and make the greatest thing we can for people who want to do managed services. And the things those folks want are the same things that we cared about in the beginning, which is short-term contracts or contracts you can get out of. It's price. It's specifically price. And SF Compute is not trying to be a thing that captures a massive margin on top of it. We're specifically trying to make the prices go down.

29:41Sumeet Singh:Right. And the price is so important because of that sort of difference between CPUs and GPUs that we spoke about earlier. Yes. Can you double-click on that?

29:49Evan Conrad:So in CPUs, almost by definition, like your customers are like SaaS companies. It's Gusto and Rippling or something. And Gusto and Rippling does not need more CPUs to make more money. Gusto and Rippling can make great software. And then they can sell it like crazy. And their CPU build doesn't really go up, not significantly. And they end up with top of line margins because they end up with SAS margins. They end up with 70 % plus. MARK MANDELAVYSCHENKOVICIENCY

30:16Sumeet Singh:You can build it once and sell it in infinite times.

30:18Evan Conrad:Correct. That was the beauty of SaaS. That was the idea. That doesn't exist in AI. It's just like never going to exist because of the bitter lesson.

30:25Sumeet Singh:Here at WorldBuild, our model economy thesis, which I mentioned, really was based on the bitter lesson, right? That the general models with scale, with more compute, with more data will beat the clever architecture. Or even for me, the sort of workflows and lightweight applications sort of built around those models and with those models. Can you walk through why sort of GPU buyers, people that even believe the bitter lesson, like those GPU buyers, why are they different from CPU buyers? Can you explain the economic reality?

30:58Evan Conrad:In CPUs, the customers of the cloud are SaaS companies. And SaaS companies, almost by definition, have really fat margins. Build something once, you could sell it infinite times. Exactly. And then it gets better over time and so on. The problem of GPUs is that is not how AI works. In AI, you have the bitter lesson. And the way to conceptually think about this is if you're doing some sort of generation, like you're generating a video or something, your customer is paying you for the video, and then you turn around and you use compute for that video. And you do that every time. And so as your volume scales, your margins stay roughly the same, and they don't look like SAS margins.

31:38Evan Conrad:They look really thin. You as the customer need to be price sensitive. It is a requirement of your business. And that means that you push down the prices for your GPU cloud too. And so then your GPU cloud also has lower margins than the CPU clouds do. And you care less about fancy managed services. And you care more about like price as long as reliability and security and so on are there.

32:05Sumeet Singh:Is the why for you here ultimately then? like the why around SF Compute to lower the cost of compute?

32:11Evan Conrad:Yeah, totally. If price is everything. Totally. San Francisco Compute is completely distinct in GPU clouds in that we are trying to give you the best possible price. Almost every GPU cloud in existence and every cloud is positioning themselves to the public markets as we are the premium experience, we offer these great managed services, and therefore you should reward us with a high markup for our GPUs. They tell the public markets that. Meanwhile, customers don't agree. Customers instead say, if I'm buying a three-year contract with you, I better get a discount. And the GPU clouds behind the scenes do that when they can.

32:49Evan Conrad:We are explicitly trying to make the cheapest possible GPU cloud. That doesn't mean we're sacrificing our reliability. That doesn't mean we're sacrificing on the product. But if you wanted to design a business model that produced the best possible prices, you you would end up with SF Compute, basically. MARK MANDELOVICIUSSKI - Lower prices, the more Compute can proliferate. FRANCESC CAMPOYOVICIUSSKI - The world gets better when you make prices lower. The world gets better when things are more affordable. It's almost like a rule of reality. And at the moment, I think a lot of what SF Compute has been doing for a while is implicitly betting on people like lower prices.

33:28Evan Conrad:And so that's what we're going to do.

33:30Sumeet Singh:MARK MANDELOVICIUSSKI - And I guess, through the various twists and turns, And now it's, let's build supercomputers, essentially, to lower the cost of compute.

33:39Evan Conrad:To be clear about why our model makes cheaper prices is that if you're a fund and you got a 20 % return on your fund over the year, that's amazing. That's really good. If you're a startup and you make 20 % margins, it's terrible. You don't want 20 % margins. That's really bad. And so the expectation differences between what a fund is doing and what a company is doing are different. And so the more your company is actually a fund, the more you should be a fund. And the less you should try and be a big sort of company with high margins. The problem is all the clouds have set themselves up and positioned themselves to investors as companies.

34:27Evan Conrad:Meanwhile, their assets under their balance sheet are growing and growing and growing, and actually they look like funds. And they're not. And there's actually better people who are out there in the world who have cheaper cost of capital even than the hyperscalers. There's sovereign wealth funds and massive players right now who are entering the space. They have cheaper cost of capital than most GBP funds.

34:48Sumeet Singh:That is the economic reality, and you are playing for the economic reality.

34:51Evan Conrad:Yes. We are the company that takes no bullshit. We do what we say on the tin. Our entire culture is we never had the opportunity to be fake. We never had the opportunity to pretend to be anything other than the reality of the world. So in the branding of S.F. Compute, you will never see us say, we're going to democratize compute or powering the AI revolution or something. It's like, no. We sell GPUs. We rent them to you. The reason why you use us? Price. Reliability. Like super simple shit.

35:25Sumeet Singh:It is straight up. It is for an economic reality. Yes. Versus some grand vision. And ultimately, the buyers of the folks that you work with, they definitely should have those missions. Correct. But I think it's just you make it possible. Part of my model economy thesis is that there will be bouts of volatility. We're in a GPU glut one day to all of a sudden we're in a GPU shortage. There is this constant chatter of a bubble. Are we in a bubble? Yes, this is a bubble. But where does SF Compute sit within that sort of bubble spectrum?

35:55Evan Conrad:If there is a bubble, here is where the bubble is. It is that in order to afford a large GPU contract, you go out and you raise the big round. And you then spend a bunch of that money up front to pay for your GPU cluster because you're buying it for a long period of time. Often longer than most companies fully have a plan for. Like password projections. Yes. You do that right at the beginning of the company. And you pay, and you're not paying over time and you don't have any way out. From the GPU cloud's perspective, they're relatively safe. So the bubble isn't in the GPU cloud? I don't think so.

36:33Evan Conrad:Unless I'm wrong about this and lots of clouds are just like way over leveraged on accounts payable risk. I don't think that's actually the case. I think a lot of people are being smarter than they were before. Instead, I think the bubble is in whoever owns the equity of those companies that just raise a whole big round. Because if they don't succeed, then they can't get that capital back. And there's also nothing else you can do with that.

37:02Sumeet Singh:So how do you sort of frame SF Compute as like, you said this thing before, it's like the anti-bubble company. What does that mean?

37:10Evan Conrad:If you think the bubble is in companies that are buying GPU clusters and it's their ownership right over those GPUs, that's where the coyote that's walking off the cliff is, then what you need to do is you need to give those people liquidity. You need to get those people an out that they don't have to blow up their company just because they bought too big of a contract.

37:35Sumeet Singh:Just because maybe their demand changed or it was different than their projections.

37:39Evan Conrad:And if a bunch of companies sell all at once, totally. The compute price will collapse and so on. But it's not going to be zero. There's something you can recoup. Right now, it's zero. Right now, there's nothing you can recoup if you have signed a long-term contract. You're just dead. So that's the only way out as far as we see. So SF Compute's goal to some extent is to reduce the risk of an AI bubble, but where the risk actually is. Not where everyone thinks it is. You have to be right. You have to know where it is. It's a very complicated subject. And lots of people on the internet say all sorts of things.

38:15Evan Conrad:And most of them are wrong.

38:17Sumeet Singh:Yeah. So as this anti-bubble sort of company, I remember when we first met, the idea was that SF Compute would be this exchange for GPUs. Is that still the right way to position yourself to be the anti-bubble company? Or is there something else?

38:31Evan Conrad:So I think that was the way that we were framing it at the time because it seemed like the easiest way to get the point across. I've currently stumbled upon just calling it like Marriott, which I think is the better analogy. If you don't know Marriott, Marriott doesn't own a lot of their hotels. Instead, the hotels are like owned by somebody else, but Marriott manages them. And then, you know, they have their own genre of market for their hotels that they're managing. That's kind of what we are doing. The clusters, financially not owned by us, but run and operated by us. And to do that, what we had to do was we made a finance grade ledger and an order book that had all the weird intricacies of compute built into it.

39:17Evan Conrad:And we built a KYC program and an AML program and the whole thing that you would otherwise do to make an exchange. But typically when we say the word exchange, most people kind of get the wrong idea or they go so far into the financialization of compute thing. They go to derivatives. Yeah. And that is totally a thing we may do in the future. There's lots of people who are trying to build that right now. We think there's lots more infrastructure you have to do before you even get close to that.

39:45Sumeet Singh:You have to settle the compute, as I call it.

39:47Evan Conrad:Yeah. So, for example, lots of people are trying to make indexes. The indexes, as far as we can tell, are built on people's wishful prices. It's like, what do you want your prices to be? Back to the economic reality. Yes. And I would be very terrified of betting against an index that doesn't settle to a real price or is settled to the price that someone wants the thing to be.

40:10Sumeet Singh:By being Marriott, you are actually at the forefront of that. You have information.

40:16Evan Conrad:Yes.

40:17Sumeet Singh:We have real-deal pricing information.

40:19Evan Conrad:And we have the actual settlement price that other folks don't have.

40:24Sumeet Singh:So to finish the conversation, the current landscape, let's say, in AI, it feels kind of like a cyberpunk dystopia, right? Everyone going crazy about Malt's book recently, let's say. There's anxiety about AGI. It's about scarcity. It's quite frantic. But when I think about the world that SF Compute is building, like the San Francisco Compute company world, it's blue skies, green grass, landscapes. Why is it important for you that the future of supercomputing is calm?

40:59Evan Conrad:One thing you will never see SF Compute do is position ourselves as democratizing AI or revolutionizing compute or something. we like to be very does what it says on the tin right anti-hype by nature almost yeah i think you get like clouded by hype your brain doesn't work well and people's brains collectively doesn't work very well and if you actually think that the current moment is really important and we do you actually shouldn't be very hypey because it makes it hard for you to do anything real The current scale of the GPU build out is multiple times the cost of the Apollo project. For a while, people were saying there was going to be a Manhattan Project for AI.

41:43Evan Conrad:We're like 30 times the cost of Manhattan Project by now. You know, it's the cost of a war. It's more than the GDP of various countries. It's a really big thing. It is an important thing that you should think seriously about. And when you get consumed by the hype, you end up kind of being in this weird mental state that doesn't let you make good decisions about what you're doing. And if you actually think it is important, you should slow down, calm down, and think over a longer period of time. SF Compute right now is trying very hard to think, how are we going to do things over the next 10 years?

42:23Evan Conrad:Not how are we going to do things in the next six months? and that is in part because in the beginning of the company, we had to think in the next month, month by month. And that's so bad for your brain and it's also so bad for the things you were doing for other people like your product and your employees and everything.

42:40Sumeet Singh:Well, thank you for joining us. Of course. And I hope the world learned something new about this model economy and where SF Compute sits in that. Yeah. Thank you for having me. Hey, this is Ben Kaznoka, co-founder of Village Global. Thanks so much for tuning in to the Village Global Podcast, where we go deep on all of the biggest topics in tech. If you enjoyed this conversation, please subscribe to our YouTube channel. You can check us out on Spotify, Apple, wherever you get your podcasts. We'd love to see you for the next one.

From the publisher
This is the first episode of Worldbuilders, a new series on the Village Global Podcast guest-hosted by Sumeet Singh, Founder & Managing Partner of Worldbuild.

Sumeet sits down with Evan Conrad, Founder & CEO of the San Francisco Compute Company, to talk about the real economics of GPU compute, how SF Compute went from an accidental GPU cloud to building supercomputers, where the actual AI bubble is, and why the future of supercomputing should be calm.

Topics covered include: the origin story of SF Compute, why GPU contracts require multi-year commitments, the difference between GPU and CPU economics, what "offtake" means and why it matters, the Marriott model for supercomputing, and how SF Compute is working to reduce the risk of an AI bubble.

Thanks for listening — if you like what you hear, please review us on your favorite podcast platform.

Check us out on the web at www.villageglobal.com or get in touch with us on X @villageglobal.

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