In short
Why absolute return strategies may be in a “golden age,” and how higher-rate dispersion, AI-driven capex, and late-cycle lending excesses create opportunity—especially in opportunistic credit and event-driven investing across public and private markets.
Guest backgrounds
Tony Yoseloff is Managing Partner and CIO of Davidson Kempner. He grew up near Princeton, studied public policy at Princeton (Woodrow Wilson School), later pursued finance at Columbia, and joined Davidson Kempner as a summer intern in 1998 (the firm had <15 people and about $1B AUM). He focuses on opportunistic credit and event-driven investing.
Key claims
Higher interest-rate regimes increase dispersion and idiosyncratic risk, improving winner/loser selection. “Private credit” is mostly direct corporate lending; competition and capital inflows can degrade lending standards. AI has delayed some credit problems but doesn’t remove underlying capital-structure issues. Private markets may face prolonged “blockages” due to incentives, porous documentation, and duration risk.
Notable examples
1990s/2000s absolute return heyday; venture capital cycles (1980s poor, 2000s weak); 1999/2000 “late-cycle” echoes; direct corporate lending growth; India’s improved NCLT bankruptcy regime; AI infrastructure power-plant constraints delaying timelines.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOThe State of Absolute Return Strategies
0:00 to 1:32
Discussing the current landscape and potential of absolute return strategies.
“I think we're in a golden age of absolute return strategies.”
Tony's Journey to Finance
1:41 to 4:30
Tony shares his educational background and early career decisions.
“But I had seen, and I know you're not a big user of social media, but I had managed to extract from LinkedIn that you were at a Princeton reunion.”
Overview of Davidson Kempner
4:30 to 4:48
Tony provides insights into Davidson Kempner's operations and global presence.
“opportunity I thought we had as an institution.”
Investment Philosophy and Strategies
4:48 to 6:32
Discussion on Davidson Kempner’s investment strategies across public and private markets.
“And so we've got a larger office in New York and a smaller office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.”
Counter-Cyclicality in Investing
6:32 to 8:33
Exploring how event-driven strategies perform in varying market conditions.
“And so that mark-to-market discipline of public markets is really helpful when you're thinking about private market investing.”
Counter-Cyclicality in Investing
8:37 to 9:15
Exploring how event-driven strategies perform in varying market conditions.
“Morgan's active ETFs are backed by rigorous research, a century-long commitment to active investing and investment processes that have been tried and tested over multiple market cycles.”
The Future of Absolute Return Strategies
9:15 to 13:44
Discussing the future potential and competition in absolute return strategies.
“We talked earlier on before we started recording about one investment committee I sit on where a very large firm had said two years ago, no hedge fund allocation.”
Economic Cycles and Investment Opportunities
13:44 to 14:01
Tony examines the impact of economic cycles and technological changes on investments.
“that's good for anyone who's investing in the asset class.”
The Impact of AI on Economic Cycles
14:01 to 17:28
Discussion on how AI influences economic cycles and late-cycle behaviors.
“I then sort of stopped and I thought, is that even a helpful question to ask these days, given the level of abnormal interventions we've seen?”
Lessons from the Internet Bubble
17:29 to 19:56
Reflecting on the parallels between current markets and the 1999 tech bubble.
“Ultimately, what was going to happen happened.”
Show all 24 chapters
Understanding Private Credit
19:57 to 23:28
Detailed explanation of private credit and its components in the financial market.
“But this is a very interesting point, which is that that era of 99, 2000, where there are echoes today, most of the damage was done in the destruction of equity because there were so many absurd prices being paid.”
The Dynamics of Direct Corporate Lending
23:29 to 27:39
Exploration of the growth and competition in direct corporate lending markets.
“Again, you can outgrow your opportunity set.”
Navigating the Challenges in Private Equity
27:40 to 28:00
Discussion on the current challenges and future outlook for private equity and debt.
“story, by the way, than a European story.”
Challenges in Private Equity and Debt Markets
28:00 to 29:40
Discussing the current blockages in private equity and debt markets and their implications.
“And so, you know, none of these markets are immune to the basic laws of supply and demand.”
Impact of AI on Investment Strategies
29:40 to 31:20
Exploring how AI can influence investment opportunities and strategies in private markets.
“And I think it's going to be very barbelled.”
Navigating the Landscape of Public Markets
31:20 to 33:00
Analyzing the fluctuations in public markets and the international investment outlook.
“I don't think you're going to get it back across the industry, but you might get it back in a handful of specific investments.”
Return Expectations and University Allocations
33:00 to 34:20
Examining how institutions like universities adjust return expectations and investment strategies.
“You'll have old-fashioned restructurings where keys get turned over.”
Understanding International Investment Opportunities
34:20 to 36:40
Assessing the potential for alpha generation in international markets relative to the U.S.
“I'm smiling because, you know, Japan this morning, Bank of Japan put up rates to 1%.”
Investing in Southern Europe and Emerging Markets
36:40 to 39:00
Focusing on the investment opportunities in Southern Europe and regions like India.
“And, you know, for 25 years, no one wanted to talk about power plants.”
Access and Competition in Opportunistic Credit
39:00 to 42:00
Discussing the nuances of accessing opportunistic credit and the competitive landscape.
“And, you know, one of the things I think is really phenomenal as an allocator is I get to sit on top of all this.”
Investment Strategies in India
42:00 to 45:39
Learn about the challenges and opportunities in investing in India, particularly in the credit and equity markets.
“But to me, and if Howard didn't say this in your podcast with me, he probably should have.”
Risks and Opportunities in Private Markets
45:40 to 47:37
Explore the risks in private markets that investors might underestimate and where to allocate capital wisely.
“What's the one or two risks in private markets that people are still underestimating?”
Advice for Young Investors
47:38 to 51:06
Get insights on pursuing a career in finance and the importance of passion in investment management.
“And so, you know, you try to learn from the last crisis, but it turns out the next crisis is always going to look different.”
Learning from Market Dynamics
51:07 to 53:30
Understand how to adapt investment strategies during challenging market conditions and the importance of historical context.
“Well, I'm going to say Money Maze is number one on the list.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00I think we're in a golden age of absolute return strategies. We discovered fundamentally there's just much higher dispersion and much higher idiosyncratic risk in higher interest rate markets than lower interest rate markets. Just because the cost of capital today is higher doesn't mean the cost of capital is high. Having a 10-year rate in the mid-fours isn't extraordinary. It's just extraordinary based upon where things were. When you read in the papers about private credit, what you're really reading about is the direct corporate lending market. If everyone's in the same asset class and your asset class ultimately outgrows the size of borrowers that are available to lend to, that's where you can start to have real issues.
0:33You've had 10-year cycles in venture capital. You didn't make any money in venture capital in the 1980s, and you made very little to no money in the 2000s. You missed the great funds at the end of the decade that would have had Uber or Airbnb and stuff along those lines. And so I think, again, if you really like your vocation and you like what you're doing, you're going to stick with it even when the times are a little tougher. In the world of global credit and invent-driven investing, there are few firms that have been both quietly competitive while simultaneously successful and longstanding.
1:04Davidson Kempner may not be a household name, but they've navigated cycles by identifying opportunities which typically emerge from dislocations and complexity when the power between borrowers and lenders shifts. It's been said of Tony that he prefers discipline over drama. And given emerging cross-currents, it seemed a good time to hear the perspective of where the next phase of the global credit cycle may be headed and where capital may be rewarded or punished. Tony Oslov, CIO of Davidson Kempner, welcome to the Money Mates podcast. Thank you, Simon. It's very nice to be here. Well, you're over from New York.
1:39You're drinking English tea. And we're going to have a conversation that I hope will range across quite a number of the things I just picked up on. But I had seen, and I know you're not a big user of social media, but I had managed to extract from LinkedIn that you were at a Princeton reunion. And I wonder when you got to Princeton, was that the highlight of your life at that stage? Yeah, it was a real changing point in my life. So I grew up 25 minutes down the road from Princeton, but I might as well have grown up a million miles away. I went to a very large suburban public high school, one of the largest high schools in the state of New Jersey where I grew up.
2:14I didn't really seriously consider going to Princeton until the end of my junior year of high school. It seemed too close to home. And Princeton just exposed me to a very different world that I had seen growing up in this large suburban existence before I was there, even though it was only 25 minutes down the road. So I was very proud to be accepted in that era. Although if you go back historically, the year I was born, 1974, was a nadir in birth years. So it might have been the single easiest year to get into Princeton in the last 50 years. But we didn't think about it that way. We thought it was very hard.
2:51And it was an amazing experience for me. And, you know, I was fortunate enough. I had, you know, bermalcul for, you know, corporate finance and, you know, professors I could only have dreamed of having access to there. And I learned a lot outside the classroom as well for my classmates, too. And so did that almost sort of push you towards finance and you didn't consider other options? No, it's sort of the opposite. So when I was in high school, I was fortunate enough to have a really good public policy program through my high school. We did high school civics type stuff. And so I wasn't really sure if I wanted to do a career in finance or a career more public policy related.
3:30I majored in the public policy program at Princeton at that time. It was called the Woodrow Wilson School. today. It's called the School of Public International Affairs. But it really wasn't until after Princeton, I decided to pursue finance full time. I was really back and forth between going to work in Washington, D.C. and doing regulatory law versus working in finance. Now, the 1990s were really the heyday of the mutual fund world. And the very start of online trading happened in that era. So it was a very exciting time for that. I decided ultimately that public policy might be a better hobby for me or area of intellectual interest.
4:07But it wasn't really until I was at Columbia for grad school a few years later that I decided that. Got it. So finance beckons and you've been, I would say, a loyal servant of Davidson Kempner because that's where you spent most of your life. Yeah, I started as a summer intern in 1998. The firm had, I believe, fewer than 15 people at the time. We managed about a billion dollars. That was actually a lot of money to manage in a hedge fund structure in 1998. And I really liked the people I was working with and I liked the opportunity I thought we had as an institution. So give us the recap today.
4:38Davidson Kempner, sites, people, locations. So Davidson Kempner manages just under$40 billion in capital. Our headquarters is in New York City, but we do have multiple offices in three continents. And so we've got a larger office in New York and a smaller office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Our second largest office globally is here in the UK, relatively close to where we're filming this today. And then we've got in Asia, our headquarters would be in Hong Kong, but we've also got offices in Mumbai and Shenzhen. Now, as I went through your materials, there was this sentence, which I'm going to ask you to unpick, which is, we invest opportunistically across the capital structure in both public and private.
5:19Now, we know our industry generally promises a lot, frequently fails to act counter-cyclically. Where does Davidson Kempner believe that that counter-cyclicality in a lot of what you do really is sort of almost woven into the DNA? Well, you know, first of all, I think it's in the nature of how we invest. So if I were to take a step back, even from that sentence, I would say, what do we think we're good at? What does our firm specialize in? It's really a combination of opportunistic credit and event-driven investing. And those strategies really cut across both public and private markets, particularly in the opportunistic credit side of things.
5:58And in terms of the statement that you said, like we do that across both public and private markets. We're crossover credit investors. And this is a term that I think we've taken from the technology world where you've got some larger firms that invest in both public and private strategies in technology. I think there's some of the same benefits to that in credit that there is in technology as well. We have many billion dollars worth of investments in private companies. Some are debt, some are equity. You get tremendous amount of exposure, access, information, et cetera, that you learn in the private companies that are just helpful in your knowledge of understanding public companies.
6:35And then I think there's a certain DNA that you have as a public market investor when you have to come in and literally mark your portfolio to market every day that sometimes gets lost in the private markets where maybe people still pretend in their heads that their investments were worth what they thought they were worth, a year ago or two years ago. And so that mark-to-market discipline of public markets is really helpful when you're thinking about private market investing. I find you're often a year or two ahead in the movie in where things are going. And then on the event-driven side, which again is a significant part of our business, and we do have some relative value businesses too, but I would say event-driven is the second biggest component of it.
7:12You are literally trying to isolate for a specific event. And so you may have two companies that are in favor that are merging together, or you may have two companies that are very out of favor that are merging together. And the downside that you might have if a merger breaks apart, let's say, might be different in one versus another. But the fundamental analysis as to whether the deal is going to close is substantially similar in those two strategies. And I think the performance that you have of event-driven strategies is quite counter-cyclical because maybe softer events are more likely to fall apart in hard markets than harder events are.
7:48But, you know, harder events, you know, contracts are contracts, right? And so, you know, market conditions change and management teams still have to close on deals they've signed up to. IFM Investors is a global asset manager, founded and owned by pension funds with capabilities in infrastructure equity and debt, private equity, private credit, and listed equities. They believe healthy returns depend on healthy economic, environmental and social systems. And these are evolving on a scale never experienced before. To find opportunity, build value and meet the needs of future generations, you need scale, skill and expertise.
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9:12When you invest, your capital is at risk. We talked earlier on before we started recording about one investment committee I sit on where a very large firm had said two years ago, no hedge fund allocation. And we know that, you know, there's been less enthusiasm towards that sector. What are you seeing in terms of interest from capital allocators? I think we're in a golden age of absolute return strategies. And I think we're going to be throughout this decade. I think if you go back and look back, and it's always a dangerous thing to say. There's a famous baseball saying from a baseball player named Yogi Berra, which is it's hard to make predictions, especially about the future.
9:49But I'll make one here. And my prediction is when you look back at the end of the 2020s, people are going to be very excited about their performance of their absolute return portfolios over that decade. You know, our reasoning for that, and we wrote about this in a white paper last year, which is available on our LinkedIn page and our website, is that there's much higher dispersion in higher rate environments than there is in lower rate environments. And so we went back and we looked over the last 30 years or so ago. And part of this, and this dates back to a time period that we both lived through, which was the original heyday of absolute return strategies in the 1990s and the 2000s.
10:28And so as we got into the early 2020s, my thought was things feel a lot more similar to me. They felt like in the first 10 or 15 years of my career, versus when they were today, is there a market-based reason for that? Or did too many people maybe suggest what the CIO you spoke with suggested, that there wasn't stuff to do an absolute return and it got interesting? And what we discovered fundamentally is there's much higher dispersion and much higher idiosyncratic risk in higher interest rate markets than lower interest rate markets. I think there are really good reasons for that. Higher interest rates do separate winners from losers.
11:03Now, you've obviously had a dramatic increase in the cost of capital in the last five years compared to what you had in the five or 15 years before that. What I remind people is just because the cost of capital today is higher doesn't mean the cost of capital is high. And so if you go back over longer periods of time, the average 10-year rate, just to use it as a proxy, in the U.S. has been between 4 % and 5 % for the last 100 years. The average 10-year rate over the last 60, 65 years, So if you start in the early 1960s, it's more like 6 % in terms of where things are. And so having a 10-year rate in the mid-4s isn't extraordinary.
11:41It's just extraordinary based upon where things were. But I think there was a real degrading of return possibilities in absolute return in the second half of the 2010s in particular that was really just living through the back half of that zero interest rate environment. Never say never, but it just feels highly unlikely to me that we're coming back to a zero interest rate environment anytime soon, or that perhaps we'll ever see a zero interest rate environment of the duration of what we saw previously in our lifetimes. And so I think that plays really well for absolute return strategies that fundamentally are either picking winners from losers or they're trying to figure out, so to speak, what events are going to happen and what aren't going to happen.
12:22And fundamentally, most hedge fund strategies fall into one of those two categories. I think the bonus of it, so maybe the icing on the cake, so to speak, is the fact that there's just a lot less competition in this asset class, too, on top of it than there was previously. And that competition has changed dramatically. So we think of ourselves as a multi-strategy firm. So we do a number of different things within our hedge fund strategies, convertible arbitrage, long-short equity, opportunistic credit, risk arbitrage, et cetera. That's a very different setup than a multi-manager shop, which tends to use a lot of leverage to magnify relatively small rates of return.
13:02There just aren't as many multi-strategy firms around as there were 10 years ago or 20 years ago. It was really hard to continue to thrive during that zero interest rate environment. So when I think about having maybe less direct competition, there's plenty of indirect competition, but less direct competition than we had 10 or 20 years ago. And you couple that with a really good environment. That feels like a good place to be. But I think the things I'm applying specifically to multi-strategy firms or opportunistic credit, you could apply across the industry. And again, we want some allocators, of course, to be excited about our asset class.
13:38But the more that some are skeptical about it and capital doesn't continue to chase returns. and willow down return premiums, that's good for anyone who's investing in the asset class. Got it. Now, when Howard Marks was a guest on the show, he made the comment, which is not surprising, is don't expect to get different returns if you're doing what everybody else is doing. Got to think about the cycle. Now, as I wrote down in my notes, where are we in the economic cycle? I then sort of stopped and I thought, is that even a helpful question to ask these days, given the level of abnormal interventions we've seen?
14:10Well, I think, yeah. also have to be careful because there certainly are abnormal government interventions, but there's also just technological or world change that can impact things. So if I think about like my personal thinking on the last five years, you know, we were reasonably convinced that there would be interesting opportunities and opportunistic credit in the U.S. in 2023 and 24. I think the opportunities were good and we did well in them, but I think a lot of what we thought was going to happened in that period of time actually got pushed out by a few years. And so why did it get pushed out by a few years?
14:42First of all, you know, when investors want to paper over problems in their portfolio, you know, never underestimate their ability to do so for a period of time. But I think there's actually more to it. I think it's really AI. And so you say, well, what's the link between, you know, bad capital structures not being resolved in AI? It's that the U.S. economy has been very strong the last three or four years, you know, maybe much more so than people who were expecting doom and gloom in 2022. And if you think about it, it's not just amazing policy decisions as to why the U.S. is there. It's the tremendous amount of CapEx spending that's going into AI-related infrastructure and the tide lifting all boats.
15:20And so if I go back to Howard's statement about where we are in economic cycles, that would have been harder to predict because it's not a normal economic cycle. It's almost an add-on to what would have been a normal economic cycle that turned things from being perhaps problematic. And those problems still exist, and those problems are still going to have to be worked out. They haven't been solved for most companies. But there's this other thing going on on the side that's actually much bigger and more important for the overall economy, and that tide has lifted a lot of boats. So am I wrong to say that as an old-time investor, there is a lot of what I would call late cycle behavior going on, particularly in these capex numbers, you know, and cash flow diminution on the other side?
16:04Well, so as a starting point, I am quite worried about this late cycle behavior as well. I mean, the thought I have in my head is, are we in 1999, you know, all over again? Because there are a lot of dynamics like 1999. And, you know, again, there's this saying that, history doesn't repeat, but it rhymes in terms of where things are. The companies look very different today. The types of investments look very different today. A lot of that AI infrastructure cap access ultimately led by some of the most profitable businesses on the planet, which until fairly recently were doing so from free cash flow.
16:37They're really not doing it beyond where free cash flow is. The take up of tokens is real. The demand for tokens is real, particularly in the coding space. What's going on is not going away. It's going to continue to accelerate. But can you get way ahead of the game with that? What's the wrinkle that's going to postpone things? Even some basic things. It's a heck of a lot harder to add computing power than people think, because if your limiting reagent of that is power, and you need to build power plants, It turns out whether it's in the U.S. or it's whether in Europe or overseas, it's not always so easy to build power plants.
17:16It's not always easy to make that work. You know, timelines can be several years from that. You know, local municipalities may have opinions on things in terms of where they want to take things. And so there can be a lot of wrinkles in the ointment. And so if you want to, like, make an analogy directly and you think about, you know, the great bubble that was Internet 1.0, it wasn't that investors were wrong about what was going to happen. Ultimately, what was going to happen happened. It just happened several years later and in different ways. And so the promise of the Internet probably took five or ten years from the late 1990s to materialize.
17:55And you can think about seminal moments with that. I would think the invention of YouTube and really Google buying YouTube was a several moment in that. That was really the first wide-scale video on the internet of success. Airbnb and Uber, which were both birthed around the same time, turning internet prowess into physical world, getting yourself a room or getting yourself a car on demand. Those were all relatively new things. I think we all know that dramatic change is coming from AI. but many people you talk to, how is it actually impacting your workflow or how is it actually impacting what's going on in your office?
18:33And if you run a call center, you can give a really detailed, great answer to that. There are many other businesses where it's more anecdotal, it's a little slower. There's inertia too, right? There's people whose roles might change, not always for the better as a result of AI. And so there's really no impetus to make those changes. It could take longer. So I just say all of that in saying, If you've got a market that people start to think is priced for perfection and then you don't achieve perfection, that's kind of the late cycle behavior. I don't think that what happened in the 2000 and 2002 timeframe ultimately negatively impacted the impact of the internet on the world.
19:13I'd actually say it positively impacted it. It kind of cleaned up a lot of the companies, the pets.com of the world. It didn't really make sense in that era. But, you know, if you had held Amazon stock at the peak and then held it at the trough, you would have lost, you know, 95 plus percent of your money. Ultimately, you have made a spectacularly good investment, even if you bought it at the peak for, you know, the next 25 or 26 years. Very few investors have the fortitude to actually do that and ride that out. And so who made the money off of it might have been very different than the impact, the positive impacts of society of the investment.
19:46Well, I do remember that era. I remember buying the Amazon converts after the bust. I think they went up 50 % and I felt very smart selling them, only to find that it was one of the worst decisions as the stock roared. But this is a very interesting point, which is that that era of 99, 2000, where there are echoes today, most of the damage was done in the destruction of equity because there were so many absurd prices being paid. Cisco 100 times was perhaps not as daft as some of the other numbers we saw. But the epicenter of this has been what is referred to as private credit. I'd like us to disentangle or you to disentangle that term because it's a headline that covers all.
20:27How do you think about what's sitting underneath that? So let me start by disentangling the term private credit. And then if you'd indulge me, I might actually talk a little bit about private equity alongside private credit. credit. And so people use the term private credit generically to describe what is really direct corporate lending. The reality is, if you were to look at the Cambridge Associates definition of private credit, which is really the one that's kind of pervaded, there's three parts of private credit. There is direct corporate lending. That's by far the largest part today. There's also asset-backed lending or specialty lending.
21:01And then there's opportunistic credit, which is our largest credit strategy. We do have some strategies in asset-backed lending as well. So the growth rate of direct corporate lending has been in the low to mid 20 % range for the last 10 or 15 years. And so if you were to look pre-GFC, direct corporate lending was a relatively niche asset class. If you were to look today in 2026, it is the same size roughly as the bank syndicated lending market. So i.e. public debt and private debt are roughly the same size. And so I think most investors, like when you read in the papers about private credit, what you're really reading about is the direct corporate lending market.
21:44The reason I think it's important to separate them is because just so much more money has flowed into direct corporate lending. There's nothing inherently wrong with the asset class. The problem, you know, maybe it's the opposite of the Howard Marks comment about going where investors aren't. If everyone's in the same asset class and your asset class ultimately outgrows the size of borrowers that are available to lend to, that's where you can start to have real issues. The reason I want to tie this back into private equity, which is a fundamental difference between the early 2000s and today, is really size of private markets and what's actually happened in the private markets.
22:23And so the primary customer base for direct corporate lenders are private equity firms. In fact, many direct corporate lenders pride themselves on being sponsor-backed lenders, and they only want to lend to sponsors. So who are sponsors? Almost exclusively private equity firms in terms of who you're lending your money to. So that's like one starting point. And there have been some very big fundamental changes in private markets over the last 26 years. And so the early 2000s were really the point where private market investments became more institutionalized, right? You had an investment period of time in the 1980s and the 1990s where the Yales and the Princedons and maybe a relatively small number of people were dominating that market.
23:06Private assets performed a lot better than public markets in the early 2000s, and that led a lot of investors into private markets. As we spoke about earlier, absolute return investors had a harder time post the GFC, but private fund investors, i.e. private equity investors and private credit investors, did not as hard a time post the GFC. And so assets continue to pour into those asset classes. Again, you can outgrow your opportunity set. You know, what's happened more recently is 40 % of private equity dollars have gone into software businesses the last several years. And, you know, low to mid 30 % of direct corporate lending dollars have gone into software businesses because if your clients are private equity firms, you have to follow your clients.
23:50And, you know, one of the inverse positives, I guess negatives of what's going on in the AI is that, you know, software is in peril right now. There really is no getting around that as an asset class. And so the benefit the public markets have today, which is sort of the opposite of what happened in the early 2000s, the public markets have substantial exposure to AI in portfolios. And so even while your software investments haven't done very well, you've more than made up for it in other areas, which is why the S &P has been around an all-time high. If you're investing in private equity strategies or direct corporate lending strategies, you don't really have exposure to AI in that way.
24:29It actually does exist in private markets, but it exists in growth equity, venture capital, actually absolute return strategies too. To some degree, it does not exist in private equity strategies. And so the whole paradigm has just been very changed to, you know, what we would have had previously. And again, it goes back to Howard's line about if you're doing the same thing as everyone else, it could be problematic at some point. I'm thrilled to share that the Money Maze podcast is sponsored by the World Gold Council. They champion the role gold plays as a strategic asset through expert research, commentary, and insights.
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25:04And it's not just your portfolio that may benefit from gold. learn how gold mining is supporting female economic empowerment and small businesses via their new documentary series called Gold, The Journey Continues. Tap the link in the show notes to start watching. I'm excited to announce that the Money Maze podcast is sponsored by the London Stock Exchange Group, known as LSEG. At the heart of the global economy, LSEG provides data, analytics, and infrastructure that connects investors, businesses, and economies. LSEG is where ideas meet capital, enabling sustainable growth and opportunity. Tap the link in the show notes to learn more.
25:43So one of the hallmarks of late cycle behavior is a deterioration in lending standards and documentation, etc. Have you been observing that? Yeah, I mean, completely. I mean, so my truisms of investing are that capital chases returns and markets become efficient over time. And if I go back to the growth rate of direct corporate lending over a long period of time, if you go back 10 years ago, what were those firms offering? They were offering speed and one-stop shopping in terms of competing. And in exchange for that, they might ask for a little bit more coupon and better terms and conditions. And I think since sponsors probably assumed their deals were never going to default anyway, they were willing to give that up.
26:24In the last five or six years, private equity sponsors have not had to give that up. And the reason, so i.e., the covenants that exist in larger cap direct corporate loans are substantially similar to what you would have in public markets. So there are some defenses that you have in private markets that you don't have in public markets, i.e., the lenders can all get together and avoid some of the creditor-on-creditor violence that you've seen, quote-unquote, in public markets. But fundamentally, that can break, too. You know, if you've got a syndicate with 28 private lenders in it, is it really that private anymore, right?
26:56Is there much more of a risk that a few folks are going to break ranks? The answer to that is yes. And I think you'll see more of that over time in that asset class. But the fundamental reason why competence fell away was competition. And as a lender, you're not giving something up on price. You're giving up a term and condition that in a smaller subset of your deals is going to matter. But in a larger subset of deals, when you get paid back, it's not going to matter. So it was an easy give, I think, relative to giving on price. I think ultimately, direct corporate lenders had to give on price, too, to get transactions.
27:27But that's all just the sheer amount of capital pouring into an asset class and capital chasing returns and the natural efficiencies that you would expect happening in a functioning market happen. It's much more of a U.S. story, by the way, than a European story. I mean, the U.S. markets are much more dominated in terms of leverage finance by direct corporate lending than it is in Europe. But in the U.S., it's very prevalent. And you would expect these things to happen over time. The average pricing of a venture capital deal today, first round, far higher than it was 10 years ago. Why is that?
27:59There's just a lot more money chasing the asset classes. People have done well. And so, you know, none of these markets are immune to the basic laws of supply and demand. So we're going to come to non-US in a minute. But before we leave this particular segment, one could say it's a euphemism, but the term applied to the current situation in private equity and private debt are blockages. How does this get worked through? So I hope I'm not providing bad news to folks who are listening to this podcast, but I think it could take a lot longer than people think to work this through because you have to worry about what incentives are, right?
28:41First of all, private equity funds generally have 8 % preferred returns on them, such that the firms are not going to earn carry unless they hit that. Then the second thing is that the model of private equity means that you always need to raise another fund to be in business. The benefit of absolute return strategies is if you do your job, you're growing the capital naturally. So even if your investors need to withdraw a little bit to pay their own bills or whatever it is, like you actually grow AUM just by doing your job. You know, when you do your job in private equity, you return AUM and you have to go raise another fund.
29:18I don't know if the right stat is that there are as many private equity funds as there are McDonald's franchises or not. I've had a harder time validating that. But there are 100 % as many private equity funds as there are Burger King or Wendy's franchises in the United States, which is more like$6 ,000 versus$18 ,000. And if you look at the proliferation of that asset class in the 2010s, and you look at both where returns sit today and you look at where investors are allocating on a going-forward basis, you're going to have some real contraction in both number of firms and size of firms. And I think it's going to be very barbelled.
29:53I mean, I sort of joke it's like the club world. The clubs that people want to be in, everyone wants to be in. And the clubs that people don't want to be in, no one wants to be in. Right? And you have this bifurcation. And the clubs that are popular remain very popular. And the clubs that aren't popular go away, right, or consolidate. And I think you're going to see that. I think that just takes a several-year period. And then you couple that with the fact that you've got a large number of loans that don't make sense today based upon debt-to-LTV or interest coverage tests or any number of different things you're going to look at.
30:25and you've got very porous documents. So 90 % of the documents in public markets are Covenant light. And this actually is something in public markets that started to come more to Europe. And in private markets, I think for recent deals, it's probably not gonna be that far off from that number. And sponsors have time and sponsors have flexibility and sponsors incentives are not always gonna be straightforward or known. And that can just lead to things taking a really long time. Look, they're gonna be one-offs, right? There are businesses that sit in sponsor world that are very large beneficiaries of some of the AI CapEx that we spoke about earlier.
31:02It's not like every business is going to be bad. In the software world, even let's say the most challenged part of the asset class, there are going to be businesses that are AI winners that are able to use AI to improve their offerings, that have a moat around them that investors maybe aren't respecting today. And maybe you'll get some of that multiple back that you've lost. I don't think you're going to get it back across the industry, but you might get it back in a handful of specific investments. And all these things take time. And there's time that's in the process, and there's time that's in inertia.
31:33And then there's time just proving out your model, right? So let's just say you've got a business where there is some stealthy growth to it. When are investors going to give you credit for that? Two years later? Four years later? And so, I mean, that was the timeframe in the early 2000s, I think it was, for people really to give you credit for sustainability of cash flows. And I just think it's going to take several years for this to work itself out. I think the excesses of the 2000, let's call it 18 to 21 era, were just so large that there's not a simple solve for this. So you've been on record being quite excited about the opportunities that are being presented.
32:11How do you expect to take advantage of them? I think there's a lot of different ways that you can do this. And I think it does toggle across the public markets and private markets. So I don't think it's either or. I think it's both. In private markets, I think there's going to be many sellers of capital structures or pieces of capital structures where, you know, if you view direct corporate lenders essentially as the new banks, right, they will have workout groups. Some of them have workout groups already. You're not going to sell everything. You are going to choose to work some stuff out, right?
32:43But you may prioritize larger loans over smaller loans. You may prioritize loans where you can have more of a direct impact and others can have a direct impact. And, of course, you'll think about the price that you're being offered for them. You've got sponsors who are fighting for their lives and deals where there is equity value. There just is too much debt on the transaction, and they're going to look for capital partners in that area. You'll have old-fashioned restructurings where keys get turned over. And then I think there's a lot of natural growth capital, actually, that maybe isn't attracting private capital because too much of the private capital is gummed up in this other stuff.
33:19And so it's just less readily available. So things that would have been readily financed four or five years ago were having harder times finding capital partners and or the price of being that capital partner is much higher rate than where things were. So I think all of the above in private markets is like in play in terms of where you'd invest. And then I think you're going to have many natural ups and downs in public markets to boot over that period of time. I mean, we haven't really talked that much about outside the U.S. too. The markets outside the U.S. look very different than the markets look in the U.S.
33:54for the most part. You know, maybe outside of Korea or Taiwan or something like that. They've not had that AI bounce the way that you've had in the U.S. in public markets. And so I think there's just a lot of ways to play that theme. And this does actually all go back to rates. The cost of capital is not high, but it's higher than it was previously. And that just creates tremendous opportunity in a world where a tremendous amount of the capital structures were still set in a period of time with lower rates. I'm smiling because, you know, Japan this morning, Bank of Japan put up rates to 1%. It's been 30 years since they were short rates were at 1%.
34:31But I'm really interested in the subject of returns and return expectations of, you know, institutions such as Yale that has pulled back on its private asset allocations. It's not alone in that. Do you think that generally, in the excitement of the lower rate environment and the capital allocations that followed, that return expectations of those long-term investing entities, endowments particularly, has been unrealistically high? Well, look, I think that universities or top allocators are not immune to the capital chases, returns, and markets become efficient over time phenomenon of markets. Actually, our president at Princeton University, Chris Iscuper, wrote about this in his annual letter earlier this year.
35:21My joke was, you know, it's fairly rare that a university president's annual letter is going to be more covered by the Wall Street Journal than it is by the Chronicle of Higher Education. But that was the case. And one of the things he spoke about was the fact that returns have come down over very long periods of time. And I go back to simplistic things like some of the strategies that these Ivy League schools, you know, really created. I mean, David Swenson goes back to the 1980s in terms of these strategies. Creative and institutionalized are now monsters in terms of the size of the asset classes.
35:55And it's not that you can't generate great returns in these strategies. You're just not guaranteed to generate great returns in these strategies. I don't think that because a strategy is private that it's immune to the supply-demand dynamics of any other strategy. If too much money is chasing a strategy relative to its opportunity set, the likelihood is that returns are going to suffer over a period of time. And so I do think allocators need to be realistic about what things can achieve on a going-forward basis versus where they are today. It's not to say that people can't occasionally achieve really outsized returns.
36:29Obviously, you've seen them in the growth space in a handful of these very large AI-linked companies. You have seen them in private markets, too, in some of the CapEx providers, right? You know, I actually cut my teeth early at DK working on power plants. And, you know, for 25 years, no one wanted to talk about power plants. For 20 years, no one wanted to talk about power plants from the mid-2000s to today. Now, all of a sudden, everyone wants to talk about power plants, right? So a skill set that wasn't that valuable became very valuable again all of a sudden. So there is some cyclicality to these things.
36:58But fundamentally, you're not immune to supply-demand things. And so I think investors just need to understand if you're in competitive strategies, you can't look in the rearview mirror to what returns were 10 or 15 years ago. I do think this dynamic will turn right side up in private equity again. It just might take another five or 10 years. It just may not be overnight. Let's just turn from the U.S. scene to the global investing landscape. And I'm thinking here about, it was Barton Biggs formerly, you know, Morgan Stanley, you used to talk about the global efficient frontier. and international investing was one way to capture and optimize those returns.
37:34Now, of course, that's been dumbed down by larger returns in the U.S., but how do you think about that international investing equation? Yeah, so I actually think Barton is still correct where there's real alpha to earn outside the United States. And some of it is market structure, some of it is regulatory structure, some of it is fewer people playing. The part that I think has been harder more recently is what you alluded to, which is, you know, beta has done so well in the United States that even if you generated a lot of alpha outside the United States, your overall return may still look better in the United States.
38:10From my perspective, that will equalize over time. You know, if you look at valuations in Europe, for example, compared to the U.S., and you exclude the tech-related investments that you have in the U.S. that maybe you can't access through European markets in the same way, Europe is still really cheap on a 30 - to 35-year basis compared to the U.S. And so we're very happy to take our chances on earning alpha outside the United States and having that as a tool in the toolkit. And it has to compete against the U.S. in terms of rates of return. And so, you know, for our investing strategies, they do, you know, generally wind up being majority in the United States.
38:51But I would say relative to the size of the markets that we're investing in, the international markets more than punch above their weight for us with where they're investing because of this alpha component. And, you know, one of the things I think is really phenomenal as an allocator is I get to sit on top of all this. And, you know, if we think really interesting things are going on, you know, we've been very public that we think there have been great lending opportunities in India. For example, you can go a little bit deeper in that and put more capital to work in that. If there are other markets that aren't giving you that opportunity, you can do less.
39:21Now, there's usually not nothing to do in a market. Like there's usually always something to do in a market. But in terms of allocations, you can swing more. you can swing last, just like if you're running a portfolio with equity and credit, you may sometimes have more equity or you sometimes may have more credit. It's yet another tool in the toolkit in a competitive world. And the other thing I would add is that the number of markets that we can invest in and maybe the size of those markets has also grown a lot since the days of Barton Biggs. And so India would be another great example of that.
39:59But the number of European markets that we're active in, we add more countries onto the list. It feels like every couple of years, maybe changes going on in other parts of the world as well. Middle East has been an area that's actually been fairly interesting for actually investing dollars into, which is not something you would have said 10 years ago or 15 years ago in terms of that part of the world. That creates the opportunity set as well as markets become more, not more efficient, but more institutionalized in terms of where things are. So we're wholehearted subscribers to that. If we have this conversation 10 years from now, I think you're going to find more openness to international markets relative to what it's been with this, quote unquote, U.S.
40:38exceptionalism you've had more recently. Yes, I read your white paper, Europe offers compelling investment opportunities. And of course, one of the things we all struggle with is this sort of term eurosolosis, which includes the UK, the lack of growth, the lack of dynamism and dysfunctional capital markets where bank lending has dominated. When you write about and you implement, deploy capital in Europe, how do you think about the priorities versus the opportunities? Well, look, I mean, as a starting point, I think you've had to throw some assumptions out the window in Europe in the last 10 years.
41:12I think investors 10 or 15 years ago would have been more focused on Northern Europe and less focused on Southern Europe. We've become more on a relative basis focused on Southern Europe and less on Northern Europe because the growth is much more in Southern Europe, but the capital is less going to Southern Europe. Sometimes I find these institutional biases die hard. If someone had a bad experience in a deal in Portugal 20 years ago, they may tell you why they don't want to invest in XYZ country. in a country that's true around the world. It's true in certain bankruptcy jurisdictions in the U.S.
41:47as well. And you can say, well, the rules have changed and you can look at the last five or 10 years of history and they've been very good. And that's opportunity, by the way. Not everyone wants to attack an asset class as a result of that. And Europe has been a lower growth environment than the U.S. But to me, and if Howard didn't say this in your podcast with me, he probably should have. Price matters a lot in these things. And so sometimes you can buy cheap and sell cheap and still do really well. And if you buy a good asset, maybe you buy cheap and sell fair priced. You don't need to get a premium price to do well.
42:26Opportunistic credit is not venture capital in terms of the rates of return that we're looking for or multiples of capital that we're looking for in the asset class. And so in the private markets, do you have access to the opportunity? Not everyone's going to have that. If you have access to it, do you really understand what's going on? Do you really understand the dynamics? It's a level fewer of people who are maybe going to have access to that as well. It just narrows the playing field in terms of who can compete. You know, if you're the capital provider, I think that's a really good thing. Got it.
42:53You've mentioned India twice. I saw it in your materials when I went through it. India has been a complicated place for people to invest. I'm talking about international investors. Typically, the equity path has been the one that's been taken. I'm intrigued. just tell us a little bit how you approach the lending space. Well, you know, I'd separate it into two things. On the lending side, there were concrete changes in the rules in India that were made about 10 years ago through their NCLT regime. To the bankruptcy process, they are much more Western style in terms of lenders being able to foreclose on debt, those rules being respected by the courts in a reasonably quick period of time.
43:34So we've had the benefit, if you want to call it that, of being involved in multiple processes, and the processes go on the way you would want it to go. One of my rules of bankruptcy-related investing is sometimes the courts are better than you would think on their face, and sometimes the courts are actually worse than you would think on their face. And so, again, having 40-plus years of expertise in this and looking at hundreds and hundreds of bankruptcy cases across the world, you get a pretty good feel for how things are going to work and when they're going to work. And those have improved in India over a period of time.
44:09So on the credit side, there still is a subset of investors, both international and local, by the way, who were burned under the prior regime, who I think think of things the way they were 10 or 15 years ago versus where they are today. On the money going into equity versus going into debt, I think the reasons of that were much more, the returns on equity in India were potentially quite strong for a longer period of time. You know, international investors, let's say seeking risk, wanted to earn higher returns than those risk dollars. Again, that changes in the credit side, if you look over 25 or 30 years or more recent, they're not older in terms of where they were.
44:51And so as a result of that, people prioritized equity and forgot about credit. There's been much more interest. It's It's still relatively small, but much more interest on the credit side in the last five or six years as these changes have happened. And so, you know, there's, you know, a relatively small community of folks who have been investing there. There's also very high barriers to entry in India in terms of some of the regulatory and tax hoops you need to go through to be an investor there. And that's led to a, you know, good opportunity spent for a small number of folks. I'll go back to my capital chases returns and markets become efficient.
45:24And that market has become more efficient and will continue to become more efficient. But there are still structural reasons why marginal dollars that go into India are much more likely to go into equity than go into credit. Got it. I've got two rapid fire questions as we move to close, which is, what's number one? What's the one or two risks in private markets that people are still underestimating? Well, you know, we mentioned it earlier. I do think people are underestimating the duration risk today. And so the risk is that people just get stuck in low returning funds for a longer period of time, which both chews up capital negatively and eliminates their flexibility.
46:05And for many institutions that have to spend a certain portion of their assets every year on their mission or whatever it is, forces them in a position where they either can't do certain things, so they don't have that liquidity, or they're forced to sell because they need that liquidity. And I think that's a risk that even though people are talking about it is actually far worse than what people think. Clear. And the flip side, if you were a global allocator, you know, with an absolute return mandate, where's the one or two places you would absolutely want to be looking and deploying capital?
46:34Well, you know, I do think doing opportunistic credit in an absolute return strategy has become a little bit old fashioned. There are valid reasons for that, but I think it's a pretty exciting place to be. There are not that many folks who are doing public market investing anymore. To be fair, public market investing, particularly in the United States from the mid 2010s to the COVID crisis was tough. And I think allocators got used to the fact that cycles were going to be steep but short. If you look at the 2015-16 public market cycle or the 2020-21 public market cycle, those were year or two long cycles.
47:13So the viewpoint is, well, hey, aren't all cycles going forward going to be that way? I don't think that's the case. If you go back to earlier in my career, cycles lasted five, six, seven years. They didn't last one or two years. I think it's the dynamic that we're in today. I think we're relatively early into a quite prolonged cycle. It's just going to look completely different because, you know, because of the low covenants and the debt, you just aren't going to have as many bankruptcies. And so, you know, you try to learn from the last crisis, but it turns out the next crisis is always going to look different.
47:46Got it. Three closing questions. Advice for youth. If they're thinking about going into finance versus other things, what would you say to young people? Well, this is probably general advice. It's not necessarily specific to finance. Um, make sure you're going into it because you love it as opposed to going into it because, um, you think you can earn a healthy living or have a good career doing it. What I have found is the people who are the most successful, um, ultimately get to a point where they're not doing their jobs for, um, uh, just compensation and lifestyle. They're doing it for the love of the sport.
48:22And so, you know, I remember early in my career going to ideas dinners, reading Barron's or any number of small publications over the weekend, anything I can get my hands on that was not only finance related, but investing related, wanting to learn about a very wide range of investing, not just what I did. And it was because fundamentally, I really loved doing it for a living. I was very fortunate. Maybe I want this path and not the regulatory law path for that because I don't know if I would have spent my weekends studying regulatory law journals, right, in terms of things along those lines. And so, you know, I'm probably a bigger believer in sampling when people are younger versus having to know exactly what you want to do when you're 16 or 17 years old.
49:07But whatever you do decide, just make sure your heart is really in it. And investment management can be a tough business when your strategy is not in favor or it's not working. What have you learned when the wind is really blowing in your face? Well, you need to understand why. I'm not a believer. Like, there's always something to do somewhere. Like, there's a continuum of investments, and there are going to be investments even when the wind is blowing in your face that are obviously terrible by definition with how you described it, but are also okay or better. And so, you know, you have to start out with as an investment manager, like, what are you offering to your clients?
49:46What are you telling your clients are going to do? Like some of your clients may know that the wind is actually in your in your face. They just want you to do better than the average bear, so to speak, in that period of time. And there's a reason they probably have you in their portfolio and it may be to diversify themselves out of something else that you're doing. So I am a believer in, you know, to some degree sticking with your knitting with this stuff. But if all you say is, well, this is terrible, I don't want to do it. You know, you're not ultimately achieving the goals. And then when these things change, they can change very quickly.
50:14And it can often take a few years for the rest of the world to figure it out. And that's why it's important to always have investors who are in strategies, if that's part of what you're doing, where the wind is in your face, so to speak, because they're going to be the first people to see it. And they're going to have a window where things are exceptionally good in their area because no one is competing with them. And they've got the expertise, and they've got the contacts, and they've got the know-how. And so all asset classes are cyclical. I mean, I'll go back to venture capital. You've had 10-year cycles in venture capital.
50:43You didn't make any money in venture capital in the 1980s, and you made very little to no money in the 2000s, depending upon where you were. But if you stopped doing it for a decade, you missed the great funds at the end of the decade that would have had Uber or Airbnb in them and stuff along those lines. And so I think, again, if you really like your vocation and you like what you're doing, you're going to stick with it even when the times are a little tougher. Finally, investment input. If you could only either watch or read or listen to a piece of investment-related content every day, what's your go-to most important?
51:16Well, I'm going to say Money Maze is number one on the list. No, look, I actually love this podcast, but I've actually gotten into podcasts in general for the level deeper in things, right? So as a basic point, I still get physical newspapers. So we get the FT, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Barron's delivered to our house every day. And, you know, in the wider financial press, you get a good chunk of information that's research or investing specific. I'm very fortunate. I've got a very wide variety of investing-related research that's tossed at me from Davidson Kepner analysts all day.
51:54So I have plenty of time to read about investments. And, you know, through investment committee work, I get to learn about other strategies out there that we don't do. But it is fun to get the level deeper. It is fun to get anecdotes and things, especially when you know the markets and you can hear people who you respect and have some knowledge base about. I mean, it was one of the ways I really learned about investing early in my career. You know, I'd watch investors. So, for example, I was in some very large investments that David Tepper was in in Appaloosa very early in my career. and he might have approached some of them differently than we did.
52:29And I would try to reverse engineer what they were doing and why they were doing it and maybe contrast that to things that we were doing in that era. And there's a lot that you can learn from that. I mean, I'm sure a good, I'm more used to American football, but I'll say European football coach is looking at the plays the opposition is running and trying to figure out not only how to stop them, but how to improve their own plays as a result of that. And I think there's a very healthy dynamic of that. But the amount of information that's available on investing online, and it's not limited to podcasts, obviously, it's just so awesome and massive that you could spend your whole life doing that if you wanted to.
53:07And that, of course, that point about data makes me smile because you spotted Liars Poker by Michael Lewis up there on the shelf, also a Princeton alum. I knew him at the LSE, and he's been a guest twice. And, of course, he wrote Moneyball, which was the beginning of that whole new era where data really mattered in analysis rather than the gut feel of the coach and the talent spotter. I've learned a lot today, Tony, and so I want to thank you, first of all, for things I'm taking away from this and your perspective. Number one is the resolution of this private equity and private debt logjam is going to take longer than consensus believes.
53:44Number two is that in a higher return environment, there is more dispersion of returns. and that leads you, number three, to say that you think we are in, starting in the early stages of the golden age of absolute return. And finally, as it pertains to Europe, but not exclusively, you made a really interesting point, which is you can buy cheap and you can sell cheap and still make money and the world's full of opportunities. So Tony, it's been great having you here today. Thank you. Thank you, man. It's a lot of fun, sir.
From the publisher
In the world of global credit and event-driven investing, there are few firms that have been both quietly competitive, whilst simultaneously successful and long-standing.
Founded over 40 years ago, Davidson Kempner may not be a household name, but they have navigated cycles by identifying the opportunities which emerge from dislocations, and complexity when the power between borrowers and lenders shifts.
In this conversation, we discuss if it’s possible to assess where we are in the economic cycle. Tony then disentangles the term “private credit” and explains where he believes blockages and problems exist.
He talks about the interdependence of private equity and private debt, and why he thinks the market may be underestimating the time needed to work through these issues.
He explains where he sees capital is as scarce and where it has been abundant, and what that means for risk-taking.
Finally, he discusses why Europe may have less growth but has many opportunities, why lending in India appeals, and most interestingly why we may be in “a golden age of absolute return.”
The Money Maze Podcast is kindly sponsored by J.P. Morgan Asset Management*, IFM Investors, World Gold Council and LSEG.
*During the episode we cite J.P. Morgan Asset Management as Europe’s leading active ETF provider by assets under management. This is sourced from J.P. Morgan Asset management and Bloomberg, data as of 30 March 2026.




